Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D45

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica	Forty Fifth Distinction Single Question Whether God from Eternity willed Things Other than Himself
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem quadragesimam quintam quaero utrum Deus ab aeterno voluit alia a se. Quod non: Quia tunc in voluntate divina fuisset relatio ad creaturam realis. Consequens falsum (sicut patet distinctione 30), ergo et antecedens.	1. About the forty fifth distinction I ask whether God from eternity willed things other than himself. That he did not Because then in the divine will there would have been a real relation to creatures. The consequent is false (as is plain from distinction 30 nn.49-51), therefore the antecedent is too.
2 Probatio consequentiae: prius Deus vult aliquid quam intelligat se velle illud (sit illud a), quia - sicut dictum est distinctione 39 certitudo intellectus divini circa futura contingentia non est sine certitudine vel rectitudine voluntatis; ergo relatio illa, quae est in voluntate divina primo ad a, ipsa praecedit omnem considerationem intellectus de illa volitione; ergo non est in voluntate sive in volitione ut cognita est, sed ut in se est, - et per consequens est ibi ex natura rei, et non in cognito ut cognitum est.	2. Proof of the consequence: God first wills something before he understands that he wills it (let that thing be a), because – as was said in distinction 39 [see interpolation for that distinction] – the certitude of the divine intellect about future contingents is not without the certitude and rectitude of the will; therefore the relation, which is in the divine will first to a, itself precedes all consideration by the intellect about that volition; therefore it is not in the will or in volition as it is known but as it is in itself, – and consequently it is there from the nature of the thing, and not in the known as it is known.
3 Contra: Si non voluit ab aeterno, ergo nec modo vult de novo, quia tunc esset mutabilis; ergo nihil vult. ƿ	3. On the contrary: If he did not will from eternity, then neither does he will now de novo, because then he would be mutable; therefore he wills nothing.
	I. To the Question
4 Respondeo: Omnis potentia operativa perfecta potest esse principium operandi circa quodcumque obiectum natum respici a tali potentia, sicut perfectus intellectus potest esse principium intelligendi quodcumque intelligibile et perfectus visus videndi quodcumque visibile; igitur cum in Deo sit voluntas formaliter (ex distinctione 2), et etiam summe perfecta 'quia infinita' (ex eadem distinctione), sequitur quod ipsa possit esse principium volendi quodcumque volibile.	4. I reply: Every perfect operative power can be the power of operating about any object that is of a nature to have a respect to such power, – just as a perfect intellect can be the principle of understanding anything intelligible and perfect sight of seeing anything visible; therefore since in God there is will formally (from distinction 2 nn.75-88), and even will supremely perfect ‘because infinite’ (from the same distinction nn.94, 101, 117- 118, 234-235, 300-303), the result is that it can be the principle of willing anything willable.
5 Non autem potest esse principium volendi aliquid ex tempore, quia hoc non posset esse sine mutatione alicuius: et non obiecti voliti, quia obiectum volitum non habet esse nisi quia volitum et quia est in ipsa voluntate divina; ergo ista mutatio esset ipsius voluntatis, sicut deductum fuit distinctione 30 de ratione ipsius voluntatis. Ergo voluntas divina potest in aeternitate sua esse principium volendi quodcumque volibile.	5. But it cannot be a principle of willing anything from time, because this could not be without the change of something; and not of the willed object, because the willed object only has being because it is willed and because it is in the divine will; therefore this change would be in the will itself, as was deduced in distinction 30 n.41 about the idea of the will itself. Therefore the divine will can in its own eternity be the principle of willing anything will-able.
6 Non est autem ratio volendi simul ambo opposita, quia illa respectu nullius possunt simul esse; nec est ratio volendi neutrum, quia tunc in creaturis nihil esset a Deo volitum, - et per consequens nihil causaret in creaturis, quia contingentia non potest esse in Deo nisi a parte voluntatis, sicut deductum est distincƿtione 39. Ergo in aeternitate est ratio volendi aliquod obiectum aliud in quibuscumque aliis a se.	6. But it is not the idea of willing both opposites at the same time, because opposites cannot be at the same time with respect to anything; nor is the idea of willing neither of them, because then nothing in creatures would be willed by God, – and consequently he would cause nothing in creatures, because contingency can only be in God on the part of the will, as was deduced in distinction 39 [in the interpolation for that question]. Therefore there is in eternity the idea of willing any other object in anything other than himself.
	II. To the Principal Arguments
7 Ad argumenta respondeo quod sicut dictum est prius distinctione 30 de relationibus ex tempore, quod terminantur ad Deum sub ratione mere absoluta, et simili modo de ideis distinctione 35, et simili modo de omnipotentia distinctione 43 (et est mere absoluta secundum quod est attributum divinum et sic terminat relationem creaturae possibilis ad Deum), - ita dico hic quod voluntas divina sub ratione mere absoluta terminat respectum volibilis ad ipsum, quod quidem voluntas divina producit in esse volito in aeternitate sicut intellectus producit in esse cognito vel intellecto; et simili modo dicendum est istud inesse voluntati sicut esse secundum se, sicut dictum est de esse cogniti distinctione 36.	7. To the arguments [nn.1-2] I reply that as was said before in distinction 30 n.31 about relations from time that have God as their term under a purely absolute idea, and in like manner about the ideas in distinction 35 n.27, and in like manner about omnipotence in distinction 43 nn.11, 14 (and omnipotence is purely absolute as it is a divine attribute, and thus is it the term of the relation of a possible creature to God), – so I say here that the divine will under a purely absolute idea is the term of the respect of the will-able thing to God himself, because indeed the divine will produces things in eternity in willed being as the intellect produces in known or understood being; and in like manner one must say that this willed being is present as being in itself in the will, as was said about the being of being known in distinction 36 nn.26-29, 34-35.
8 Sed tunc argues: si volitum habet relationem ad voluntatem divinam, - aut igitur relationem realem, aut secundum rationem tantum. Si realem, ergo fundamentum suum est reale; ergo illa res habet esse reale ab aeterno. Si relationem rationis tantum, - contra: non est per actum intellectus divini, comparantis illud obiectum ad intellectum suum, - igitur non est relatio rationis in eo; licet ƿenim intellectus divinus prius comparet illud obiectum ut cognitum ad intellectum suum quam sit volitum ab ipso, et in illo priore causet relationem rationis ipsius obiecti ut cogniti ad intellectum suum, non tamen videtur causare aliquam relationem eius ad voluntatem.	8. But then you will argue: if the willed thing has a relation to the divine will, – either then a real relation or a relation of reason only. If real then its foundation is real; therefore the thing has real being from eternity. If a relation of reason only, – on the contrary: the relation does not come from an act of the divine intellect comparing the object to his intellect, – therefore there is in it no relation of reason; for although the divine intellect compare the object as known to his intellect before the object is willed by him, and although in that prior stage he cause a relation of reason of the object itself as known to his intellect, yet he does not seem to cause any relation of it to the will.
9 Licet posset hic responderi quod ista relatio voliti ad voluntatem sit per actum intellectus divini comparantis obiectum volitum ad voluntatem suam (quia prius comparat voluntatem suam ad obiectum quam comparet ad intellectum suum), si poneretur idem 'esse' sufficere in obiecto intellectus ut obiectum cognitum et voluntatis ut volitum est, et quod nullo modo esset praesens voluntati nisi quia praesens fuerit intellectui, - tamen respondeo aliter quod in obiecto illo volito est relatio alia ad voluntatem divinam quam illa, in eo, quae est ut obiecti intellecti ad intellectum divinum; et illa alia relatio non est relatio realis, - nec tamen est rationis, loquendo stricte de relatione rationis, scilicet intellectus.	9. Although one could here [n.8] respond that this relation of the willed thing to the will is from an act of the divine intellect comparing the willed object to his own will (because he compares his will to the object before he compares it to his intellect), yet if the same ‘being’ were posited as sufficient in the object of the intellect as it is a known object and in the object of the will as it is willed, and if this would in no way be present to the will save because it was present to the intellect, – yet I reply in another way that in the willed object there is a relation to the divine will other than the relation in it which is as of the understood object to the divine intellect; and that other relation is not a real relation, – nor yet is it a relation of reason, speaking strictly of a relation of reason, namely one of the intellect.
10 Nec ista divisio est sufficiens, quod omnis relatio 'aut est realis, aut est rationis', accipiendo relationem rationis stricte, quia omnis potentia quae potest habere actum circa obiectum exsistens non ut exsistens est, et illud obiectum potest actu suo comparare ad aliud ad quod tale obiectum non comparatur ex natura rei, potest in obiecto, ut obiectum est, causare relationem rationis ƿipsius ad aliud; quae quidem non est realis, quia non est ex natura obiecti in se, - nec tamen est stricte rationis, quia non semper illa potentia comparans est ratio tantum sive potentia ratiocinativa.	10. Nor is the division sufficient that every relation ‘is either real or of reason’, taking relation of reason strictly, because every power that can have an act about an existing object but not as it is existent, and that can by its act compare that object to another to which such object is not compared from the nature of the thing – every such power can cause in the object, as it is object, a relation of reason between itself and something else; which relation is not real, because it is not from the nature of the object in itself, – nor yet is it strictly of reason, because the comparing power is not always only reason or a ratiocinative power.
11 Potest enim voluntas, utens aliquo obiecto ad finem, causare in obiecto illo relationem rationis ad illum finem: et nec est illa realis relatio, quia non est in obiecto ex natura rei sed ex comparatione voluntatis conferentis (potest enim uti Deo ad creaturam); nec est illa relatio rationis, quia potentia 'causans istam comparationem' non est ratio, - sive intellectus sive imaginatio dicatur talis virtus collativa, sive quaecumque alia: certum est enim quod voluntas est talis potentia comparativa et collativa (et imaginativa, similiter), ita bene sicut potentia intellectiva; et ideo certum est quod utraque istarum potentiarum potest obiectum suum comparare, et in obiecto suo causare relationem: non realem, quia sic esset ibi, in tali, ex natura rei sine omni comparatione, - nec relationem rationis stricte sumptam pro relatione causata ab intellectu, licet eam quandoque concomitetur relatio rationis causata ab intellectu. Sed voluntas divina, et etiam omnis voluntas (quidquid sit de imaginatione, de qua non nunc), potest comparare se ipsam ad obiectum in esse volito ab aeterno (et e converso), et sic potest in obiecto causare relationem rationis ad ipsam.	11. For the will, when using some object for an end, can cause in the object a relation of reason to the end; and it is not a real relation, because it is not in the object from the nature of the thing but from the comparison made by the comparing will (for it can use God in relation to the creature); nor is it a relation of reason, because the power ‘causing the comparison’ is not reason, – whether intellect or imagination is said to be such a comparing power, or anything else; for it is certain that the will is such a comparing and conferring power (and the imaginative power likewise), just as well as the intellective power is; and therefore it is certain that each of these powers [sc. intellective and volitional] can compare its own object and can cause a relation in its own object; not a real relation, because it would thus be there, in such object, from the nature of the thing without any comparison, – nor a relation of reason taken strictly as a relation caused by the intellect, although sometimes it be accompanied by a relation of reason caused by the intellect. But the divine will, and even any will (whatever may be true of imagination, about which we will not speak now), can compare itself to the object in willed being from eternity (and conversely), and so it can cause in the object a relation of reason to itself.