Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D24
Translated by Peter Simpson.
| Latin | English |
|---|---|
| Quaestio Unica | Single Question Whether Number properly exists in Divine Reality |
| ƿ1 Circa distinctionem vigesimam quartam quaero utrum in divinis sit proprie numerus. ƿ | 1. About the twenty fourth distinction I ask whether number properly exists in divine reality.[1] |
| 2 Respondeo: Aut ponitur quod numerus habeat unitatem formalem, respectu cuius formalitatis unitates sunt materiales et sicut materia illius ƿformae, - aut ponitur quod numerus est unus tantum aggregatione unitatum, sicut acervus lapidum dicitur unus aggregatione lapidum. | 2. I respond: Either one posits that number has formal unity, with respect to which formality the unities are material and as it were the matter of the form, - or one posits that number is one only by aggregation of units,[2] as a heap of stones is said to be one by aggregation of stones. |
| 3 Quod horum verum sit, alias dicetur, quando tractabitur de numeris. | 3. Which of these is true will be said elsewhere when number is dealt with.[3] |
| 4 Primo modo dico quod numerus non est in divinis, quia quaelibet persona divina est infinita et quaelibet proprietas personalis est eadem infinito. Sed nihil quod est formaliter ex se infinitum, vel idem infinito, est potentiale vel pars alicuius, quia tunc esset aliquid maius infinito (quia totum esset maius infinito, si tantum pars eius esset infinita), et ideo illam positionem tenendo non erit numerus in divinis. | 4. In the first way [n.2] I say that number does not exist in divine reality, because each person is infinite and each personal property is the same as the infinite. But nothing that is formally of itself infinite, or the same as the infinite, is potential or a part of something, because then there would be something greater than the infinite (because the whole would be greater than the infinite, provided only a part were infinite), and therefore if this position is maintained there will not be number in divine reality. |
| 5 Si secunda positio vera est, scilicet quod numerus est tantum unus aggregatione unitatum, cum aggregata sint simpliciter diversa, ita quod non faciunt nec sunt aliquid per se unum (immo sunt minus unum quam illa quae sunt unum per accidens) et quae sunt in divinis, sunt aliquid idem alicui vere uni, quod est essentia, - sequitur quod nulla est aggregatio ibi rei ad rem, et ita nullus est ibi numerus secundum illam secundam positionem. ƿ | 5. If the second position is true, namely that number is only one by aggregation of units [n.2], since aggregated things are simply diverse, such that they do not make nor are they something per se one (rather they are less one than things that are one per accidens), and what is in divine reality is the same as something truly one, namely the essence, - the result is that there is no aggregation there of thing with thing, and so there is no number there according to the second position. |
| 6 Si tamen numerus habeat esse in intellectu tantum, simul concipiente plura una vel plures unitates, cum intellectus aliquis possit concipere tres personas simul vel unam solam (non concipiendo tres personas) et non sit conceptus ita perfectus et completus concipiendo unam personam sicut concipiendo tres personas (unde aliqui distincti articuli fidei respiciunt distinctas personas), posset poni quasi unus totalis conceptus Trinitatis in intellectu. | 6. If however number has being in the intellect only, when the intellect conceives many units or many unities at the same time, then since some intellect can conceive three persons together or one alone (not conceiving the three persons), and since a concept in the case of conceiving one person without conceiving three persons is not as perfect and complete (hence certain distinct articles of the faith have regard to distinct persons), there can be posited in the intellect as it were one total concept of the Trinity. |
| 7 Sed omittendo an numerus sit in intellectu, et loquendo de numero in re, - dico quod numerus simpliciter non est in divinis tenendo alterutram illarum duarum opinionum primarum. Conceditur tamen ibi numerus 'secundum quid' (scilicet cum hac de terminatione personarum), quia ibi fit abstractio illius - in numero quod non dicit imperfectionem (scilicet distinctionis) ab eo quod notat imperfectionem (aut in utroque numeratorum, aut saltem in altero), scilicet a potentialitate si numerus est unus secundum formam, vel a diversitate si numerus est unus per aggregationem unitatum plurium. Bene tamen conceditur ibi distinctio sine diversitate vel potentialitate (vel etiam aggregatione), quae dicunt imperfectionem aliquam in unitate. | 7. But passing over whether number is in the intellect and speaking of number in reality - I say that, when holding either one of the two first concepts [nn.4-5], number simply is not in divine reality. Yet number is conceded to be there 'in a certain respect' (namely with the determination of persons [sc. 'three persons']), because in that case an abstraction is made of that which - in number - does not state imperfection (namely of distinctness) from that which does indicate imperfection (either in each of the numbered things or at any rate in one of them), namely abstraction from potentiality, if the number is one according to form, or from diversity, if the number is one by aggregation of several unities. Yet there is well conceded there is a distinction without diversity or potentiality (or even aggregation), which indicate some imperfection of unity.[4] |
Notes
- ↑ a. [Note by Duns Scotus] [References to Henry, John, Metaphysics, Damascene, Avicenna, contained in the Reportatio]
On the contrary. - Boethius: "That is truly one in which there is no number." Again, one is prior in nature to two. Again, part than whole. Again, either in substance or in relation.
Solution. - 'One' is double (synonym): that which follows form and is the principle of number and adds above 'one' the idea of measure (and therefore it is in the genus of quantity), -that which follows form because of matter; thus there is a double number in Averroes, Metaphysics 5 com.12 (or triple number: formal, mathematical, sensible). The first number exists there [in divine reality], by the 'one' that preserves unity; the second number is not there; or otherwise: for there is not number there simply but along with determination of forms.
Response. - Numbered things are several things divided, hence they are not counted in a whole save potentially; they are of a nature to be contained in the unity of one continuous thing. All are of a nature to be a unit, therefore they are of one species and located in different parts of the matter.
In God there are no things divided from each other, because of unity of essence; by the opposite fact there is formal number in an immaterial species.
Again, whatever is there [in divine reality] is as it were a species, but does not make a many contained under the same species; therefore only number 'in a certain respect' is there (namely with the addition of the persons and the attributes), such that if these are of one species, absence of division prevents numbering them - if there is division of the essence, difference of species prevents numbering them; number there agrees with mathematical number because it arises from unity of essence and from the root, - it differs because here [in divine reality] the unity is not divided but is distinguished as it were in species (in this it agrees with formal number, but it [formal number] is never rooted in one singular form, and the difference there [in divine reality] is through absolute forms, here [in formal number] not).
To the first [argument - see opening paragraph of this note]: it is not one in number, because it does not constitute number. To the second: he is speaking of number along with determination, namely of persons. To the third: multitude is more known to us and is marked by position - but a multitude is a division of units, which is negation of union, therefore they are not 'many' save along with determination; contrariwise in God; although according to the mode of the name it ['one'] signifies negation, the negation is only of a negation ['one' denies 'division' and 'division' denies 'union'], and so it is, as to real being, a true positive.
- ↑ a. [Note by Duns Scotus] A number of distinct things exists not only by aggregation but by distinction of beings.
- ↑ Vatican editors: no such treatment of number by Scotus exists.
- ↑ [Note by Duns Scotus] As to the remark in Metaphysics 106.1057a3-4, about the 'one' that constitutes number etc. ["For number is a multitude, measurable by a one."] add: 'one' in the intellect, by a unity of order, can have the idea of measure according to reason; number is such a 'one', through definite distance of the last unit from the first; therefore number is a measure according to reason (it is thus perhaps that Augustine was speaking about time). - On the contrary: 'a measured thing' is measured in accord with something of itself; if in accord with quantity, then it is in itself a discrete how much.
Response, by maintaining the common way:
The units that are parts of number are of one nature, and they are not merely one concept but the individual units are of one nature. Second: 'ones' are distinct such that one unit does not include in itself the other unit; therefore a unit of nature does not make a number along with a unit of supposit, nor with a unit of formality, because nature is included in the second and includes the third. Thirdly, in each unit and each 'one' there is required potentiality of part to whole. Because of the first fact God is not numbered along with creatures, because his singular unity - which is existentially in God - is not of the same nature with other unity (because then it [God's unity] would be narrowed down by the qualification 'infinite' [sc. infinite unity] and so God would be composite).
Because of the second fact, a white thing and a sweet thing are not two, but whiteness and sweetness are two. The reason is grammatical, that an adjectival term of number determines a substantive; the substantive in the first case is the subject [sc. the thing that is white and that is sweet], and what is indicated about it is that the subject is two distinct units - in the second case [sc. whiteness, sweetness] the substantive is the form as form; for the same reason whiteness and colored-ness are two, but whiteness and color are not, because one unit includes the other unit [sc. whiteness includes color as part of its definition], just as de-whitening includes both natures [sc. whiteness and color are both included in the definition of de-whitening]. A cause could also be assigned for these on the basis of the first fact, namely that the unit of a supposit, the unit of a nature, and the unit of a formality are not of the same nature; so none of them is counted up along with the others.
Because of the third fact nothing outwardly or inwardly intrinsic in God is countable, because neither is it potential; yet by extending number to distinction among entities, number is admitted in divine reality. And these two points - namely entity and distinction between the numbered things - are required for number but are not sufficient; therefore when number on their basis alone is posited, it is imperfectly posited (thus 'three persons').
Corollary: a threefold grouping of stones is per se one (according to the common opinion), such that it is not merely this-this-this; the trinity of divine persons is merely this-this-this, and is not any further a one. Another way of speaking would be possible if number in the intellect is posited, because then there is agreement with both cases. [Vatican editors: number as posited in the intellect allows one to speak equally correctly of three in the case of a threefold grouping of stones and in the case of a trinity of persons.
