Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P5A3

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Art. 3
239 Circa tertium articulum sunt opiniones, quarum una est talis, quod ab alio dicitur intellectus practicus et ab alio actus vel habitus. Hoc sic: verum operabile et non operabile sunt obiecta specialia, formaliter diversa, ideo per se distinguunt illa quae per se respiciunt ipsa, puta et actus et habitus, qui dicuntur practici quia circa operabile; sed intellectus non dicitur practicus nisi sit operativus, qualis non est nisi ille qui apprehendit ordinem ad opus, - quod non facit nisi motus ex appetitu finis, ita quod practicus intellectus includit in suo actu, non formaliter de essentia actus sed connotando, ordinem necessario ad desiderium finis explicite et eorum quae sunt ad finem implicite; quapropter cum speculabile ordinari ad opus accidat speculabili (licet ordinabile esse non accidat ei), differentia inter speculativum intellectum ƿ et practicum inde proveniens erit accidentalis et per respectum ad aliquid extra intellectum, licet differentia habituum et actuum sit formalis secundum differentiam formalem obiecti operabilis et non operabilis. Unde in III De anima dicitur quod intellectus speculativus et practicus differunt fine, et VI Ethicorum: ((Bonum intellectus practici est verum confesse se habens appetitui recto)).	239. [First opinion] – About the third article [n.227] there exist opinions one of which is of this sort, that the intellect is called practical from one thing, and the act or habit is called practical from another. It is as follows: truth that is doable and that is not doable are specific objects, formally diverse, and so they distinguish per se the things that have a per se respect to them, namely act and habit, which are called practical because they concern something doable; but the intellect is only called practical if it is operative, and only the intellect that apprehends an order toward doing is of this sort. But it does not apprehend this order unless it is moved by appetite for the end, so that the practical intellect includes in its act, not formally by the essence of the act but by connotation, an order that is necessarily toward desire, a desire explicitly of the end and implicitly of the things for the end; wherefore, since the ordering of an object of speculation toward doing is accidental to that object (although the object’s being capable of being so ordered is not accidental to it), the difference, which flows from this, between the speculative and the practical intellect will be accidental and in respect of something extrinsic to the intellect, although the difference of the habits and acts is formal in accord with the formal difference of doable and non-doable objects. Hence in On the Soul 3.10.433a14-15 it is said that the speculative and practical intellect differ in their end, and in Ethics 6.3.1139a29-31 that: “The good of the practical intellect is truth in conformity with correct appetite.”
240 Exemplum: intellectus speculativus apprehendit sanitatem ut bonum conveniens, appetitus appetit illam, et sequitur aliquo modo consideratio intellectus practici quod sanitas est acquirenda. Stante igitur desiderio finis, intellectus practicus ex hoc principio, 'illud per quod melius potest acquiri, est procurandum', procedit discurrendo, et terminatur discursus in ultima conclusione consilii; et totus iste discursus sicut sumit principium ex apprehensione finis desiderati, qui est primum obiectum intellectus practici, ita est ut illa inventa ad finem operetur, et ideo voluntatem finis praesupponit et ad electionem sequentem consilium ordinatur.	240. An example: the speculative intellect apprehends health as a fitting good, the appetite desires it, and there follows in another way the consideration of the practical intellect that health is to be acquired. With the desire for the end in place, then, the practical intellect proceeds discursively from the principle ‘that by which health can be better acquired is to be procured’, and its discursive process ends at the final conclusion of deliberation; and the whole discursive process, just as it takes its principle from apprehension of the desired end, which is the first object of the practical intellect, so it does what has been discovered in view of the end, and hence it presupposes will for the end and is ordered to the choice that follows deliberation.
241 Contra hanc opinionem - quae, ut breviter dicam, in hoc consistit quod distinctionem intellectus practici et speculativi ponit penes finem qui accidit obiecto, sed habitus speculativus et ƿ practicus differunt et distinguuntur penes obiectorum specialium differentiam formalem - arguitur, quia de habitibus dicitur II Metaphysicae: ((Finis speculativae veritas, practicae autem opus)).	241. Against this opinion – which, to speak briefly, consists in this that it puts the distinction of the practical and speculative intellect in an end that is accidental to the object, but the speculative and practical habit differ and are distinguished by the formal difference of their special objects – the argument is that it is said of the habits in Metaphysics 2.1.993b20-21 that: “The end of speculative science is truth, but of the practical it is doing.”
242 Similiter, tunc habitus practicus erit in intellectu speculativo nec intellectus illo habitu dicetur practicus, quod videtur inconveniens, quia omni habitu denominatur habens secundum naturam habitus.	242. Likewise, the practical habit will in that case be in the speculative intellect, and the intellect will not be called practical by that habit, which seems discordant, because every habit denominates its possessor according to the nature of the habit.
243 Respondent ad primum quod scientiae practicae finis est opus in potentia et aptitudine, in quantum eius obiectum est operabile per se; sed obiectum operabile consideratur secundum habitum istum in universali, quae consideratio non sufficit ad hoc quod subiciatur operationi in actu et in particulari; quia actus est melior potentia in bonis, ideo requiritur talis consideratio particularis et in actu: illa autem est per alium habitum a scientia practica, et ille habitus alius solum est in intellectu practico. Ad secundum dicit quod denominative potest dici practicus, non simpliciter sed intelligendo denominationem fieri ab habitu. ƿ	243. They reply to the first argument [n.241] that the end of practical science is work potentially and in aptitude, insofar as its object is per se doable; but the doable object is considered according to the habit in general, which consideration is not enough for it to be subject to operation in actuality and in particular; because in goods act is better than potency, and so such particular and actual consideration is required; now the consideration is by a habit different from practical science, and that habit alone is in the practical intellect. To the second argument [n.242] the response is that the habit can be said to be by denomination practical, not simply, but by understanding the denomination to be made from the habit.
244 Contra: igitur habitus et actus practicus esse possunt in intellectu speculativo, quia habitus vel actus ex natura sua practicus potest esse in intellectu sine relatione tali ad actum voluntatis, qualem ponit. Consequens concederet, sed alium habitum poneret posse haberi in intellectu practico, ex actibus non tantum practicis sed ex actibus intellectus practici generatum.	244. To the contrary: therefore the practical habit and act can exist in the speculative intellect, because a habit and act that are of their nature practical can exist in the intellect without such reference to an act of will of the sort posited. The consequent would be conceded, but another habit would be posited as capable of being possessed in the practical intellect, a habit generated not only by practical acts but also by acts of the practical intellect.
245 Contra: habitus practicus generatus ex actibus practicis sufficeret ad eadem ad quae ille alius generatus ex actibus intellectus practici, quia voluntas imperans considerationem propter talem finem non dat aliam rationem considerationi in dirigendo, nec per consequens habitui generato ex considerationibus.	245. To the contrary: a practical habit generated from practical acts would be enough for the same things as the other habit would be enough for that is generated by acts of the practical intellect, because the will commanding consideration for the sake of such an end does not give any other reason for consideration in acts of directing, nor consequently for a habit generated by considerations.
246 Item, tunc multa accidentia eiusdem speciei erunt in eodem. Non enim propter ordinem voluntatis vel non ordinem potest poni distinctio specifica actus huius et illius, similiter nec habitus.	246. Again, in that case many accidents of the same species will exist in the same thing. For one cannot, on account of order or non-order of the will, posit a specific distinction between this act and that, nor similarly between this habit and that.
247 Item, tertio, contra opinionem in se arguo sic: subiectum magis denominatur a per se condicione sui accidentis et essentiali quam a condicione illius accidentali; igitur si intellectus potest dici ƿ practicus ex condicione accidentali sui habitus, puta ex ordine voluntatis ordinantis actum eius ad aliud, multo magis potest dici practicus ex ordine essentiali actus quo actus dicitur essentialiter practicus. Ideo ab eodem videtur intellectus dici practicus a quo habitus et actus, licet non ita accidentaliter dicatur istud de habitu et actu sicut dicitur de intellectu, respectu cuius est accidens per accidens.	247. Again, third, against the opinion in itself [nn.239-240] I argue thus: a subject is denominated more from a per se and essential condition of its accident than from an accidental condition of it; therefore, if the intellect can be called practical from an accidental condition of its habit, to wit from the order of the will ordering its act to something else, much more can it be called practical from the essential order of the act by which the act is said to be essentially practical. Therefore, the intellect seems to be called practical from the same thing as that from which the habit and act are called practical, although of the habit and act it is not said as accidentally as it is said of the intellect, where it has the respect of an accident per accidens.
248 Aliter dicitur quod illud a quo habitus et actus dicuntur practici est finis et extensio cognitionis practicae ad praxim quae est extensio ad finem. Pro hac opinione auctoritates positae sunt prius.	248. [Second opinion] – Alternatively, it is said that the thing from which habit and act are said to be practical is the end and the extension of practical knowledge to action, which is extension to an end. On behalf of this opinion are the authorities set down earlier [nn.223-225].
249 Arguitur etiam per rationem. Primo sic, quia aut habitus dicitur practicus ab obiecto, aut a fine. Non ab obiecto proprio, quia intellectus 'extensione fit practicus', quod non est verum nisi de eodem intellectu speculativo et postea practico extenso ad opus; ƿ igitur circa idem obiectum potest esse consideratio speculativa et practica.	249. There is also argument by reason. First thus: that a habit is said to be practical either from the object or from the end. Not from the proper object because the intellect ‘is made practical by extension’, which is only true of the same speculative intellect that is also afterwards practical when extended to work; therefore there can be a speculative and a practical consideration of the same object.
250 Secundo sic, quia medicina dividitur in speculativam et practicam, et tamen ipsa est de aliquo eodem subiecto, ut de sanitate vel de corpore sanabili.	250. Second thus: that medicine is divided into speculative and practical, and yet it is about some object that is the same, as about health or the body capable of health.
251 Item, actus dicitur practicus quia bonus vel malus moraliter, bonitas et malitia moris competunt actui ex circumstantiis; inter circumstantias autem prima et praecipua est circumstantia finis; igitur etc.	251. Again, an act is said to be practical because it is morally good or bad; goodness and badness in morals belongs to an act by its circumstances; but first and chief among the circumstances is the circumstance of the end; therefore etc.
252 Contra istam positionem arguo sic: quaero, aut habitus et actus dicantur practici propter extensionem actualem ad opus, vel tantum propter extensionem aptitudinalem vel habitualem ad opus? Non propter actualem (ut habetur in secundo articulo et ipsi concedunt), quia tunc faber non intendens operari non haberet cognitionem practicam; igitur propter extensionem aptitudinalem. Sed aptitudo non convenit uni naturae quae repugnat alii nisi propter aliquid absolutum in tali natura; quia enim haec ƿ natura est talis, ideo convenit sibi talis aptitudo; igitur praesupponit in ipsa consideratione aliquam condicionem intrinsecam per quam conveniat sibi talis aptitudo. Ista condicio considerationis in se est ab alia causa eius priore; sed causae priores eius sunt intellectus et obiectum; igitur convenit sibi ab intellectu vel ab aliquo obiecto.	252. Against this position I argue thus: I ask, are habit and act said to be practical because of actual extension to work or are they so only because of an aptitudinal or relational extension to work? Not because of actual extension (as is contained in the second article [nn.236-238] and as they concede), because in that case the workman who is not intending to work would not have practical knowledge; therefore because of aptitudinal extension. But an aptitude which is repugnant to one nature does not belong to another save because of something absolute in such nature; for because this nature is such, therefore such aptitude belongs to it; therefore in its very consideration it presupposes some intrinsic condition by which such aptitude belongs to it. This condition of consideration in itself is from another cause prior to it; but the prior causes of it are intellect and the object; therefore the condition belongs to it from the intellect or from some object.
253 Si dicatur quod finis est causa prior, immo prima inter omnes causas, secundum Avicennam VI Metaphysicae, et ita ab ipsa potest esse consideratio talis naturae ut ei conveniat talis aptitudo, contra: finis non est causa nisi in quantum amatus et desideratus movens efficiens ad efficiendum. Sed aptitudo dicta convenit considerationi sive finis sit amatus sive non. Potest enim in intellectu esse dicta cognitio qualitercumque voluntas se habeat, immo si voluntas non esset coniuncta intellectui. Et ita a fine tamquam a finali causa non convenit aptitudo illa cognitioni; nihil enim inest ab aliqua causa quod inest illa non causante. ƿ Si dicas, finis aptus est amari antequam aptitudo illa insit cognitioni, contra: hoc non salvat propositum, quia effectus nihil habet ab aliquo causaliter quia illud natum esset causare nisi actu causet; igitur cognitio non habet aptitudinem, sive naturam illam quam consequitur talis aptitudo, a fine aptitudinaliter causante nisi actu causet; nec causat in actu ut causa finalis nisi ut actu amatus et desideratus moveat efficiens ad agendum; igitur etc.	253. If it be said that the end is the prior cause, or rather is the first among all causes, according to Avicenna Metaphysics 6 ch.5 (94va), and so from it can arise the consideration of such a nature so that such an aptitude befits it, on the contrary: the end is not a cause save insofar as, being loved and desired, it moves the efficient cause to cause its effect. But the said aptitude belongs to such a consideration whether the end is loved or not. For the said knowledge can exist in the intellect however the will is disposed, even were the will not conjoined with the intellect. And so it is not from the end as from the final cause that the aptitude belongs to the knowledge; for no cause makes a thing to be present that is present when the cause is not causing. If you say that the end is apt to be loved before the aptitude is present in knowledge, on the contrary: this does not save the intended proposition, because an effect does not get anything causally from a thing on the ground that the thing has the nature to cause if the thing is not actually causing; therefore knowledge does not get an aptitude, or the nature that such aptitude is consequent upon, from an end that is apt to cause if it is not actually causing; nor does it actually cause as a final cause unless, being actually loved and desired, it moves the efficient cause to act; therefore etc
254 Praeterea, aut finis ut elicitus vel habitus extra facit habitum esse practicum, aut ut finis consideratus et intentus. Non ut elicitus extra, quia sic est posterior habitu, et effectus aliquo modo; sed effectus non distinguit causam. Si ut cognitus, sic habet rationem obiecti; ergo obiectum distinguit. Si ut intentus, hoc iam improbatum est, quia ante naturaliter quam intendatur est cognitio talisa. ƿ	254. Besides, either the end as extrinsically elicited or possessed makes the habit to be practical, or it does so as considered and intended. Not as extrinsically elicited because in this way it is posterior to the habit and is in a way its effect; but an effect does not cause distinctions in a cause. If as considered, in this way it has the nature of the object; therefore the object causes the distinction. If as intended, this has already been refuted [n.253], because such knowledge exists before the end is naturally intended.
255 Praeterea, non omnis cognitionis practicae finis est praxis . Aliqua enim intellectio practica est respectu praxis potentiae inferioris, ut puta quae est appetitus sensitivi vel potentiae motiƿvae; nullus autem actus potentiae inferioris est finis actus intellectus, quia nihil ignobilius est per se finis nobilioris; actus intelligendi est nobilior et perfectior quocumque actu cuiuscumque potentiae inferioris sensitivae.	255. Besides, not every end of practical knowledge is action. For some practical understanding has regard to the action of a lower power, as for example the action of sensitive appetite or of the power of movement; but no act of a lower power is the end of an act of intellect, because nothing less noble is per se the end of something more noble; the act of understanding is nobler and more perfect than any act at all of any lower sensitive power at all.
256 Dicitur quod licet intellectio sit nobilior in esse naturae quam operatio potentiae inferioris, non tamen in genere moris, quia melius moraliter est fortiter agere quam cogitare fortiter agere.	256. It is said that, although understanding is nobler in its natural being than the operation of a lower power, yet it is not so in the genus of morals, because to act bravely is morally better than to think of acting bravely.
257 Contra hoc dupliciter. Primo quia falsum supponitur, nam ƿ actus potentiae inferioris non est bonus moraliter nisi quia conformatur rationi rectae ut regulae suae; igitur rectitudo rationis est causa bonitatis talis in actu illo et non e converso; sed actum rationis esse sic rectum est ipsum esse bonum moraliter sicut intellectio potest esse bona moraliter. - Confirmatur ratio, quia prudentia est simpliciter melior virtute morali ut est in appetitu sensitivo; igitur et actus eius ut eius est melior actu illius ut illius; igitur iste ut practicus sicut potest intellectio esse practica est melior illo ut practico sive bono moraliter. Ex hoc patet quod probatio de cogitare non valet; quando enim quaeritur excellentia unius ad alterum, non debet comparari optimum ad infimum, sed optimum ad optimum vel simpliciter ad simpliciter debet comparari. Sicut ergo accipit optimum ibi, puta 'fortiter agere extra', ita debet accipere in intellectu 'dictare secundum prudentiam fortiter agere'. Hoc secundum est melius etiam moraliter, quia ut regula habet bonitatem formalem quae est rectitudo propria; aliud est tantum bonum materialiter, quia ex se non est bonum ƿ moraliter circumscribendo ordinem ad regulam istam et ad voluntatem imperantem.	257. Against this there is a twofold objection. First, that it supposes something false, for the act of a lower power is not morally good unless it is conformed to right reason as to its rule; therefore rightness of reason is the cause of such goodness in that act and not conversely; but the act of reason being in this way right is for it to be morally good, just as understanding can be morally good. – The reasoning is confirmed because prudence is simply better than moral virtue as moral virtue exists in the sensitive appetite; therefore the act of the former as it is the former’s act is better than the act of the latter as it is the latter’s act; therefore the former as practical, in the way that understanding can be practical, is better than the latter as practical or as good morally. Hence it is plain that the proof about thinking is not valid; for when one is looking for the excellence of one thing over another, one should not compare the best to the worst, but one should compare the best to the best or the simply so to the simply so. Therefore, just as the best is taken there, namely to act bravely in fact, so one should take the best in the intellect, namely ‘to command brave action in accordance with prudence’. This second is better even morally, because, as being the rule, it has formal goodness, which is rightness proper; the other is only good materially, because, when one removes from it its order to the rule and to the will as commanding, it is not of itself morally good.
258 Secundo, prima responsio non videtur ad propositum: quaeritur enim unde intellectio sit practica, non supponendo eam esse practicam, potissime cum nec supponatur de illa prima circumstantia quae est finis sed inquiratur; igitur ut quaeritur de intellectione practica, et prima circumstantia a qua foret practica, ipsa tantum accipitur ut est illud quod est in esse naturae; igitur sic distinguere de ipsa secundum bonitatem moris et naturae, nihil est aliud quam supponere quod quaeritur et distinguere aliquid ut consideratur praecise sub altero membro distinctionis.	258. Second, the first response [n.256] does not seem relevant to what is proposed: for one does not look for the source of understanding’s being practical by supposing it to be practical, especially since one is not presupposing its first condition, namely the condition of the end, but one is inquiring into that condition [n.248]; therefore, since one is looking for practical understanding and for the first circumstance that will make it practical, one only takes understanding as to what it is in its natural being; therefore to distinguish it according to moral and natural goodness like this is nothing other than to assume what is being sought for and to distinguish the thing as the thing is considered in its precision under one member of the distinction.
259 Ideo corrigitur ista opinio ab aliis et dicitur quod habitus dicitur practicus a fine qui est consideratio practica; proprius enim finis cuiuscumque habitus est actus eius. - Sed contra istud. Si consideratio ista quae est finis habitus est practica, ergo ipsa habet causam ex qua dicatur practica: aut ergo finem illius consideƿrationis, et hoc iam improbatum est; aut obiectum, et tunc sequitur quod ipsum obiectum est prior causa a qua dicitur habitus practicus quam ipsa consideratio, et habetur propositum, quod ab obiecto tam habitus, licet mediate, quam actus dicitur practicus.	259. Therefore this opinion [n.248] is corrected by others and it is said that a habit is called practical from the end, which is practical consideration; for the proper end of any habit is its act. – But against this: If this consideration, which is the end of the habit, 124 is practical, then it has a cause for being called practical; either then the cause it has is the end of that consideration, and this has already been refuted [nn.252-255]; or it is the object, and then it follows that the object is the cause, prior to the consideration itself, whereby the habit is said to be practical, and one has what is proposed, that it is from the object that both the habit, though mediately, and the act are said to be practical.
260 Concedo igitur quod habitus non dicitur practicus ab actu proprio, quia et ille est practicus a causa priore. Nec cognitio aliqua habitualis vel actualis est per se practica quia ordinatur ad praxim ut ad finem; potest tamen quandoque habere primam extensionem, scilicet conformitatem ad praxim, a fine ipsius praxis, non tamen in quantum est finis sed in quantum est obiectum.	260. [Scotus’ own opinion] – I concede, then, that the habit is not called practical from the act proper, because the act too is practical from a prior cause. Nor is any habitual or actual knowledge practical per se because it is ordered to action as to an end; yet it can sometimes get its first extension, namely conformity to action [n.236], from the very end of the action, not however from it insofar as it is end but insofar as it is object.
261 Primum patet. Quandoque enim prima principia practica sumuntur a fine praxis, et ita ille finis, ut causa praxis prima, in genere illo includit virtualiter totam notitiam, et ita ipsa notitia habet quiditatem suam et aptitudinem ab illo.	261. The first point here [about first extension] is plain. For sometimes the first practical principles are taken from the end of action, and so the end, as first cause of action, includes virtually all the knowledge in the genus, and so the knowledge itself gets from it its quiddity and aptitude.
262 Secundum patet. Ideo enim praxis dat talem aptitudinem sive talem naturam habentem aptitudinem, quia ut obiectum primum includit principia, et mediantibus illis conclusiones, et ita totam notitiam practicam; non autem in quantum finis, tum quia ƿ a fine ut fine nulla natura vel aptitudo naturalis habetur nisi amato et desiderato et sic movente efficiens; prius autem naturaliter quam ametur includit dicta principia et conclusiones; veritas enim principii practici necessarii non dependet a voluntate magis quam speculativi, nec conclusiones necessario illatae ex tali principio; tum quia quodcumque aliud includeret virtualiter notitiam talem, eodem modo daret notitiae conformitatem talem, puta si ipsa praxis includeret primo in genere illo talem notitiam, vel illud circa quod est operatio, sicut quandoque contingit et tactum fuit in responsione ad tertium argumentum in quaestione prima de subiecto theologiae: homo enim forte est subiectum tam moralis scientiae quam medicinae - non autem felicitas vel sanitas - quia utriusque finis ratio includitur in ratione illius circa quod est praxis.	262. The second point [about the end as object] is plain. For practice gives the aptitude, or the sort of nature possessing an aptitude, for this reason, that as the first object includes the principles and, by means of them, the conclusions, so it includes the whole of practical knowledge; but not insofar as it is end, first because no nature or natural aptitude is got from the end, unless the end is loved and desired and so is moving the efficient cause [n.253]; but before it is naturally loved it includes the said principles and conclusions; for the truth of a necessary practical principle does not depend more on the will than does the truth of a speculative principle, and neither do the conclusions necessarily inferred from such a principle; – second because anything else that may virtually include such knowledge would give such conformity to the knowledge in the same way, to wit if the action itself, or that which the operation is about, were first in the genus to include such knowledge, as sometimes happens and as was touched on in the response to the third argument in the first question about the subject of theology [n.185]; for man is perhaps the subject of both moral and medical science – but not happiness or health – because the idea of the end of each is included in the idea of what the action is about.
263 Si dicatur quod principia prima practica sumuntur semper a fine, igitur semper finis primo includit virtualiter notitiam eorum, si concederetur conclusio, tamen staret quod non in quantum finis sed in quantum obiectum, et tunc posset dici quod homo est finis tam sanitatis quam felicitatis naturalis, ut tangitur in responsione praecedenti; sed saltem non est proximus finis praxis, quia si ƿ negaretur conclusio, negandum esset antecedens universaliter sumptum, quia particulariter est verum, ubi scilicet ratio finis non concluditur ex aliquo pertinente ad cognitionem practicam.	263. If it be said that the first practical principles are always taken from the end, therefore the end always first includes the knowledge of them virtually, – if this conclusion were conceded, it would hold nevertheless that the end did so, not insofar as it was end, but insofar as it was object, and it could then be said that man is the end both of health and of natural happiness, as was touched on in the preceding response [n.262]; but man is not at any rate the proximate end of the action, because, if the conclusion were denied, the antecedent taken universally would have to be denied, for taken particularly it is true, namely when the idea of the end is not deduced from anything pertaining to practical knowledge [n.314].
264 Vel aliter posset exponi antecedens sic: 'principia prima' etc., verum est inter illa quae sumuntur a circumstantiis moralibus, praesupposito actu bono secundum genus, quia sic obiectum non est circumstantia. Alio modo, accipiendo actum nude, etiam obiectum est circumstantia; et ex isto videtur antecedens improbari: a quo enim sumitur omnino prima circumstantia actus nude considerati, videtur esse prius quocumque alio, et ita obiectum, a quo primo specificatur actus ut dicatur bonus ex genere actus, circumstantionabilis ulterius aliis circumstantiis ut sit plene moralis, videtur omnino primum in cognitione practica. De hoc non oportet modo prosequi an concludat vel non, quia in libro tertio locum habet. Breviter igitur quoad hunc articulum dico quod practica non habet primo extensionem sibi competentem a fine in quantum finis, propter rationes praeadductas. ƿ	264. Or the antecedent could be expounded in another way thus: ‘the first principles are always taken from the end’ is true in the case of those principles that, once an act good in its kind has been presupposed, are taken from the moral circumstances, because in this way the object is not a circumstance. In another way, when the act is taken bare, the object is also a circumstance; and by this the antecedent seems to be refuted; for that from which the first circumstance of the act considered bare is altogether taken seems to be prior to anything else, and so the object from which the act is first 126 specified so as to be called good in kind of act, being qualifiable by the other circumstances so as to be fully moral, seems to be altogether first in practical knowledge. But it is not necessary now to pursue the question whether this conclusion holds or not, because its place is in the third book (3 Suppl. d.26 q. un. n.10; d.38 q. un. nn.4-5; also 2 d.7 q. un. nn.11-13, 24-28; d.40 q. un. n.3) [cf. n.362 below]. Briefly then to this article [nn.239, 227] I say that practical knowledge does not first get its appropriate extension from the end insofar as it is end, for the reasons adduced above [n.262].