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| Art. 5 | |
| 270 His visis respondendum est ad primam quaestionem, ubi sunt quinque viae tenentes partem negativam quaestionis. Una dicit sic, declarando, quod duplex est actus voluntatis, unus perficiens, alius qui perficitur a voluntate, ut habetur a Gandavo in Summa et vide articulo octavo quaestione secunda, in solutione tertii argumenti. ƿ | 270. Now that these points have been made visible, we must respond to the first question [n.217], where there are five ways of holding the negative side of the question [sc. that theology is not a practical science]. [First way] – One way speaks like this, declaring that there is a double act of the will, one perfecting the will, the other being perfected by it, as is maintained by Henry of Ghent in his Summa a.8 q.3 ad 3.[1] |
| 271 Pro hac via est auctoritas Augustini in sermone De Iacob et Esau: ((Omnia)), inquit, ((opera nostra sunt ut mundetur oculus, quo videtur Deus)). | 271. For this way there is the authority of Augustine in his sermon On Jacob and Esau (Sermon 88 ch.5 n.6): “All our works,” he says, “are for the purpose of purifying the eye whereby God is seen.” |
| 272 Item, potest sic argui: non requiritur directivum nisi ubi potest ƿ esse error; scientia practica est directiva, ergo scientia beatorum non est practica, quia beati errare non possunt; ergo nec nostra est practica, quia est eadem cum illa beatorum. | 272. Again, it can be argued thus: an act of direction is not required except where there can be error; practical science is directive, therefore the science of the blessed is not practical, because the blessed cannot err; therefore neither is our science practical, because it is the same as that of the blessed. |
| 273 Item, potest argui secundum intellectum istius alibi: Deus non habet scientiam practicam; sed maxime habet istam, vel solus; igitur etc. | 273. Again, it can be argued according to how the understanding of this science exists elsewhere: God does not have practical science; but he most of all or alone has this science; therefore etc. |
| 274 Contra istud arguo, ac primo rationem positionis istorum duco ad oppositum quadrupliciter. Primo sic: etsi voluntas non potest errare circa finem in universali ostensum, potest tamen errare circa finem in particulari ostensum; ergo ad hoc quod recte agat circa finem particulariter ostensum requiritur directio. Ostensio finis in ƿ theologia est finis non in universali sed in particulari, quia ad metaphysicum pertinet illa ostensio in universali. | 274. I argue against it, and first I reduce the idea of these people’s position to the opposite in four ways. First thus: although the will cannot err about the end displayed in a universal way, yet it can err about the end displayed in a particular way; therefore, in order for it to act rightly about the end displayed in a particular way, there is need of direction. The end is displayed in theology not in a universal but a particular way, because displaying it in a universal way belongs to metaphysics.[2] |
| 275 Praeterea, habitus directivus non ponitur propter substantiam actus sed propter circumstantiam, sicut temperantia non ponitur propter substantiam actus comedendi, vel alterius huiusmodi, sed propter circumstantiam; ergo licet voluntas esset determinata ad substantiam actus tendentis in finem in particulari, requireretur tamen directio quantum ad circumstantias illius actus, ad quas non extenditur directio quae est circa substantiam actus. - Ex istis duabus rationibus arguitur, quod ubicumque contingit in praxi errare et recte agere, ibi est notitia practica necessaria ad dirigendum; in ista praxi quae est dilectio finis ut pertinet ad theologiam contingit errare dupliciter, ut ostendunt rationes istae, tum ratione ƿ obiecti in particulari, tum ratione circumstantiarum actus; igitur etc. | 275. Further, a directive habit is not posited for the substance of an act but for its circumstance, as temperance is not posited for the substance of the act of eating, or of the other act of the sort, but for its circumstance; therefore, although the will is determined to the substance of an act that tends to the end in particular, direction would still be required as to the circumstances of the act, to which circumstances direction about the substance of the act does not extend. – From these two reasons the argument is taken that wherever it is possible to err or to act rightly in action, there practical knowledge is needed for giving direction; in the action that is love of the end, as it pertains to theology, error is possible in two ways, as the reasons show, both by reason of the object in particular and by reason of the circumstances of the act; therefore etc. |
| 276 Praeterea, tertio: cuius dilectio principaliter intenditur extra genus cognitionis, eius cognitio principaliter intenditur intra genus cognitionis; dilectio autem finis per eos principaliter intenditur extra genus cognitionis, ergo cognitio finis principaliter intenditur in genere cognitionis. Sed in qualibet scientia principaliter intenditur cognitio sui subiecti primi, ergo finis est principale subiectum huius scientiae. A fine sumuntur principia practica; principia autem practica concludunt conclusiones practicas; ergo ista scientia quae primo intendit dilectionem finis extra genus cognitionis est practica. | 276. Further, third: where the love of something is what outside the genus of knowledge is principally intended, there the knowledge of that thing is what inside the genus of knowledge is principally intended; but love of the end, according to them, is what outside the genus of knowledge is principally intended, therefore knowledge of the end is what within the genus of knowledge is principally intended. But in any science what is principally intended is knowledge of the first subject, therefore the end is the principal subject of this science. From the end practical principles are taken; but practical principles entail practical conclusions; therefore this science [of theology], which first intends love of the end outside the genus of knowledge, is practical. |
| 277 Praeterea, ad idem genus, secundum praxim vel speculationem, pertinent principia et conclusiones; conclusiones enim practicae resolvuntur in principia practica, non speculativa; ergo cum cognitio finis sit directiva in actibus circa ea quae sunt ad finem et cognitio eorum quae sunt ad finem sit quasi conclusio conclusa in cognitione finis quasi principii, si cognitio eorum quae sunt ad finem sit cognitio conclusionum practicarum, cognitio finis erit cognitio practicat quia de principio practico. ƿ Sic patet responsio ad rationem eius primam quia falsum accipit, quasi quod voluntas esset determinata ex se, quod probant duae primae rationes. Similiter, si voluntas esset determinata, adhuc tamen cognitio esset practica, sicut probant duae ultimae rationes. | 277. Further, principles and conclusions belong to the same genus, whether as regard action or as regard speculation; for practical conclusions are resolved to practical principles, not speculative ones; therefore when knowledge of the end is directive in the case of acts that concern what is for the end, and when knowledge of what is for the end is a sort of conclusion included in knowledge of the end as a sort of principle, then if knowledge of what is for the end is knowledge of practical conclusions, the knowledge of the end will be practical knowledge because of a practical principle. Thus the response to this position’s first reason [n.270] is plain, because it assumes what is false, as if the will were determined from itself, the falsity of which is proved by the first two reasons [nn.274-275]. Likewise, if the will were determined, nevertheless the knowledge would still be practical, as the two final reasons prove [nn.276-277]. |
| 278 Ad auctoritatem eorum (videtur concludere quod visio Dei est finis huius scientiae, quod ipsi non concedunt) respondeo quod auctoritas loquitur de istis operationibus exterioribus, quae sunt ieiunia, vigiliae et orationes; tamen actus quicumque exterior natus est conformari alicui actui interiori a quo habet suam bonitatem, et etiam ad aliquem interiorem ordinari, et finaliter ad velle. | 278. To the authority they appeal to [n.271] (it seems to conclude that the vision of God is the end of this science, which they do not concede) I reply that the authority is speaking of those external actions that are fastings, vigils, and prayers; yet any external act is of a nature to be conformed to any interior act from which it gets its goodness, and also of a nature to be ordered to some interior act, and ultimately to an act of willing. |
| 279 Ad tertium respondeo: agens intendit per se inducere formam, nec intendit remotionem contrarii nisi per accidens. Ita habitus per se dirigit, per accidens autem excludit errorem; et si habitus est perfectus, non compatitur secum errorem, immo si compatitur, non est perfectus. Beati ergo licet non possint errare, non sequitur quod non habeant habitum etiam directivum, quia eo per impossibile circumscripto errare possent, sed eo posito, propter eius perfectionem excluditur omnis error. ƿ | 279. To the third [n.272] I reply: an agent intends per se to introduce a form and does not intend the removal of the opposite except per accidens. Thus a habit per se directs, but it per accidens excludes error; and if the habit is perfect it is not compatible with error, nay if it is compatible it is not perfect. Therefore although the blessed cannot err, it does not follow that they do not have also a directive habit, because, if that were per impossibile removed, they could err, but, once it is posited, because of its perfection, all error is excluded. |
| 280 Ad quartum dicetur infra, post solutionem huius primae quaestionis solvendo quartam obiectionem contra eam. | 280. Discussion of the fourth [n.273] will be given below, after the solution of this first question, by solving the fourth objection against it [nn.324-331]. |
| 281 Secunda via, licet recte et non recte possit elici, negat tamen dilectionem finis esse praxim, quia non est circa obiectum contingens. Dicit enim Commentator I Ethicorum quod praxis est operatio secundum electionem; electio tantum est circa contingens ex III Ethicorum, quia est appetitus consiliativus; consilium non est nisi de contingente. Ex hoc etiam descriptio praxis posita in primo articulo solutionis probatur esse insufficiens, quia omittit obiectum praecisum. Consequenter dicit haec via nullam notitiam esse practicam quae extenditur ad volitionem ultimi finis tantum, quia non est verum contingens. | 281. [Second way (n.270)] – The second way, although it might be rightly and not rightly coaxed out, nevertheless denies that love of the end is action because it is not about a contingent object. For the Commentator says on the Ethics [Eustratius Explanations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1 ch.1 3E] that action is operation according to choice; choice is only about the contingent, Ethics 3.4.1111b29-30, because it is deliberative appetite; deliberation is only about the contingent (Ethics 3.5.1112a21- 22, 30-31). From this too is proved that the description of action posited in the first article 133 of the solution [n.228] is insufficient, because it omits the precise object. As a result this way asserts that no knowledge is practical that is extended to a willing of the final end alone, because this end is not a true contingent. |
| 282 Contra istam viam est quarta ratio posita contra praecedentem. ƿ Item, vere praxis est illa operatio ad quam inclinat virtus appetitiva, quia quaelibet talis virtus est habitus electivus, ex II Ethicorum, et electio est praxis, ut ostendetur contra tertiam viam statim; sed ad dilectionem finis inclinat non tantum caritas, sed amor acquisitus, qui est virtus appetitiva, quia habitus acquisitus vel appetitus est consonus rationi rectae. Motivum huius viae solvetur in solutione secundae rationis principalis ad primam quaestionem. | 282. Against this way is the fourth reason set down against the preceding way [n.277]. Again, in truth action is that operation to which appetitive virtue inclines, because any such virtue is a habit of choice, from Ethics 2.6.1106b36-7a2, and choice is action, as will be shown against the third way directly [nn.287-289]; but not only is charity inclined to love of the end but also acquired love, which is appetitive virtue, because the acquired habit or appetite is in agreement with right reason. The motive for this way will be solved in the solution to the second principal reason for the first question [nn.346-351]. |
| 283 Tertia via ponit quod vel volitio non est proprie praxis sed tantum actus ea posterior, vel si ipsa est praxis, hoc non est nisi in ordine ad actum aliquem imperatum potentiae inferioris, puta appetitus sensitivi vel potentiae motivae, vel huiusmodi. | 283. [Third way (n.270)] – The third way posits that either volition is not properly action but only the act posterior to it is, or, if it is action, it is not so save in order to some act of a lower power that it commands, to wit of the appetitive power or of the motive power or the like. |
| 284 Pro hac tertia via arguitur quia omnis praxis sequitur electionem. Quod probatur per Philosophum VI Ethicorum: ((Principium actus est electio, non cuius gratia, sed unde motus)), id est non finale, sed effectivum; principium effectivum naturaliter praecedit effectum; igitur etc. ƿ | 284. An argument for this way is that all action follows choice. The proof is from the Philosopher in Ethics 6.2.1139a31-32: “The beginning of action is choice, not choice for the sake of which, but choice that is the source of motion,” that is, not the final cause but the efficient cause; the efficient cause naturally precedes the effect; therefore etc. |
| 285 Praeterea, habitus practicus generatur ex praxibus; sed habitus practicus generatur ex actibus sequentibus electionem; ergo illi sunt praxes. | 285. Further, a practical habit is generated from actions; but a practical habit is generated from acts that follow choice; therefore these are actions. 134 |
| 286 Item, Commentator super I Ethicorum: ((Praxis est operatio secundum electionem)); ergo praxis sequitur electionem. | 286. Again, the Commentator on the Ethics [Eustratius, id. 1 ch.1 3E] says: “Action is operation according to choice;” therefore action follows choice. |
| 287 Contra istud, quod non tantum actus sequens electionem sit praxis, probatur, quia VI Ethicorum dicit Philosophus quod non est electio recta sine ratione recta et habitu virtutis; ergo virtus per se requiritur ad electionem rectam; non requireretur autem si esset habitus generatus ex actibus posterioribus electione, quia tunc non inclinaret per se nisi ad actus illos posteriores electione. Ideo sub alia forma arguitur, quia habitus ex eisdem actibus generatur ad quos inclinat, ex II Ethicorum; sed virtus moralis per se inclinat ad electionem rectam, quia, ut patet per definitionem eius II Ethicorum, virtus est ((habitus electivus)) etc.; ergo ex electionibus per se generatur virtus moralis, et per consequens non tantum actus electionem sequentes sunt praxes. | 287. Against this is the proof that not only an act which follows choice is action, because in Ethics 6.2.1139a33-34 the Philosopher says that choice is not right without right reason and the habit of virtue; therefore virtue is per se required for right choice; but it would not be required if it were a habit generated from acts posterior to choice, because it would not then incline per se to any acts save those posterior to choice. For this reason the argument proceeds under another form, that a habit is generated by the same acts as those to which it inclines, from Ethics 2.1.1103b21-23; but moral virtue per se inclines to right choice, because, as is clear from its definition in Ethics 2.6.1106b36-7a2, virtue is “a habit of choice” etc.; therefore moral virtue is per se generated by choices, and as a result it is not only acts which follow choice that are actions. |
| 288 Praeterea, non solum falsum est negare electionem esse praxim, quod arguitur ratione iam facta, sed, sicut probatum fuit primo ƿ articulo, actus elicitus voluntatis est primo praxis, et imperatus non nisi propter ipsam; igitur si electio sit sola, sine ordine ad actum imperandum, puta propter defectum materiae actus exterioris, ipsa sola erit vere praxis. Hoc declaratur sic: non habens pecunias, cui tamen in phantasmate repraesentantur pecuniae antequam actus alicuius electio sit principium effectivum vel ad aliquem imperandum, si eligat illas liberaliter distribuere si haberet, quantum ad actum et habitum virtutis non requiritur ulterior prosecutio vel distributio, quia aliquo obiecto praesentato in phantasmate circa quod potest esse actus liberalitatis, complete habetur electio, ex qua generatur liberalitas vel quae elicitur ex liberalitate; nec requiritur ulterior prosecutio, nec aliquid exterius, nec ordo ad exterius si materia actus exterioris deficiat. | 288. Further, not only is it false to deny that choice is action, as argued by the reason just given, but also, as was proved in the first article [nn.230, 234], an elicited act of the will is action first, and a commanded act is so only because of it; therefore if a choice exists on its own, without order to a commanded act, to wit because of lack of matter of the external act, it alone will be truly action. This is made clear thus: someone without money, to whom however money is presented in imagination, before the choice of any action becomes a principle moving to or commanding some action, if he chooses to distribute the money liberally should he have it, then, as far as the act and habit of virtue is concerned, no further prosecution of the act or distribution is required, because when some object has been presented in imagination about which an act of liberality can be done, the choice from which liberality is generated, or which is elicited from liberality, is possessed in its completeness; nor is there required any further prosecution of the act, or anything external, or any order to what is external, if the matter of the external act is lacking. |
| 289 Praeterea, ordo iste non potest esse nisi causae ad causandum 'quia' effectum; sed quod causa in se non sit talis ex se ut prior est effectu sed tantum quia actualiter ordinatur ad efficiendum, ƿ videtur inconveniens, cum causa nihil habeat ex effectu, nec ex ordine ad ipsum. | 289. Further, this order can only be of a cause to a causing ‘that’ of the effect;[3] but that a cause in itself is not of itself such as to be prior to the effect, but is so only because it is actually ordered to bringing about the effect, seems discordant, since a cause gets nothing from the effect, nor from its order to the effect. |
| 290 Tunc ad auctoritatem VI Ethicorum dico quod ibidem statim subdit Philosophus: ((Electionis autem appetitus et ratio quae gratia alicuius)) (id est practica), supple 'sunt principium'. Ad hoc etiam ut electio sit recta requiritur virtus in appetitu; unde sequitur: ((Non sine habitu morali est electio)), scilicet recta. Ergo virtus habet actum elicitum immediatiorem sibi quam sit ille cuius electio est principium ut imperans; prius enim actus elicitus voluntatis qui est electio est actio bona, quam actus exterior imperatus ab electione bona sit bonus. Quod probatur per Philosophum; statim enim ibi subdit (post illud 'neque sine habitu est electio'): ((Bona actio enim sine more non est)). Sed si ista sit maior ad probandum quod praedixit de electione, sumetur ista minor sub, 'bona electio est bona actio'. Concedo ergo auctoritatem affirmativam quod electio est principium actus unde quo, quia actus ƿ ab ipsa imperatus est actus etiam moralis; sed ex hoc non sequitur quod solus ille sit actus sive praxis, immo est electio prior praxis, propter quam et iste est bona praxis. | 290. Then, as to the authority from the Ethics [n.284], I say that in the same place the Philosopher at once adds: “But of choice (supply: the principles are) appetite and reason for the sake of something” (that is, practical reason). Also, in order for choice to be right, virtue is required in the appetite; hence there follows: “Choice (namely right choice) is not without moral habit.” Therefore virtue has an elicited act more immediate to it than the act which choice is the principle of by commanding it; for the elicited act of the will, which is choice, is a good act before the external act, which is commanded by good choice, is good. The proof is given by the Philosopher; for he immediately adds (after the remark ‘nor is choice without habit’): “For a good action is not without custom.” But if this is the major premise to prove what he said just before about choice, this minor premise will be assumed under it, ‘good choice is good action’. I concede, therefore, the authority that affirms choice to be the principle of action in the sense of the source of action, because an act commanded by choice is also a moral act; but from this it does not follow that only this latter is an act or action, nay rather choice is a prior action, on account of which that act too is a good action. |
| 291 Ad secundum, si maior est vera, dico quod habitus practicus generatur ex electionibus, sicut supra dictum est de eligente frequenter liberaliter dare; etiam sine actu imperato, si facultas non adsit, posset in ipso generari liberalitas. Quia tamen quando actus imperati sunt impossibiles voluntas non communiter eligit frequenter recte circa materiam istorum actuum - quia quod non creditur possibile alicui, aut non vult illud, aut tenuiter, secundum Augustinum - ideo communiter non generatur habitus practicus qui est virtus sine praxibus imperatis sequentibus electiones; non tamen generatur ex illis sequentibus, sed ex electionibus, in quibus est formaliter bonitas moralis; in praxibus imperatis est tantum materialiter. | 291. To the second [n.285], if the major is true, I say that a practical habit is generated from the choices, as was said above about the person who frequently chooses to give liberally [n.288]; even without the commanded act, should the means not be available, liberality can be generated in him. But because, when the commanded acts are impossible, the will does not in general make frequent right choice about the matter of these acts – for what someone does not believe to be possible for him he either does not will or wills weakly, according to Augustine – therefore in general the practical habit which is virtue is not generated without the commanded actions that are subsequent to the choices; it is not, however, generated from these subsequent actions but from the choices, where moral goodness exists formally; in the commanded actions it only exists materially. |
| 292 Ad tertium, ad Commentatorem, oportet quod ly 'secundum' non sit ibi nota causae efficientis si descriptio debet esse convertibilis cum descripto, ut iam probatum est per Aristoƿtelem VI Ethicorum, sed debet intelligi ly 'secundum' effective vel formaliter, vel accipiatur electio ibi pro liberalitate sive potestate dominativa, vel accipiatur electio pro elicitione actus volendi qui non est electio vel volitio aliqua. Sed actio de genere actionis secundum illam electionem, quasi secundum principium activum, est omnis praxis, sive sit electio sive sequens electionem, quia actio de genere actionis reducitur ad principium effectivum. | 292. To the third [n.286], in response to the Commentator, it is necessary that the ‘according to’ there not be an indication of the efficient cause, if the description must be convertible with the thing described, as was already proved by Aristotle in the Ethics [n.290]; but the ‘according to’ must be understood effectively or formally, or let choice there be taken for liberality or for the controlling power, or let it be taken for the eliciting of an act of will which is not a choice or a volition. But all action is action in the genus of action in accord with that choice, as though in accord with its active principle, or let every action be choice or what follows choice, because action in the genus of action is reduced to the effective principle. |
| 293 Istae tres viae ponunt theologiam esse speculativam pure, non obstante quod extendatur ad dilectionem finis - sive ad illam voluntas quasi naturaliter determinetur praecedente ostensione, sive libere et contingenter ad illam se habeat, non tamen circa obiectum contingens et agibile, sive tertio circa quodcumque obiectum quomodocumque se habeat, non tamen operando, id est non tamen in ordine ad actum imperatum, sed sistendo in primo actu elicito. | 293. These three ways [nn.270, 281, 283] lay down that theology is purely speculative, notwithstanding the fact that it is extended to love of the end – whether the 137 will is as it were naturally determined to the end previously shown to it, or whether the will is freely and contingently related to it, although the object the will concerns is not contingent and doable [n.281], or, third, whether the will is related in any way at all to any object at all, not however by doing it, that is, not however in its order to the commanded act, but by stopping at the first elicited act [n.283]. |
| 294 Quod autem talis extensio non concludat practicum, persuaƿdetur, quia tunc quaelibet notitia esset practica, quia quamlibet concomitatur aliqua delectatio vel dilectio. | 294. But that such extension does not include the practical is proved because then any knowledge would be practical, because some delight or love accompanies any knowledge at all. |
| 295 Similiter, X Ethicorum, felix ((est Dei amantissimus)), et tamen illam felicitatem ponit Philosophus speculativam et non practicam. | 295. Likewise in Ethics 10.9.1179a22-24 it is said that “the happy man is most dear to God,” and yet the Philosopher sets down this happiness as speculative and not practical. |
| 296 Contra hanc conclusionem, communem istis, videtur sequi quod aliqua sit operatio in potestate hominis ita quod sit vere actus humanus et tamen non sit proprie speculatio nec praxis, puta amor finis; consequens videtur inconveniens. | 296. Against this conclusion, common to these ways, is that it seems to follow that there is some operation in the power of man such that it is truly a human act and yet is not properly speculation or action, namely love of the end; the consequent seems discordant. |
| 297 Praeterea, quod cognitio directiva in quacumque volitione non sit practica, cum sit 'veritas confesse se habens appetitui recto', videtur inconveniens, quia talis veritas est proprium opus mentis practicae ex VI Ethicorum. | 297. Further, that directive knowledge in any volition is not practical seems, since ‘truth is agreement with right appetite’, to be discordant, because such truth is the proper work of the practical mind, from Ethics 6.3.1139a29-31. |
| 298 Quod additur de delectatione nihil est ad propositum, quia cum delectatio sit passio consequens naturaliter operationem perfectam, sive sit de speculatione sive sit de speculato, propter extensionem ad illam nulla ex isto ponitur notitia practica, quia nec illa est praxis, proprie loquendo; hoc tangetur distinctione 15 ƿ tertii libri. Sed amare et desiderare obiectum cognitum, et hoc sic vel sic circumstantionabile, est vere praxis, nec naturaliter consequens apprehensionem, sed libere - recte et non recte elicibilis. | 298. What is added about delight [n.294] is nothing to the purpose, because since delight is a passion naturally consequent to perfect activity, whether it be of speculation or of the thing speculated about, no practical knowledge is, because of extension to delight, posited from this fact, because neither is it action properly speaking; this will be touched on at 3 Suppl. d.15 q. un. But to love and desire a known object, and one with 138 such or such circumstances, is truly action, nor does it follow apprehension naturally but is free – being rightly or not rightly elicited. |
| 299 Quod additur de felice speculativo quod est Dei amantissimus, auctoritas non cogit, quia loquitur passive, quasi 'maxime amatus a Deo', non active, sicut patet ibi; subdit enim: ((Si quaedam cura humanorum a diis sit, rationabile et gaudere ipsos)) (supple 'deos') ((optimo et cognatissimo: hoc autem intellectus)), et tunc: ((diligentes ergo hoc)) (id est intellectum) ((rationabile erit deos rebeneficiare, ut amicis)) etc. | 299. What is added about the happy contemplative, that he is most dear to God [n.295], is not the conclusion compelled by the authority, for it speaks passively, as though the happy man ‘is most loved by God’, not actively, as is clear in that place; for it adds: “if the gods have any care for human things, it is reasonable that they (that is, the gods) take joy in what is best and most like them; but this is the intellect,” and then: “to those therefore who love this (that is, the intellect) it will be reasonable for the gods to give reward, as to their friends,” etc. |
| 300 Sed, praetermissa auctoritate illa, numquid felix speculativus est amantissimus secundum Aristotelem ut amare distinguitur contra delectari, sive de obiecto speculato sive de speculatione? ƿ Respondeo: XII Metaphysicae vult quod primum movens movet ut amatum; ergo intelligentia inferior amat primum, et tamen illius felicitatem poneret in speculatione, sicut patet X Ethicorum; ergo ipse sub speculatione comprehendit non tantum delectationem, sed amare. Ergo nec propter extensionem ad illud erit notitia practica secundum ipsum, sed speculativa. | 300. But, setting that authority aside, is it the case that the happy contemplative is most dear according to Aristotle in the way that to love is distinguished from to be delighted, whether about the object speculated on or about the speculation? – I reply: in Metaphysics 12.7.1072b3 he wants the first mover to move as being loved; therefore a lower intelligence loves the first mover, and yet he would place its happiness in speculation, as is clear from Ethics 10.8.1178b7-32; therefore he himself includes under speculation not only delight but loving. Therefore neither will there be, according to him, practical knowledge because of extension to it, but speculative knowledge. |
| 301 Sed quare non tenetur in hoc, cum ratio scientiae practicae et speculativae accipiatur ab ipso? - et ita duae primae viae, illam negantes, ponentes theologiam esse speculativam bene ponunt etiam secundum Philosophum. - Respondeo: illud 'amare' quod poneret in intelligentia, poneret necessitate naturali voluntati inesse, ita quod ibi non contingeret eam errare et recte agere, ita quod respectu illius notitia esset tantummodo ostensiva, non directiva, nec quantum ad obiectum in particulari nec quantum ad aliquam eius condicionem vel aliquam circumstantiam actus volendi. | 301. But why then is he not held to this result, since the idea of practical and of speculative science is adopted by him? – and so the first two ways, in rejecting that view [sc. that theology is practical], are, even according to the Philosopher, right to set down theology as speculative. – I reply: the ‘to love’ that he would posit in the intelligence he would posit to be in the will by natural necessity, so that it would not be a contingent matter there that it errs and acts rightly, so that, with respect to it, the knowledge is 139 ostensive only, and not directive, whether as regards the object in particular or as regards any condition of it or any circumstance of the act of willing. |
| 302 Hoc modo non dicerent theologi de amare creaturarum intelligibilium respectu Dei in particulari et quantum ad circumstantias actus, sicut argutum est contra primam viam in primis duaƿbus rationibus. Si igitur convenisset nobiscum, ponendo amare finis libere et recte et non recte posse elici, nec recte elici nisi eliciatur conformiter rectae rationi, non tantum ostendenti obiectum sed etiam dictanti sic eliciendum, forte posuisset respectu talis notitiam practicam, quia confesse se habentem appetitui recto. Igitur melius est theologo, qui habet ab eo discordare in minori, consequenter dicendo discordare in conclusione, quam convenire in conclusione quam ipse non poneret si minorem cum theologo non teneret. Cum igitur dicis quod ab ipso habemus rationem practici et speculativi, verum est, et in maiori convenimus quod illa est speculativa, quae licet ad dilectionem extenderetur ut ostendens obiectum, nullo modo tamen esset directiva in actu ut circumstantionabilis et ut huius obiecti in particulari; sed minorem quam ipse assumet sub, habemus nos negare in proposito. ƿ | 302. The theologians would not speak in this way about the loving of intelligible creatures with respect of God in the particular case and as regards the circumstances of the act, as was argued against the first way in the first two reasons [nn.274-275]. If therefore he [= the Philosopher] had agreed with us in positing that love of the end can freely and rightly and not rightly be elicited, and that it cannot be rightly elicited unless it is elicited in conformity with a right reason not only showing the object but also bidding it to be thus elicited, perhaps he would have posited a practical knowledge with respect to such love that was in agreement with right appetite. Therefore it is better for the theologian, who must disagree with him in the minor premise, to say that he disagrees as a result in the conclusion than to agree in a conclusion he himself [= the Philosopher] would not posit if, with the theologian, he did not hold the minor. When, therefore, you say that we get from him the idea of practical and speculative, it is true, and we agree in the major premise that it [= theology] is speculative, which although it is, as pointing out the object, extended to love, yet in no way is it directive in act of an object as subject to circumstances and as of this object in particular; but the minor which he himself assumes under the major we have to deny in the proposed case.[4] |
| 303 Et ideo est quarta via, quae dicit quod theologia est affectiva. Quod bene potest intelligi si affectiva ponatur esse quaedam practica; si autem affectiva ponatur esse tertium membrum, distinctum contra practicum et speculativum, sic est contra dicta in primo articulo, ubi est ostensum dilectionem esse vere praxim, et etiam contra auctoritates multas, quae sentiunt praecise scientiam distingui in practicam et speculativam, et nullum est tertium membrum. | 303. [Fourth way] – And therefore there is a fourth way, which says that theology is affective. Which can be understood in a good way if affective is set down as something practical; but if it is set down as a third member, distinct from the practical and speculative, it is in this way contrary to what was said in the first article, where it was shown that love is truly action [nn.228-235], and also against many authorities that believe precisely that science is divided into the practical and the speculative, and there is no third member. |
| 304 Quinta via dicit theologiam esse contemplatiƿvam. Pro qua adducitur Augustinus XII De Trinitate cap. 14, ubi vult quod sapientia est respectu contemplationis, scientia respectu actionis; cum ergo theologia sit proprie sapientia, et non scientia, ipsa non erit practica sed contemplativa. Respondeo: Augustinus XII De Trinitate cap. 4 dicit quod illae duae portiones animae, superior et inferior, non distinguuntur nisi penes officia; et in utraque est trinitas (in superiori autem imago Trinitatis), et tamen sola superior portio est contemplativa, quia respicit aeterna. Ergo illa contemplatio de qua loquitur non distinguitur a speculatione intra genus scientiae: continet enim illud contemplativum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, et ita in contemplativo illo potest esse extensio extra genus scientiae, sicut potest esse in activo, hoc est, in portione inferiori respiciente temƿporalia, quae etiam habet trinitatem. Si igitur ista est contemplativa ut loquitur ibi Augustinus, non prohibetur propter hoc esse practica si extenditur ad praxim in portione superiori. | 304. [Fifth way] – The fifth way says that theology is contemplative. For this way Augustine is adduced in On the Trinity 12 ch.14 n.22, where his meaning is that wisdom is in respect of contemplation, science in respect of action; since, therefore, theology is properly wisdom and not science, it will not be practical but contemplative. I reply that Augustine in On the Trinity 12 ch.4 n.4 says that the two parts of the soul, the superior and the inferior, are only distinguished according to their functions; and in both there is a trinity (but in the superior the image of the Trinity), and yet only the superior is contemplative, because it has regard to things eternal. Therefore the contemplation of which he speaks is not distinguished from speculation within the genus of science; for the contemplative contains memory, intelligence, and will, and so in the contemplative there can be extension outside the genus of science, just as there can be in the active, that is, in the inferior part, which regards temporal things, and it too contains a trinity. If then it is contemplative as Augustine speaks there, it is not for this reason prevented from being practical if it is extended to practice in the superior part. |
| 305 Alia est opinio, discordans a praecedentibus in conclusione, scientia est speculativa et practica. Quod probatur dupliciter. Uno modo sic: sicut doctrina illa in qua scribuntur aliqua de iure, aliqua de philosophia, esset speculativa et practica, sive scriberentur in distinctis libris sive interscalariter et commixtim, ita in ista doctrina simul speculativa et practica tractantur, non in distinctis libris et capitulis sed interscalariter et commixtim; ergo est speculativa et practica. | 305. [Another opinion] There is another opinion, discordant from the preceding ones in its conclusion that science is speculative and practical. The proof for it is twofold. One way is as follows: just as a teaching in which there are some things written about law and other things about philosophy would be speculative and practical, whether they were written in separate books or intertwined and mixed, so too in this teaching [of theology] speculative and practical things are treated of together, not in separate books and chapters but intertwined and mixed; therefore it is speculative and practical. |
| 306 Quod iterum sic probatur, quia nulla cognitio speculativa distinctius tractat de operabilibus quam eorum cognitio necessaria est ad speculationem, nec aliqua practica distinctius tractat de speculabilibus quam eorum cognitio requiratur propter praxim ad quam extenditur; ista tractat distinctius de operabilibus quam ƿ eorum cognitio sit necessaria ad speculationem, et distinctius de speculabilibus quam cognitio eorum requiratur ad cognitionem practicam; ergo ipsa est speculativa et practica. - Maior patet, quia speculabilia non considerantur in scientia practica nisi propter considerationem practicam, nec operabilia in speculativa nisi propter considerationem speculativam. Minor patet, quia haec tractat de operabilibus ita distincte ac si esset praecise de eis, et de speculabilibus ac si esset praecise de eis. | 306. Again it is proved in this way, that no speculative knowledge treats more distinctly of doable things than is needed for speculation by the knowledge of them, nor does any practical science treat more distinctly of things to speculate than is required by the knowledge of them for the action it is extended to; this science treats more distinctly of doable things than is needed for speculation by the knowledge of them, and more distinctly of things to speculate than is required for practical knowledge by the knowledge of them; therefore it is speculative and practical. – The major is plain, because things to speculate are considered in a practical science only on account of practical consideration, and doable things are considered in speculative science only on account of speculative consideration. The minor is plain, because this science treats of doable things as distinctly as if it were precisely about them, and of things to speculate as distinctly as if it were precisely about them. |
| 307 Contra istam arguitur sic: habitus non habens evidentiam ex obiecto non distinguitur secundum distinctionem obiectorum (tunc enim oporteret ponere duas fides infusas); iste habitus non habet evidentiam ex obiecto, ergo non distinguitur secundum distinctionem obiectorum; ergo non est duo habitus propter distinctionem operabilium et speculabilium. | 307. Against this it is argued thus: a habit that does not have evidence from its object is not distinguished according to distinction of objects (for then it would be necessary to posit two infused faiths); this habit [of theology] does not have evidence from its object, therefore it is not distinguished according to distinction of objects; therefore it is not two habits on account of the distinction between things to do and things to speculate. |
| 308 Praeterea, licet dicta opinio de duobus habitibus posset aliquam probabilitatem habere de theologia ut tradita est in Scriptura, tamen de theologia in se, cuius est subiectum essentia divina ut haec essentia (sicut dictum est de subiecto theologiae), non videƿ tur probabilis: nam de illo subiecto, cum verissime sit unum cognoscibile, nata est haberi primo aliqua notitia vere una; si alia detur quae non sit de ipso sed de alio primo, illa alia non erit theologia in se. Theologia ergo est habitus unus simpliciter, licet forte cum ipsa possit in Scriptura esse aliqua notitia quae sit de alio subiecto. | 308. Further, although the said opinion about two habits could have some probability about theology as it is handed down in Scripture, yet about theology in itself, whose subject is the divine essence as this essence (in the way said about the subject of theology [n.167]), it does not seem probable; for as to that object, since it is most truly a single knowable, some knowledge truly one is of a nature to be first had about it; if there were some other knowledge which was not about it but about some other first thing, that other knowledge will not be theology in itself. Therefore theology is a habit simply one, although perhaps there could along with it exist in Scripture some knowledge that was about some other subject. |
| 309 Item, patet quod ordo scientiarum secundum eminentiam stat ad unum tantum, quia non possunt esse duae primae simpliciter: illam unam eminentiam et solam dico theologiam, quae sola primo est de subiecto primo theologiae. | 309. Again, it is plain that the order of sciences with respect to eminence is in relation to one thing alone, because there cannot be two sciences simply first; that single and sole eminence I say is theology, which alone is first about the first subject of theology. |
| 310 Praeterea, deduco rationem eius in oppositum: illa cognitio est practica in qua non determinatur de speculabilibus magis quam eorum cognitio pertineat ad praxim vel cognitionem practicam; ista non tractat de speculabilibus distinctius quam eorum cognitio requiratur ad practicam cognitionem vel praxim dirigendam; ergo etc. Probatio minoris: quaelibet cognitio de condicionibus appetibilitatis finis, et de condicionibus eorum quae sunt ad finem quatenus sunt ad finem, et tertio de condicionibus quorumcumque ƿ huiusmodi vel aliorum circa quas contingit potentiam operativam errare nisi dirigatur, est necessaria ad practicam cognitionem; nulla cognitio hic traditur de fine vel de his quae sunt ad finem quin sit talis; igitur etc . Vel saltem circa illas contingit voluntatem ignorantem errare, sicut dicetur in solutione tertiae obiectionis contra solutionem quaestionis principalem. | 310. Further, I reduce the reason for it [n.306] to the opposite conclusion: that knowledge is practical in which the determination of things to speculate on is no greater than pertains, on the part of knowledge of them, to practice or practical knowledge; this knowledge [of theology] does not treat of things to speculate on more distinctly than knowledge of them requires for directing practical knowledge and practice; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor: any knowledge at all of the conditions of the desirability of the end, and of the conditions of what is for the end insofar as it is for the end, and third of the conditions of anything of the sort or of other things, about which conditions the operative power can err unless it is directed, is necessary for practical knowledge; no knowledge here treats of the end or of what is for the end without being of this sort; therefore etc. Or at any rate it is possible for an ignorant will to err about them, as will be said in the solution of the third objection [n.322] against the principal solution of the question.[5] |
| 311 Assumptum patet, quia quaecumque condicionum traduntur de fine magis natae sunt ostendere appetibilitatem finis, et condiciones eorum quae sunt ad finem natae sunt magis ostendere ea ordinata ad finem. ƿ | 311. The assumption is plain, because any conditions handed down about the end are of a nature to show more the desirability of the end, and the conditions of the things that are for the end are of a nature to show more the things ordered to the end. |
| 312 Ad argumentum, patet quod minor est falsa. Ad probationem dico quod non posset ita distincte tractari de fine cognito et de his quae sunt ad finem, quin illa tota cognitio esset practica intellectui creato, quia tota illa cognitio nata est ostendere finem sub ratione appetibilitatis et ea quae sunt ad finem sub ratione ordinis eorum ad finem, vel circa quaecumque posset voluntas non directa errare. | 312. To the argument [n.306], it is plain that the minor is false. In proof I say that the end and the things for the end could not be treated so distinctly without the whole knowledge being practical for a created intellect, because the whole knowledge is of a nature to show the end under the idea of desirability and to show the things that are for the end under the idea of their order to the end, or in respect of whatever an undirected will could err about. |
| 313 Alia opinio tenet eandem conclusionem, sed ponit theologiam cum hoc esse simpliciter unum habitum. ƿ | 313. [Another opinion] – Another opinion holds the same conclusion, but posits along with this that theology is one habit simply.[6] |
| 314 Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo quod cum actus voluntatis elicitus sit verissime praxis, etiam si non concomitetur aliquis actus imperatus (ut patet ex articulo primo), et extensio cognitionis practicae consistat in conformitate ad praxim et prioritate aptitudinali (patet hoc ex secundo) sequitur quod illa est practica cognitio quae est aptitudinaliter conformis volitioni rectae et naturaliter prior ipsa; sed tota theologia necessaria intellectui creato est sic conformis actui voluntatis creatae et prior eo; igitur etc. - Probatio minoris, quia primum obiectum theologiae est conforme virtualiter volitioni rectae, quia a ratione ƿ eius sumuntur principia rectitudinis in volitione; ipsum etiam determinat intellectum creatum ad notitiam rectitudinis determinatae ipsius praxis quoad omnia theologica necessaria prius naturaliter quam aliqua voluntas creata velit, alias non essent necessaria; ergo ex primo obiecto sequitur tam conformitas quam prioritas theologiae ad volitionem, et ita extensio ad praxim, a qua extensione ipsa cognitio dicenda sit practica. Confirmatur ista ratio, quia cum primum obiectum theologiae sit finis ultimus, et principia in intellectu creato sumpta a fine ultimo sunt principia practica, ergo principia theologiae sunt practica; ergo et conclusiones practicae. | 314. [On the theology of necessary things] – To the question [n.217], therefore, I reply that since an elicited act of will is most truly action, even if no commanded act accompanies it (as is plain from the first article [nn.230, 232, 234-235]), and since extension of practical knowledge consists in conformity to action and in aptitudinal priority (this is plain from the second article [nn.236-237]), it follows that that knowledge is practical which is aptitudinally conform to right volition and is naturally prior to it; but the whole of theology necessary for a created intellect is thus conform to the act of the created will and prior to it; therefore etc. – The proof of the minor is that the first object of theology is virtually conform to right volition, because from the idea of it are taken the principles of rectitude in the will; it also determines the created intellect to knowledge of the determinate rectitude of action itself, with respect to all the necessary elements of theology, naturally before any created will wills them, otherwise they would not be necessary; therefore from the first object there follow both the conformity and the priority of theology to volition, and thus extension to action, from which extension knowledge itself must be called practical. A confirmation of this reason is that the first object of theology is the ultimate end, and the principles in the created intellect taken from the ultimate end are practical principles, therefore the principles of theology are practical; therefore the conclusions too are practical. |
| 315 Si obiciatur contra per dicta in quaestione praecedente, ubi dicitur quod Deus non est hic primum subiectum in quantum finis sed ut haec essentia; principia autem sumpta a fine ut finis est practica sunt; igitur etc. | 315. If an objection be made against this from what was said in the preceding question, where it is said that God is not the first subject here as he is the end but as he is 145 this essence [nn.167, 195]; but the principles taken from the end as it is end are practical; therefore etc. |
| 316 Item, cognitio finis ultimi non est immediate conformis nec nata esse conformis praxi eliciendae; igitur non est propinque practica. | 316. Again, knowledge of the ultimate end is not immediately conform to, nor is it of a nature to be conform to, the eliciting of action; therefore it is not proximately practical. |
| 317 Item, primum obiectum includit virtualiter conformitatem ad ƿ praxim rectam, non tamen solam cognitionem sic conformem; alioquin de ipso non posset esse scientia speculativa, quod videtur inconveniens. Qualiter enim est ista veritas practica 'Deus est trinus' vel 'Pater generat Filium'? Ergo primum obiectum includit aliquam notitiam speculativam. Igitur ex conformitate illa virtuali primi obiecti ad praxim non sequitur theologiam esse practicam, cum veritates maxime theologicae in quantum theologia distinguitur a metaphysica sint speculativae. | 317. Again, the first object virtually includes conformity to right action, but it does not include only the knowledge that is thus conform; otherwise there could not be speculative science about it, which seems discordant. For how is this truth practical ‘God is triune’ or ‘the Father generates the Son’? Therefore the first object includes some speculative knowledge. Therefore from the virtual conformity of the first object to action it does not follow that theology is practical, since the truths that are most theological insofar as theology is distinguished from metaphysics are speculative. |
| 318 Item, tunc scientia Dei esset practica, quae est de eodem subiecto primo, et videtur quod ratio solutionis quaestionis possit applicari ad intellectum divinum sicut ad creatum. | 318. Again, the science of God, which is about the same first subject, would in that case be practical, and it seems that the reason for the solution to the question [n.314] could be applied to the divine intellect just as to the created intellect. |
| 319 Ad primum dico quod respectus finis non est a quo sumantur principia in aliqua scientia, sed illud absolutum in quo fundatur respectus; illud est 'haec essentia'. | 319. To the first [n.315] I say that the respect of the end is not what the principles are taken from in any science, but the absolute subject is on which the respect is founded; that subject is ‘this essence’. |
| 320 conformem est virtualiter conforme, et ita est cognitio practica, quia conclusiones practicae habent practica principia; proxima autem cognitio isti quae est de fine est cognitio fruitionis finis, et illa nata est esse conformis formaliter praxi fruitionis. | 320. To the second [n.316] I say that what virtually contains conform knowledge is virtually conform, and thus is practical knowledge, because practical conclusions have practical principles; but the knowledge proximate to the one which is about the end is knowledge of enjoyment of the end, and it is of the nature to be formally conform to the action of enjoyment. |
| 321 Ad tertium dico quod primum obiectum solummodo includit notitiam conformem volitioni rectae, quia virtute eius nihil ƿ de ipsa cognoscitur quod non sit vel rectitudo volitionis alicuius vel virtualiter includens notitiam talis rectitudinis. Et concedo quod infertur pro inconveniente in consequente, quod de ipso nulla potest esse scientia speculativa; necessario enim notitia eius et cuiuscumque intrinseci per ipsum cogniti conformis est praxi aptitudinaliter et prior si cognitum est necessarium. | 321. To the third [n.317] I say that the first object includes only knowledge that is conform to right volition, because by virtue of it nothing is known about the will that is not either rectitude of some will or virtually includes knowledge of such rectitude. And I concede what is inferred as a discordance in the consequent, that there can be about it no speculative science; for necessarily knowledge of it and of anything intrinsic known through it is aptitudinally conform to action and prior, if what is known is necessary. |
| 322 Cum instatur de illis veritatibus, quae verissime videntur theologicae et non metaphysicae, 'Deus est trinus', 'Pater generat Filium', dico quod istae veritates sunt practicae. Prima quidem virtualiter includit notitiam rectitudinis dilectionis tendentis in tres personas, ita quod si actus eliceretur circa unam solam, excludendo aliam (sicut infidelis eliceret), esset actus non rectus; secunda includit notitiam rectitudinis actus qui est circa duas personas quarum una est sic ab alia. | 322. When an instance is drawn from the truths, which seem to be most truly theological and not metaphysical, ‘God is triune’, ‘the Father generates the Son’ [n.317], I say that those truths are practical. The first indeed virtually includes knowledge of the rectitude of love tending toward the three persons, such that if the act were elicited about one of them alone by excluding another (as an unbeliever would elicit it), the act would not be right; the second includes knowledge of the rectitude of the act which is about two persons one of whom is thus from the other. |
| 323 Et si obiciatur contra hoc, quod nihil nisi essentiale est ratio terminandi actum dilectionis; theologia autem magis proprie est de personalibus quam de essentialibus, quia essentialia plurima possunt cognosci a metaphysico; ergo theologia ut distinguitur a metaphysica quantum ad propriissima sibi non est practica. Prima propositio probatur, quia alias esset aliqua ratio diligibilitatis in ƿ una persona quae non esset in alia, quod est falsum, quia tunc nulla beatificaretur in se ipsa. Respondeo: essentiale est absolute ratio terminandi actum amandi ut propter quam, sed personae terminant actum amandi ut quae amantur. Non autem sufficit ad rectitudinem actus quod habeat rationem formalem convenientem in obiecto, sed etiam requiritur quod habeat obiectum conveniens, in quo sit talis ratio formalis. Praeter ergo illam notitiam rectitudinis quam includit essentiale in actu amandi Deum, personalia includunt propriam notitiam ulteriorem rectitudinis requisitae. | 323. And if it be objected against this that only what is essential is the reason for terminating the act of love; but theology is more properly about the personals than about the essentials, because several essentials can be known by the metaphysician; therefore theology, as it is distinguished from metaphysics, is not practical as to what is most proper to it. The proof of the first proposition is that otherwise there would be some reason of lovability in one person that was not in another, which is false, because then no person would be blessed in itself. I reply: an essential is absolutely a reason for terminating the act of love as the ‘that because of which’, but the persons terminate the act of loving as what are loved. For it is not sufficient for rectitude of the act that it have the formal reason that is fitting to the object, but there is also required that it have the fitting object in which such formal reason exists. So, over and above the knowledge of rectitude which the essential includes in the act of loving God, the personals include the further proper knowledge of the required rectitude. |
| 324 Ad quartum posset concedi quod theologia Dei de necessariis sit practica, quia in intellectu suo natum est primum obiectum theologicum quasi gignere notitiam conformem volitioni rectae priorem naturaliter ipsa volitione. Quod conformem, patet. Quod etiam priorem, probatur, quia prius naturaliter intellectus intelligit primum obiectum quam voluntas illud velit; igitur prius naturaliter volitione potest habere omnem notitiam sibi sufficientem virtualiter inclusam in intellectione primi obiecti; talis est quaecumque notitia necessaria de primo obiecto. Consequentia supposita patet, tum quia per impossibile exclusa omni voluntate posƿset intellectus habere omnem notitiam sufficientem virtualiter inclusam in intellectione primi obiecti, cum illa intellectio praecedat omnem volitionem; - tum quia intellectus divinus non discurrit; igitur non prius naturaliter intelligit primum obiectum quam aliquid in ipso virtualiter inclusum quoad notitiam: igitur si prius intelligit primum obiectum quam voluntas velit aliquid, prius intelligit quodlibet inclusum quoad notitiam in primo obiecto quam voluntas velit (haec secunda probatio consequentiae minus valet). | 324. To the fourth [n.318], one could concede that the theology of God about necessary things is practical, because in his intellect the first theological object is of a nature to generate, as it were, the knowledge conform to right volition that is naturally prior to the volition itself. That it is conform is plain. That it is also prior is proved because the intellect naturally understands the first object before the will wills it; therefore it can naturally have, prior to the will, all the knowledge sufficient for it virtually included in the understanding of the first object; of such sort is any necessary knowledge whatever of the first object. The assumed consequence is plain, both because, if all will were per impossibile excluded, the intellect could have all sufficient knowledge virtually included in the understanding of the first object, since that understanding precedes volition; – also because the divine intellect is not discursive; therefore it does not naturally understand the first object before it understands anything as to knowledge that is virtually included in the object; therefore, if it understands the first object before the will wills anything, it understands anything as to knowledge that is included in the first object before the will wills (this second proof of the consequence is less strong). |
| 325 Si obiciatur quod tunc voluntas divina non erit prima regula sui in actibus suis si eius actum praecedit notitia cui debet in agendo conformari ad hoc ut recte agat; consequens videtur inconveniens, quia tollit summam libertatem voluntatis divinae si ab alio determinetur et non ex se primo ad primum actum suum. Si autem omnem actum eius praecedat cognitio practica, ab intellectu determinabitur ad primum actum, quia non potest ei dissentire; tunc enim posset peccare. | 325. If it be objected that the divine will will not be the first rule of itself in its act if its act is preceded by the knowledge it should be conformed to so as to act rightly; the consequent seems discordant, because the supreme freedom of the divine will is taken away if this will is determined by another and not first by itself to its first act. But if all its acts are preceded by practical knowledge, it will be determined to its first act by the intellect, because it cannot dissent from it; for then it could commit sin. |
| 326 Item, supra dictum est Philosophum bene dicere consequenter si intelligentia naturaliter amat Deum visum; ergo notitia ostendens Deum non est practica. Fiat similis consequentia de Deo naturaliter amante se. ƿ | 326. Again, it was said above that the Philosopher consequently speaks well if intelligence naturally loves God when seen; therefore a knowledge that shows God is not practical. Let there be a like consequence about God naturally loving himself. |
| 327 Item, dirigens est aliqua causa respectu directi, ergo est distinctio realis inter ipsa; non est autem talis distinctio intellectionis Dei ad velle. Confirmatur ratio, quia intellecto velle iam esse elicitum intellectus non dirigit; tantum enim dirigit circa eliciendum quasi prior ipso: sed in Deo velle sui non sequitur voluntatem esse, ergo numquam est ibi quasi eliciendum, sed semper quasi elicitum; ergo etc. | 327. Again, something that directs is a cause in respect of something directed, so there is a real distinction between them; but there is no such distinction of God’s intellection to his willing. A confirmation of the reason is that, if one understands an act of will to have already been elicited, the intellect is not directing, for its direction only concerns something to be elicited as being prior to it; but in God his willing does not follow the being of the will, so his willing there is never something to be elicited, as it were, but is always as it were elicited; therefore etc. |
| 328 Hic videtur consequenter dictis esse dicendum quod accipiendo regulam pro rectificante in praxi, prima regula est finis ultimus, qui virtualiter primo includit notitiam rectitudinis necessariae cuiuslibet praxis, sicut primum obiectum scientiae speculativae primo includit notitiam veritatum speculabilium. Haec autem regula prima quae est finis ordinate rectificat intellectum et voluntatem sicut istae potentiae natae sunt agere ordinate, ita quod quasi prius gignit notitiam conformem rectae praxi quam rectam praxim vel quam rectificet praxim; et ita potentia practicante alia ƿ erit potentia prius recta, ita quod consequens illatum in prima ratione videtur concedendum. Cum improbatur posset dici quod sicut universaliter libertas stat cum apprehensione praevia, ita stat summa libertas cum perfectissima apprehensione praevia; apprehensio autem praxis perfectissima includit notitiam conformitatis quando ipsa necessario convenit praxi. | 328. It seems here that, in consequence of what has been said [nn.274-277, 310- 312, 314, 319-320, 322-323], one must say that, when one takes the rule for what gives right guidance in action, the first rule is the ultimate end, which virtually includes the knowledge of the rectitude necessary to any action, just as the first object of speculative science first includes knowledge of truths of speculation. But this first rule, which is the end, gives right guidance to the intellect and the will according to the order that those powers naturally have in acting, such that it generates knowledge conform to right action as it were before right action or before it makes action right; and in this way there will be another power that is right prior to the power that acts, so that it seems that the consequent deduced in the first reason [n.325] must be conceded. Although it is criticized [n.325], one could say that, just as freedom is universally consistent with previous apprehension, so supreme freedom is consistent with the most perfect previous apprehension; but the most perfect apprehension of action includes the knowledge of conformity when it necessarily agrees with action. |
| 329 Cum ulterius arguitur quod determinaretur aliunde, hoc negandum est loquendo de determinatione quae fit per agens sufficiens. Licet enim non posset dissentire a notitia recta et priore praxi, hoc tamen non est quasi intellectus per notitiam sit causa sufficienter active determinans ipsam ad actum, sed ex perfectione voluntatis est, quod ipsa tantum nata est agere conformiter potentiae priori in agendo, quando illa prior prius perfecte agit circa obiectum, hoc est tantum novit prius quantum potest nosse. Quod dico pro contingentibus, quorum intellectus divinus non habet omnem notitiam sibi possibilem ante omnem actum voluntatis; ideo circa illa non oportet quod conformiter agat potentiae priori, quia ipsa non prius conformiter novit tale obiectum. Sed aliter ƿ semper accidit circa cognoscibilia necessaria ex se, quia illa perfectissimam notitiam sui habent absque actu voluntatis. | 329. When it is further argued that it would then be determined by something else [n.325], one must deny this by speaking of the determination that is done by a sufficient agent. For although it could not disagree with knowledge that is right and prior to action, yet it is not as if the intellect is by its knowledge a sufficient cause actively determining the will to act, but this is from the perfection of the will, which is of a nature only to act in conformity with the prior power in acting, when that prior power acts perfectly about its object, that is, when it knows in advance as much as it can know. But I say this about contingent things, of which the divine intellect does not have all the knowledge possible to it before any act of the will; therefore, as to those contingent things, I say that it is not necessary for it to act in conformity with the prior power, because it does not itself have in advance conform knowledge of such object. But it is otherwise as regards knowables that are of themselves necessary, because these contain the most perfect account of themselves without any act of will.[7] |
| 330 Licet autem haec responsio videatur evadere argumentum, et sequentia argumenta possent evadi, tamen aliter dicendum est, quod theologia necessaria in intellectu divino non est practica, quia non est prioritas naturalis intellectionis ad volitionem quasi conformativi ad ipsum conformandum sive directivi ad dirigendum aliquid: quia posita notitia quacumque rectitudinis ipsius praxis, licet ex se posset conformare potentiam conformabilem sive rectificabilem aliunde, non tamen voluntatem divinam respectu sui ƿ primi obiecti, quia illa ex se sola rectificatur respectu illius obiecti, quia vel naturaliter tendit in illud, vel si libere, nullo modo est de se quasi indifferens ad rectitudinem et quasi aliunde aliquo modo habens eam, ita quod notitia determinata rectitudinis non est necessario prior volitione quasi illud volitio requirat ut recte eliciatur; sed tantum praeexigit ostensionem obiecti; et illam notitiam ex se directivam non praeexigit ut directivam sed tantum ut ostensivam, ita quod si posset praecedere volitionem sola ostensio obiecti et sequi notitia rectitudinis necessariae ipsius praxis (sicut dicetur de praxi circa contingentia), aeque recte eliceretur volitio tunc et nunc Non igitur modo est intellectio prior et conformativa sive regulativa. | 330. Now although this response seems to avoid the argument [n.325], and although the subsequent arguments might be avoided [n.326-327], yet one must respond otherwise and say that necessary theology in the divine intellect is not practical, because there is no natural priority of conformative or directive intellection to the will to make it conform or to direct anything; because once any knowledge whatever of the rectitude of action has been posited, although it could of itself conform a conformable or directable power from without, yet it could not conform the divine will with respect to its own first object, because the will is rectified by itself alone with respect to that object, for either it naturally tends toward it or, if it tends freely, it is not of itself in any way as it were indifferent to rectitude or in any way from without as it were possessed of that rectitude, and so determinate knowledge of rectitude is not necessarily prior to volition as though the will required it in order to be rightly elicited; but all that is required in advance is the showing of the object; and the knowledge that is of itself directive it does not require in advance as directive but only as ostensive, and so if the mere showing of the object could precede the will and if knowledge of the rectitude necessary for action could follow (in the way that will be said of action about contingent things [n.333]), volition would be rightly elicited equally in this case as in that. Therefore intellection is not now prior and conformative or regulative. |
| 331 Ad argumentum igitur probans prioritatem notitiae rectitudinis ad praxim rectam responderi potest quod licet aliqua sit prioritas intellectionis ad volitionem, non tamen sic prior ut requirat cognitionem rectam esse priorem praxi, quia talis prioritas est regulae ad regulatum, qualis esse non potest quando voluntas est omni modo regula sui in agendo. Huius controversiae de scientia Dei respectu sui, an sit pracƿtica, summa in hoc consistit: si notitia quae de se esset directiva in praxi, dato quod potentia rectificans vel practicans in sciente esset dirigibilis in agendo, sit practica ex hoc solo quod sic esset directiva, vel non practica ex hoc quod potentia practicans in sciente non est dirigibilis. Qui alteram partem tenet, dicat consequenter. | 331. To the argument, therefore, that proves the priority of knowledge of rectitude to right action [n.324], one can reply that although there is some priority of intellection to volition, yet it is not prior such that it requires right cognition to be prior to action, because such priority is priority of the rule to the thing ruled, which is not the sort there can be when the will is in every way its own rule in acting. The sum of this controversy about the science God has with respect to himself, whether it is practical or not, consists in this: whether the knowledge which of itself would be directive in action, if it were granted that the power in the knower which is right or is active were directable in its acting, is practical from the fact alone that it is directive, or is not practical from the fact that the power in the knower which is active is not directable. He who holds one side or the other will answer accordingly. |
| 332 Ex hoc introducitur secundus articulus quaestionis, scilicet de theologia contingentium, an sit practica. Dico quod in illo tantummodo intellectu potest theologia contingentium esse practica qui potest habere determinatam notitiam rectitudinis praxis ante omnem volitionem illius intelligentis vel ante ipsam praxim elicitam, quia solummodo ibi haec theologia contingentium potest esse vel est conformis praxi et prior ea. Talis est omnis intellectus creatus, quia nullius intelligentis creati voluntas primo determinat rectitudinem contingentem convenientem suae praxi. ƿ | 332. [About the theology of contingent things] – From this is introduced the second article of the question, namely about the theology of contingent things, whether it is practical or not [nn.314, 324, 330; 1 d.38 q. un. nn.1-4]. I say that the theology of contingent things can be practical only in that intellect which can have determinate knowledge of the rectitude of action prior to all volition of the one who has the intellect, or prior to the elicited action itself, because only there is this theology of contingent things able to be or is conform to action and prior to it. Of such sort is every created intellect, because in the case of no created intelligence does the will first determine the contingent rectitude that is fitting to its action. |
| 333 In intellectu vero divino non potest theologia contingens esse practica, tenendo ista duo, scilicet quod cognitio practica et praxis ad quam extenditur debent esse necessario eiusdem suppositi, et quod Dei ut operantis nulla sit praxis nisi volitio (non ponendo in ipso potentiam tertiam aliam ab intellectu et voluntate), nam nulla cognitio conformis praxi vel volitioni contingenti rectae praecedit in intellectu divino praxim eius rectam sive ipsam volitionem Dei, quia volitione primo determinatur illi praxi talis rectitudo. | 333. But in the divine intellect contingent theology cannot be practical if one holds onto these two points, namely that practical knowledge and the action to which it is extended ought necessarily to belong to the same supposit,[8] and that of God as an actor there is no action save volition (if one does not posit in him a third power other than intellect and will), for no knowledge conform to action or to a right contingent will precedes in the divine intellect its right action or God’s volition itself, because such rectitude is first determined by the will for that action. |
| 334 lllud primum est verum, nam si quaecumque cognitio de praxi alterius sit practica, ergo cognitio mea de hoc quod est Deum creare mundum vel de hoc quod est intelligentiam movere caelum erit practica. Saltem hoc videtur concludere quod cognitio practica non potest esse intelligentiae vel intelligentis inferioris ƿ operante aliquo secundum illam praxim, pari ratione nec superioris nec aequalis si nihil faciat ad praxim operantis; si autem aliquid faciat, iam superior habet praxim propriam respectu cuius sua cognitio sit practica. | 334. The first point is true, for if any knowledge at all about someone else’s action is practical, then my knowledge of the fact that God creates the world or that an intelligence moves the heavens, will be practical. This at least seems to be conclusive, because the practical knowledge cannot belong to a lower intelligence or understanding when something else is acting according to the action in question, nor, by parity of reasoning, to a higher or equal intelligence if it is contributing nothing to the action of the doer; but if it does contribute something, the higher intelligence does now have its own action with respect to which its knowledge would be practical. |
| 335 Item, si cognitio practica habet aliquam causalitatem respectu praxis ad quam extenditur et non est nata habere talem causalitatem nisi primo respectu praxis quae sit in intelligente, videtur sequi propositum. | 335. Again, if practical knowledge has any causality with respect to the action to which it is extended, and if it only naturally has such causality in the first respect of action in the one who understands, the thing proposed [n.333] seems to follow. |
| 336 Contra: igitur de eodem haberet unus intellectus notitiam practicam et alius speculativam si praxis esset possibilis uni intellectui et non alteri. Potest dici quod perfecta rectitudo praxis includit circumstantiam operantis sicut et alias circumstantias, ita quod sine illa non est rectitudo. Si enim accipiatur 'Deus est amandus', nisi addatur a quo, puta a voluntate, non est verum practicum complete, quia Deus a bruto non est amandus: itaque hoc verum perfectum 'Deus est amandus a Deo' in quocumque intellectu est practicum; ita et istud 'homini est ieiunandum quandoque' non est tantum ƿ practicum homini cognoscenti sed etiam angelo et Deo; ita etiam homini et Deo est hoc practicum 'angelo caelum est movendum', et concedo quod infert prima probatio tamquam inconveniens. | 336. To the contrary: therefore about the same thing one intellect would have practical knowledge and another speculative, if action were possible to one intellect and not to the other. One can say that perfect rectitude of action includes the circumstance of the doer just as it does the other circumstances as well, so that without it there is no rectitude. For if one takes ‘God is to be loved’ and does not add by what, namely by the will, it is not a practical truth completely, because God is not to be loved by a brute; therefore this perfect truth ‘God is to be loved by God’ is practical in any intellect whatever; thus too this truth ‘man should sometimes fast’ is practical not only to the man who knows it but also to an angel and to God; so also this truth is practical to man and to God ‘the heaven is to be moved by an angel’, – and I concede as something discordant what the first proof infers [n.334]. |
| 337 Et si obiciatur quod non salvatur prioritas cognitionis practicae ad praxim - prius enim dilectio respectu sui est recta quam homo vel angelus possit intelligere 'Deus est amandus a Deo' respondeo: ista prioritas debet esse ex obiecto et intellectu, hoc est, quod natum sit determinare intellectum ad notitiam determinatae rectitudinis praxis, scilicet quantum est ex se ante praxim; ita obiectum hoc natum est quemcumque intellectum determinare ad notitiam istam 'Deus est amandus a Deo' quantum est ex se ante praxim, licet aliquis intellectus ex imperfectione sui non prius determinetur quam potentia operans ex perfectione sui operetur. | 337. And if it be objected that the priority of practical knowledge to action is not preserved – for love with respect to himself is right before a man or an angel could understand ‘God is to be loved by God’ – I reply: this priority ought to be from the object and the intellect, that is, that it naturally determine the intellect to knowledge of determinate rectitude of action, namely as far as it is of itself in advance of action; in this way this object is of a nature to determine any intellect whatever to the knowledge ‘God is to be loved by God’ as far as it is of itself in advance of action, although some intellect, because of its own imperfection, is not determined before the acting power, because of its own perfection, acts. |
| 338 Ad aliam obiectionem dico quod sicut voluntas potest esse causa superior respectu praxis potentiae motivae, non tamen quaecumque respectu cuiuscumque, puta non mea respectu potentiae motivae angeli, sed quando fit in eodem, ita quod si practica sit causa respectu praxis, hoc est in eodem intelligente et operante; ƿ nec oportet quod in alio sit non practica, nisi accipiendo stricte practicam pro immediate applicabili ad opus quantum est ex identitate suppositi cognoscentis et operantis, qualem immediationem denotat infinitivus significans praxim constructus cum 'scire' - sic enim conceditur quod solus Deus scit se infinite diligere licet angelus sciat ipsum infinite a se diligendum. | 338. To the other objection [n.336] I say that just as the will can be a superior cause with respect to the action of the moving power, not however any will at all with respect to any power at all, for example, not my will with respect to the moving power of an angel, but when it is in the same subject, so that if it is a practical cause with respect to action, this is in the same knower and the same doer; nor is it necessary that in someone else it be non-practical, unless one takes practical strictly for what is immediately applicable to a work to the extent it depends on the identity of subject in knower and doer, which immediacy is denoted [in Latin] by the infinitive that signifies the action when it is construed with the verb ‘to know’ – for in this way it is conceded that only God knows that he loves himself [Latin infinitive: ‘to love himself’]infinitely although an angel might know that he is to be infinitely loved by himself. |
| 339 Qui sic respondet, a principio habet concedere omnem veritatem de praxibus agentium creatorum cognosci a quocumque intellectu practicante, quia omnes illae, sive ab obiecto, ut necessariae, sive aliunde, ut contingentes, natae sunt prius esse conformes praxibus sive prius determinare rectitudinem praxium quam ipsae praxes eliciantur. Omnes autem veritates de volitione divina, necessariae quidem, sunt practicae, contingentes autem non, quia ante illam praxim elicitam ad quam extenduntur non habent conformitatem, quia nullam determinationem rectitudinis; verbi gratia, Deus practice cognoscit homini esse paenitendum et angelo esse movendum, sed non quod Deo est volendum hominem sanctum paenitere vel angelum movere. | 339. Someone who thus responds must from the beginning concede that every truth about the action of created agents is known by some acting intellect, because all these truths are of a nature to be conform to action, or to determine the rectitude of action (whether from the object if they are necessary, or from something else if they are contingent), before the action is elicited. But all truths about divine volition are practical if necessary but not practical if contingent, because these, in advance of the action’s being elicited to which they are extended, do not have conformity, for they do not have any determination of rectitude; for example, God knows practically that man should repent and that the angel should move, but not that God should wish a holy man to repent and an angel to move. |
| 340 Si quaeras qualis est theologia contingentium in se, non comƿparata huic vel illi intellectui, potest dici quod ipsa talis est in se qualis est ex obiecto; non est autem ex obiecto conformis praxi ante omnem praxim, quia ex obiecto nulla nata est haberi notitia determinata rectitudinis contingentis; ideo ex obiecto non est practica, ergo speculativa, si sufficienter dividunt notitiam. Huic congruit quod in intellectu divino negatur esse practica: talis enim videtur res in se qualis est in perfecto in genere illo, non in imperfecto. | 340. If you ask of what sort theology of contingents is in itself when not compared with this intellect or with that, one can say that it is in itself the sort it is from its object; but from its object it is not conform to action in advance of every action, because no determinate knowledge of contingent rectitude is of a nature to be had from the object; therefore from its object it is not practical, therefore it is speculative, if knowledge is sufficiently divided between these [n.303]. Congruent with this is that in the divine intellect it is denied to be practical [n.333]; for a thing seems to be such in itself as it is in a perfect instance in that genus and not as it is in an imperfect one. |
| 341 Si obiciatur quod tunc cognitio in se speculativa est alicui practica, puta intellectui creato, igitur practicum non repugnat speculativo, respondeo: esse speculativum ex obiecto est esse per se speculativum; ita esse practicum ex obiecto sufficienter determinante intellectum ad notitiam rectitudinis - et si sufficienter, igitur ante volitionem - est esse per se practicum. Sic opponuntur ista duo, ut et ista, 'non extensibile ad praxim' et 'extensibile ad ƿ praxim'. Sed aliunde esse practicum quam ex obiecto, puta a causa extrinseca, ut a voluntate determinante intellectum ad notitiam praxis, est esse accidentaliter practicum; ita concedo theologiam contingentium esse practicam nobis, licet in se sit speculativa. | 341. If it be objected that then knowledge in itself speculative is for someone practical, to wit for a created intellect, therefore the practical is not repugnant to the speculative, I reply: to be speculative from the object is to be speculative per se; so, to be practical from an object that sufficiently determines the intellect to knowledge of rectitude – and if sufficiently then prior to volition – is to be practical per se. It is in this way that these two are opposed, as are also these ‘not-extendable to action’ and ‘extendable to action’. But to be practical from something other than the object, to wit from an extrinsic cause, as from the will determining the intellect to knowledge of action, 155 is to be accidentally practical; thus I concede that the theology of contingent things is practical for us, though in itself it is speculative. |
| 342 Contra hoc: cui per se convenit unum oppositum, ei aliud oppositum nec per se nec per accidens convenit; igitur notitia per se speculativa nec per se nec per accidens est practica. Respondeo: licet antecedens posset exponi de per se primo modo vel secundo, non autem tertio modo, prout dicit idem quod solitarie, tamen concedo quod nullo modo inhaerendi inhaeret oppositum praedicati huius quod est per se practica vel huius quod est per se speculativum, quia theologia contingens per se secundo modo est per se practica vel speculativa, ita quod et inhaerentia sit per se et praedicatum determinatur per ly 'per se'. Sed per accidens esse practicum per accidens non opponitur illi, sicut esse nigrum simpliciter et esse album secundum quid non opponuntur: 'secundum quid' enim et 'simpliciter' determinant ƿ praedicata ut denominantia. Si arguitur 'per se est per se speculativa, ergo per se est speculativa', concedo, nec huic praedicato repugnat hoc praedicatum 'per accidens practica'. | 342. Against this: that to which one opposite per se belongs the other opposite belongs neither per se nor per accidens; therefore knowledge in itself speculative is not practical either per se or per accidens. I reply: although the antecedent might be expounded of per se in the first or in the second way, not however in the third way, the way in which it signifies the same as the solitary [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a-34-b10], yet I concede that in no way of inhering does the opposite of this predicate inhere which is ‘per se practical’ or of this predicate ‘per se speculative’, because contingent theology per se in the second way is per se practical or speculative, so that the inherence is both per se and the predicate is determined by the ‘per se’. But to be per accidens practical is per accidens not opposed to that inherence, just as to be black simply and to be white in some respect are not opposed; for ‘in some respect’ and ‘simply’ determine predicates as they are denominative. If it is argued ‘it is per se to be per se speculative, therefore it is per se speculative’, I concede the point, but to this predicate the predicate ‘per accidens practical’ is not opposed. |
| 343 Si vero alterum illorum duorum quae ista responsio tenet non teneatur, tunc potest concedi quod theologia contingens licet non in se sit practica, quia non ex obiecto, tamen in omni intellectu, creato et increato, esset practica per accidens, quia ipsa in intellectu divino potest esse conformis praxi prius quam praxis illa eliciatur a voluntate creata; prius enim intellectus Dei novit peccatorem adultum in Nova Lege debere conteri quam peccator conteratur. Et non tenendo primum illorum, cognitio Dei de praxi alterius operantis est practica; non tenendo etiam secundum, puta ponendo agere Dei ad extra esse praxim eius aliam a volitione Dei formaliter, licet intellectus divinus non prius novit a esse creandum quam voluntas sua velit, tamen prius novit quam creet, et ita illam praxim ad extra praecedit notitia conformis, licet non ex obiecto sed aliunde conformis. | 343. But if the one of these two [n.333] that is held by that response is not held, then it can be conceded that contingent theology, although it is not in itself practical because not so from its object, yet in every intellect created and uncreated it would be practical per accidens, because in the divine intellect it can be conform to action before the action is elicited by a created will; for the intellect of God knew that the adult sinner in the New Law should be punished before the sinner is punished. And by not holding to the first of the two above mentioned, the knowledge of God about the action of some other actor is practical; also by not holding to the second of them, to wit by positing the action of God extrinsically to be an action of his formally different from the will of God, although the divine intellect does not know by any ‘it must be created’ before his will wills it, yet he knows before he creates, and so conform knowledge precedes the extrinsic action, although it is not conform from the object but from something else. |
| 344 Hoc saltem teneo quod theologia contingentium non est per se practica sive ex obiecto; potest tamen intellectui creato esse per ƿ accidens practica, et hoc in illo intelligente cuius est operari secundum praxim cui determinatur rectitudo a voluntate divina. An vero intellectui divino sit practica, patet tenendo illa duo vel opposita quid est dicendum consequenter. Probabilia autem videntur haec tria: primo quod practica est regulativa in praxi contingentis, et secundo quod est regulativa potentiae practicantis aliunde quam a se rectificabilis, et tertio quod in Deo non est potentia practicans nisi voluntas. Ex primo et tertio sequitur quod si notitia divina esset practica, ipsa esset rectificativa vel regulativa in volitione divina; sed hoc est falsum ex secundo illorum, quia voluntas ex se primo recte elicit velle respectu primi obiecti, respectu autem secundorum, quorum est contingenter, ex se sola determinatur, non per aliquam notitiam rectitudinis praecedentem. | 344. This at any rate I hold to, that the theology of contingents is not practical per se or from its object; yet for a created intellect it can be practical per accidens, and that in the intelligence to whom it belongs to act according to the action for which rectitude is determined by the divine will. But as to whether it is practical to the divine will, by holding those two positions [n.333] or the opposites [n.343] it is plain what should be said as a consequence. These three things, however, seem to be probable: first, that the practical is regulative in the action of the contingent, and second that it is regulative of the power of the doer who is set right by something other than himself, and third that in God the only power that acts is will. From the first and third it follows that if divine knowledge is practical, it is rectificatory or regulative in divine volition; but this is false from the second of those things that were said [n.333], because the will of itself first rightly elicits willing with respect to the first object, but with respect to the second objects, which it is contingently related to, it is determined by itself alone, not by any preceding knowledge of rectitude. |
Notes
- ↑ 81 Interpolation: “ ‘First act is with respect to the end and is the perfect operation which the will forms within itself and unites itself to the last end; second act is with respect to things that are for the end, hence a good action is that by which the will tends to something else outside itself, just as is any action directive to the end. In the first act the will does not need a directive act but mere showing of the end is sufficient; for there is speculation in it only so as to show perfectly to the will the object of its operation so that it may at once tend to it with a perfect operation. Now such act simply concerns speculative knowledge. In the second act the will needs a directive act, and this pertains to practical knowledge, because there is in it speculation so as to direct action, which is proper to practical knowledge. But the act that is perfected by the will is not the end of this knowledge (unless the end is under an end) but there is another act which perfects the will; and from this fact does this knowledge have its being most perfectly speculative, because the act principally intended in this knowledge is the act of the will about the end, in which it does not need a directive act but only a showing of the object. Therefore it is not practical knowledge, but only simply speculative knowledge, since in its own principal act it does not need a directive act.’ So Henry of Ghent. ‘For this way’ etc. [n.271].”
- ↑ 82 Text canceled by Scotus: “The blessed cannot err in any act concerning the theological object; therefore they naturally have directive knowledge in respect of any act concerning the theological object.”
- ↑ 83 Sc. as opposed to a causing ‘why’. A cause ‘that’ merely makes the effect to exist; a cause ‘why’ gives the effect the nature it has as well. The argument of this paragraph seems to be that since the third way supposes that choice is only action because the effect it causes is action, then the cause is getting its nature from the effect, which is contrary to the relation of cause and effect.
- ↑ 84 Text cancelled by Scotus: “And given that such necessity is posited in the intellect from the nature of the will that loves God, would he posit necessity thus in the will of the wise man whom he himself posited as naturally happy? If not, then the wise man can be directed in such an act. – I reply: he only denied the practical to such a man because he said his happiness was speculative.”
- ↑ 85 Text cancelled by Scotus: “For although the Trinity of persons does not show the end to be more desirable than if they were not three (because the Trinity is the end insofar as they are one God, not insofar as they are three), yet a will ignorant of the Trinity can err in loving or desiring the end by desiring to enjoy one person only. Likewise, a will ignorant that God made the world can err by not repaying the sort of love that gratitude would require for so great a communication of his goodness made for our utility. Thus, by being ignorant of the articles pertaining to reparation it is possible to be ungrateful, by not repaying the love due for so great a benefit. So too of other theological articles.”
- ↑ 86 Interpolation: “and this because of its one subject, which is God, in which come together all the things that are considered in this science. For all of them fall under the consideration of this science insofar as they participate in something divine, and therefore whether it consider them by comparison to work or not, as in the case of purely speculative science, but because of the formal unity of the subject this science is single. – Against this opinion thus: whenever something common is divided first through certain opposite differences, it is impossible for both differences to be found under some one thing contained under that common thing; but science in common is divided first into practical and speculative; therefore it is impossible for these differences to be found together in some one science. The major is manifest, because if differences that jointly divide some common thing could be compatible with each other in something contained in common, then the same body could be corporeal and incorporeal, and the same animal sensible and non-sensible, and the same man rational and irrational, which is absurd. The minor is plain from Avicenna at the beginning of his Metaphysics 1 ch.1 (70ra), and from the Commentator in his first comment on Ethics 1 [Eustratius, I preface (1A)]. Again, a contradiction about one and the same thing would follow, namely that it is extended and not extended, and many other disagreeable results follow. – An addition.”
- ↑ 87 Interpolation: “To the second [n.326] it can be said that it is not similar, because there is there simple being pleased, but here there circumstanced efficacious willing. Likewise, the divine will is not merely ostensive, but it is at least equivalently directive, because it is an objectual, though not potential, regulation and determination, which the Philosopher did not posit. – To the third [n.327] I say that, if it was conclusive, it would follow that there was neither any intellection nor any volition in God, since the divine essence is the moving object for both, and thus, along with the concurring part, it is a vital power as joint cause; I say therefore that there is only an order of quasi-effects of the same quasi-cause in the proposed case, which order however is not distinct from the quasi-effects, because these effects are neither properly caused nor produced, nor do they have a principle, nor are they elicited, but they simply flow out; the causality therefore is metaphorical, as commonly happens in divine reality. Or in another way, when upholding that the intellect in some way or other directs, the assumption is denied when speaking properly of cause. To the confirmation [n.327] I say that the order of nature suffices, which order stands along with simultaneity in duration of the knowledge for action and of the will for willing, and thus the answer is plain to the arguments, when one upholds the first way.”
- ↑ 88 Interpolation: “and if of another supposit, then it would be practical, because it would be of the directible or determinable power of the other supposit, namely of the power of some created supposit or other.”
