Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P1Qu/A4

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Art. 4
66 Tres rationes quibus innititur ista solutio confirmantur per auctoritates. Prima per auctoritatem Augustini XVIII De civitate cap. 11: ((Philosophi, nescientes ad quem finem essent ista referenda, inter falsa quae locuti sunt verum videre potuerunt)) etc.	66. The three reasons on which this solution rests are confirmed by authorities. The first [nn.13-16] by the authority of Augustine City of God XVII ch.41 n.3: “The philosophers, not knowing to what end those things were to be referred, were able, among the false things they said, to see something true” etc.
67 Secunda confirmatur per Augustinum XI De civitate cap. 2: ((Quid prodest nosse quo eundum sit, si ignoratur via qua eundum sit?)) In hoc errabant philosophi, qui etsi aliqua vera de virtutibus tradiderunt, tamen falsa miscuerunt, secundum auctoritatem praecedentem Augustini, et patet ex eorum libris. Improbat enim Aristoteles politias a multis aliis dispositas, II Politicae. Sed nec ipsa politia Aristotelis est irreprehensibilis: VII ƿ enim Politicae cap. 7 docet deos esse honorandos ((( Decet enim)), inquit, ((honorem exhibere diis))), et ibidem cap. 5 ((lex nullum orbatum)) tradit ((nutrire))!	67. The second reason [nn.17-18] is confirmed by Augustine City of God XI ch.2: “What advantage is it to know whither one should go if the way by which one should go is not known?” On this point the philosophers were in error who, although they handed on some truths about the virtues, yet mixed in falsehoods, according to the preceding authority of Augustine [n.66], and it is plain from their books. For Aristotle blames the polities arranged by many others, Politics 2. But neither is the polity itself of Aristotle free of blame: in the Politics, 7.9.1329a29-32, he teaches that the gods are to be honored (“For it is fitting,” he says, “to give honor to the gods”), and in the same place, 7.16.1335b19-25, he hands on a law “not to nourish anything defective”!
68 Tertia ratio confirmatur per Augustinum XI De civitate cap. 3: ((Ea quae remota sunt a sensibus nostris, quoniam testimonio nostro scire non possumus, aliorum testimonio requirimus)). Et hoc confirmat totam solutionem principalem. Quia enim complexiones illae de quibus argutum est nobis ex se neutrae sunt, nullus potest testimonio suo credere de ipsis, sed oportet testimonium supernaturale requirere alicuius superioris tota specie humana.	68. The third reason is confirmed by Augustine City of God XI ch.3: “As to things that are remote from our senses, since we cannot know them by our own testimony, we require the testimony of others.” And this confirms the whole of the principal solution. For because the propositions about which our argument is [nn.40-41] are in themselves neutral, no one can believe them on his own testimony, but a supernatural testimony must be required of someone who is above the whole human race.
69 Qualiter autem prima traditio sive revelatio talis doctrinae potuerit fieri et facta fuerit, dubium est, - an scilicet locutione interiore, an exteriore, cum aliquibus signis adhibitis, sufficientibus ad causandum assensum; ad propositum sufficit, quod utroque modo ƿ potuit supernaturaliter talis doctrina revelari, sed neutro modo sine errore potuit ab homine tradi primo.	69. Now in what way the first handing down or revelation of such doctrine could be done or was done is doubtful – whether, that is, it was by interior locution or exterior, along with the use of some signs sufficient to cause assent; but it suffices for the proposed case that such doctrine could have been supernaturally revealed in either way, although it could in neither way have been first handed down by a man without error.
70 Contra istas tres rationes simul instatur quod seipsas destruant, quia quod ostenditur esse necessario cognoscendum, hoc ostenditur esse verum, quia nihil scitur nisi verum; ergo quidquid istae rationes ostendunt necessarium esse cognosci (puta quod fruitio Dei in se est finis hominis, quoad primam, - via deveniendi ad ipsam, est per merita quae Deus acceptat ut digna tali praemio, quoad secundam, - quod Deus est trinus et contingenter causat, et huiusmodi, quoad tertiam), totum illud ostenditur esse verum. Vel igitur istae rationes non sunt nisi ex fide, vel ex ipsis concluditur oppositum illius quod probant.	70. Against these three reasons it is at once instanced that they destroy themselves, because a thing that is shown as requiring necessarily to be known is shown to be true, because nothing is known except truth; therefore whatever those reasons show as necessary to be known (namely, that the enjoyment of God in himself is the end of man as to the first reason [nn.13-16], – the way to reach it is through the merits that God accepts as worthy of such reward as to the second reason [nn.17-18], – that God is triune and causes contingently, and the like, as to the third reason [nn.40-41]), all this is shown 34 to be true. Either, then, those reasons only rest on faith, or from them is concluded the opposite of what they prove.
71 Respondeo: naturali ratione ostenditur necessarium esse scire alteram partem determinate huius contradictionis 'fruitio est finis, fruitio non est finis', hoc est, quod intellectus non est mere dubius vel neuter in hoc problemate 'an fruitio sit finis', quia talis dubitatio vel ignorantia impediret inquisitionem finis; non autem ostenƿditur naturali ratione quod haec pars sit necessario cognoscenda. Et hoc modo rationes praedictae ut sunt naturales concludunt de altera parte contradictionis, hac vel illa; non determinate de hac nisi ex creditis tantum.	71. I reply: by natural reason it is shown that there is need to know determinately one part of this contradiction, ‘enjoyment is the end, enjoyment is not the end’, that is, that the intellect is not merely doubtful or neutral about this problem, ‘whether enjoyment is the end’, because such doubt or ignorance would impede search for the end; but by natural reason it is not shown that this part needs to be known necessarily. And in this way the aforesaid reasons, insofar as they are natural, conclude to one side of the contradiction, this or that; not about it determinately except only from things believed [cf. n.12].