Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P3Q1/A8

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Art. 8
196 Ad tertiam quaestionem videtur probabiliter posse dici quod theologia non est de omnibus scibilibus, quia distinctae quiditates ab essentia divina ut est haec essentia singularis continent primo virtualiter multas veritates de se. Quod probatur, quia per impossibile circumscripto omni alio si istae quiditates essent increatae, adhuc continerent tales veritates, sicut patet de linea et de numero quantum ad propositiones immediatas de eis. Et secundum hoc posset poni quod in intellectu divino essent habitus distincti secundum rationem, habitus - dico - scientiales, utpote: theologia esset quam causaret essentia divina ut haec in intellectu eius, geometria autem in intellectu eius esset quae virtute lineae esset in intellectu eius, et sic arithmetica ratione numeri, et sic de aliis.	196. To the third question [n.139] it seems that it can probably be said that theology is not about all knowables, because quiddities distinct from the divine essence as it is this singular essence contain first many truths virtually about themselves. The proof is that, after everything else per impossibile has been removed, these quiddities, if they were uncreated, would still contain such truths, as is clear of line and number with respect to the immediate propositions about them. And, accordingly, one could set down that in the divine intellect there were habits distinct in idea, I mean habits of science, namely: theology would be the one that the divine essence as this essence would cause in the divine intellect, while geometry in his intellect would be the one that was in his intellect by virtue of line, and arithmetic in this way by virtue of number, and so on about others.
197 Contra istud tripliciter: Primo, quia vilesceret intellectus divinus, pro eo quod pateretur ab alio obiecto ab essentia sua; nam si in illo instanti naturae ƿ in quo intelligeret lineam adhuc esset quasi in potentia ad veritates cognoscendas exsistentes in linea - et virtute istius quiditatis cognoscit eas - igitur linea quasi effective imprimeret cognitionem istarum veritatum in intellectu divino, et ita linea erit motiva intellectus divini.	197. Against this in three ways: First, because the divine intellect would be cheapened by reason of the fact that it would be opened up by an object other than its essence; for in the instant of nature in which it understood line, it would still be in a state of potentiality with respect to knowing the truths that exist in line – and it recognizes those truths by virtue of the quiddity of line – , therefore line would as it were be the efficient cause imprinting the knowledge of those truths on the divine intellect, and so line will be the mover of the divine intellect.
198 Secundo sic: omnis potentiae actuabilis a diversis obiectis per se virtute propria eorum primum obiectum est aliquid commune eis; sed si linea virtute sui causaret veritatem in intellectu divino, pari ratione et aliae res causabunt veritatem in intellectu eius, et ita primum obiectum intellectus divini erit ens commune, non essentia sua singularis. Nec obstat quod obiecta alia attribuuntur ad essentiam suam, ita enim alia entia attribuuntur ad substantiam, et tamen primum obiectum intellectus nostri est ens.	198. Second thus: the first object of every power that is made actual by diverse objects through their per se proper virtue is something that is common to those objects; but if line, by virtue of itself, caused truth in the divine intellect, by equal reason other things too will cause truth in God’s intellect, and so the first object of the divine intellect will be common being, not his own singular essence. Nor is it an objection here that other objects are attributed to his essence; for thus are other beings attributed to substance, and yet the first object of our intellect is being.
199 Tertio, quia si essentia sua est primum obiectum, patet quod non communitate praedicationis; ergo erit primum secundum virtualitatem. Non autem esset primum obiectum virtualiter si quodlibet aliud secundum virtutem propriam immutaret intellectum eius. ƿ	199. Third, because if his essence is the first object, it is clear that it is not first by commonness of predication; therefore it will be first by virtual-ness. But it would not be the first object virtually if anything else were to effect, in accord with its own virtue, a change in his intellect.
200 Ideo dico aliter, quod theologia divina est de omnibus cognoscibilibus, quia obiectum primum theologiae suae facit omnia alia actu cognita in intellectu eius, ita quod si in primo signo naturae est essentia sua primo cognita intellectui suo, et in secundo signo naturae quiditates continentes virtualiter veritates proprias, in tertio signo sunt istae veritates, virtualiter contentae in illis quiditatibus, sibi notae; non est ordo secundi ad tertium secundum causalitatem, quasi istae quiditates aliquid causarent in intellectu eius, sed tantum est ordo effectuum ordinatorum respectu eiusdem causae, puta quia essentia sua quasi prius natura causat istas quiditates notas quam veritates de eis sunt notae. Exemplum: si sol illuminaret partem aliquam sibi propinquam, et alia pars a sole remotior non esset illuminabilis nisi a sole propter eius opacitatem, sol illuminaret partem illam remotam, non autem prior primo illuminata; esset tamen ordo inter propinquam partem et remotam sicut ordo effectuum eiusdem causae, et tamen non ordo causae ad effectum, quia pars illuminata nihil agit in partem opacam remotam. ƿ Ita est in proposito. Essentia Dei in intellectu suo facit quiditates aliquas actu notas, et quasi posterius naturaliter facit veritates illas, in illis contentas, notas intellectui illi; tamen illae quiditates nullam habent virtutem respectu intellectus Dei immutandi, quia intellectus Dei non est natus perfici ab illis quiditatibus, quia est infinitus, et illae quiditates sunt finitae, et infinitum a finito nullo modo perficitur.	200. [About divine theology] – Therefore I say differently that divine theology is about all knowables, because the first object of God’s theology makes everything else actually to be known in his intellect, such that, if in the first moment of nature his essence is known first in his intellect, and in the second moment of nature the quiddities are 97 known that contain virtually their own truths, in the third moment are known to him the truths that are virtually contained in those quiddities; if this is so, the order of the second to the third is not according to causality, as if those quiddities caused something in his intellect, but there is only an order of effects ordered in respect of the same cause, to wit, that his own essence causes those quiddities to be known first in nature, as it were, before the truths about them are known [cf. 1 d.3 p.1 q.4 nn.18-19]. An example: if the sun illuminated some part near itself, and another part more distant from the sun was only capable, on account of its opacity, of being illuminated by the sun, the sun, and not the part first illuminated, would illuminate that distant part; the order, however, between the near and distant part would be like the order of effects of the same cause, and yet it would not be an order of the cause to the effect, because the illuminated part performs no action on the dark distant part. So it is in the proposal. The essence of God in his own intellect makes other quiddities to be actually known, and later as it were it naturally makes the truths contained in them to be known to his intellect; yet those quiddities have no virtue in respect of effecting a change in God’s intellect, because God’s intellect is not of the nature to be perfected by those quiddities, because it is infinite and those quiddities are finite, and the infinite is in no way perfected by the finite.
201 Sic ergo Deus de omnibus cognoscibilibus solum habet cognitionem theologicam, quia tantum virtute primi obiecti theologici actuantis intellectum eius, ita quod theologia Dei non tantum est de omnibus, sed etiam est omnis cognitio possibilis Deo de eis, et absolute ipsa est de quocumque est omnis cognitio non includens ex se aliquam imperfectionem, quia ipsa sola de quocumque cognoscibili non includit limitationem; quaelibet autem alia, quia est a causa limitata, necessario includit limitationem.	201. In this way, then, does God have only theological knowledge about all knowables, because he has knowledge only by virtue of the theological object actuating his intellect, such that the theology of God is not only about all things but is also the whole knowledge possible for God about them, and it is absolutely about anything about which there is any knowledge that does not of itself include some imperfection, because 98 it alone includes no limitation about any knowable at all; but any other knowledge, because it is limited by a cause, necessarily includes a limitation.
202 Sed de intellectibus creatis beatorum aliter est, quia intellectus eorum nati sunt immutari a quiditatibus creatis ad cognitionem veritatum inclusarum in eis; et ideo praeter istam theologicam veritatem, quam habent de illis quiditatibus ut ostensis in essentia Dei, possunt habere cognitionem naturaƿlem de eisdem propria motione earum. Theologia igitur beatorum de quibuscumque creatis non est omnis cognitio de eis possibilis tali intellectui.	202. [On the theology of the blessed] – But as to the created intellects of the blessed things are otherwise, because their intellects are of the nature to be changed by the created quiddities so as to know the truths included in them; and therefore, in addition to the theological truth, which they have about those quiddities as displayed in the divine essence, they can have a natural knowledge of the same things by the proper movement of those things. Therefore the theology of the blessed about certain created things is not the whole knowledge about them which is possible for such intellects.
203 Sed dubium est an sit de omnibus, licet aliqua alia sit de quibusdam cognoscibilibus. Hic distinguendum est de theologia in se, et ut est habitus perficiens intellectum creatum beatum. Primo modo est de omnibus scibilibus, quia omnia illa sunt nata sciri virtute primi obiecti theologici; secundo modo, dico quod possibile est eam esse de quocumque, quia de omnibus scibilibus, quia scibilia illa omnia non sunt infinita. De facto autem non habet limitationem nisi ex voluntate Dei ostendentis aliquid in essentia sua; et ideo actualiter theologia eorum est de tot quot Deus voluntarie ostendit eis in essentia sua.	203. But there is a doubt whether their theology is about everything, although they have some other knowledge about some of the knowables. Here a distinction must be drawn about theology in itself and as it is a habit perfecting the blessed created intellect. In the first way it is about all knowables, because these are all of a nature to be known by virtue of the first theological object; in the second way I say that it is possible for it to be about any knowable, because it is about all knowables, for all the knowables are not infinite. De facto, however, it has no limitation save from the will of God displaying something in his essence; and therefore the knowledge of the blessed is in actuality about all the things that God voluntarily displays in his essence.
204 De theologia nostra dico quod ipsa non est actualiter omnium, quia sicut theologia beatorum habet terminum, ita et nostra, ex voluntate Dei revelantis. Terminus autem praefixus a voluntate divina, quantum ad revelationem geƿneralem, est illorum quae sunt in Scriptura divina, quia - sicut habetur in Apocalypsi cap. ultimo - qui apposuerit ad haec, apponet ei Deus plagas quae apponuntur in libro isto. Igitur theologia nostra de facto non est nisi de his quae continentur in Scriptura, et de his quae possunt elici ex eis.	204. [On our theology] – About our theology I say that is not about all things, because, just as the theology of the blessed has a limit, so also does ours, from the will of God revealing. But the limit fixed by the divine will as to general revelation is the things that are in divine Scripture, because – as is contained in the last chapter of Revelation – “he who adds to these things, to him will God add the plagues that are set down in this book.” Therefore our knowledge is de facto only of the things contained in Scripture and of the things that can be elicited from them.
205 De potestate theologiae nostrae dico quod non potest esse de omnibus, tum propter defectum intellectus nostri, non potentis concipere in speciali multas quiditates, - revelatio autem secundum communem legem non est nisi de his quorum termini communiter naturaliter possunt concipi a nobis, - tum propter defectum theologiae nostrae, quia non potest stare cum cognitione evidenti de eisdem cognoscibilibus, secundum aliquos, et per consequens de naturaliter nobis cognitis non potest stare theologia nostra revelata.	205. About the power of our theology I say that it cannot be about everything, both because of the defect of our intellect, which is not able to conceive specifically many quiddities, – but revelation according to ordinary law is only of things whose terms can commonly be conceived by us naturally, – and because of the defect of our theology, because it cannot stand with evident knowledge of the same knowables, in the opinion of some, and consequently our revealed theology cannot stand with evident knowledge of some things naturally known to us.
206 Tamen omnis theologia, sive Dei sive beatorum sive nostra, est de omnibus entibus quantum ad aliqua de eis cognoscibilia, videlicet quantum ad respectus quos habent ad essentiam divinam ut est haec essentia, quia respectus non potest cognosci sine cognitione amborum extremorum: et ita respectus qui est ad hanc essentiam ut haec, non potest cognosci sine cognitione huius essentiae ut est haec. ƿ Sic igitur, ut vere dicatur, theologia est de omnibus, et est omnis cognitio non includens imperfectionem. Ideo intellectui Dei, qui non potest habere aliquam cognitionem imperfectam, est omnis cognitio, non tamen simpliciter est omnis cognitio, quia praeter illam potest alia haberi de aliqua quiditate speciali movente intellectum creatum. Ipsa etiam sola est cognitio de omnibus quantum ad aliqua cognoscibilia, ut videlicet quantum ad respectum eorum ad hanc essentiam ut haec, si tamen haec essentia ut haec terminet aliquem respectum creaturae et non sub ratione alicuius attributi naturaliter a nobis intelligibilis. Et ista forte est ratio quare non possumus scire de intellectu creato quod ordinatur ad hunc finem ut hic est, quia non possumus cognoscere respectum fundatum in natura intellectuali ad istam essentiam tamquam ad proprium finem, quia nec extremum ad quod est respectus, et ideo nec rationem imaginis respectu istius naturae in se, sicut sancti loquuntur de imagine. ƿ	206. [On theology taken all together] – However all theology, whether God’s or the blessed’s or ours, is about all beings as to some things that are knowable about them, namely as to the relations they have to the divine essence as it is this essence, because a relation cannot be known without knowledge of both extremes; and in this way the relation that is to this essence as this cannot be known without knowledge of this essence as it is this. Thus, then, to speak truly, theology is about everything, and it is all knowledge that does not include imperfection. Therefore to the intellect of God, who cannot have any imperfect knowledge, it is all knowledge, but it is not simply all knowledge, because in addition to it another knowledge can be had about some special quiddity that is moving the created intellect. Also it alone is knowledge of all things as to some knowables, namely as to their relation to this essence as this, provided however this essence as this terminates some relation of a creature and not under the idea of some attribute naturally intelligible to us. And this perhaps is the reason that we cannot know about the created intellect that it is ordered to this end as it is this, because we cannot know the relation founded in intellectual nature to this essence as to its proper end, because neither can we know the extreme to which it is the relation, and therefore we cannot know the relation of the image of this nature in itself, in the way the saints speak about the image.
207 Ad primum argumentum dico quod concludit de theologia non in se sed prout traditur in Scriptura sacra.	207. To the first argument [n.140] I say that it concludes about theology not in itself but as it is handed down in Sacred Scripture.