Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D46

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica	Forty Sixth Distinction Single Question Whether God’s Will of Being Well-Pleased is always Fulfilled
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem quadragesimam sextam quaero utrum voluntas beneplaciti Dei semper impleatur. Et videtur quod non: I ad Tim. 2: Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri; non tamen omnes erunt salvati; igitur etc.	1. About the forty sixth distinction I ask whether God’s will of being well-pleased is always fulfilled. And it seems that it is not: I Timothy 2.4: “God wills all men to be saved;” but not all will be saved; therefore etc.
2 Praeterea, Matth. 23 ait Salvator illis filiis Hierusalem: Quoties volui congregare filios tuos, quemadmodum congregat gallina pullos suos sub alas, et noluisti; igitur ut prius.	2. In addition Matthew 23.37 the Savior says to the children of Jerusalem: “How often have I wanted to gather your children as a hen gathers her chicks, and ye would not;” therefore as before.
3 Contra: Rom. 9: Voluntati eius quis resistet?	3. On the contrary: Romans 9.19: “Who hath resisted his will?”
4 Et in Psalmo: Omnia, quaecumque voluit, fecit.	4. And Psalm 113.11: “Everything that he willed he did.”
	I. To the Question
5 Respondeo: Voluntas Dei, quantum ad omnia, semper debet impleri, - quia ƿsicut omnipotens potest omne possibile, ita, quando voluntas divina determinatur ad ponendum aliquid in esse ultima determinatione, illud erit; velle autem illud voluntate beneplaciti, est velle illud ultima determinatione quae potest poni ex parte ipsius voluntatis omnipotentis, volentis effectum in esse; ergo, respectu cuiuscumque effectus Deus est sic volens, illud erit.	5. I reply: The will of God must, as to all things, always be fulfilled, – because as the Almighty can do everything possible, so, when the divine will is determinate with final determination to posit something in being, that thing will be; but to will that thing with the will of being well-pleased is to will it with the ultimate determination that can be posited on the part of an almighty will that wills the effect into existence; therefore as regard every effect for which God is thus willing, that effect will be.
6 Et posset confirmari ratio, quia si causa, ultima determinatione ad aliquid determinata, non poneret effectum in esse, hoc non videretur nisi propter impotentiam eius, - ut puta quia non sufficeret ex se vel esset impedita ab aliquo alio, vel propter mutabilitatem eius antequam intelligatur poni effectus in esse; sed omnipotens nec est impotens, nec mutabilis; ergo etc. ƿ	6. And the reason can be confirmed, because if a cause, determinate with ultimate determination to something, were not to posit the effect in being, this would seem to be because of its lack of power – as for example that it was not sufficient of itself or was impeded by something else, or because of its capability of changing before the effect is understood to be posited in being; but the Almighty is not lacking in power, nor is he mutable; therefore etc.
	II. To the Principal Arguments
7 Ad primum argumentum dico quod licet illud dictum Apostoli posset exponi de distributione accommoda, pro omnibus qui salvi fient, - tamen multo melius posset exponi de voluntate antecedente, sic: 'vult omnes homines salvare et salvos fieri', quantum scilicet est ex parte sui, - et voluntate sua antecedente, pro quanto dedit eis dona naturalia et leges rectas, et adiutoria communia, sufficientia ad salutem.	7. To the first argument [n.1] I say that although the saying of the Apostle could be expounded with an appropriate distribution of terms, to mean all those who will be saved – yet it could be better expounded of antecedent will as follows: ‘he wills to save all men and that all men be saved’, namely as far as concerns his own part – and by his antecedent will he has, to this extent, given them the natural gifts and right laws and common aids that are sufficient for salvation.
8 Sicut de rege, statuente bonas leges et praefigente ministros ad custodiam illarum legum, posset dici quod vult omnes subditos suos pacifice vivere et quiete, quantum in ipso est, et tamen si aliquem videret tribulari iniuste, non oporteret quod rex statim intromitteret se ad faciendum istum quiete vivere nisi devolveretur ad ipsum per querimoniam de facto (vult quidem ille quemlibet vivere pacifice et quiete antecedenter, non tamen vult quemcumque immediate ita vivere), - ita dico in proposito quod etsi Deus non habeat voluntatem beneplaciti ad istum salvandum, tamen vult isti illa adiutoria communia ad salutem, quibus iste etiam potest ƿsufficienter bene vivere et salvari; propter quae potest dici quod quantum est ex parte sui, vult omnes salvos fieri.	8. Just as, in the case of a king who establishes good laws and appoints ministers to guard those laws, one could say that he wills all his subjects to live peaceably and quietly, as far as in him, and yet, if he see someone being unjustly treated, there would be no need for the king at once to intervene to ensure that he lives quietly unless the matter were delivered to him by a complaint of fact (he does indeed antecedently will anyone to live peaceably and quietly, but he does not will anyone immediately to live thus), – so I say in the issue at hand, that although God not have a will of being well-pleased for saving this particular man, yet he wills for him the common aids of salvation, by which aids even that particular man can live well and be saved; for which reason one can say that, as far as concerns his own part, he wills all to be saved.
9 Ad secundum Magister exponit (et bene), non quod omnes voluit implere voluntatem Christi, sed quod omnes quos ipse congregavit, congregavit sua voluntate. Vide expositionem Magistri et nota eam.	9. To the second [n.2]: the Master expounds (and well expounds, d.46 ch.2 n.414), that it was not that he willed all to fulfill the will of Christ, but that he gathered by his will all whom he gathered. See and note the exposition of the Master.