Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P5A1

Practica omni aliqua speculativa est nobilior; nulla nobilior ista

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
217 Quaeritur utrum theologia sit scientia practica vel speculativa. Quod non sit practica, probatur: Quia in Ioan. 20: Haec scripta sunt ut credatis; credere est speculativum, quia ei succedit visio; ergo etc.	217. The question is whether theology is a practical or a speculative science. Proof that it is not practical: Because in John 20.23 it is said: “These things are written that you might believe;” to believe is something speculative, because on it vision follows; therefore etc.
218 Praeterea, practica ponitur esse circa contingens, III De anima et I Ethicorum; sed obiectum huius scientiae non est contingens, sed necessarium; ergo etc.	218. Besides, practical science is set down as being about the contingent, On the Soul 3.10.433a26-30 and Ethics 1.2.1094b7, 21-22; but the object of this science is not contingent, but necessary; therefore etc.
219 Item, Boethius De Trinitate assignat tres partes speculativae, quarum una est theologia secundum eum; et quod loquatur de ista theologia, videtur, quia subdit ibi de subiecto illius quod subiectum eius est substantia prima, de qua dicit quod ((substantia Dei materia caret)). ƿ	219. Again, Boethius On the Trinity ch. 2 assigns three parts to speculative science, one of which is theology according to him; and it seems he is speaking about theology in the present sense, because about its subject he there adds that its subject is the first substance, of which he says that “God’s substance lacks matter.”
220 Item, practica omni aliqua speculativa est nobilior; nulla nobilior ista; ergo etc. Probatio primae: tum quia speculativa est sui gratia, practica gratia usus, tum quia speculativa est certior, ex I Metaphysicae.	220. Again, nobler than any practical science is some speculative science; but no science is nobler than this science [of theology]; therefore etc. The proof of the first proposition is both that speculative science is for its own sake while practical is for the sake of use, and that speculative science is more certain, from Metaphysics 1.2.982a14-16, 25-28. 109
221 Item, haec inventa est omnibus necessariis exsistentibus propter fugam ignorantiae, quod apparet, quia sollicitudo circa necessaria impedit ab inquisitione huius doctrinae; ergo ipsa est speculativa. Sic enim arguit Philosophus I Metaphysicae quod metaphysica sit speculativa.	221. Again, after all necessary sciences were in existence, this science was invented for escaping ignorance, as is clear because concern with necessities is an impediment to the investigation of this doctrine; therefore it is a speculative science. For in this way does the Philosopher argue in Metaphysics 1.2.982a19-25, that metaphysics is speculative.
222 Contra: Rom. 13: Finis legis est dilectio. Item, Matth. 22: In his duobus mandatis universa lex pendet et prophetae. Item, Augustinus De laude caritatis: ((Ille tenet quidquid latet et quidquid patet in divinis sermonibus qui caritatem servat in moribus)). ƿ Hae autem auctoritates probant quod ista scientia non est praecise propter speculari, sed speculativa nihil quaerit ultra speculari, secundum Avicennam I Metaphysicae a (quaere eum ibi).	222. On the contrary: Romans 13.10: “The end of the law is love.” Again, Matthew 22.40: “On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.” Again, Augustine On the Praise of Charity, Sermon 350 n.2: “He who keeps charity in morals possesses whatever is hidden and whatever is plain in the divine words.” But these authorities prove that this science is not precisely for speculation, but speculative science seeks nothing beyond speculation, according to Avicenna Metaphysics 1.1 (70ra) (examine him there).
223 Secundo quaeritur utrum ex ordine ad praxim ut ad finem dicatur per se scientia practica. Arguo quod sic: III De anima dicit Philosophus: ((Intellectus extensione fit practicus, et differt a speculativo fine)).	223. Second, the question is whether a science is called practical per se from order to action [praxis] as to its end. 110 I argue that it is: In On the Soul 3.10 433a14-15 the Philosopher says: “The intellect becomes practical by extension, and differs from the speculative in its end.”
224 Item, I Metaphysicae: ((Practica est minus nobilis quam speculativa, quia gratia usus)). Hoc argumentum non teneret nisi usus esset per se finis illius habitus.	224. Again in Metaphysics 1.2.982a14-16 he says: “The practical is less noble than the speculative, because it is for the sake of use.” This argument would not hold unless use was the end per se of that habit.
225 Item, II Metaphysicae: ((Finis speculativae est veritas, finis autem practicae est opus)). ƿ	225. Again in Metaphysics 2.1.993b20-21 he says: “The end of the speculative is truth, but the end of the practical is work.”
226 Contra: VI Metaphysicae distinguit Philosophus scientias practicas a speculativis penes obiecta, sicut patet; ibi enim distinguit scientiam practicam, tam activam quam factivam, a speculativa penes obiectum et non penes finem. Item, VI Ethicorum distinguit ratiocinativum a scientifico penes necessarium obiectum et contingens; igitur scientia est practica per se ex obiecto: non igitur ex praxi ut fine. Item, III De anima assignat obiectum practicae bonum, non quodcumque sed agibile et contingens; igitur scientia est practica per se ex obiecto: non igitur ex praxi ut a fine.	226. On the contrary: In Metaphysics 6.1.10225b18-28 the Philosopher distinguishes practical sciences from speculative by their objects, as is plain; for he there distinguishes practical science, both active and productive, from speculative by its object and not by its end. Again, in Ethics 6.2.1139a3-15 he distinguishes the calculative from the scientific by the necessary and contingent object; therefore science is practical per se from its object; therefore not from action as from its end. Again, in On the Soul 3.10.433a26-30 he assigns good as the object of the practical, not any good but doable and contingent good; therefore science is practical per se from its object; not therefore from action as from its end.
227 Ad istas quaestiones solvendas accipio unum generale quod ab omnibus conceditur, scilicet quod habitus practicus aliquo modo extenditur ad praxim. In speciali igitur videndum est: primo, quid praxis sit ad quam dicitur cognitio practica extendi; secundo, qualiter cognitio practica extenditur ad praxim illam; tertio, a quo habet cognitio talem extensionem. ƿ	227. To solve these questions I take one general thing that is conceded by everyone, namely that the practical habit is in some way extended to action. One must consider therefore in particular: first, what the action is is to which practical knowledge is said to be extended; second, in what way practical knowledge is extended to that action; third, by what thing knowledge has such extension.
Art. 1
228 Dico igitur primo quod praxis ad quam cognitio practica extenditur est actus alterius potentiae quam intellectus, naturaliter posterior intellectione, natus elici conformiter intellectioni rectae ad hoc ut sit rectus. Prima condicio apparet, quia stando praecise in actibus intellectus nulla est extensio intellectus, quia non extra se tendit nisi ut actus eius respicit actum alterius potentiae. Et si dicas unum actum intellectus extendi ad alium, directum per illum, non propter hoc secundus est praxis, ut modo loquimur, nec primus cognitio practica, quia tunc logica esset practica, quia dirigit in actibus discurrendi.	228. I say first, then, that the action to which practical knowledge is extended is the act of some power other than the intellect, naturally posterior to the intellect, of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right intellect so as to be right. The first condition is clear, because when one stops precisely at acts of the intellect there is no extension of the intellect, because it does not tend beyond itself unless its act has regard to the act of another power. And if you say that one act of the intellect is extended to another, being directed by it, the second act is not for this reason action as we are now speaking of action, nor is the first knowledge practical, because then logic would be practical, because it directs in acts of discursive thought.
229 Secunda condicio patet, quia actus non habentes ordinem ad intellectum, cuiusmodi sunt actus vegetativi, ac naturaliter praecedentes intellectum. ut actus sensitivi. non dicuntur praxes, nec ad ƿ eos extendi notitia practica ut sunt priores intellectione. Similiter actus potentiae appetitus sensitivi quatenus praecedit actum intellectus non est praxis; hoc enim modo communis est nobis et brutis. Nec respectu istorum actuum est aliqua cognitio practica, nisi quia aliquo modo est moderativa istorum actuum et isti actus sequuntur intellectionem moderativam ut sunt per ipsam moderati.	229. The second condition is plain, because acts not having an order to the intellect, of which sort are vegetative acts, and acts naturally preceding the intellect, as sense acts, are not called actions, nor is practical knowledge said to be extended to them in the way these are prior to understanding. Similarly, the act of the power of sense appetite, insofar as it precedes the act of the intellect, is not action; for it is in this way common to us and to the brutes. Nor is any knowledge practical in respect of these acts, unless it in some way moderates them and these acts follow the understanding moderating them qua being moderated by it.
230 Ex his duabus condicionibus sequitur corollarium, quod videlicet praxis ad quam extenditur habitus practicus non est nisi actus voluntatis elicitus vel imperatus, nam nullus alius actus ab intellectione vel praeter intellectionem essentialiter posterior est intellectione, quia quicumque alius detur actus eiusdem rationis cum ipso, posset esse prior, sicut patet discurrendo per actus potentiarum omnium.	230. From these two conditions follows a corollary, namely that the action to which the practical habit is extended is only an elicited or commanded act of the will, for 112 no other act coming from understanding or beside understanding is essentially posterior to understanding, for any other given act, which is of the same nature as it is, could be prior to it, as is plain by running through the acts of all the powers.
231 Hoc patet secundo sic, quia praxis est actus qui est in potestate cognoscentis. Quod probatur ex VI Ethicorum, quia artifex eget virtute ad recte agendum; non autem indiget virtute respectu illius quod non est in potestate sua; igitur artifex in potestate sua ƿ habet factionem: multo magis prudens habet in potestate sua actionem, quia est formaliter virtuosus. Ex hoc ultra: si omnis praxis est in potestate cognoscentis et nihil est in potestate voluntatis nisi vel actus elicitus vel imperatus, sequitur propositum ut prius.	231. This fact is plain, second, in this way, that action is an act that is in the power of the knower. The proof is from Ethics 6.5.1140b22, that the artisan needs a virtue for acting rightly; but he does not need a virtue with respect to what is not in his power; therefore the artisan has the act of making in his power; much more does the prudent man have action in his power, because he is virtuous in his very form. From this follows further: if all action is in the power of the knower, and if nothing is in the power of the will save either an elicited or commanded act, the proposition intended follows as before [n.230].
232 Contra istam condicionem videtur sequi quod tunc aliqua intellectio erit praxis, quia aliqua potest esse actus imperatus voluntatis sicut actus alterius potentiae imperatur ab ipsa. Et tunc ultra: ergo prima condicio est falsa, quod scilicet praxis est operatio alterius potentiae ab intellectu. - Respondeo: licet speculatio sit quaedam operatio et ita praxis, extendendo nomen, tamen ut praxis dicitur sola operatio ad quam intellectus potest extendi, nulla intellectio est praxis; et hoc modo accipitur praxis quando ad praxim dicitur cognitio practica extendi. Cum ergo arguitur 'intellectio est imperata a voluntate, ergo est praxis', non sequitur, sed sequitur: 'ergo est praxis vel practica'; ipsa enim nata est denominari quasi accidentaliter a praxi ad quam est extensibilis, non autem potest esse terminus talis extensionis. Tamen e converso ƿ bene concedo, quod omnis praxis est actus elicitus voluntatis vel imperatus. Unde ex ista secunda condicione inferre oppositum primae, est facere fallaciam consequentis ponendo consequens.	232. Against this condition is that the consequence seems to be that then any intellection will be action, because any intellection can be an act commanded by the will the way the act of other powers is commanded by the will. And in that case it follows further that therefore the first condition is false, namely that action is the operation of a power other than the intellect. – I reply: although speculation is a certain operation and so, in an extended sense, is an action, yet, in the way action is said to be only the operation to which the intellect can be extended, no understanding is action; and this is the way action is taken when practical knowledge is said to be extended to action. When, therefore, it is argued that ‘understanding is commanded by the will, therefore it is action’, the consequence does not hold, but what holds is ‘therefore it is action or practical’; for it has the nature to be denominated practical accidentally, as it were, because of the action to which it can be extended; but it cannot be the term of such extension. Yet, on the other 113 hand, I do well concede that all action is an elicited or commanded act of the will. Hence, to infer from this second condition the opposite of the first condition is to commit the fallacy of the consequent, by asserting the consequent.
233 Tertia condicio probatur. Tum ex dicto Philosophi VI Ethicorum, quod electio recta necessario requirit rationem rectam. Quod non tantum est verum de electione stricte sumpta, sed pari ratione de quacumque volitione recta, quod ipsa requirit rationem rectam cui conformiter eliciatur; omnis autem praxis vel est volitio vel sequens volitionem, ex corollario praecedente; ergo omnis praxis ad hoc ut sit recta nata est conformiter elici rationi rectae. Tum ex dicto Augustini XV De Trinitate, quod intellectus intelligit sibi et aliis. Igitur sicut potest iudicare de actu suo, ita potest iudicare de actibus aliarum potentiarum; igitur de actu naturaliter posteriore actu suo prius naturaliter potest iudicare quam ille actus ƿ eliciatur; et per consequens, si recte iudicet, oportet istum actum conformiter elici si debeat esse rectus.	233. Proof of the third condition. First from the remark of the Philosopher in Ethics 6.2.1139a22-25, that right choice necessarily requires right reason. This remark is not only true of choice taken strictly but, by parity of reason, of any right volition, because it requires the right reason in conformity with which it is elicited; but all action either is volition or follows volition, from the preceding corollary [n.230]; therefore all action, for the purpose of being right, is naturally elicited in conformity with right reason. Second from the remark of Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.5 n.10, ch.7 n.13, that the intellect performs acts of understanding for itself and for the other powers. Therefore, just as it can pass judgment on its own act, so it can on the acts of the others; therefore on an act naturally posterior to its own act it can naturally pass judgment before that posterior act is elicited; and consequently, if the intellect judges rightly, that act, if it has to be right, must be elicited in conformity with that judgment.
234 Ex duabus condicionibus praxis ultimis sequitur quod actus imperatus a voluntate non est primo praxis sed quasi per accidens, quia nec primo est posterior intellectione nec primo natus elici conformiter rectae rationi. Oportet ergo aliquem alium actum esse primo praxim; ille non est nisi volitio, quia per illam habet actus imperatus dictas condiciones; ergo prima ratio praxis salvatur in actu elicito voluntatis. Et tunc ultra: quandocumque aliquid est primo tale coniunctum cum alio, si posset separari ab illo adhuc esset tale; igitur si actus voluntatis potest separari ab actu alterius potentiae, separatus ab illo posteriore iste erit praxis. Separatur autem circa quodcumque quod potest esse obiectum actus voluntatis circa quod non potest esse actus alterius potentiae, cuiusmodi sunt omnia immaterialia; igitur circa omne tale est actus voluntatis, et ille solus est praxis.	234. From the two final conditions of action [nn.228, 229, 233] it follows that an act commanded by the will is not primarily but as it were per accidens action, because it is not primarily posterior to understanding nor is it primarily of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right reason. Some other act, then, must be primarily action; this act is nothing but volition, because through volition the commanded act has the said conditions; therefore the first idea of action is found in an elicited act of the will. And then further: whenever something that is conjoined to another is primarily of a certain sort, it would still be of that sort if it could be separated from that other; therefore if the act of will can be separated from the act of the other power, it will be action when separated from that posterior act. But it is separate with respect to whatever can be the object of an act of will with respect to which there cannot be an act of another power, and of this sort are all immaterial things; therefore an act of will is about every such thing, and it alone is action.
235 Secundo hoc idem probatur ex intentione Philosophi III ƿ De anima, ubi inquirens principium motivum, postquam conclusit duo esse motiva, videlicet voluntatem sive appetitum et rationem, subdit: ((Intellectus non movet sine appetitu, voluntas enim appetitus est)). Et consequenter dicit quod appetitus duo quandoque sibi sunt contrarii: ideo est ponere quasi unum movens specie, quia duobus appetitibus commune est ratio speciei intermediae, scilicet ratio appetitus. Vult ergo expresse quod sicut appetitus sensitivus habet rationem motivi cum sensu et phantasia, ita voluntas habet rationem principii motivi cum intellectu et ratione. Igitur sicut actus appetitus sensitivi sine quocumque transitu ad extra est vere praxis quando sequitur actum intellectus, ita actus voluntatis, qui ponitur aeque principium motivum, erit vere praxis, quia semper sequitur actum intellectus; et hoc etiam si sit solus, sine actu imperato, immo cum actu in appetitu sensitivo opposito illi quem imperaret, quia ipsa ut habens appetitum illum quandoque contrarium, est principium motivum et operativum, cuius operatio sit praxis. ƿ	235. Second, the same is proved from the intention of the Philosopher On the Soul 3.10.433a17-18, where, in his inquiry about the first mover, after he has concluded that there are two movers, namely will or appetite and reason, he subjoins: “The intellect does not move without appetite, for will is appetite.” And next he says that two appetites are sometimes contrary to each other; therefore he is positing as it were one species of mover, because common to the two appetites is the nature of the species that mediates between them, namely the nature of appetite. His meaning expressly, then, is that just as the sense appetite has the nature of a mover along with sense and imagination, so the will has the nature of a moving principle along with intellect and reason. Therefore, just as an act of sensitive appetite without any transition to what is extrinsic is truly action when it follows an act of intellect, so the act of will that is posited as equally a moving principle will truly be action, for it always follows an act of intellect; and it is action even if it is on its own without a commanded act, nay even if it is with an act in sense appetite opposed to the act 115 which it commands, because, although it has that sometimes opposed appetite, it is itself a moving and operating principle, whose operation is action.