Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P3Q1/A7

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Art. 7
188 Ad Boethium dico quod loquitur de subiecto accidentis, non de subiecto considerationis. ƿ Ad illud de II Physicorum dico quod intelligit de materia ex qua, quod ipsa et efficiens non coincidunt, et non intelligit de materia in qua vel circa quam. Vel dicendum est melius quod subiectum scientiae secundum veritatem non pertinet ad genus causae materialis, sed ad genus causae efficientis; tamen subiectum scientiae dicitur materia per quandam similitudinem ad factionem, ubi simul concurrit ratio obiecti circa quod et ratio materiae susceptivae, quia actus eius est factio transiens extra. Non sic est de actu proprio scientiae; tamen intelligitur transire, quia non terminatur in se sed ad aliud circa quod est, licet non recipiatur in illud 'circa quod' sed manet in sciente. Et propter hanc proprietatem materiae unam, scilicet 'esse circa quod', obiectum dicitur materia respectu scientiae et actus eius. ƿ	188. [To the Arguments from the Second Way] – To Boethius [n.129] I say that he is speaking of subject in the sense of subject of an accident, not in the sense of subject of study. To the text from the Physics [n.130] I say that it means matter in the sense of matter ‘from-which’, for this matter and the efficient cause do not coincide, and not that it means the matter ‘of-which’ or ‘about-which’. Or better, one should say that the subject of a science with respect to truth does not belong to the genus of material cause but to the genus of efficient cause; yet the subject of a science is said to be its matter by a certain likeness to the act of making, where the idea of the object ‘about-which’ comes together with the idea of the susceptible matter, because the act of making is a doing that passes over to something outside it. Things are not like this in the case of the proper act of a science; still, a science is understood to pass over, because it does not terminate in itself but in that about which it is, although it is not received in the ‘about-which’ but remains in the knower. And on account of this one property of matter, namely ‘to be that about which’, the object is said to be the matter in relation to the science and to its act.
189 Ad illud de I Posteriorum dico quod obiectum cuiuslibet scientiae inventae naturaliter aliquod est universale; ideo subiectum talis scientiae oportet quod habeat partes subiectivas. Istius autem scientiae obiectum est essentia haec ut singularis, quia imperfectionis est in natura creata universali quod in multis singularibus dividitur; ista igitur imperfectione ablata, remanet quod ista essentia est scibilis sine divisibilitate eius in partes subiectivas. Posset tamen dici quod personae divinae sunt quasi partes subiectivae ipsius essentiae divinae; sed ipsa essentia in eis non numeratur sicut in aliis imperfectis, ubi subiectum est clivisibile in multa.	189. To the text of the Posterior Analytics [n.131] I say that the object of any science naturally discovered is something universal; therefore the subject of such a science should have subjective parts. But of this science (of theology) the object is this essence here (sc. God) as a singular, because it is a mark of imperfection in universal created nature that it is divided among many singulars; once this imperfection has been removed, the result is that this essence is knowable without divisibility of it into subjective parts. Yet it could be said that the divine persons are a sort of subjective parts of the divine essence itself; but the essence itself is not numerically multiplied in them the way it is in other and imperfect things, where the subject is divisible into many parts.
190 Quod additur de passionibus, dicunt aliqui quod attributa sunt quasi passiones ipsius essentiae. Sed hoc non valet $a quia omne attributum ut hoc potest proprie sciri theologice de Deo, licet aliquod ut confuse cognitum sit metaphysice cognitum de ipso. Sicut enim Deus sic et sic, hoc est ut hic et ut confuse cognitus pertinet ad theologicum et metaphysicum, sic et quodlibet attributum ƿ sic et sic sumptum. a$ Quod autem additur quod passio est extra essentiam subiecti, hoc est verum ubi passio est realiter causata ab obiecto; sed in divinis illud quod habet passionis rationem non est causatum, quia per identitatem transit in essentiam; tamen quantum ad scibilitatem scitur per rationem essentiae ac si esset realiter distincta ab essentia.	190. As to the point that is added about properties [n.131], some say that the attributes are a sort of properties of the essence itself. But this does not hold, because any attribute as this can properly be known of God theologically, while any attribute as known confusedly is known of him metaphysically. For just as God taken in this way and in that, that is, as this and as confusedly known, pertains to the theologian on the one hand and to the metaphysician on the other, so too does any attribute pertain to them when taken in this way and when taken in that. As to what is added about the property being outside the essence of the subject [n.131], this is true when the property is really caused by the object; but in the deity that which has the nature of a property is not caused, because it passes over into essence by way of identity; yet, as far as its knowability is concerned, it is known through the idea of the essence as if it were really distinct from the essence.
191 Quod, tertio, dicitur de principio subiecti, dico quod non oportet principia scibilis esse principia ipsius subiecti in se, quia entis in quantum ens, quod ponitur subiectum metaphysicae, nulla sunt principia, quia tunc essent cuiuslibet entis; sed oportet cuiuslibet subiecti esse principia per quae demonstrentur eius passiones de eo, et ex quibus principiis tamquam ex mediis demonstrationis formantur principia complexa, sicut propositiones per se notae . Hoc modo cuiuslibet subiecti, quantumcumque imprincipiati respectu suarum passionum, possunt esse principia. ƿ	191. As to what, third, is said about the principle of the subject [n.131], I say that it is not necessary that the principles of the subject as knowable be principles of the subject as it is in itself, because in the case of being qua being, which is set down as the subject of metaphysics, there are no principles, because then they would be principles of any being whatever; but what is necessary is that in the case of any subject whatever there are principles by which its properties are demonstrated of it, and from these principles, as from the means of demonstration, propositional principles are formed, such as are the self-evident principles. In this way there can be principles of any subject whatever, insofar as the subject is the principle-without-principle in relation to its properties.
192 Ad primum argumentum secundae quaestionis, quando arguitur per Hugonem et Cassiodorum, dicitur quod loquuntur hic non de formali subiecto sed de materia proxima de qua diffusius tractatur in Scriptura, propter ordinem immediatiorem quem habent ad finem.	192. To the first argument of the second question, when the argument through Hugh of St. Victor and Cassiodorus is made [nn.133-134], the response is that they are speaking here, not of the formal object, but of the proximate matter which is more extensively dealt with in Scripture, because of the more immediate order to the end they are holding to.
193 Ad secundum dico quod de Deo non est metaphysica ut de subiecto primo. Quod probatur, quia praeter scientias speciales oportet aliquam esse communem, in qua probentur omnia quae sunt communia illis specialibus; igitur praeter scientias speciales oportet aliquam esse communem de ente, in qua tradatur cognitio ƿ passionum de ente, quae cognitio supponitur in scientiis specialibus; si igitur aliqua est de Deo, praeter illam est aliqua de ente naturaliter scita in quantum ens. Cum vero probatur quod scientia metaphysicae est de Deo per Philosophum VI Metaphysicae, dico quod ratio eius sic concludit: 'nobilissima scientia est circa nobilissimum genus', vel ut primum subiectum, vel ut consideratum in scientia illa perfectissimo modo quo potest considerari in aliqua scientia naturaliter acquisita. Deus autem etsi non est primum subiectum in metaphysica, est tamen consideratum in illa scientia nobilissimo modo quo potest considerari in aliqua scientia naturaliter acquisita.	193. To the second [n.135] I say that metaphysics is not about God as about its first subject. The proof is that, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science in which are proved all the things that are common to the special ones; therefore, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science about being, in which the knowledge of the properties of being are dealt with, which knowledge is presupposed in the special sciences; if then there is some science about God there is, in addition to it, some naturally known science about being insofar as it is being. But when it is proved through the Philosopher in the Metaphysics [n.135] that the science of metaphysics is about God, I say that his argument thus concludes: ‘the noblest science is about the noblest class of things’, whether as first subject or as considered in that science in the most perfect way in which, in any naturally acquired science, it can be considered.
194 Ad Commentatorem I Physicorum, dico quod Avicenna cui contradixit Commentator - bene dixit, et Commentator male. Quod probatur: primo, quia si aliquas substantias separatas ƿ esse esset suppositum in scientia metaphysicae et conclusum in scientia naturali, ergo physica esset simpliciter prior tota metaphysica, quia physica ostenderet de subiecto metaphysicae 'si est', quod praesupponitur toti cognitioni scientiae metaphysicae. - Secundo, quia per omnem condicionem effectus potest demonstrari de causa quia est, quam impossibile est esse in effectu nisi causa sit; sed multae sunt passiones consideratae in metaphysica, quas impossibile est inesse nisi ab aliqua prima causa talium entium, ergo ex talibus passionibus metaphysica potest demonstrare aliquam esse causam primam illorum entium. Minor probatur, quia multitudo entium, dependentia, compositio, et huiusmodi - quae sunt passiones metaphysicae - ostendunt aliquod esse simplex actu, independens omnino et necesse esse. Multo etiam perfectius ostenditur prima causa esse ex passionibus causatorum consideratis in metaphysica quam ex passionibus naturalibus, ubi ostenditur primum movens esse; perfectior etiam cognitio et immediatior de primo ente est cognoscere ipsum ut primum ens, vel ut necesse esse, quam cognoscere ipsum ut primum movens. ƿ	194. To the Commentator on the Physics [n.136] I say that Avicenna – whom the Commentator contradicts – spoke well and the Commentator badly. The proof is: first, that if the existence of any separate substances were a presupposition in the science of metaphysics and a conclusion in natural science, then physics would be simply prior to the whole of metaphysics, because physics would show the ‘whether it exists’ about the subject of metaphysics, which fact is presupposed to the whole knowledge of the science of metaphysics. – Second, that a proof can be given about the existence of a cause through any condition of the effect that could not exist in the effect unless the cause existed; but many properties are considered in metaphysics that can only be present in beings from some first cause of such beings; therefore, on the basis of such properties, metaphysics can demonstrate that there is some first cause of those beings. The proof of the minor is that the multitude of beings, their dependence, composition, and the like – which are the properties of metaphysics – show that there is something that is simple in its actuality, altogether independent, and necessarily existent. Also, the existence of a first cause is much more perfectly shown from the properties of caused things considered in metaphysics than from the natural properties by which is shown that there is a first mover; also it is a more perfect and more immediate knowledge of the first being to know it as first being, or as necessarily existent, than to know it as first mover.
195 Ad aliud dico quod respectus finis non est ratio nobilissima cognitionis, sed illud quod est finis - sicut ratio fundamenti istius respectus - est ratio nobilissima; deitas autem est ratio fundamentalis respectus finis ad creaturas; igitur deitas erit primum obiectum, quod concedo. Et ita argumentum est in oppositum. Cum autem ostenditur de bonitate ex II Metaphysicae, dico quod si per aliquam appropriationem bonitas sit fundamentum finis, tamen deitas est radicale et primum fundamentum ipsius. Bene autem sequitur: 'si non est finis ultimus, igitur non est bonum aliquod', quia si non est perfectum bonum, nullum est bonum; nullum autem perfectum est bonum quod ordinatur ad aliud, quia quod est tale, habet bonitatem diminutam. Non oportet tamen bonitatem esse propriam rationem ipsius finis, sed essentia magis est propria et fundamentalis. Per hoc apparet ad dictum Avicennae in VI Metaphysicae, quod non debet intelligi de fine, sed de ratione fundamentali respectu finis. ƿ	195. To the other citation [n.137] I say that relation to an end is not the noblest idea of knowledge but that which the end is – as being the idea of the foundation of that relation – is the noblest idea; but the deity is the founding idea of the relation of end for creatures; therefore the deity will be the first object, which I concede. And thus proceeds the argument to the opposite. But when the proof from the Metaphysics about the good is given [n.137], I say that if the good, by a certain appropriateness, is foundation of the end, still the deity is the root and first foundation of it. But the consequence is good: ‘if there is no final end, then there is no good’, because if there is no perfect good there is no good; but no good is perfect which is ordered to some further good, because a good of this sort has a diminished goodness. However it is not necessary that goodness be the proper idea of end 95 itself, but essence is more proper and fundamental. Hereby is it clear, in respect of the remark of Avicenna on the Metaphysics [n.137], that the remark must be understood, not of the end, but of the fundamental idea in respect of the end.