Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P1Qu/A5

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Art. 5
72 Ad argumenta pro opinione Aristotelis. Ad primum dico quod cognitio dependet ab anima cognoscente et obiecto cognito, quia secundum Augustinum, IX De Trinitate cap. ultimo, ((a cognoscente et cognito paritur notitia)). Licet igitur anima habeat sufficiens activum et passivum intra pro quanto actio respectu cognitionis convenit animae, tamen non habet sufficiens activum intra se pro quanto actio convenit obiecto, quia sic est ut tabula nuda, ut dicitur III De anima. Est igitur intellectus agens quo est omnia facere, verum est in quantum 'factio' respectu cognitionis convenit animae, non in quantum obiectum est activum.	72. To the arguments [n.6-11] for the opinion of Aristotle. To the first [n.6] I say that knowledge depends on the soul that knows and the object that is known [nn.6-11], because according to Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18 “knowledge is born from knower and known.” Although, therefore, the soul may have within a sufficient active and passive element to the extent an action with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, yet it does not have within itself a sufficient active element to the extent the action agrees with the object, because it is thus a blank tablet, as is said at On the Soul 3.4.429b30-30a2. The intellect then is an agent by which it makes everything, but it is so insofar as ‘making’ with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, not insofar as the object is active.
73 Ad confirmationem rationis. Ad maiorem dico quod natura ƿ quandoque accipitur pro principio intrinseco motus vel quietis prout describitur II Physicorum - quandoque pro principio activo naturaliter, prout natura distinguitur contra artem sive contra propositum propter oppositum modum principiandi, sive sit intrinsecum sive non, dummodo sit naturale. Primo modo maior non est vera, quia non correspondet omni passivo naturaliter principium activum intrinsecum quod sit natura, quia multa sunt naturaliter receptiva alicuius actus, cuius non habent principium activum intrinsecum. Secundo etiam modo propositio maior est falsa in quibusdam, quando videlicet natura propter sui excellentiam ordinatur naturaliter ad recipiendum perfectionem ita eminentem, quae non possit subesse causalitati agentis naturalis secundo modo. Ita est in proposito.	73. To the confirmation for the reason [n.7]. To the major I say that nature is sometimes taken for the intrinsic principle of motion and rest – as it is described in the Physics 2.1.192b20-23 – sometimes for the naturally active principle, insofar as nature is distinguished from art or from choice on account of their opposite modes of being a principle, whether it is intrinsic or not, provided it be natural. In the first way the major is not true, because there does not naturally correspond to every passive element an active intrinsic principle that is nature, because many things are naturally receptive of some act for which they do not have an active intrinsic principle. In the second way too the major proposition is false in certain cases, namely when a nature, because of its excellence, is naturally ordered to receiving a perfection so eminent that it cannot fall under the causality of an agent that is natural in the second way. Thus it is in the proposed case.
74 Cum probatur maior dico quod potentia passiva non est frustra in natura, quia etsi per agens naturale non possit principaliter reduci ad actum, tamen potest per tale agens dispositio ad ipsum induci, et potest per aliquod agens in natura - id est in tota coordinatione essendi vel entium - puta per agens primum vel supernaturale complete reduci ad actum.	74. When the major is proved [n.7], I say that the passive power is not in vain in nature, because although it cannot by a natural agent be principally reduced to act, yet the disposition for it can be introduced by such an agent, and can by some agent in nature – that is, in the whole system of being and beings – to wit, by the first or supernatural agent, be completely reduced to act.
75 Et si obicitur quod istud vilificat naturam quod ipsa non possit ƿ consequi perfectionem suam ex naturalibus, cum natura minus deficiat in nobilioribus, ex II De caelo et mundo, respondeo: si felicitas nostra consisteret in speculatione suprema ad qualem possumus nunc naturaliter attingere, non diceret Philosophus naturam deficere in necessariis. Nunc autem illam concedo posse haberi naturaliter, et ultra, dico aliam eminentiorem posse recipi naturaliter. Igitur in hoc magis dignificatur natura, quam si suprema sibi possibilis poneretur illa naturalis; nec est mirum quod ad maiorem perfectionem sit capacitas passiva in aliqua natura quam eius causalitas activa se extendat.	75. And if it be objected that that cheapens nature because it cannot attain its perfection from its natural powers, although nature fails less in nobler things, from On the Heavens 2.8.290a29-35, I reply: if our happiness consisted in a supreme contemplation of the sort to which we can now naturally attain, the Philosopher would not say [On the Soul 3.9.432b21-22] that nature fails in necessary things. But now I concede that that happiness can be had naturally, and further I say that another more eminent one can be received naturally. Therefore nature is in this respect made more dignified than if that 36 natural one were posited as the supreme one possible for it; nor is it to be wondered at that there is a passive capacity in some nature for a greater perfection than its active causality can extend itself to.
76 Illud quod adducitur de II Caeli et mundi non est ad propositum, quia Philosophus loquitur ibi de organis correspondentibus potentiae motivae si ipsa inesset stellis. Et concedo quod universaliter cui datur potentia quae nata est esse organica, ei datur a natura organum, in non orbatis dico. Sed in proposito data est potentia, sed non organica; non tamen data sunt naturaliter omnia alia praeter potentiam concurrentia ad actum. A Philosopho ƿ igitur ibi haberi potest quod natura ordinabilis ad aliquem actum vel obiectum naturaliter habet potentiam ad illud, et organum si potentia est organica; sed non sic de posterioribus requisitis ad actum .	76. What is adduced from the On the Heavens is not relevant to the case, because the Philosopher is speaking there of instruments corresponding to the motive power if it is in the stars. And I concede that universally to a thing to which a power is given that is naturally organic, to it is by nature given an organ, I mean in non-defective things. But in the proposed case a power is given but it is not organic; yet not all the other things have been given that, besides the power, concur in an act. From the Philosopher, then, can be there had that a nature orderable to some act or object naturally has a power for it, and an organ if the power is organic; but of the later things required for act it is not so.
77 Aliter posset dici ad maiorem quod ipsa est vera loquendo de potentia passiva naturali ut passiva comparatur ad activam, non autem ut passiva comparatur ad actum receptum. Differentia membrorum patet in principio solutionis istius quaestionis.	77. It can be said otherwise to the major [n.7] that it is true speaking of a natural passive power as it is a passive power in contrast to an active one, but not as it is a passive power in contrast to a received act. The difference between these two is plain at the beginning of the solution to this question [n.57].
78 Minor autem est vera secundo modo, non primo modo. Posset etiam tertio modo faciliter dici ad minorem, negando, quia licet absolute intellectus possibilis sit naturaliter receptivus talis intellectionis, non tamen pro statu isto. De causa autem huius dicetur inferius distinctione 3.	78. The minor [n.7] however is true in the second way, not the first [n.57]. It might also in a third way be easily replied to the minor by denying it, because although absolutely the possible intellect is naturally receptive of such understanding, not however for this present life. But the cause of this will be spoken about below, 1 d.3 p.1 q.2 n.16; q.3 n.2.
79 Ad rationem tertiam quaere responsionem Thomae in Summa, I parte Summae quaestione 1, ubi respondet sic, quod ƿ ((diversa ratio cognoscibilis diversitatem scientiarum inducit. Eandem enim conclusionem demonstrat astrologus per medium mathematicum, id est a materia abstractum, (puta quod terra est rotunda), et naturalis per medium circa materiam consideratum. Unde nihil prohibet de eisdem rebus de quibus philosophicae disciplinae tractant secundum quod sunt cognoscibilia lumine rationis naturalis etiam aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod cognoscuntur lumine divinae revelationis)). Contra: si de cognoscibilibus in theologia est cognitio tradita vel possibilis tradi in aliis scientiis, licet in alio lumine, ergo non est necessaria cognitio theologica de eisdem. Consequentia patet in exemplo eius, quia cognoscens terram esse rotundam per medium physicum, non indiget cognitione per medium mathematicum, tamquam simpliciter necessaria .	79. To the third reason [n.8] examine the response of Thomas in ST Ia q.1 a.1 ad 2, where he responds thus, that “the diverse nature of the knowable introduces a diversity of sciences. For the same conclusion is demonstrated by the astrologer through a 37 mathematical middle term, that is, one abstracted from matter (to wit, the conclusion that the earth is round), and by the natural philosopher through a middle term that is considered in matter. Hence nothing prevents the same things which the philosophical sciences treat of according to how they are knowable by the light of natural reason from being treated of by another science according to how they are known by the light of divine revelation.” On the contrary: if knowledge of things knowable in theology is handed on or can be handed on in other sciences, although in another light, then theological science about the same things is not necessary. The consequence is clear in his example, because he who knows that the earth is round by a physical middle term does not need the knowledge by a mathematical middle term as if this knowledge were simply necessary.
80 Dicta tamen responsio ad tertium exponitur sic, quod sciƿlicet habitus et est habitus et est forma; in quantum habitus, habet distinctionem ab obiecto, sed in quantum forma, potest distingui a principio activo. Respectu autem habitus scientifici principia sunt causae effectivae. Licet igitur ubi est idem scibile (puta quod terra est rotunda) non sit distinctio per obiecta, tamen est distinctio per principia quibus mathematicus et physicus hoc ostendunt: et ita erit distinctio habituum in quantum sunt formae et non in quantum sunt habitus.	80. The said response, however, to the third argument is thus expounded, namely that a habit is both a habit and a form; insofar as it is a habit it gets its distinction from the object, but insofar as it is a form it can be distinguished by the active principle. Now with respect to the habit of science principles are efficient causes. Although, therefore, where there is the same knowable (for example, that the earth is round) no distinction is drawn through the objects, yet a distinction is drawn through the principles by which the mathematician and the natural philosopher show this; and thus there will be a distinction of habits insofar as they are forms and not insofar as they are habits.
81 Contra: forma est communis ad habitum; sed impossibile est aliqua esse distincta in ratione superioris et indistincta in ratione inferioris; ergo impossibile est aliqua esse distincta per rationem formae unde forma et tamen esse indistincta in ratione habituum (hoc enim esset ac si aliqua essent distincta in ratione animalis et indistincta in ratione hominis). Praeterea, supponit etiam quod principia sunt distinctiva habitus in alio genere causae quam ut principia effectiva, quod falsum est, quia si aliquam rationem causae distinctivae habeant ad habitus, non habent rationem nisi causae efficientis. Praeterea, semper stat ratio quia quantumcumque possent poni habitus distincti cognitivi, tamen non salvatur necessitas unius, quasi alias cognitio sit impossibilis, ponendo possibilitatem alterius habitus undecumque distincti. ƿ	81. On the contrary: the form is common to the habits; but it is impossible for anything to be distinct from other things under the idea of what is superior but not to be thus distinct under the idea of what is inferior; therefore it is impossible for anything to be distinct under the idea of the form whereby it is a form and yet not distinct under the 38 idea of habits (for this would be as if some things were distinct from other things under the idea of ‘animal’ and not distinct from them under the idea of ‘man’). Besides, it supposes too that the principles distinguish the habits in some other genus of cause than as efficient principles, which is false, because if the principles possess some idea of cause that makes distinctions in respect of habits they possess only the idea of efficient cause. Besides, the reason is still in place that, however much one can posit distinct cognitive habits, yet one does not preserve the need for one of them, as though the knowledge would otherwise be impossible, when one posits the possibility of a second habit that is for any reason distinct.
82 Ideo ad argumentum respondeo quod in illis scientiis speculativis etsi tractetur de omnibus speculabilibus, non tamen quantum ad omnia cognoscibilia de eis, quia non quantum ad propria eorum, sicut patuit prius in tertia ratione contra primam opinionem (quaere supra g).	82. Therefore to the argument I reply that in those speculative sciences, although all objects of speculation are treated of, yet not as to everything that is knowable about them, because not as to their properties, in the way it was made clear in the third reason [nn.40-47] against the first opinion.
83 Ad quartum respondetur sic, quod principia prima non possunt applicari ad conclusiones aliquas nisi sensibiles: tum quia termini eorum sunt abstracti a sensibilibus, et ita sapiunt naturam eorum, tum quia intellectus agens, per quem debet fieri applicatio, limitatur ad sensibilia.	83. To the fourth [n.9] the response is thus, that the first principles cannot be applied to any conclusions save those of sense; both because their terms are abstracted from sensibles and thus reflect the nature of them, and because the agent intellect, by which the application must be made, is limited to sensibles.
84 Contra: certum est intellectui ista prima principia esse vera non tantum in sensibilibus, sed etiam in insensibilibus; non enim dubitat magis intellectus quod contradictoria non sunt simul vera de immateriali quam de materiali. Et quod dicitur quod terminus primi principii est ens quod dividitur in decem genera, et illud non extendit se ad obiectum theologicum, hoc nihil valet; non enim magis dubitamus quod contradictoria non sunt simul vera de Deo (ut quod Deus est beatus et non beatus, et huiusmodi) quam de albo. ƿ	84. On the contrary: it is certain to the intellect that those first principles are true not only in sensibles but also in non-sensibles; for the intellect has no more doubt in the case of immaterial things than in the case of material ones that contradictories are not both true. And as to the remark that the term of the first principle is being as divided into the ten categories, and that this does not extend itself to the object of theology, it is of no 39 force; for we are not more in doubt about God that contradictories are not both true (as that God is blessed and not blessed and the like) than about something white.
85 Alia datur responsio, quod ex solis maioribus non sequuntur conclusiones, sed cum minoribus adiunctis; nunc autem minores non sunt naturaliter manifestae quae deberent illis adiungi. Contra: minores sumendae sub primis principiis praedicant de sumptis 'sub' terminos subiectos primorum principiorum; sed notum est terminos primorum principiorum dici de quocumque, quia sunt communissimi; igitur etc.	85. Another response is given, that conclusions do not follow from major premises alone but with the minor premises added; but the minors that should be added to them are not now naturally manifest. On the contrary: the minors to be assumed under the first principles make assertions about things assumed ‘under’ the terms that are the subjects of the first principles; but it is known that the terms of the first principles are said of anything whatever, because they are most common; therefore etc.
86 Ideo respondeo quod secunda pars minoris est falsa, haec videlicet quod in primis principiis 'includuntur virtualiter omnes conclusiones scibiles'. Ad probationem dico quod sicut termini subiecti sunt communes, ita et termini praedicati. Quando igitur termini subiecti, quia distributi, accipiuntur pro omnibus, non accipiuntur pro omnibus nisi respectu terminorum praedicatorum qui sunt communissimi, et per consequens virtute talium principiorum non sciuntur de inferioribus nisi praedicata communissima.	86. For this reason I respond that the second part of the minor is false, namely this, that in the first principles ‘all knowable conclusions are virtually included’ [n.10]. In proof I say that just as the subject terms are common, so also are the predicate terms. When, therefore, the subject terms, because they are distributed, are taken to cover everything, they are not taken to cover everything except in respect of the predicate terms that are most common, and consequently, by virtue of such principles, only the most common predicates are known about lower things.
87 Hoc patet ratione, quia medium non potest esse 'propter quid' respectu alicuius passionis nisi quae passio includitur virtualiter in ratione illius medii; in ratione autem subiecti principii communissimi non includitur 'propter quid' aliqua passio particularis, sed tantum passio communissima; ergo illud subiectum non potest esse medium vel ratio cognoscendi aliqua nisi sub illa ratione commuƿnissima. Sed praeter passiones communissimas sunt multae aliae passiones scibiles, ad quas passiones non possunt passiones primorum principiorum esse media, quia non includunt illas. Igitur multae sunt veritates scibiles quae non includuntur in primis principiis. Hoc patet in exemplo, quia ista 'omne totum est maius sua parte' etsi includat istam 'quaternarius est maior binario', et alias similes de eodem praedicato, non includit tamen istas: 'quaternarius est duplus ad binarium', 'ternarius se habet in proportione sexquialtera ad dualitatem', nam ad ista praedicata oporteret quod habet specialia media includentia ipsa.	87. This is clear in the reason, because the middle term cannot be the ‘why’ in respect of any property save of one that is virtually included in the idea of the middle term; but in the idea of the subject of the most common principle the ‘why’ of any particular property is not included, but only of the most common property; therefore the subject cannot be the middle term or reason for knowing anything save under the most common idea. But there are in addition to the most common properties many other knowable properties for which the properties of the first principles cannot be the middle 40 terms, because they do not include them. Therefore there are many knowable truths that are not included in the first principles. This is clear in the example, because the statement ‘every whole is greater than its part’, although it includes the statement ‘four is greater than two’, and other like statements about the same predicate, yet it does not include the following: ‘four is double in respect of two’, ‘three is in the relation of one and a half to two’, for there would be need that these predicates have special middle terms which include them.
88 Tertia probatio, logica, est quia licet contingat descendere sub subiecto universalis affirmativae, non tamen sub praedicato; multa autem praedicata contenta sub praedicatis primorum principiorum sunt scibilia de inferioribus ad subiecta illorum; igitur illa praedicata per prima principia non sciuntur de illis subiectis.	88. The third proof [the first proof is n.86, the second n.87], a logical one, is that although it may be possible to descend under the subject of a universal affirmative, yet not under the predicate; but many predicates contained under the predicates of the first principles are knowable of things inferior to the subjects of the principles; therefore these predicates are not known of these subjects through the first principles.
89 Contra istud obicitur: 'de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio et de nullo eodem ambo'; sequitur 'igitur de hoc album vel non al ƿ bum', ita quod licet ibi descendere sub praedicato et sub subiecto. Respondeo: istud principium 'de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio' etc., valet istam 'de quolibet cuiuslibet contradictionis altera pars estvera et altera falsa', ubi est duplex distributio, et sub utroque distributo licet descendere 'ergo de hoc huius contradictionis' etc.; sed sub praedicato stante confuse tantum non licet descendere, quia non sequitur 'de quolibet cuiuslibet contradictionis altera pars, ergo haec pars'. Ita est in aliis principiis; semper praedicatum universalis affirmativae stat confuse tantum, sive sint ibi duae distributiones in subiecto sive una. Et in proposito exemplo adhuc patet propositum. Quia de homine scibile est quod est risibilis, numquam per hoc principium 'de quolibet' etc. potest plus inferri nisi 'igitur de homine risibile vel non risibile'. Altera igitur pars praedicati disiuncti numƿquam scietur de subiecto per hoc principium, sed requiritur aliud principium speciale, ut definitio subiecti vel passionis, quod quidem est medium et ratio ad sciendum 'risibile' determinate de homine.	89. An objection against this: ‘affirmation or negation about a thing are also both about the same not-thing’; the consequence follows, ‘therefore about this white or nonwhite’, in such a way that it is licit to descend there under the predicate and under the subject. I reply that the principle ‘affirmation or negative about a thing’ etc. is equivalent to the principle ‘one side of any contradiction about anything is true and the other false’, where there are two distributed terms and it is licit to descend under either distributed term to ‘therefore about this part of this contradiction’ etc.; but under a predicate that only stands confusedly it is not licit to descend, because this does not follow, ‘one side of any contradiction about anything, therefore this side’. Thus it is in other principles; the predicate of a universal affirmative always only stands confusedly, whether there are two distributed terms there in the subject or one. And in the proposed example the proposed case is also plain. Just because it is knowable about man that he is capable of laughter, never can more be inferred by the principle ‘one side of any contradiction’ etc. than that ‘therefore about man he is either capable or not capable of laughter’. One or other part, then, of the predicated disjunction will never be known of the subject by this principle, but some other special principle is required, as the definition of the subject or the property, which is indeed the middle term and the reason for knowing ‘capable of laughter’ determinately of man.
90 Ad primum distinguo de obiecto naturali. Potest enim accipi obiectum naturale vel pro illo ad quod naturaliter sive ex actione causarum naturaliter activarum potest potentia attingere, vel pro illo ad quod naturaliter inclinatur potentia, sive possit attingere naturaliter illud obiectum sive non. Posset igitur maior negari intelligendo 'naturale' primo modo, quia obiectum primum est adaequatum potentiae, et ideo abstractum ab omnibus illis circa quae potest potentia operari; non autem oportet quod si intellectus possit naturaliter intelligere tale commune, quod possit naturaliter intelligere quodcumque contentum sub illo, quia intellectio alicuius contenti multo excellentior est intellectione confusa talis communis; sic, concessa minore in utroque sensu, conclusio intenta non habetur, scilicet de naturaliter attingibili, quia sic maior fuit falsa. ƿ	90. To the principal arguments. – To the first [n.1] I draw a distinction about the natural object. For ‘natural object’ can be taken either for that which can naturally or by the action of causes naturally active be attained, or for that to which the power is naturally inclined, whether it can naturally attain the object or not. The major, then, might be denied by denying ‘natural’ in the first way, because the first object is something adequate to the power and is therefore abstracted from all those things that the power is able to operate on; however it is not necessary that the intellect, if it could naturally understand some such common thing, could naturally understand whatever is contained under it, because the understanding of something contained is much more excellent than a confused understanding of such a common thing; thus, although the minor is in each sense conceded, the intended conclusion is not gained, namely the conclusion about something naturally attainable, because the major in this way was false.
91 Contra hanc responsionem arguo quod destruit seipsam. Primum enim obiectum est adaequatum potentiae, per ipsum, et verum est, hoc est, quod nihil respicit potentia pro obiecto nisi in quo est ratio illius primi, et in quocumque est ratio illius primi illud respicit potentia pro obiecto; igitur impossibile est aliquid esse primum naturaliter quin sit quodlibet contentum sic per se obiectum naturaliter. Da enim oppositum, et tunc non est adaequatum naturaliter sed excedens, et aliquod eo inferius est adaequatum, et ita primum. Ratio autem quae adducitur pro responsione fallit secundum figuram dictionis. Licet enim ens ut est quid intelligibile uno actu (sicut homo est intelligibilis una intellectione) sit naturaliter intelligibile (illa enim unica intellectio entis ut unius obiecti est naturalis), non tamen potest ens poni primum obiectum naturaliter attingibile, quia est primum obiectum ut includitur in omnibus per se obiectis, et ut sic non est naturaliter attingibile nisi quodlibet illorum sit naturaliter attingibile. Commutat igitur hic 'hoc ƿ aliquid' in 'quale quid' cum arguit 'ens est naturaliter intelligibile, igitur ens ut est primum obiectum intellectus, hoc est adaequatum, est attingibile naturaliter', quia antecedens est verum ut ens est unum singulare intelligibile, sicut album, sed consequens concludit de ente ut includitur in omni intelligibili, non ut seorsum ab illis intelligitur.	91. Against this response I reply that it destroys itself. For the first object is by itself something adequate to the power and is true, namely because the power has regard to nothing as object except what has in it the nature of the first object, and whatever has in it the nature of the first object the power has regard to it as to its object; therefore it is impossible for something to be naturally first without anything whatever that is contained in it being thus per se naturally the object. For grant the opposite, and then it is not naturally adequate but exceeds, and something inferior to it is adequate, and thus is first. Now the reason that is adduced for the response [n.90] is the fallacy of figure of speech. For although being, insofar as it is something intelligible in one act (as man is intelligible in one understanding), is naturally intelligible (for the one understanding of being as of a single object is natural), yet being cannot be posited as the first object naturally attainable, because it is the first object as it is included in all per se objects, and as such only whatever among them is naturally intelligible is naturally attainable. Therefore the phrase ‘this thing’ is altered to ‘this thing as qualified’ when it is argued ‘being is naturally intelligible, therefore being as it is the first object of the intellect is the adequate object and naturally attainable,’ for the antecedent is true of being as it is one intelligible, the way white is, but the consequent draws a conclusion about being as it is included in all intelligibles, not as it is intelligible apart from them.
92 Ad argumentum igitur est alia responsio, realis, quod videlicet minor est falsa de obiecto naturali, id est naturaliter attingibili, - vera alio modo, ad quod scilicet naturaliter inclinatur vel ordinatur potentia. Et ita debet intelligi auctoritas Avicennae. Quid autem sit ponendum obiectum primum naturaliter attingibile, de hoc infra distinctione 3. Confirmatur responsio per Anselmum De libero arbitrio cap. 4: ((Nullam)), inquit, ((ut puto, habemus potestatem, quae sola sufficiat ad actum)). 'Potestatem' vocat quod nos communiter vocamus 'potentiam'; patet per exemplum eius de visu. Non est igitur inconveniens potentiam esse naturaliter ordinatam ad obiectum ad quod non potest naturaliter ex ƿ causis naturalibus attingere, sicut quaelibet ex se sola ordinatur et tamen non potest sola attingere.	92. To the argument [n.1], then, there is another response, a real one, namely because the minor is false about the natural object, that it is naturally attainable, – it is true in the other way, namely as that to which the power is naturally inclined or ordained [n.90]. And in this way should the authority of Avicenna be understood. But as to what should be set down as the first object naturally attainable, 1 d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.8-12 below is about it. The response is confirmed by Anselm On Free Choice of the Will ch.3, ‘We have, as I think, no ability,’ he says, ‘that is sufficient of itself for act.’ He calls ability what we commonly call power; it is clear from his example about sight. It is not therefore inappropriate for a power to be naturally ordained to an object which it cannot naturally attain by natural causes, after the manner of anything that is directed of itself alone to something and yet cannot on its own attain that something.
93 Ad secundum argumentum nego consequentiam. - Ad probationem patet ex dictis in responsione data ad secundum argumentum pro opinione Philosophi, quia superiora ordinantur ad perfectionem maiorem passive recipiendam quam ipsa active possunt producere, et per consequens istorum perfectio non potest produci nisi ab aliquo agente supernaturali. Non sic est de perfectione inferiorum, quorum perfectio ultima potest subesse actioni inferiorum agentium.	93. To the second argument [n.2] I deny the consequence. – To the proof [n.2] the thing is clear from what was said [nn.73-78] in the response given to the second argument for the opinion of the Philosopher, that higher things are ordered to the passive reception of a higher perfection than they themselves can actively produce, and consequently their perfection cannot be produced except by some supernatural agent. It is not so with the perfection of inferior things, whose final perfection can be subject to the action of inferior agents.
94 Ad tertium dico quod veritati complexae alicui firmiter tenendae intellectus possibilis est improportionatus, id est, non est proportionale mobile talium agentium quae ex phantasmatibus et ex lumine naturali intellectus agentis non possunt cognosci. Quando arguis 'ergo fit proportionalis per aliud', concedo et 'per aliud' in ratione moventis, quia per movens supernaturale revelans assentit illi veritati, - et 'per aliud' in ratione formae, quia ƿ per illum assensum factum in ipso, qui est quasi quaedam inclinatio in intellectu ad istud obiectum, proportionans illum isti. Cum ultra de illo 'alio' quaeris 'an sit naturale vel supernaturale', dico quod supernaturale, sive intelligas de agente sive de forma. Cum infers 'ergo intellectus est improportionatus ad illud, et per aliud proportionatur', dico quod ex se est in potentia oboedientiali ad agens, et ita sufficienter proportionatur illi ad hoc ut ab ipso moveatur. Similiter, ex se est capax illius assensus causati a tali agente, etiam naturaliter capax; non oportet igitur ipsum per aliud proportionari ipsi assensui recipiendo. Statur igitur in secundo, non in primo, quia veritas ista revelata sufficienter non est inclinativa intellectus ad assentiendum sibi, et ita improportionale agens, et passum sibi improportionale; sed agens supernaturale est sufficienter inclinativum intellectus ad istam veritatem, causando in ipso assensum quo proportionatur huic veritati, ita quod non oportet intellectum per aliud proportionari tali agenti, nec formae ab ipso impressae, sicut oportet ipsum proportionari tali obiecto per aliud duplici modo praedicto. ƿ	94. To the third argument [n.3] I say that the possible intellect is not commensurate with firm possession of every propositional truth, that is, it is not commensurate with being moved by the sort of agents that it cannot get to know from phantasms and the natural light of the agent intellect. When you argue ‘therefore it is made commensurate by something else’ I concede the point – both as to ‘by something else’ in the sense of ‘by a mover’, because the possible intellect assents to the truth through a mover that reveals supernaturally, and as to ‘by something else’ in the sense of ‘by a form’, because it assents by the assent that is 44 made in the possible intellect, which assent is a sort of inclination in the intellect toward that object, making it commensurate with the object. When about that ‘something else’ you ask further ‘whether it is natural or supernatural’, I say that it is supernatural, whether you understand the question of the agent or of the form. When you infer ‘therefore the intellect is not commensurate with it, and is by something else made commensurate with it ’, I say that it is of itself in a state of obediential potency with respect to the agent [cf. 3 d.1 q.2 n.7, q.4 n.2], and thus it is sufficiently commensurate with it for the purpose of being moved by it. Likewise, it is of itself capable of the assent caused by such an agent, even naturally capable; it is not necessary, therefore, that it be by something else made commensurate for receiving the very assent. A stand, then, is made at the second stage, not the first [n.3], because the revealed truth does not sufficiently incline the intellect to assent to it, and thus the agent is not commensurate and the recipient is not commensurate to it; but a supernatural agent does sufficiently incline the intellect to the truth, by causing in it an assent whereby it is commensurate with this truth, such that there is no need for the intellect to be by something else made commensurate to such an agent or to the form it impresses, as there is need that it be by something else made commensurate in the two aforesaid ways to such an object [n.94].