Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D44
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| Quaestio Unica | Forty Fourth Distinction Single Question Whether God could Make Things other than He has Ordained them to be Made |
| ƿ1 Circa distinctionem quadragesimam quartam - ubi Magister tractat 'utrum Deus potuit res melius fecisse quam fecit' - quaero istam quaestionem: utrum Deus possit aliter facere res quam ab ipso ordinatum est eas fieri. Et videtur quod non: Quia tunc posset facere res inordinate. Consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. | 1. About the forty fourth distinction – where the Master deals with the question ‘whether God could have made things better than he did’ – I ask this question: whether God could make things other than he has ordained them to be made. And it seems not: Because then he could make things in a disordered way. The consequent is false, therefore the antecedent too. |
| 2 Contra: Res aliter fieri quam factae sunt, non includit contradictionem; nec est necessarium; igitur etc. | 2. On the contrary: Things being made other than they have been made does not include a contradiction; nor is the universe necessary; therefore etc. |
| I. To the Question | |
| 3 Respondeo: In omni agente per intellectum et voluntatem, potente conformiter agere legi rectae et tamen non necessario conformiter agere legi rectae, est distinguere potentiam ordinatam a potentia absoluta; et ratio huius est, quia potest agere conformiter illi legi rectae, ƿet tunc secundum potentiam ordinatam (ordinata enim est in quantum est principium exsequendi aliqua conformiter legi rectae), et potest agere praeter illam legem vel contra eam, et in hoc est potentia absoluta, excedens potentiam ordinatam. Et ideo non tantum in Deo, sed in omni agente libere - qui potest agere secundum dictamen legis rectae et praeter talem legem vel contra eam - est distinguere inter potentiam ordinatam et absolutam; ideo dicunt iuristae quod aliquis hoc potest facere de facto, hoc est de potentia sua absoluta, - vel de iure, hoc est de potentia ordinata secundum iura. | 3. I reply: In everyone acting by intellect and will, who is able to act in conformity with right law and yet not by necessity in conformity with right law, one must distinguish between ordained power and absolute power; and the reason for this is that he can act in conformity with that right law and so according to ordained power (for the power is ordained insofar as it is the principle of carrying things out in conformity with right law), and he can act without that law or against it, and here there is absolute power, exceeding ordained power. And therefore not only in God but in any agent acting freely – who can act according to the dictate of right law and without that law or against it – one must distinguish between ordained power and absolute power; therefore the jurists say that someone can do something de facto, that is by his absolute power – or de iure, that is by ordained power according to right. |
| 4 Quando autem illa lex recta - secundum quam ordinate agendum est - non est in potestate agentis, tunc potentia eius absoluta non potest excedere potentiam eius ordinatam circa obiecta aliqua, nisi circa illa agat inordinate; necessarium enim est illam legem stare - comparando ad tale agens - et tamen actionem 'non conformatam illi legi rectae' non esse rectam neque ordinatam, quia tale agens tenetur agere secundum illam regulam cui subest. Unde omnes qui subsunt legi divinae, si non agunt secundum illam, inordinate agunt. | 4. But when that right law – according to which one must act in ordered way – is not in the power of the agent, then his absolute power cannot exceed his ordained power about any object unless he acts about it in disordered way; for it is necessary that such law stand – comparing it to such agent – and yet that an action ‘not conformed to that right law’ is not right nor ordered, because such an agent is held to act according to the law he is subject to. Hence all those subject to the divine law, if they do not act according to it, act in disordered way. |
| 5 Sed quando in potestate agentis est lex et rectitudo legis, ita quod non est recta nisi quia statuta, tunc potest aliter agens ex libertate ƿsua ordinare quam lex illa recta dictet; et tamen cum hoc potest ordinate agere, quia potest statuere aliam legem rectam secundum quam agat ordinate. Nec tunc potentia sua absoluta simpliciter excedit potentiam ordinatam, quia esset ordinata secundum aliam legem sicut secundum priorem; tamen excedit potentiam ordinatam praecise secundum priorem legem, contra quam vel praeter quam facit. Ita posset exemplificari de principe et subditis, et lege positiva. | 5. But when the law and the rightness or law are in the power of the agent, so that it is only right because it is established, then an agent acting from his own freedom can ordain otherwise than that right law directs; and yet along with this he can act rightly, because he can establish another right law according to which he may act in ordered fashion. Nor does his absolute power then simply exceed his ordained power, because it would be according to some law ordained, just as it was according to the prior law; yet it exceeds ordained power precisely according to the prior law, against which or without which it acts. This can be exemplified in a prince and his subjects, and in positive law. |
| 6 Ad propositum ergo applicando, dico quod leges aliquae generales, recte dictantes, praefixae sunt a voluntate divina et non quidem ab intellectu divino ut praecedit actum voluntatis divinae, ut dictum est distinctione 38; sed quando intellectus offert voluntati divinae talem legem, puta quod 'omnis glorificandus, prius est gratificandus', si placet voluntati suae - quae libera est - est recta lex, et ita est de aliis legibus. | 6. Applying this to the issue at hand, then, I say that some general laws, giving direction rightly, have been pre-established by the divine will and not indeed by the divine intellect as it precedes the act of the divine will, as was said in distinction 38 nn.5- 6, 9-10;[1] but when the intellect presents some such law to the divine will, namely that ‘everyone who is to be glorified must first be endowed with grace’, this law, if it please his will – which is free – is right, and so it is about other laws. |
| 7 Deus ergo, agere potens secundum illas rectas leges ut praefixae, ƿsunt ab eo, dicitur agere secundum potentiam ordinatam; ut autem potest multa agere quae non sunt secundum illas leges iam praefixas, sed praeter illas, dicitur eius potentia absoluta: quia enim Deus quodlibet potest agere quod non includit contradictionem, et omni modo potest agere qui non includit contradictionem (et tales sunt multi modi alii), ideo dicitur tunc agere secundum potentiam absolutam. | 7. God then, being able to act according to those right laws as they have been preestablished by him, is said to act according to his ordained power; but as he can do many things that are not according to but without the laws already pre-established, he is said to act by his absolute power; for because God can do anything that does not include a contradiction, and can act in every way that does not include a contradiction (and many other ways are such), therefore he is then said to act according to ordained power. |
| 8 Unde dico quod multa alia potest agere ordinate; et multa alia posse fieri ordinate, ab illis quae fiunt conformiter illis legibus, non includit contradictionem quando rectitudo huiusmodi legis - secundum quam dicitur quis recte et ordinate agere - est in potestate ipsius agentis. Ideo sicut potest aliter agere, ita potest aliam legem rectam statuere, - quae si statueretur a Deo, recta esset, quia nulla lex est recta nisi quatenus a voluntate divina acceptante est statuta; et tunc potentia eius absoluta ad aliquid, non se extendit ad aliud quam ad illud quod ordinate fieret, si fieret: non quidem fieret ordinate secundum istum ordinem, sed fieret ordinate secundum alium ordinem, quem ordinem ita posset voluntas divina statuere sicut potest agere. | 8. Hence I say that he can do many other things in ordered way; and the fact that many other things can be done in ordered way, other than those which are made in conformity with the laws, does not include a contradiction when the rectitude of this sort of law – according to which someone is said to act rightly and in ordered way – is in the power of the agent. Therefore just as God can act otherwise, so he can establish another right law, – which, if it were established by God, would be right, because no law is right save as it is established by the divine will accepting it; and then his absolute power for something does not extend itself to something other than that which would be done in ordered fashion, if it were done; it would not indeed be done in ordered fashion according to the existing law, but if would be done in ordered fashion according to another order, which other order the divine will could establish, just as it has power to act. |
| 9 Advertendum etiam est quod aliquid esse ordinatum et ordinate fieri, hoc contingit dupliciter: ƿUno modo, ordine universali, - quod pertinet ad legem communem, sicut ordinatum est secundum legem communem 'omnem finaliter peccatorem esse damnandum' (ut si rex statuat quod omnis homicida moriatur). Secundo modo, ordine particulari, - secundum hoc iudicium, ad quod non pertinet lex in universali, quia lex est de universalibus causis; de causa autem particulari non est lex, sed iudicium secundum legem, eius quod est contra legem (ut quod iste homicida moriatur). | 9. One must note too that something’s being ordained and being done in ordered fashion can happen in two ways: In one way by universal order – which pertains to the common law, as is ordained according to the common law that ‘everyone finally a sinner is to be damned’ (just as when a king establishes that every murderer is to die). In a second way in particular order – according to the judgment that the law in universal does not pertain to, because law is about universal cases; but about a particular case there is no law, but there is judgment according to law of that which is against the law (as that this murderer is to die). |
| 10 Dico ergo quod Deus non solum potest agere aliter quam ordinatum est ordine particulari, sed aliter quam ordinatum est ordine universali - sive secundum leges iustitiae - potest ordinate agere, quia tam illa quae sunt praeter illum ordinem, quam illa quae sunt contra ordinem illum, possent a Deo ordinate fieri potentia absoluta. | 10. I say then that God can act not only otherwise than has been ordained by particular order, but he can also act in ordered fashion otherwise than has been ordained by universal order – or according to the laws of justice, – because both the things that are without that order and the things contrary to it, can be done in ordered fashion by God by absolute power.[2] |
| 11 Potentia tamen ordinata non dicitur nisi secundum ordinem legis universalis, non autem secundum ordinem legis rectae de aliquo particulari. Quod apparet ex hoc quod possibile est Deum salvare quem non salvat, qui tamen morietur in peccato finaliter et damnabitur, - non autem conceditur ipsum posse salvare Iudam iam damnatum (nec tamen hoc est impossibile potentia absoluta Dei, quia non includit contradictionem); ergo istud, scilicet 'salvare Iudam', eo modo est impossibile quo modo possibile est salvare istum: ergo istum potest salvare de potentia ordinata (quod ƿverum est), et illum non. Non quidem ordine particulari (qui est quasi de isto agibili et operabili particulari tantum), sed ordine universali, quia si salvaret, staret modo cum legibus rectis - quas vere praefixit - de salvatione et damnatione singulorum. Staret enim cum illa 'quod finaliter malus damnabitur' (quae est lex praefixa de damnandis), quia iste adhuc non est finaliter peccator, sed potest esse non peccator (maxime dum est in via), quia potest Deus eum gratia sua praevenire; sicut si rex praeveniret aliquem ne faceret homicidium, si non damnat eum, non facit contra legem suam universalem de homicida. Non autem staret, cum illa particulari lege, quod Iudam salvaret; Iudam enim potest praescire salvandum de potentia ordinata, sed non isto modo ordinata sed absoluta ab isto modo, et alio modo ordinata secundum aliquem alium ordinem, quia secundum alium ordinem tunc possibilem institui. ƿ | 11. However ordered power is not spoken of save as in accord with the order of universal law, and not in accord with the order of right law about some particular. The point is plain from this, that it is possible for God to save someone whom he does not save and who however will die in sin finally and be damned – but it is not conceded that he can save Judas already damned (though this is not impossible by God’s absolute power, because it does not include a contradiction), therefore this thing, namely ‘to save Judas’, is impossible in the way in which it is possible to save him [sc. possible according to existing ordained power]; therefore God can by ordained power save this person (which is true) and not save that one. Not indeed by particular order (which is as it were about this particular doable and workable thing only), but by universal order, because if he saved him, it would now stand with right laws – which he truly pre-fixed – about the salvation and damnation of particular individuals. For it would stand with the proposition that ‘he who is finally evil will be damned’ (which is the pre-fixed law about those to be damned), because this person is still not finally a sinner but can be a non-sinner (especially when a wayfarer), because God can prevent him by his grace; just as, if a king were to prevent someone from committing murder, then, if he does not damn him, he does not act against his universal law about murderers. But it would not stand with that particular law that he would save Judas; for he can fore-know that Judas is to be saved by ordained power, though not ordained in the existing way but in a way absolute from this way, and this other way is ordained according to some other order, because established according to another possible way.[3] |
| 12 Qualiter autem voluntas divina possit circa particularia et circa leges rectas instituendas, non volendo oppositum eius quod nunc vult, dictum est supra distinctione 39. | 12. But how the divine will has power about particulars and about establishing right laws, by not willing the opposite of what he now wills, was stated above in distinction 39 [in the interpolation for that question above]. |
| II. To the Principal Arguments on Both Sides | |
| 13 Ad argumentum patet quod consequentia non valet, quia si faceret res alio modo quam nunc ordinatum est eas fieri, non propter hoc inordinate fierent, quia si statueret alias leges secundum quas fierent, eo ipso ordinate fierent. | 13. To the argument [n.1] it is plain that the consequence is not valid, because if God were to make things in a way other than he has ordained them to be made, they are not for this reason made in disordered way, because if he established other laws according to which they were made, they would by that very fact be made in ordered way. |
| 14 Ad argumentum in oppositum concedo quod probat de potentia absoluta, - quae tamen si esset principium alicuius, esset eo ipso ordinata, sed non secundum ordinem ab eo praefixum, eundem quem prius habuit. | 14. To the argument for the opposite [n.2] I concede what it proves about absolute power – which, however, if it was the principle of anything, would by that fact be ordained, but not according to a pre-fixed order of God that was the same as he had before. |
Notes
- ↑ [Interpolation]: because there is found no necessity from the terms in these laws (as that every sinner will be damned), but only from the divine will accepting them, which will operates according to laws of this sort that it has made; or enough for the issue at hand to say that the laws are established by divine wisdom.
- ↑ [Interpolation, Appendix A] Again, one must know that a distinction is to be made in the case of this proposition, ‘God can produce things otherwise than he has disposed’. In the composite sense it is false; for what is signified is that this proposition is true, ‘God produces things otherwise than according to his disposition’; in the divided sense it is true, and there are two categorical propositions, and the sense is: ‘God can make things in this way’, ‘he did not dispose to make them in this way’. And yet it does not follow that he acts in disordered way, as is plain from what has been said.
- ↑ [Interpolation] Absolute power then can save Judas, – but ordained power can save this sinner, although he will not be saved; but a stone can be beatified neither by absolute nor ordained power. And in this regard, it is plain as to what it is in respect of that there is said to be absolute power in God, that is insofar as he has power against universal law but not particular.
