Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P5A4

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Art. 4
265 Ex hoc patet solutio secundae quaestionis propositae, cuius teneo partem negativam, sed primam relationem, scilicet conformitatem, habet per se ab obiecto, quod vel est rectitudo praxis vel aliquid virtualiter includens illam rectitudinem, et ideo cognitioni illi est praxis conformabilis ut sit recta, quia cognitio est talis cogniti.	265. From this the solution to the second question posed is plain [n.223]. I hold to the negative part of it [sc. science is not said to be practical from its order to the end], but the first relation, namely conformity [n.236], is had by practical science per se from the object, which is either rectitude of practice or something virtually including that rectitude, and therefore action is conformable to that knowledge so as to be right, because the knowledge is of such a known thing.
266 Sed de alia relatione, scilicet prioritate, dubium est unde conveniat cognitioni. Dico quod necessario praxim naturaliter praecedit aliqua intellectio, sicut patet ex primo articulo; et secundum hoc convenit praxi posterioritas et cognitioni prioritas ex ratione potentiarum ordinatarum naturaliter in agendo, intellectus scilicet et voluntatis. Sed non semper illa intellectio prior est practica, sed tantum quando est determinativa rectitudinis vel determinatae rectitudinis ipsius praxis, et hoc vel virtualiter vel formaliter. Quando autem in apprehensione praevia nulla est determinatio virtualis vel formalis de rectitudine praxis, licet ibi sit prioritas, tamen ibi deficit conformitas, quia ipsa non est cui debeat ƿ praxis conformari ut sit recta, quia ipsa nihil determinatum ostendit de rectitudine praxis. Potest igitur dici quod licet absolute ex natura intellectus et voluntatis sit cognitio prior, tamen quod cognitio conformis, id est conformativa, sit prior, hoc est simul ex obiecto et ordine potentiarum et potentiae practicantis, nam etsi obiectum determinet intellectum ad cognitionem rectitudinis prius naturaliter quam voluntas velit et voluntas sit aliquo modo regulabilis aliunde, ƿ non tamen tantum apprehensio praecedit praxim sed apprehensio conformis. Hoc autem accidit quandocumque determinata rectitudo praxis est cognoscibile necessarium, sive ut principium per intellectum sive ut conclusio per scientiam.	266. But as to the other relation, namely priority [n.236], it is doubtful whether it belongs to the knowledge. I say that necessarily some understanding naturally precedes action, as is plain from the first article [nn.229-233]; and in this respect posteriority belongs to action and priority to knowledge from the nature of the powers that are ordered naturally in acting, namely intellect and will. But that prior understanding is not always practical, but only when it is determinative of the rectitude or of the determinate rectitude of the action itself, and that either virtually or formally. But when there is in the preceding apprehension no virtual or formal determination of the rectitude of the action, although there is priority in it, yet conformity in it is lacking, because it is not the knowledge to which action should be conformed in order to be right, because it points out nothing determinate about the rectitude of the action. It can be said then that, although absolutely from the nature of the intellect and of the will knowledge is prior, yet the fact that conform knowledge, namely knowledge that makes conform, is prior comes from the object and at the same time from the order of the powers and of the power of the actor, for although the object determines the intellect to knowledge of rectitude naturally before the will wills, and although the will in some way receives its rule from something else, yet not apprehension alone but conform apprehension precedes action. But this happens whenever the determinate rectitude of action is a necessary knowable, either as a principle through the intellect or as a conclusion through science.
267 $a Haec quae iam dicta sunt, de hoc videlicet unde duplex relatio, scilicet conformitatis et prioritatis conveniat notitiae practicae, generaliter intelligantur, nisi oporteat pro intellectu divino aliquid addere, videlicet quod potentia practicans, cuius praxe notitia conformis est prior, sit aliquo modo determinabilis aliunde sive alii tamquam regulae conformabilis in agendo; quod an requiratur ad notitiam vel non, tangetur in responsione ad quartam obiectionem, quae fiet contra solutionem quaestionis principalem. a$	267. The things that have just been said, namely about the source from which the double relation, that is of conformity and of priority, belongs to practical knowledge, are to be understood in a general way, unless one should add something on behalf of the divine intellect, namely that the acting power, to whose action the conform knowledge is prior, is in some way determinable, or conformable to another as to a rule in its acting, from somewhere else; but whether this is required for knowledge or not will be touched on in response to the fourth objection that will be made against the principal solution to the question [nn.324-331].
268 Quando autem rectitudo determinata contingenter convenit praxi, tunc non est obiectum aliquod determinans intellectum ad cognitionem rectitudinis determinatae antequam voluntas velit, et hoc loquendo de intellectu et voluntate in communi, nam illud contingens non determinatur ad alteram partem ante omnem actum voluntatis. Comparando tamen in speciali ad intellectum hunc et voluntatem hanc, illam praxim potest praecedere cognitio conforƿmis quam praecedit cognitio determinata rectitudinis, et quam non, non; potest autem praecedere in omni intelligente, et solo cuius voluntas non est primo determinans rectitudinem illi praxi.	268. But when determinate rectitude belongs contingently to action, then there is no object determining the intellect to knowledge of determinate rectitude before the will wills, and this when speaking of intellect and will in general, for the contingent thing is not determined to either part in advance of all acts of the will. But when making comparison specifically to this intellect and this will, the conform knowledge, which determinate knowledge of rectitude precedes, can precede the action, and the one which it does not precede cannot; but it can precede in all and only the intelligence whose will is not the first determinant of rectitude for the action.
269 Exemplum praedictorum: Rectitudo huius praxis 'amare Deum' necessaria est, et includitur in ratione Dei virtualiter; hanc praxim etiam in quocumque non tantum nata est praecedere apprehensio, sed etiam apprehensio conformis, cui scilicet praxis est conformanda ut sit recta: ex obiecto igitur quod est ex se primo determinativum intellectus ad notitiam rectitudinis determinatae ipsius praxis et ex ordine intellectus et voluntatis in operando, habetur hic notitia prior praxi et conformis, et ita in qualibet alia cui necessario convenit determinata rectitudo. Sed rectitudo huius praxis 'colere Deum in sacrificio altaris' est contingens; quandoque enim est actus rectus, ut modo, quandoque non, ut in Veteri Testamento: et ideo non est aliquod obiectum determinativum intellectus ad notitiam huius rectitudinis ante omnem actum voluntatis, et ideo nec ista praecedit ut conformis omnem actum voluntatis. Alicuius tamen praecedit, puta illius ƿ solius quae non primo determinat rectitudinem huic praxi, qualis est voluntas humana. Haec enim rectitudo determinatur a voluntate divina, acceptante nunc talem cultum vel actum et alias alium.	269. An example of what has been said: The rectitude of this act ‘to love God’ is necessary and is included virtually in the idea of God; this action is also not only naturally preceded in everyone by apprehension but also by conform apprehension, namely the apprehension to which the action must be conformed so as to be right; so it is from the object which of itself primarily determines the intellect to know the determinate rectitude of the action, and from the order of the intellect and the will in acting, that this knowledge is obtained which is prior to action and conform, and likewise in the case of any other action that determinate rectitude necessarily belongs to. But the rectitude of this action ‘to worship God in the sacrifice of the altar’ is contingent; for sometimes the act is right, as it is now, and sometimes not, as it was in the Old Testament; and therefore there is not an object determinative of the intellect to knowledge of this rectitude in advance of every act of the will, and so the knowledge does not precede, as conform knowledge, every act of the will. Yet it does precede the act of some will, to wit of that will alone which does not first determine rectitude for this action, of which sort is the human will. For this rectitude is determined by the divine will, which accepts now this sort of cult or act and at other times some other one.