Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P4Q1
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Translated by Peter Simpson.
| Latin | English |
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| 208 Iuxta hoc quaero utrum theologia in se sit scientia, et utrum ad aliquam aliam scientiam habeat habitudinem subalternantis vel subalternatae. Ad primam quaestionem dico quod scientia stricte sumpta quattuor includit, videlicet: quod sit cognitio certa, absque deceptione et dubitatione; secundo, quod sit de cognito necessario; tertio, quod sit causata a causa evidente intellectui; quarto, quod sit applicata ad cognitum per syllogismum vel discursum syllogisticum. Haec apparent ex definitione 'scire' I Posteriorum. Ultimum, videlicet causatio scientiae per discursum a causa ad scitum, includit ƿ imperfectionem, et etiam potentialitatem intellectus recipientis. Ergo theologia in se non est scientia quantum ad ultimam condicionem scientiae; sed quantum ad alias tres condiciones est scientia in se et in intellectu divino. | 208. On this matter I examine whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it has toward any other science the relation of making it subaltern to itself or of being subaltern to it. I. To the First Question [On theology in itself and in God] – To the first question I say that science taken strictly includes four things, namely: that it be certain knowledge, without deception or doubt; second, that it be about a necessary known thing; third, that it be caused by a cause evident to the intellect; fourth, that it be applied to the thing known by a syllogism or syllogistic discursion. These things are clear from the definition of ‘know’ in Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b9-12. The last condition, namely that science is caused discursively from the cause to the thing known, includes imperfection[1] and also potentiality in the receiving intellect. Therefore theology in itself is not a science as to this last condition of science; but as to the other three conditions it is a science in itself and in the divine intellect. |
| 209 Sed utrum sit scientia quantum ad quartam condicionem ut est in intellectu beatorum, dubium est. Et videtur quod non, per Augustinum XV De Trinitate cap. 16: ((Fortasse non erunt ibi volubiles)), etc., ((sed totam scientiam nostram unico intuitu videbimus)); ergo intellectus beatorum non discurret, et ita non habebunt scientiam quantum ad istam quartam condicionem scientiae. Sed oppositum videtur, quia quiditas subiecti, in quocumque lumine videtur, continet virtualiter veritates, quas potest facere notas intellectui, de se, scilicet intellectui passivo a tali obiecto Ergo si quiditas lineae visa in lumine naturali potest facere veritates ƿ in se inclusas notas intellectui nostro, pari ratione et ut visa in essentia divina; sed omnis veritas causata in intellectu nostro per aliquid prius naturaliter notum causatur per discursum, quia discursus non requirit successionem temporis nec ordinem ipsius, sed ordinem naturae, videlicet quod principium discursus sit prius naturaliter notum, et ut sic sit causativum alterius extremi discursus. Hoc potest concedi, videlicet quod beatus vere potest habere scientiam theologicam quantum ad omnes condiciones scientiae, quia omnes condiciones scientiae vere concurrunt in cognitione eius. Auctoritas Augustini XV De Trinitate cap. 16 non cogit, quia loquitur dubitative, cum 'forte'; nec illud intendit asserere, sed quod verbum nostrum non erit aequale Verbo divino, etiam quantumcumque sit perfectum. Similiter, potest exponi auctoritas Augustini de visione beata, quae tantum respicit essentialia in Deo. ƿ | 209. [On the theology of the blessed as it is a science] – But whether as to the fourth condition it is a science as it is in the intellect of the blessed is matter for doubt. And it seems that it is not, from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.16 n.26: “Perhaps there they will not be changeable,” etc., “but we will see our whole science in a single intuition;” therefore the intellect of the blessed is not discursive, and so they will not have science as to that fourth condition of science. But the opposite seems to be the case, because the quiddity of the subject, in whatever light it is seen, contains of itself virtually the truths that it can make known to the intellect, namely to an intellect that is passive in respect of such an object. Therefore, if the quiddity of line seen in the natural light can make known to our intellect the truths included in itself, it will, by parity of reasoning, also do the same when seen in the divine essence; but every truth caused in our intellect by something that is naturally first known is caused in it discursively, because discursion does not require succession of time or the order of time, but the order of nature, namely that the principle of the discursion is naturally known first, and that in this way it is causative with respect to the second term of the discursion.[2] This can be conceded, namely that the blessed can truly have theological science as to all the conditions of science, because all the conditions of science truly concur in the knowledge of it. The authority of Augustine in On the Trinity [n.209] is not cogent, because he speaks hesitantly with a ‘perhaps’; nor does he intend to assert that point, but that our word will not be equal to the divine Word, however perfect our word may also be. In like way can be expounded Augustine’s authority about the blessed vision [n.209], which only has respect to the essentialities that are in God.[3] |
| 210 Sed dubium aliud est in ista quaestione, quia ad theologiam pertinent contingentia sicut et necessaria. Quod patet de theologia nostra, quia omnes articuli de incarnatione sunt de contingentibus, in theologia etiam beatorum, quia omnia cognoscibilia de Deo in respectu ad creaturas extra sunt de contingentibus. De contingentibus autem non videtur posse esse scientia, patet ex definitione scientiae; igitur videtur quod theologia tota ut extendit se ad omnia illa contenta non possit habere rationem scientiae, sive cum discursu sive non. | 210. [On the science of contingents as a science] – But there is another doubt in that question, because contingent things pertain to theology just as do necessary things [n.150]. The thing is clear about our theology, because all the articles about the incarnation are about contingents, even in the theology of the blessed, because everything knowable about God in respect of creatures extrinsically are about contingents. But it does not seem possible for there to be science about contingents, as is clear from the definition of science [n.208]; therefore it seems that the whole of theology, in the way it extends itself to all its contents, cannot have the nature of science, whether it is discursive or not. |
| 211 Hic dico quod in scientia illud perfectionis est, quod sit cognitio certa et evidens; quod autem sit de necessario obiecto, haec est ƿ condicio obiecti, non cognitionis, quia quantumcumque scientia sit de necessario obiecto, ipsa in se poterit esse contingens, et per oblivionem deleri. Si igitur aliqua alia cognitio est certa et evidens, et, quantum est de se, perpetua, ipsa videtur in se formaliter perfectior quam scientia quae requirit necessitatem obiecti. Sed contingentia ut pertinent ad theologiam nata sunt habere cognitionem certam et evidentem et, quantum est ex parte evidentiae, perpetuam. Hoc patet, quia omnia contingentia theologica nata sunt videri in primo obiecto theologico, et in eodem nata est videri coniunctio illarum veritatum contingentium. Visio autem extremorum veritatis contingentis et unionis eorum necessario causat evidentem certitudinem de tali veritate evidente. Quantum est etiam ex parte obiecti theologici ostendentis, talia vera nata sunt videri in tali obiecto perpetuo, quantum est ex se. Igitur contingentia ut pertinent ad theologiam nata sunt habere perfectiorem cognitionem quam scientia de necessariis acquisita. | 211. On this point I say that what belongs to perfection in science is that the knowledge is certain and evident;[4] but as to its being about a necessary object, this is a condition of the object, not of the knowledge, because science, to the extent it is of a necessary object, can be in itself contingent and can be destroyed by being forgotten. If therefore some other knowledge is certain and evident and, as far as concerns itself, perpetual, it seems that it is formally in itself more perfect than a science that requires necessity in its object. But contingents, as they pertain to theology, naturally have a knowledge that is certain and evident and, on the part of the evidence, so far perpetual. The thing is clear, because all theological contingents are naturally seen in the first theological object, and the connection of those contingent truths in that object is naturally seen. But the vision of the extremes of a contingent truth and of their union necessarily causes evident certitude about such an evident truth. As to what concerns also the part of the theological object which displays them, such truths are naturally seen in such a perpetual object, as far as depends on itself. Therefore contingent things, as they pertain to theology, are of a nature to be more perfectly known than an acquired science about necessary things. |
| 212 Sed numquid cognitio eorum est scientia? Dico quod secundum illam rationem scientiae positam I Posteriorum, quae requirit necessitatem obiecti, non potest de eis esse scientia, quia cognoscere contingens ut necessarium, non est cognoscere contingens; tamen secundum quod Philosophus accipit scientiam in VI Ethicorum, ut dividitur contra opinionem et suspicionem, bene potest ƿ de eis esse scientia, quia et habitus quo determinate verum dicimus. | 212. But can knowledge of them be a science? I say that according to the idea of science posited in the Posterior Analytics [n.208], which requires necessity of the object, there cannot be science of them, because to know a contingent thing as necessary is not to know it as contingent; yet, according to the way the Philosopher takes science in Ethics 6.3.1139b15-18, as divided against opinion and suspicion, there can very well be a science of them, because it also is a habit whereby we say something determinately true. |
| 213 Magis tamen proprie potest dici quod theologia est sapientia secundum se, quia de necessariis contentis in ea ipsa habet evidentiam et necessitatem et certitudinem, et obiectum perfectissimum et altissimum et nobilissimum. Quantum autem ad contingentia, habet evidentiam manifestam de contingentibus in se visis ut in obiecto theologico, et non habet evidentiam mendicatam ab aliis prioribus; unde notitia contingentium ut habetur in ea magis assimilatur intellectui principiorum quam scientiae conclusionum. | 213. [On science as it is wisdom] – More properly, however, it can be said that theology is wisdom in itself, because it has evidence and necessity and certitude about the necessary things contained in it, and its object is most perfect and highest and noblest. But, as to contingent things, it has manifest evidence about the contingent things that are 105 seen in themselves as they exist in the theological object, and it does not have evidence begged from other things prior to them; hence the knowledge of contingents, as it is possessed in theology, is assimilated rather to the understanding of principles than to the science of conclusions. |
| 214 Ad secundam quaestionem dico quod haec scientia nulli subalternatur, quia licet subiectum eius esset aliquo modo sub subiecto metaphysicae, nulla tamen principia accipit a metaphysica, quia nulla passio theologica demonstrabilis est in ea per principia entis vel per rationem sumptam ex ratione entis. Nec etiam ipsa sibi aliquam aliam subalternat, quia nulla alia accipit principia ab ipsa, nam quaelibet alia in genere cognitionis ƿ naturalis habet resolutionem suam ultimo ad aliqua principia immediata naturaliter nota. | 214. To the second question [n.208] I say that this science is not subaltern to any science, because although its subject is in some way under the subject of metaphysics, yet it does not receive any of its principles from metaphysics, because no theological property is demonstrable in metaphysics through the principles of being or through reasoning taken from the idea of being. Nor does this science make any other science subaltern to it, because no other science takes from it its principles, for anything else in the genus of natural knowledge has its resolution ultimately to some immediate principles that are naturally known. |
| 215 Contra: resolutio non stat in cognoscibilibus nisi ad perfectissimum cognoscibile, nec de eodem nisi ad ipsum perfectissime cognitum; linea perfectius cognoscitur in Verbo quam per motionem sui ipsius; ergo resolutio conclusionum de linea non stat nisi ad quiditatem lineae vel ad principia de ea ut videntur in Verbo. Illa autem habetur per Verbum visum. Ergo resolutio quarumcumque conclusionum et principiorum stat ad visionem Verbi. Ergo illa subalternat sibi alias notitias, quibus omnibus dat evidentiam. | 215. On the contrary: resolution does not stop at knowables unless the knowable is the most perfect, nor does it stop there unless that knowable is most perfectly known; line is more perfectly known in the Word than by way of its own movement; therefore the resolution of conclusions about line does not stop save at the quiddity of line, or at the principles about it, as these are seen in the Word. But that resolution is had by seeing the Word. Therefore the resolution of any conclusions and principles whatever stops at the vision of the Word. Therefore that vision makes the other knowledges, to all of which it gives evidence, subaltern to itself. |
| 216 Ad hoc respondeo quod etsi metaphysicus cognoscens distincte quiditatem lineae vel totius perfectius cognosceret aliquod principium immediatum de linea vel de toto quam geometer, tantum confuse cognoscens lineam vel totum, tamen geometro est illa propositio immediata per se nota. Nec probatur per illam metaphysici, si ex conceptu confuso terminorum sit complexio vel coƿnexio evidenter vera, sed tantum metaphysicus eandem per se notam perfectius cognoscit; hoc magis esset si tantum per diversa motiva cognosceretur linea a diversis et aeque distincte ex parte obiecti licet non aeque clare. Ita in proposito. Principium immediatum de linea potest esse evidens intellectui moto a linea, et clarius evidens intellectui moto a Verbo ad notitiam lineae sicut linea clarius videtur; tamen principium uno modo cognitum non demonstrat se alio modo notum, sed utroque modo est 'per se', licet clarius sic vel sic. Subalternatio autem requireret quod notitia principiorum scientiae superioris esset causa notitiae principiorum scientiae inferioris etc. ƿ | 216. To this I reply that although a metaphysician who knows distinctly the quiddity of line or of whole may more perfectly know some immediate principle about line or about whole than a geometer does, who only knows line and whole confusedly, yet that immediate proposition is known per se to the geometer. Nor is his proof made through the metaphysician’s proposition, provided that the truth of the combination or connection of the terms is from his confused concept evident; the only thing is that the metaphysician has a more perfect knowledge of that same per se known truth; this would be all the more so if it was only through diverse motives that line was known from diverse things and from the side of the object with equal distinctness albeit not with equal clarity. So it is in the proposed case. An immediate principle about line can be evident to an intellect that is moved by line, and more clearly evident to an intellect moved by the Word to knowledge of line as line is more clearly seen; yet a principle known in one way does not prove itself to be known in another way, but it is known ‘by itself’ in both ways, although more clearly thus or thus. But subalternation requires that the knowledge of the principles of the higher science be the cause of knowing the principles of the lower science, etc.[5] |
Notes
- ↑ 68 Interpolation: “on the part of the science, because it is an equivocal effect.”
- ↑ 69 Interpolation: “On the contrary: in this way God knows other things through his own essence previously first known.”
- ↑ 70 Interpolation: “The argument is made that God would in that case know discursively, since he understands line and the properties that are virtually included in line. Let it be that God understands line according to the requirements of line; but it is not the case that, because line has such requirement, therefore he has such understanding of it, but rather, because he has such understanding, therefore line requires to be so understood, because his science is cause and measure of the thing. However it is not so with the blessed, because the thing, whether in itself or in the Word, is always the cause of our knowledge.”
- ↑ 71 Interpolation: “because science is a necessarily true habit, thus what remains the same cannot be sometimes true and sometimes false, just as neither can it be sometimes science and sometimes not science, Metaphysics 7.15.1039b31-40a5; therefore it is necessarily of a necessary object, such that necessity is not only the condition of he necessary object, but is rather intrinsic to the habit itself; not indeed that the habit cannot be destroyed by forgetfulness, but that it cannot not be true, just as a statement cannot be false when it remains the same as what was true before. Therefore absolutely there is no science of what is contingent; but there is most perfect knowledge, because vision remains determinately veridical, which vision does not remain when the object is not present in itself the way science remains, wherefore vision does not have the pre-eminence. I say, therefore, that theology is of necessities about a possible, to wit ‘God is creative’, ‘God is capable of assuming our nature’; similarly in the case of practical things, ‘God is to be believed’, ‘God is to be loved’, ‘God is to be worshipped’. But of these practical necessities – besides the third – the conclusions are purely theological, the third is in some way not necessary; just as some matters of speculation are necessary and purely theological, as ‘God is Triune’, others are naturally known.”
- ↑ 72 Interpolation: “This about theology in itself. But what about theology of the way? Would it be subalternate if such knowledge were to be given to someone or if it has been given? – To this some say [Aquinas, Henry of Ghent] that it is subalternate; for it is subalternate to the science of God and the blessed. – Against this it is argued first in this way: these people say elsewhere that science cannot stand with faith; but, as they say, because it is subalternate, it does stand with faith; therefore, according to them, it stands and does not stand, so they contradict themselves. – Besides, the science of God can only be single; therefore none can be subalternate. – Besides, science, according to the idea of its cause, depends only on the object or the subject or the light; but the vision of the blessed possesses no idea of cause with respect to the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore etc. – Besides, a subalternating science is not first about the same truths or the aforesaid known things, because a subalternated science begins there where the subalternating science ends; but this science can be of the same things as is the science of the blessed; therefore etc. – Besides, he who has the subalternated science is capable of having the subalternating science; in the proposed case neither of these is possible; therefore etc. The major is plain as to both parts: first, because he who has the principles about a conclusion can know the conclusion; the second is likewise plain, because the principles of the subalternating science are more universal and thus, in the order of intellectual cognition, they are known first, because there a second of this sort does not proceed from things more known but from sense. The minor is also plain as to both members: just as the wayfarer cannot see clearly, so neither can the blessed have sense.”
