Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P5A6

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Art. 6
345 Ad argumenta principalia primae quaestionis. Ad primum dico quod fides non est habitus speculativus. nec credere est actus ƿ speculativus, nec visio sequens credere est speculativa, sed practica; nata est enim illa visio conformis esse fruitioni et prius naturaliter haberi in intellectu creato ut fruitio recta illi conformiter eliciatur.	345. To the principal arguments of the first question. To the first [n.217] I say that faith is not a speculative habit and that to believe is not a speculative act, nor is the vision that follows believing speculative, but practical; for the vision is of a nature to be conform to enjoyment and it is first naturally had in the intellect so that right fruition may be elicited in conformity with it.
346 Ad secundum dicendum quod contingens circa quod est scientia practica est finis vel ens ad finem; in agibilibus autem actio est finis ultimus secundum Philosophum VI Ethicorum; ergo contingentia actionis sufficit ad obiectum scientiae practicae.	346. To the second [n.218] one must say that the contingent thing that practical science is about is the end or what is for the end; but in doable things action is the ultimate end according to the Philosopher in Ethics 6.2.1139b3-4; therefore the contingency of action suffices for the object of practical science.
347 Contra hoc arguitur, primo, quia scientia est necessariorum; ergo circa contingentia non est scientia. Antecedens patet ex definitione 'scire' I Posteriorum.	347. Against this is argued, first, that science is of necessary things; therefore there is no science about contingent things. The antecedent is plain from the definition of ‘to know’ in Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b15-16.
348 Similiter, ex VI Ethicorum scientificum distinguitur a ratiocinativo penes necessarium et contingens, ergo omnes habitus partis scientificae sunt circa necessarium; scientia autem est habitus illius partis; ergo etc.	348. Likewise from Ethics 6.2.1139a3-15, the scientific is distinguished from the calculative by reference to the necessary and the contingent [n.226], therefore all the habits of the scientific part are about the necessary; but science is a habit of that part; therefore etc.
349 Praeterea, si theologia est circa contingens agibile, ergo est habitus activus cum vera ratione; ut autem dicitur VI Ethicorum, haec est definitio prudentiae; ergo theologia est prudentia, non scientia.	349. Further, if theology is about the contingent doable, therefore it is a habit of action along with true reason; but, as is said in Ethics 6.5.1140b20-21, this is the definition of prudence; therefore theology is prudence, not science.
350 Ad primum respondeo: de contingentibus sunt multae veritates necessariae, quia actus qui contingenter elicitur concluditur ƿ necessario debere esse talis ad hoc ut sit rectus; de ipso igitur est scientia quantum ad conclusionem necessario deductam, licet in se sit contingens in quantum elicitur a potentia propria. Tunc patet ad auctoritatem Philosophi I Posteriorum: scientia est necessarii dicti de contingente, et ita veritates necessariae includuntur in intellectu contingentis, vel concluduntur de aliquo quod est contingens, per rationem alicuius prioris necessarii. Per idem ad auctoritatem Philosophi VI Ethicorum, quia habitus partis ratiocinativae est circa actum in quantum contingenter elicitur; sed habitus scientificus vel scientia est circa idem in quantum aliquid de eo necessario concluditur. Si obiciatur quod non est idem obiectum habitus scientifici et ratiocinativi, de hoc dicetur inferius, quomodo idem obiectum potest esse plurium habituum, licet non idem habitus plurium obiectorum.	350. To the first [nn.347-348] I reply: there are many necessary truths about contingent things, because it is a necessary conclusion that an act that is contingently 158 elicited should be such as to be right; about it, then, there is science as far as concerns the conclusion necessarily deduced, although it is in itself contingent as far as it is elicited by its proper power. The response is then plain to the authority of the Philosopher in the Posterior Analytics [n.347]: science is of something necessary that is said about the contingent, and so necessary truths are included in the understanding of the contingent, or they are deduced about something that is contingent by reason of some prior necessary thing [Posterior Analytics 1.8.75b24-25, 33-36; n.212]. The same point provides the response to the authority of the Philosopher in the Ethics [n.348], that the habit of the calculative part is about the act insofar as it is contingently elicited; but the scientific habit or science is about the same thing insofar as something about it is necessarily deduced. If it be objected that there is not the same object for a scientific habit as for a calculative one, we will speak about this next [n.351], how there can be the same object for several habits, although not the same habit for several objects.
351 Ad secundum dico quod concluderet scientiam moralem esse prudentiam, nam scientia moralis est habitus activus cum vera raƿtione. Ideo dico quod definitio prudentiae debet intelligi de habitu activo proximo, qualis est habitus acquisitus ex actibus. Unde sicut ars se habet circa factibilia ad habitum experti, ita circa agibilia se habet scientia moralis ad habitum prudentiae, quia habitus artis et scientiae moralis sunt quasi remoti ad dirigendum, quia universales; sed habitus prudentiae et experti, quia generati sunt ex actibus, sunt particulares, et propinqui ad dirigendum. Ista expositio est necessaria, alioquin nulla esset scientia practica, quia quaecumque est habitus activus vel factivus; conclusio autem est inconveniens, et contra Philosophum VI Metaphysicae, ut videtur, et contra Avicennam I Metaphysicae, et contra alios auctores.	351. To the second [n.349] I say that it would prove that moral science is prudence, for moral science is a habit of action along with true reason. Therefore I say that the definition of prudence must be understood of the proximate habit of action, such as is the habit acquired from acts. Hence, just as art is related, in respect of things to be made, to the habit of the man of experience, so is moral science related, in respect of things to be done, to the habit of prudence, because the habits of art and of moral science are as it were remote givers of direction, since they are universal; but the habits of prudence and of the man of experience, because they are generated from acts, are particular and proximate givers of direction. This exposition is necessary, otherwise there would be no practical science, because any practical science is a habit of doing or of making; but the conclusion is discordant and contrary to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 6.1.1025b25, as it seems, and against Avicenna in Metaphysics 1 ch.1 (70ra), and against other authors.
352 Ad tertiam rationem dico quod Boethius intelligit per theologiam metaphysicam. Et quod dicit quod est de substantia Dei, dico quod Deus consideratur in illa scientia quantum possibile est ipsum considerari in scientiis acquisitis.	352. To the third reason [n.219] that Boethius understands by theology metaphysics. And as to what he says about the substance of God, I say that God is considered in that science insofar as it is possible in acquired sciences to consider him.
353 Ad aliud dico quod nobilitatis est in inferiori attingere superius, secundum Philosophum VII Politicae. Unde sensitiva hominis est nobilior sensitiva bruti, quia in homine ordinatur ad ƿ intellectivam. Nobilitatis ergo in scientia est ordinari ad actum nobilioris potentiae. Sed Philosophus non ponit aliquam scientiam esse conformem praxi voluntatis circa finem, quia non posuit voluntatem circa finem habere praxim sed quasi quamdam motionem simplicem naturalem, et ideo nullam posuit posse esse nobiliorem per conformitatem ad finem; si tamen posuisset aliquam praxim circa finem, non negasset, ut videtur, scientiam practicam respectu illius praxis esse nobiliorem scientia speculativa circa idem, puta si aliqua esset speculativa circa illa circa quae est scientia moralis, non diceret illam speculativam esse nobiliorem morali scientia. Nos autem ponimus esse praxim veram circa finem, cui nata est cognitio esse conformis, et ideo cognitionem practicam circa finem esse nobiliorem omni speculativa. Ergo prima propositio rationis, quae videtur posse sumi ex I Metaphysicae, quamvis eam expresse non dicat Philosophus, neganda est.	353. To the next [n.220] I say that it is a mark of nobility in an inferior that it reaches what is superior, according to the Philosopher in Politics 7.14.1333a21-22. Hence the sensitive power in man is nobler than the sensitive power of a brute, because in man it is ordered to the intellective power. It is therefore a mark of nobility in science that it is ordered to the act of a nobler power. But the Philosopher does not posit any science to be conform to the action of the will about the end, because he did not posit the will to have action about the end but as it were a certain simple natural motion, and therefore he did not posit that there could be any nobler science through conformity to the end; if however he had posited some action about the end, he would not have denied, as it seems, that practical science in respect to that action was nobler than speculative science about the same thing, for example, if there were some speculative science about what moral science is about, he would not say that the speculative science was nobler than the moral science. But we do posit that there is true action about the end, to which knowledge is of a nature to be conform, and therefore that practical knowledge about the end is nobler than any speculative knowledge. Therefore the first proposition of the argument [n.220], 160 which it seems could be taken from the Metaphysics, although the Philosopher does not expressly say it, is to be denied.
354 Ad primam eius probationem dico quod illa est nobilior quae est sui gratia quam quae est gratia alicuius actus inferioris se; quaelibet autem quam ipse ponit practicam est gratia alicuius inferioris quam sit consideratio speculativa, quia saltem circa obiectum ƿ aliquod inferius quam quod ponit esse obiectum speculativae; et ideo quaelibet practica quam ponit est ignobilior speculativa aliqua. Quae autem est gratia alicuius alterius actus, nobilioris suo actu proprio, non est ignobilior, propter talem ordinem; tunc enim sensitiva nostra esset ignobilior sensitiva bruti Ad probationem secundam propositionis negatae, cum dicitur de certitudine, dico quod quaelibet cognitio scientifica respectu sui obiecti est aeque certa secundum proportionem, quia quaelibet resolvit in sua principia immediata; sed non aeque certa secundum quantitatem, quia haec sunt certiora cognoscibilia illis. Sic omnia de quibus ponit Philosophus scientias practicas sunt minus certa et perfecta cognoscibilia in se quam de quibus ponit speculativam aliquam; ideo aliqua speculativa secundum eum ponitur certior omni practica secundum quantitatem. Nos autem ponimus cognoscibile operabile, id est attingibile per operationem, quae est vere praxis, esse in se maxime cognoscibile, et ideo scientiam de ipso nec secundum quantitatem certitudinis sicut nec secundum proportionem ab aliqua alia excedi.	354. To the first proof of it [n.220] I say that what is for its own sake is nobler than what is for the sake of some act inferior to it; but whatever he posits as practical is for the sake of something lower than speculative consideration, because it is at any rate about some object inferior to what he posits as the object of speculative consideration; and therefore whatever he posits as practical is less noble than something speculative. Now what is for the sake of some other act, nobler than its own act, is not, because of such order, less noble; for then our sensitive power would be less noble than the sensitive power of the brute. To the second proof of the denied proposition, when the discussion is about certitude [n.220], I say that any scientific knowledge with respect to its object is equally certain proportionally, because any science makes resolution to its immediate principles; but it is not equally certain in quantity, because these knowables are more certain than those. Thus everything that the Philosopher posits practical science about is a less certain and perfect knowable in itself than what he posits some speculative science about; therefore some speculative science according to him is set down as more certain in quantity than any practical science. But we posit the doable knowable, that is, what is attainable by doing, which is truly action, to be in itself most knowable, and therefore the science of it is not exceeded by any other science either in quantity or in proportion of certitude.
355 Ad aliam rationem de necessariis exsistentibus dico quod haec scientia non est inventa propter necessaria extrinseca sed ƿ propter necessaria intrinseca (ut videlicet propter ordinem et moderationem passionum et operationum), sicut scientia moralis, si esset inventa omnibus necessariis extrinsecis habitis, non minus esset practica. Non est autem haec inventa ad 'fugam ignorantiae', quia multo plura scibilia possent tradi in tanta quantitate doctrinae quam hic tradita sunt; sed hic eadem frequenter replicantur, ut efficacius inducatur auditor ad operationem eorum quae hic persuadentur.	355. To the other reason about necessary existents [n.221] I say that this science was not invented for the sake of extrinsic necessities but for intrinsic ones (as namely for 161 the order and moderation of passions and actions), just as moral science, if it were invented after all extrinsic necessities had been possessed, would no less be practical. Now this science was not invented ‘for escaping ignorance’, because many more knowables could be handed down in so great a quantity of doctrine than have here been handed down; but here the same things are frequently repeated, so that the listener may more efficaciously be induced to the doing of the things that are here proved.
356 Ad argumenta secundae quaestionis. Ad auctoritatem Philosophi III De anima dico quod loquitur ibi de fine ut cognito; nam intellectus propter aliquid ratiocinans ratiocinatur propter finem cognitum et ut est principium demonstrationis.	356. To the arguments of the second question. To the authority of the Philosopher in On the Soul [n.223] I say that he is speaking there of the end as known; for the intellect that is calculating for the sake of something is calculating for the sake of the end as known and as principle of demonstration.
357 Ad secundam auctoritatem de I Metaphysicae dico quod practica non est gratia usus ut per se finis; tamen aliquam habitudinem habet ad usum, sic quod usus est per se obiectum eius, vel aliquid virtualiter includens usum, quale non posuit Philosophus esse aliquod ens nisi ens ad finem; et omne tale obiectum est ignobilius obiecto speculabili; et ideo talis ordo ad praxim concludit ignobilitatem practicae respectu speculativae.	357. To the second authority from the Metaphysics [n.224] I say the practical is not for the sake of use as for its per se end; yet it does have some relation to use, such that use is its per se object, or something that virtually includes use, of which sort the only being the Philosopher posited was being for an end; and every such object is less noble than the object of speculation; and therefore such order to action proves the ignobility of the practical in respect of the speculative.
358 Ad tertium de II Metaphysicae dico quod speculativa et practica habent diversos fines loquendo de per se finibus intra genus ƿ cognitionis, sed illi fines non primo distinguunt, sed prior distinctio est ab obiectis, sicut prius dictum est.	358. To the third authority from the Metaphysics [n.225] I say that the speculative and practical have diverse ends speaking of ends per se within the genus of knowledge, but those ends do not first distinguish them, but there is a prior distinction from the objects, as was said before [nn.252-255, 259, 265-266].
359 Ad rationes pro positione opposita cum arguitur contra distinctionem per obiecta: Ad primam dico quod non potest esse circa idem obiectum habitus speculativus et habitus practicus. - Cum autem probatur oppositum per illud Philosophi in De anima ((intellectus extensione fit practicus)), dico quod Philosophus hoc non dicit, scilicet quod intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus; sed Aristoteles ponens tres gradus intellectus, quorum primus est considerare speculabilia tantum, secundus considerare agibilia, non dictando prosequi vel fugere, dicit quod ((amplius extendendo se vult prosequi vel fugere)), ita quod ista extensio est intellectus imperfecte practici ad considerationem perfecte practicam, puta ƿ ab apprehensione terribilium ad dictamen completum de eis, praecipiendo fugam vel prosecutionem. Concesso tamen quod intellectus speculativus fiat practicus, non est ad propositum, quia 'speculativum' et 'practicum' sunt differentiae accidentales intellectus, licet sint essentiales habituum et actuum, et ideo habitus et actus non extenduntur.	359. To the reasons for the opposite position when argument is given against making distinction by objects: To the first [n.249] I say that a speculative habit and a practical habit cannot be about the same object. – But when the opposite is proved through the remark of the Philosopher in On the Soul that “the intellect is made practical by extension,” I say that the Philosopher does not say the following, namely that the speculative intellect is made practical by extension; but Aristotle, when he posits three grades of intellect, of which the first considers speculables only, the second considers doables, not by commanding to pursue or flee, he says that “by extending itself further it intends to pursue or flee,” so that this extension is of intellect imperfectly practical to consideration perfectly practical, for example from apprehension of things terrible to a complete command about them, prescribing flight or pursuit. A concession, however, that the speculative intellect is made practical is not to the purpose, because ‘speculative’ and ‘practical’ are accidental differences of the intellect, although they are essential differences of habits and acts, and therefore habits and acts are not extended.
360 Ad aliud de medicina dicit quidam quod habitus universalis est speculativus, sed quando ex ea acquiritur habitus particularis, tunc fit practicus. - Contra: tunc ex principiis speculativis sequeretur conclusio practica, quod est inconveniens.	360. To the other about medicine [n.250], some say that the universal habit is speculative but when from it the particular habit is acquired it becomes practical. – On the contrary: then from speculative principles a practical conclusion would follow, which is discordant.
361 Ideo aliter dicendum est quod quando sunt aliqua extrema opposita, quanto aliquid recedit ab uno oppositorum, tanto magis accedit ad aliud; actualissimam rationem practici habet consideratio, quae nata est immediate esse conformis formaliter praxi eliciendae; ergo quanto aliquid magis recedit ab isto, tanto magis accedit ad specuiativum: habitus ergo universalis, qui non est natus esse immediate conformis praxi, potest dici aliquo modo speculativus respectu alicuius habitus qui immediate natus est esse ƿ conformis praxi eliciendae. Ita posset ars poni habitus speculativus respectu habitus experti, quia ars, tamquam universalior habitus, non ita immediate est directiva, sicut apparet in I Metaphysicae, ((artifex frequenter errabit, expertus non errabit)). Ita potest distingui medicina in speculativam, quae scilicet est de universalibus causis et curis, quae cognitio est remotior a praxi elicienda, et in practicam, quae est de particularibus et propinquioribus praxi et immediatius conformibus praxi eliciendae. Tamen secundum veritatem illa cognitio universalior, quae comparative dicitur speculativa, est simpliciter et verissime practica, quia virtualiter includit illam particularem formaliter conformem praxi.	361. Therefore one must speak otherwise and say that when there are extreme opposites, the more something departs from one of the opposites, so much the more does it approach the other; the consideration that most has the idea of the practical is the one that is of a nature to be immediately conform formally to the action to be elicited; 163 therefore the more something departs from that, so much the more does it approach the speculative; therefore the universal habit, which is not of a nature to be immediately conform to action, can be said to be in a way speculative with respect to a habit that is immediately of a nature to be conform to the action to be elicited. In this way art could be set down as a speculative habit with respect to the habit of the man of experience, because art, as being a more universal habit, is not thus immediately directive, as appears from Metaphysics 1.1.981a14-24, “the one with the art will err, the one with experience will not err.” In this way medicine can be distinguished into the speculative, namely the one that is about universal causes and cures, which is a knowledge more remote from the action to be elicited, and into the practical, which is about particulars and things closer to action and more immediately conform to the action to be elicited. However, in truth that more universal knowledge, which is called speculative comparatively, is simply and most truly practical, because it virtually includes the particular knowledge that is formally conform to action.
362 Ad aliud de bonitate et malitia dico quod non omnis actus bonus est primo bonus a circumstantia finis ut finis, immo est aliquis actus bonus a circumstantia obiecti, puta ubi finis est obiectum, et ibi circumstantia finis ut obiecti primo tribuit rectitudinem actui; ille enim actus est ex obiecto solo simpliciter bonus, ƿ ut 'amare Deum' sine aliis circumstantiis est simpliciter bonum. Falsum est ergo quod a fine ut finis distinguitur contra obiectum accipitur prima bonitas actus moralis, immo secundo illud est falsum, quia actus circa ens ad finem licet habeat pro prima circumstantia finem, tamen ab obiecto est aliqua bonitas prior, a qua dicitur actus bonus ex genere; tertia responsio est, directe ad propositum, quia etsi circumstantia formaliter circumstet praxim ut sit bona, non tamen formaliter circumstat intellectionem practicam: non enim intellectus moderate sive medio modo dictat actum, ita quod dictare circumstantionetur hac circumstantia mediocriter, sed intellectus dictat secundum ultimum potentiae suae; est autem illud 'dictare' rectum, a principio, et principium sumitur a primo obiecto.	362. To the next one about moral goodness and badness [n.251] I say that not every good act is good first from the circumstance of the end as end, nay some act is good from the circumstance of the object, to wit when the end is the object, and there the circumstance of the end as object first gives rectitude to the act [nn.263-264]; for the act is from the object alone simply good, as the act ‘to love God’ is simply good without any other circumstances. So it is false that the first goodness of the moral act is taken from the end as the end is contradistinguished from the object, nay it is false in a second way, because, although an act about what is for the end has the end for its first circumstance, yet there is from the object a prior goodness, the goodness by which an act is said to be 164 good in its kind; the third response, directly to the purpose, is that although the circumstance formally circumstances the action so as to make it good, yet it does not formally circumstance practical understanding; for the intellect does not command an act moderately or in a middling way, such that it is circumstanced by this circumstance to command moderately, but the intellect commands the act according to the utmost of its power; but the ‘commanding’ is right from the principle, and the principle is taken from the first object.
363 Contra illud, quod non sit distinctio per obiecta. Probatio, quia omne formaliter tale, est tale per aliquid sibi intrinsecum, igitur si habitus sit formaliter practicus, hoc est per aliquid sibi intrinsecum; sed hoc non est obiectum; ergo etc. Exemplum: sol non est formaliter calidus, licet sit calidus virtualiter.	363. Against this [check] is that the distinction is not through the objects. The proof is that everything formally of a certain sort is of that sort by something intrinsic to it, therefore, if a habit is formally practical, this is by something intrinsic to it; but this is not the object; therefore etc. Example: the sun is not formally hot although it is virtually hot.
364 Praeterea, obiectum non est distinctivum habitus nisi ut causa ƿ efficiens; causae efficientes non distinguunt effectum specie, quia a causis diversis specie potest esse idem effectus specie, sicut calidum idem specie generatur aequivoce et univoce ab igne et a sole.	364. Further, the object only distinguishes the habit as an efficient cause; efficient causes do not distinguish the effect into species, because an effect the same in species can come from causes diverse in species, as a hot thing the same in species is generated equivocally and univocally by fire and by the sun.
365 Ad primum dico quod esse practicum dicit intrinsecum notitiae sicut respectus aptitudinalis dicit intrinsecum fundamento, et quod notitia aliqua sit apta nata referri, hoc est per naturam intrinsecam notitiae, quam naturam habet ab obiecto ut a causa extrinseca. Dico tunc quod habitus est practicus per intrinsecum ut per causam formalem, sed per obiectum, quod est extrinsecum, ut per causam efficientem.	365. To the first [n.363] I say that being practical means intrinsic to knowledge just as aptitudinal respect means intrinsic to the foundation, and that some knowledge is naturally apt to be referred [sc. to something else], that is by a nature intrinsic to the knowledge, which nature it has from the object as from its extrinsic cause. I say then that a habit is practical by what is intrinsic as by the formal cause, but by the object, which is extrinsic, as by the efficient cause.
366 Ad secundum dico quod licet a causis essentialiter ordinatis quarum una est univoca, altera aequivoca, possit ab utraque causante esse effectus unius rationis, sicut exemplificatur de calore, quando tamen causae efficientes proximae eiusdem ordinis ad effectus causant aliqua in quantum ipsae causae sunt distinctae, maxime si utraque sit univoca effectui sive univocatione completa sive univocatione diminuta, non potest a causis talibus distinctis esse effectus unius rationis. Univocationem completam dico quando est similitudo in forma et modo essendi formae; diminutam dico ƿ quando est similitudo in forma licet habeat alium modum essendi, quo modo domus extra est a domo in mente artificis (unde generationem istam vocat Philosophus 'aliqualiter' univocam, VII Metaphysicae). Quia ergo obiectum est causa proxima respectu notitiae et univoca, licet diminute, sequitur quod distinctio formalis obiectorum, cum causent notitias in quantum ipsa sunt distincta, necessario concludat distinctionem formalem notitiarum.	366. To the second [n.364] I say that although from essentially ordered causes, one of which is univocal and the other equivocal, there can result, when each is causing, 165 an effect one and the same in nature, as in the example of heat, however, when proximate causes of the same order to the effect cause something insofar as these causes are distinct, especially if each is univocal with the effect (whether the univocity is complete or diminished), there cannot result from such distinct causes an effect of the same nature. I say univocity is complete when there is likeness in form and in the mode of being of the form; I say univocity is diminished when there is likeness in form although the likeness has another mode of being, in the way that the real house outside comes from the house in the mind of the builder (hence the Philosopher calls this generation ‘in some way’ univocal, Metaphysics 7.9.1034a21-25). Because therefore the object is the proximate cause with respect to knowledge and is univocal, although in a diminished way, it follows that the formal distinction of objects, since these cause knowledges insofar as they are distinct, necessarily includes a formal distinction of knowledges.