Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D25

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica	Single Question Whether Person in Divine Reality states Substance or Relation
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem vigesimam quintam quaero an persona in divinis dicat substantiam vel relationem.	1. About the twenty fifth distinction I ask whether person in divine reality states substance or relation.
2 Sine argumentis.	2. Without arguments.
3 Respondeo: Persona non dicit relationem propriam, quia hoc nomen 'persona est commune tribus (secundum Augustinum VII Trinitatis cap. 7: ((Si tres personae sint, commune est eis hoc quod est 'persona'))), et non communitate aequivocationis, sicut 'hic homo' est communis Socrati et Platoni. Hoc quidem est aequivoce, quia pronomen hoc quod demonstrat hoc significat; non ita hic, quia aequivocum non numeratur in aequivocatis: non enim dicunƿtur piscis et sidus duo canes, quia numeratio alicuius in aliquibus requirit unitatem eius in eis. $a Persona sic est communis, quod numeratur (VII Trinitatis 7). a$	3. I reply: Person does not state a proper relation, because this name 'person' is common to the three (according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.7: "If there are three persons, that which is 'person' is common to them"), and not by a commonness of equivocation, as 'this man' is common to Socrates and Plato. The phrase 'this man' is indeed equivocal because the demonstrative 'this' signifies what it points out; not so here [sc. with 'person'] because an equivocal is not counted up along with equivocals; for dogfish and dogstar are not two dogs, because the counting of something in several things requires the unity of what is counted in them. Person is common in this way, because it is counted (Augustine, ibid).
4 Nec dicit relationem communem, - quod probatur per Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 9, quia ((Pater non est persona Filii)), nec e converso. Et ista ratio potest deduci sic: ad quodcumque dicitur relativum inferius, ad idem dicitur relativum superius, licet non primo. Exemplum: si duplum est duplum dimidii, et hoc primo, - duplum est multiplex dimidii, licet non primo; et non solum hoc, sed etiam usque ad generalissimum est relativum dimidii, licet non primo, id est adaequate. Ergo si persona diceret relationem communem, tunc Pater, sicut est Pater Filii primo, ita Pater esset persona Filii per se, licet non primo, - quod falsum est.	4. Nor does person state a common relation, - which is proved by Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.6 n.11, because "the Father is not the person of the Son," nor conversely. And this reason can be deduced as follows: whatever a subordinate [sc. specific] relative is said with respect to, to that same thing the higher [sc. more generic] relative is said, although not said first. An example: if the double is double of the half, and this first, then the double is a multiple of the half, although not first; and not only this but even up to the most general genus it is a relative of the half, although not first, that is, not adequately. Therefore if person stated a common relation, then Father, just as it is Father of the Son first, so Father would be person of the Son per se, although not first -which is false.
5 Nec persona dicit substantiam secundam, id est quiditatem, quia illa non numeratur in tribus; persona autem numeratur.	5. Nor does person state a secondary substance, that is, a quiddity, because this is not counted up in the three [sc. 'three deities' is not said]; but person is counted up [sc. 'three persons' is said].
6 Ergo secundum duas opiniones tactas in quaestione 'De persona' distinctione 23, quia secundum unam opinionem persona dicit negationem in genere, communem tribus, et ideo sic non significat substantiam nec relationem. Connotat tamen aliquid positivum: et primo connotat illud de quo primo praedicatur (puta Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum), non quasi ex primo intelƿlectu suo sed sicut commune connotat inferius pro quo supponit; secundo connotat relationem, qua Patri conveniat talis negatio communis, et Filio similiter; tertio et ultimo connotat essentiam, quae licet sit in primo connotato, non tamen est in eo ratio istius negationis.	6. Therefore [the reply must be] in accord with the two opinions treated of in the question 'On Person' in distinction 23 [d.23 n.24], that according to one opinion person states a negation in general, common to the three, and so in this way it does not signify either substance or relation. It does however connote something positive; and first it connotes that of which it is first predicated (namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit), not as if by what is first understood from it but as a common term connotes the inferior for which it supposits; secondly it connotes the relation whereby such common negation agrees with the Father and likewise with the Son; third and lastly it connotes the essence, which although it is in what is first connoted is yet not in it the reason for the negation.
7 Si autem teneatur alia opinio in quaestione illa, quod persona dicat aliquid positivum, abstractum a tribus ut quasi proprium, non ut species, - tunc potest dici quod significat quid positivum: sed nec substantiam nec relationem (et hoc extendendo substantiam tam ad substantiam primam quam ad secundam), sed primo aliquod positivum indifferens ad utrumque; ratio enim subsistentis indifferens est ad absolutum et relativum, tenendo personas divinas esse relativas. Ex consequenti tamen dat intelligere - sicut superius suum inferius - illud pro quo accipitur, puta relativum de quo dicitur persona (Patrem scilicet, et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum), et secundo ipsas relationes, et tertio essentiam, - ita quod utraque opinio (posita distinctione 23) concordat hic quod persona de prima ratione sua nec dicit relationem nec substantiam, et hoc nec primam nec secundam. Sed secundum unam opinionem dicit conceptum negationis (in genere) communis tribus, et ita dicit conceptum negationis communis tribus qui distinguitur in eis; secundum aliam opinionem dicit conceptum communis positivi et distincti in eis. Et secundum utramque opinionem tale comƿmune, sive positivum sive privativum, connotat - sicut suum inferius - illud de quo formaliter dicitur (puta Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum), et quasi secundo connotat formalia distinctiva in eis, et tertio essentiam communem eis.	7. If however the other opinion in that question is held, that person states something positive, abstracted from the three as a quasi-property, not as a species - then it can be said that it signifies a positive 'what'; but not substance nor relation (and this when extending substance to include both primary and secondary substance), but first something positive that is indifferent to both of them; for the idea of a subsistent, when one holds that the divine persons are relatives, is indifferent to the absolute and to the relative. Yet it gives to understand as a consequence - the way the superior genus gives to understand its inferior species - that for which it is taken, namely the relative of which person is said (namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit), and second the relations themselves, and third the essence - such that each opinion (set down in distinction 23, ibid.) agrees here that person in its first idea states neither relation nor substance, and this neither primary nor secondary substance. But according to one of the opinions it states a concept of negation (in general) common to the three, and so it states a concept of negation common to the three that is distinct in them; according to the other of the opinions it states a concept of a common thing that is positive and distinct in them. And according to both opinions such a common thing, whether positive or negative, connotes - as its inferior - that of which it is formally said (namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit), and second as it were it connotes the formal elements that are distinct in them, and third the essence that is common to them.
8 Sed obicitur quod persona significet substantiam secundam (id est quiditatem), per hoc quod dicit Augustinus VII Trinitatis cap. 9 quod per hoc quod est 'tres personae' respondetur ad quaestionem illam qua quaeritur in divinis ((quid tres)); 'quid' autem quaerit essentiam.	8. But an objection is raised that person signifies secondary substance (that is, quiddity), because of what Augustine says in On the Trinity VII ch.6 n.11, that through the phrase 'three persons' response is made to the question whereby it is asked 'what three?'; but 'what' is asking for the essence.
9 Praeterea, dicit Augustinus VII De Trinitate cap. 9 quod ((non est aliud Deum esse et personam esse)); ergo persona est mere essentiale, et per consequens significat secundam substantiam, id est quiditatem.	9. Further, Augustine says [ibid.] that "to be God and to be person are not different things;" therefore person is purely essential, and so it signifies a secondary substance, that is, quiddity.
10 Ad primum istorum dico quod 'quid' quandoque quaerit definitionem, quandoque illud quaerit de quo aliquid dicitur. Primum patet ex I Topicorum: ((Definitio est oratio, indicans quid est esse rei)). Secundum patet per Philosophum X Metaphysicae: ((Toƿtaliter quaerendum est quid 'unum', quemadmodum et quid ens, tamquam non sufficiens, quia hoc ipsum istius natura)) (intendit dicere quod non sufficit dicere ipsum 'unum' esse principium, sicut antiqui philosophi dixerunt ipsum 'unum' esse principium, sicut platonici, sed aliquid de quo dicitur 'unum'). Et secundum hoc, quaestio ista 'quid est elementum', duplicem habet responsionem: unam assignando definitionem elementi, et aliam assignando illud de quo dicitur elementum, puta 'ignis est elementum'. Nunc autem catholicis confitentibus 'tres' (secundum canonicam epistolam Ioan. cap. 5), quaesierunt haeretici 'quid tres', non interrogantes definitionem huius nominis, sed quaerentes quid esset illud substantivum quod determinaretur per illud adiectivum 'tres' (sive, de quo diceretur) - et ad hoc bene respondetur per hoc quod est 'persona'. Cum ergo accipitur quod 'quid' quaerit de essentia, non est verum generaliter nec specialiter in proposito.	10. To the first of these [n.8] I say that 'what' sometimes is asking for the definition and sometimes is asking for that about which something is said. The first is plain from the Topics 5.101b39: "Definition is a statement indicating the 'what is' of something." The second is plain from the Philosopher in Metaphysics 10.2.1053b27-28: "the whole question is what is 'one', how it is being and what being it is, because to say that this very thing is its nature is not enough" (he means to say that it is not enough to say that the 'one' is principle, the way the old philosophers said the 'one' was principle, like the Platonists, but something must be asserted that is what the 'one' is said about). And accordingly the question 'what is the element' has a double response; one is to give the essence of the element, and the other is to give that about which element is said, as 'fire is an element'. Now when Catholics were confessing the 'three' (according to the canonical epistle of John ch.5), the heretics asked 'what three?', not questioning what the definition of the word was, but asking what the substantive was that was determined by the adjective 'three' (or, what thing 'three' was being said of) - and to this question response was well made by the remark 'person'. When therefore it is assumed that 'what' asks about the essence, this is not generally true, nor is it true in particular of the issue at hand [n.9].
11 Ad secundum, de Augustino, patebit distinctione sequente, quia persona est ad se (tam in se quam in suis inferioribus), licet non ita sit ad se sicut essentia est ad se, et hoc si ponatur personas ƿdivinas esse constitutas in esse personali per aliqua absoluta; si autem hoc non ponatur, difficile videtur exponere auctoritatem beati Augustini, sed de hoc dicetur ibi.	11. As to the second, from Augustine [n.9], the answer will be plain in the following distinction, that person is referred to itself (both in itself and in its specific subordinates), although it is not referred to itself as essence is referred to itself, and this provided the position is laid down that the persons are constituted in personal existence by certain absolutes; but if this position is not laid down, then expounding Blessed Augustine's authority seems difficult; but there will be discussion of this in the next distinction [d.26 n.52].