Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P3Q1/A2

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Art. 2
141 Circa solutionem huius quaestionis sic procedo: primo distinguo de theologia in se et de theologia in nobis; secundo assignabo rationem primi obiecti; tertio distinguam de theologia quantum ad partes eius. De primo dico quod quaelibet scientia in se est illa quae nata est haberi de obiecto eius secundum quod obiectum natum est manifestare se intellectui proportionato; doctrina autem nobis est illa quae nata est haberi in intellectu nostro de obiecto illo. Theologia igitur in se est talis cognitio qualem natum est obiectum theologicum facere in intellectu sibi proportionato; theologia vero nobis est talis cognitio qualem intellectus noster natus est habere de illo obiecto. - Exemplum: si aliquis intellectus non posset intelligere geometricalia, posset tamen alicui ƿ credere de geometricalibus, geometria esset sibi fides, non scientia; esset tamen geometria in se scientia, quia obiectum geometriae natum est facere scientiam de se in intellectu proportionato.	141. As to the solution of this question [nn.124-140] I proceed thus: first I distinguish between theology in itself and theology in us; second I will designate the idea of its first subject; third I will distinguish theology into its parts. [About theology in itself and in us] – On the first point I say that any science taken in itself is that which is naturally had of the object of the science in accord with the way the object naturally manifests itself to an intellect commensurate with it; now doctrine for us is what is naturally had in our intellect about the object. Therefore theology in itself is the sort of knowledge that the object of theology naturally produces in an intellect commensurate with itself; but theology in us is the sort of knowledge that our intellect naturally has about the object. – An example: if some intellect could not understand geometrical matters yet could believe someone else about geometrical matters, geometry for it would be faith, not science; however geometry in itself would be a science, because the object of geometry naturally produces science of itself in an intellect commensurate with it.
142 De secundo dico quod ratio primi obiecti est continere in se primo virtualiter omnes veritates illius habitus. Quod probo sic: primo, quia obiectum primum continet propositiones immediatas, quia subiectum illarum continet praedicatum, et ita evidentiam propositionis totius; propositiones autem immediatae continent conclusiones; ergo subiectum propositionum immediatarum continet omnes veritates illius habitus.	142. [On the Idea of the First Object] – On the second point I say that the nature of the first object is to be what first contains virtually in itself all the truths of the habit of the science. Which I prove thus: first, that the first object contains the immediate propositions, because the subject of those propositions contains the predicate, and thus it contains the evidence for the whole proposition; now immediate propositions contain the conclusions; therefore the subject of the immediate propositions contains all the truths of the habit of the science.
143 Declaro idem secundo sic, quia primitas hic accipitur ex I Posteriorum, ex definitione universalis, secundum quod dicit adaequationem; $a obiectum non esset adaequatum habitui nisi virtualiter ƿ contineret omnia illa ad quae consideranda habitus talis inclinat, quia si non, habitus excederet obiectum illud. a$	143. I make the same clear in a second way thus, that ‘firstness’ is here taken from Posterior Analytics 1 ch.4 73b32-33, from the definition of ‘universal’ in the sense in which ‘universal’ indicates adequacy: the object would not be adequate to the habit unless it virtually contained everything that such a habit inclines one to consider, because, if it did not, the habit would exceed the object.
144 Expono quod dixi 'primo virtualiter', quia illud est primum quod non dependet ab alio sed alia ab ipso; ita igitur 'primo continere' est non dependere ab aliis in continendo sed alia ab ipso, hoc est, quod, per impossibile, circumscripto omni alio in ratione obiecti, manente intellectu eius, adhuc contineret obiective. Nihil aliud autem continet nisi per rationem eius.	144. By the phrase ‘first…virtually’ [n.142], I mean that it is first in the sense that it does not depend on another but other things depend on it; in this sense, then, ‘first contains’ means that, in its containing, it does not depend on other things but other things depend on it, that is, that if, per impossibile, all other things in the idea of the object were removed and only it remained understood, it would still objectively contain them. But it does not contain anything else save through its idea.
145 $a Quod eius essentia cognita habitualiter continet 'virtualiter primo' notitiam omnium veritatum illius habitus: ƿ Ille habitus qui dicitur scientia est species intelligibilis primi obiecti; ille respicit veritates immediatas et mediatas, non formaliter sed ex consequenti, et suum obiectum adaequatum formaliter est quiditas cuius est species. Quid igitur mirum si primum obiectum ut cognitum continet notitiam illorum ad quae consideranda sua species intelligibilis, licet mediate, movet? Immo idem est speciem intelligibilem a continere virtualiter notitiam b, et ipsum a ut cognitum habitualiter, continere, quod est, speciem intelligibilem ipsius a in memoria posse gignere notitiam b in intelligentia. Secundum hoc igitur idem est obiectum primum intellectus et scientiae: et tunc primum obiectum non distinguit illa, sed proximum, quod est verum immediatum et verum mediatum, et illud primum obiectum utriusque, ordine quodam se habet ad obiecta proxima et habitus ipsorum. Secundum hoc impossibile est uti habitu scientiae nisi prius natura et simul tempore utendo habitu intellectus, quia numquam speculor sciendo nisi considerando hoc ut verum, evidens mihi propter aliud verum. Vel igitur sunt idem habitus, et prius utor illo circa illud obiectum ad quod prius inclinat (immo secundum Henricum IX Quodlibet quaestione 4 ambo sunt idem illi habitui qui est quiditas primi obiecti simplicis, quem habitum tu dicis vocari scientiam apud Aristotelem in distinctione scientiarum), vel sunt multi - immo quodlibet verum habet proprium ƿ habitum, et praeter hoc est habitus quiditatis primi obiecti quem dicis speciem intelligibilem, et ille includit virtualiter omnes, et tunc utentem posteriore oportet simul uti omnibus prioribus. Numquid igitur ad multos actus vel unum comparans habet proprium actum circa utrumque comparatum? et praeter hoc, actum comparandi etiam ad illum maxime discurrendi? - Ponitur proprius habitus, quo inclinor demonstrare, id est inferre hoc ex hoc: ad quae extrema habeo duos habitus; quaere cedulam tertio sexterno, infra, contra Henricum, Richardum, hic - si caperetur pluralitas, paucitas esset praeeligenda.	145. That its essence, once known with the habit of science, contains ‘first virtually’ the knowledge of all the truths of the habit: The habit that is called science is an intelligible likeness (species) of the first object; it regards immediate truths and mediate ones, not formally, but by implication, and its formally adequate object is the quiddity of which it is the likeness. What wonder, then, if the first object, qua known, contains the knowledge of the things which its intelligible species moves one, although mediately, to consider? Nay rather, it is the same thing for the intelligible species of A to contain virtually knowledge of B, and for the A itself, as known with the habit of science, to contain it, that is, that the intelligible species of the A itself in memory is able to generate knowledge of B in the intelligence. In this way, then, the first object of the intellect and of the science are the same; and then the first object distinguishes, not them, but what proximately follows them, which is immediate and mediate truth, and the first object of the two of them is related in a certain order to the proximate objects and to the habit of science of the proximate objects. In this way it is impossible to use the habit of the science save by using first in nature, and also in time, the habit of intellect, because I never contemplate anything in scientific knowledge save by considering it as true, evident to me because of some other truth. 71 Either, then, they are the same habit, and I first use the habit about the object to which it first inclines me (nay rather, according to Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 9 q.4, both are the same as the habit which is the quiddity of the first simple object, which habit you say is called science by Aristotle in his distinction of sciences); or they are more than one habit – nay rather, any truth at all has its own habit, and, in addition to it, there is the habit of the quiddity of the first object, which you say is the intelligible likeness, and it virtually includes all of the habits – and then he who uses the later habit must at the same time be using all the prior ones. Can it be, then, that a habit, when compared with many acts or with one act, has an act proper to both of what it is compared with? And, besides this, an act of comparing it as well with that chief act of discursive reasoning? – My own proper act is set down as that whereby I am inclined to perform a demonstration, that is, to infer this from that; for which extremes I have two acts; look for the passage with the triangular mark below, against Henry of Ghent and Richard of St. Victor [1 d.2 p.2 q1.4 nn.35, 36] – If a plurality of habits may be made sense of, a fewness of them should be preferred.
146 Contra scilicet assignationem rationis primi obiecti superius positae a$ arguitur dupliciter. Primo sic: sicut obiectum primum ƿ ad potentiam, ita obiectum primum ad habitum; sed primum obiectum potentiae est aliquid commune ad omnia per se obiecta illius potentiae; igitur primum obiectum habitus est aliquid commune ad omnia obiecta eius, et non aliquid virtualiter continens alia.	146. On the contrary, namely against the designation of the above posited idea of the first object [nn.142-145], there are two arguments. First thus: as the first object is to the power, so is the first object to the habit; but the first object of the power is something common to all the per se objects of that power; therefore the first object of the habit is something common to all its objects, and not something that virtually contains other things.
147 Item secundo, quia communiter assignatur in scientiis pro primo obiecto aliquid quod est commune ad illa omnia quae considerantur in illa scientia, sicut in geometria linea, in arithmetica numerus, in metaphysica ens.	147. Again second: because what is commonly designated for first object in the sciences is something that is common to all the things that are considered in that science, as line is in geometry, number in arithmetic, being in metaphysics.
148 Ad primum respondeo et dico quod proportio obiecti ad potentiam est proportio motivi ad mobile vel activi ad passivum; proportio obiecti ad habitum est sicut proportio causae ad effectum. Quandocumque autem aliquod agens agit in aliquod passum, potest et quodlibet agens eiusdem rationis agere in quodlibet passum eiusdem rationis. Igitur prima extrema proportionis activi ad passivum sunt communia ad omnia per se extrema istius proportionis; nam inter ista communissima est adaequatio, quia in quocumque est ratio unius, illud respicit quodlibet in quo est ƿ ratio alterius. Sed prima extrema proportionis causae ad effectum non sunt communissima, quia inter illa non est adaequatio; non enim quodlibet contentum sub illo communi respicit illum habitum ut effectum eius sed tantum aliquod primum obiectum vel contentum, quod virtualiter respicit vel continet omnia ad quae habitus se extendit.	148. To the first argument [n.146] I reply and say that the way the object is commensurate with the power is the way the mover is commensurate with the thing moved, or the way the active thing is commensurate with the passive; the way the object is commensurate with the habit is the way the cause is commensurate with the effect. Now whenever some agent acts on some patient, any agent also of the same nature can act on any patient of the same nature. Therefore the first extremes of the commensurate relation of the active thing to the passive thing are common to all the per se extremes of that relation; for among those most common things is adequacy, because anything that the nature of one is in has regard to anything that the nature of the other is in. But the first extremes of the commensurate relation of cause to effect are not most common, because there is no adequacy between them; for not anything contained under what is common has respect to the habit as to its effect, but only some first object or content does, which virtually respects or contains everything that the habit extends itself to.
149 Ad secundum respondeo quod multorum habituum differentium specie potest esse aliquod obiectum commune, sicut ab obiectis eorum potest extrahi obiectum commune: et ita in scientiis assignatur obiectum commune a quo non est habitus unus secundum speciem, sed tantum secundum genus.	149. To the second argument [n.147] I reply that, in the case of many habits differing in species, there can be some common object in the way that from their objects an object that is common can be extracted; and in this way there is a common object designated in the sciences that gives rise to a habit, not one in species, but only one in genus.
150 De tertio dico quod theologia non tantum continet necessaria, sed etiam contingentia. Quod patet, quia omnes veritates de Deo, sive ut trino sive de aliqua persona divina, in quibus comparatur ad extra, sunt contingentes, ut quod Deus creat, quod Filius est incarnatus, et huiusmodi; omnes autem veritates de Deo ut trinus vel ut persona determinata sunt theologicae, quia ad nullam scientiam naturalem spectant; igitur primae partes integrales theologiae sunt duae, scilicet veritates necessariae et contingentes. ƿ	150. [On the Parts of Theology] – On the third [n.141] I say that theology not only contains things that are necessary but also things that are contingent. The matter is plain, 73 because all the truths about God relating to what is extrinsic to him, whether they are about him as triune or about any of the divine persons, are contingent, as that God creates, that the Son is incarnate, and the like; but all the truths about God as triune or as a determinate person are theological, because they have regard to no human science; therefore the first integral parts of theology are two, namely truths necessary and truths contingent.