Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P3Q1/A1

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
124 Quaeritur utrum theologia sit de Deo ut de primo obiecto.	The question is whether theology is about God as about its first object.
Art. 1
Quod non, arguitur duabus viis: Prima est quod aliud sit subiectum theologiae, igitur non istud. Antecedens probatur multipliciter:	124. And that it is not is argued in two ways: [Argument in the First Way] – The first way is that something else is the subject of theology, therefore this is not. The antecedent is proved in several ways:
125 Primo sic, per Augustinum De doctrina christiana libro I cap. 1: ((Omnis Scriptura est de rebus vel de signis)); igitur res vel signa sunt subiectum.	125. First thus, from Augustine On Christian Doctrine 1 ch.2 n.2: “All Scripture is of things or of signs;” therefore things or signs are the subject.
126 Item, Scriptura habet quattuor sensus: anagogicum, tropologicum, allegoricum et historicum vel litteralem; cuilibet autem sensui correspondet aliquod subiectum primum, sicut alii scientiae ƿ tantum habenti unum sensum correspondet subiectum secundum illum sensum; igitur hic sunt quattuor subiecta.	126. Again, Scripture has four senses: the anagogical, the tropological, the allegorical, and the historical or literal; but to each of these senses there corresponds some first subject, just as to any other science having one sense there corresponds a subject in accord with that sense; therefore here there are four subjects.
127 Item, quod homo sit subiectum probatur auctoritate Commentatoris I Ethicorum in prologo, quia, secundum eum ibi, scientia moralis est de homine quoad animam, medicinalis est de homine quoad corpus. Ex hoc accipitur illa propositio: 'omnis practica scientia habet pro obiecto primo illud cui acquiritur finis practicae scientiae, et non ipsum finem'; sed finis huius scientiae acquiritur homini, non Deo; ergo homo est subiectum huius scientiae et non Deus.	127. Again, that man is the subject is proved by the authority of the Commentator on Ethics bk.1 in the prologue, because, according to him there, moral science is of man as to his soul, medical science is of man as to his body. From this is received the proposition: ‘every practical science has for first object that for which the end of the practical science is acquired and not the end itself’; but the end of this science is acquired for man, not God; therefore man is the subject of this science.
128 Item aliter, sed quasi redit in idem: finis scientiae est per actum suum attingere obiectum primum inducendo in illud formam principaliter a scientia intentam, puta, ut in speculativa, inducere in illud 'esse cognitum', quia cognitio ibi principaliter intenditur, in practica inducere formam ad quam ordinatur eius praxis; finis autem hic intentus est bonitas moralis, quae non intenditur induci in Deo sed in homine; ergo homo est primum obiectum eius.	128. Again in another way, though it comes back to the same: the end of a science is to attain through its act the first object by introducing into the act the form principally intended by the science, to wit: as in the case of speculative science, to introduce into it ‘being known’, because knowledge is principally there intended; in the case of practical science, to introduce the form to which its action is ordered; but the end here intended is moral goodness, and the intention is not to introduce it in God but in man; therefore man is its first object.
129 Secunda via ad propositum est ostendere quod Deus non sit eius primum subiectum. ƿ Quod primo probatur auctoritate Boethii De Trinitate: ((Forma)), inquit, ((simplex subiectum esse non potest)).	129. [Argument in the Second Way] – The second way to the proposed conclusion is to show that God is not theology’s first object. This is proved first by the authority of Boethius On the Trinity ch.2: “The form,” he says, “cannot be a simple subject.”
130 Item, materia non coincidit cum aliis causis - II Physicorum neque in idem numero neque in idem specie; Deus autem est finis huius scientiae et efficiens; non igitur materia.	130. Again, the matter does not coincide with the other causes in the same thing, whether in number or in kind (Physics 2.7.198a24-27); but God is the end and efficient cause of this science; therefore he is not the matter of it.
131 Item, ex I Posteriorum, subiectum scientiae habet partes, principia et passiones. Deus autem non habet partes integrales, cum sit omnino simplex, nec subiectivas, cum sit singularis ex se; nec habet principia, cum sit primum principium, nec passiones, quia passio inest subiecto ita quod est extra eius essentiam; sic nihil inest Deo.	131. Again, from Posterior Analytics 1.28.87a38-39, the subject of a science has parts: principles and properties. But God does not have integral parts, since he is altogether simple, nor subjective parts, since he is singular of himself; nor does he have principles, since he is the first principle, nor properties, because a property is present in a subject in such a way that it is outside the subject’s essence; nothing is present in God in this way.
132 Contra: Augustinus VIII De civitate cap. 1: ((Theologia est sermo vel ratio de Deo)). ƿ	132. To the Contrary: Augustine City of God VIII ch.1: “Theology is discussion or reasoning about God.”
133 Secundo quaeritur utrum theologia sit de Deo sub aliqua ratione speciali. Quod sic, arguitur: Hugo De sacramentis, in principio, vult quod ((opera restaurationis)) sint subiectum; igitur si Deus est hic subiectum, hoc erit sub aliqua ratione eius speciali, in quantum scilicet est restaurator.	133. The question second is whether theology is about God under some special idea. That it is so is argued thus: Hugh [of St. Victor] in On Sacraments at the beginning wants the subject to be “the works of restoration;” therefore if God is this subject, this will be under some special idea of it, namely insofar as he is restorer.
134 Item, Cassiodorus Super Psalterium vult quod Christus sit subiectum, caput cum membris; igitur specialiter ut incarnatus sive ut caput Ecclesiae erit subiectum.	134. Cassiodorus in On the Psalter pref. ch.13 wants the subject to be Christ, the head with his members; therefore he will be the subject specifically as incarnate or as head of the Church.
135 Item, Deus absolute est subiectum metaphysicae; igitur si est hic subiectum, hoc erit sub aliqua ratione speciali. Consequentia probatur, quia non sub eadem ratione omnino est subiectum hic et ibi. Antecedens probatur per Philosophum VI Metaphysicae: ((Honorabilissimam scientiam oportet esse circa honorabilissimum ƿ genus subiectum)); illa secundum ipsum est honorabilissima. Hoc etiam confirmatur, quia vocat ibi metaphysicam theologiam.	135. Again, God absolutely is the subject of metaphysics; therefore if he is the subject here, this will be under some special idea. The proof of the consequence is that the subject in this case and in that is not taken under wholly the same idea. The proof of the antecedent is from the Philosopher in Metaphysics 6.1.1026a21-23: “The most 67 honorable science should be about the most honorable subject;” metaphysics according to him is the most honorable science. A confirmation for this indeed is that he there calls metaphysics theology [1026a18-19].
136 Item, Averroes I Physicorum ultimo commento dicit quod Avicenna multum peccavit ponendo metaphysicam probare primam causam esse, cum genus substantiarum separatarum sit ibi subiectum, et nulla scientia probat suum subiectum esse; sed ratio illa Averrois non valeret nisi intelligeret quod Deus esset primum subiectum ibi; ergo etc.	136. Again, Averroes on Physics 1, final comment [com.83], says that Avicenna was greatly at fault for laying down that metaphysics proves that there is a first cause, since the class of separate substances is there the subject and no science proves that its subject exists; but Averroes’ reason would not be valid unless he understood God there to be the first subject; therefore etc.
137 Item, ista scientia est honorabilissima, ergo est de subiecto nobilissimo sub ratione nobilissima; huiusmodi est ratio finis et boni. De fine probatur per Avicennam VI Metaphysicae: ((Si scientia esset de causis, quae esset de fine esset nobilissima)). Ex hoc concluditur de bono, quia - secundum Philosophum II Metaphysicae qui ponit infinitatem in finibus, destruit naturam boni, quia destruit naturam finis. Ex hoc accipitur quod ratio boni est ratio finis. ƿ	137. Again, this science is most honorable, therefore it is about the noblest subject under its noblest idea; of this sort is the idea of end and good. The proof, as to the end, is in Avicenna Metaphysics 6 ch.5 (95rb): “If the science is about causes, the one that is about the end would be noblest.” From this the conclusion about the good follows, because – according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 2.2.994b12-13 – he who posits an infinity in respect of ends destroys the idea of good, because he destroys the idea of end. From this is taken the conclusion that the idea of good is the idea of end.
138 Contra: Cognitio contracta supponit cognitionem absolutam. Absoluta autem cognitio est certior, ex I Metaphysicae: igitur si ista est de Deo sub ratione aliqua speciali, erit aliqua alia prior et certior de Deo absolute sumpto; talis non ponitur; igitur etc.	138. On the contrary: Knowledge with a restriction presupposes knowledge without a restriction, or absolute knowledge. But absolute knowledge is more certain, from Metaphysics 1.2.982a21-23, 25-28; therefore if this science is of God under some special idea, there will be some other science, prior and more certain, about God taken absolutely; but no such science is posited; therefore etc.
139 Quaeritur utrum scientia ista sit de omnibus ex attributione eorum ad primum eius subiectum. Quod sic: IV Metaphysicae, eadem est scientia de aliquo et de attributis ad ipsum, sicut exemplificat ibi de sano; sed omnia alia essentialiter attribuuntur ad subiectum primum huius; igitur etc. ƿ	139. The question is whether theology is about everything by way of attribution of them to its first subject. That it is: Metaphysics 4.1.1003a21-22: the science about a thing and about the attributes of the thing is the same, as is shown there by the example of health; but all other things are attributed essentially to the first subject of this science; therefore etc.
140 Contra: XIV De Trinitate cap. 1: ((Neque huic scientiae attribuendum est)) etc.	140. [Augustine] On the Trinity 14 ch.1 n.3: “And must not be attributed to this science etc.”