Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D2/P2Q4

• II. To the Question
• II. To the Principal Arguments

Latin	English
	Question Four: Whether two Angels can be in the Same Place at Once
273 Octavo quaero utrum duo angeli possunt simul esse in eodem loco.	273. Eighth I ask whether two angels can be in the same place at once.
274 Quod non: Quia duae causae totales non possunt esse simul respectu eiusdem effectus; angelus autem, exsistens in loco, est totalis causa respectu operationis in tali loco, propter quam dicitur esse ibi; ergo non potest esse ibi cum eo alius angelus, propter aliam operationem ibi exercitam.	274. That they cannot be: Because [Aquinas] two total causes cannot be together in respect of the same effect; but an angel, when existing in a place, is a total cause with respect to an operation in such place that he is said to be there by; so another angel, cannot, because of another operation exercised there, be there along with him.
275 Alia ratio ponitur ab aliis: quia quae habent eundem modum ƿessendi 'in', non possunt esse simul. Quod declaratur de duobus corporibus gloriosis, quae non possunt naturaliter simul esse in eodem loco, licet corpus gloriosum possit simul esse cum non glorioso. Ita de duobus Diis: si essent pares, neuter posset esse cum alio (secundum Damascenum cap. 5), et tamen Deus potest esse simul cum creatura propter alium modum essendi eorum in loco. Cum igitur angeli habeant eundem modum essendi in loco, non possunt simul esse in eodem loco.	275. Another reason is given by others: that things that have the same mode of existing 'in' cannot be together. The point is made clear about two glorious bodies, which cannot naturally be together in the same place, although a glorious body could be together with a non-glorious body. So about two Gods: if they were equal, neither could be with the other (according to Damascene ch.5), and yet God can be together with a creature because of their different way of being in a place. Since therefore angels have the same way of being in a place, they cannot be together in the same place.
	II. To the Question
276 In ista quaestione non est veritas ita certa et clara de facto, sicut in praecedente quaestione, quia Richardus IV De Trinitate ƿvidetur arguere daemones non habere corpora, per hoc quod legio fuit in corpore unius obsessi (Marc.): non potuisset autem legio fuisse in aliquo, si habuissent corpora. Igitur videtur arguere quod si habuissent secum corpora, fuissent corpora eorum simul in eodem loco; ergo modo, quando non habent corpora, videtur dicendum quod simul fuerunt absque corporibus.	276. In this question the truth is not as certain and clear as it is in the preceding one [n.262], because Richard of Saint Victor On the Trinity 4.25 seems to prove that demons do not have bodies by the fact that a legion of them was in the body of one possessed man (Mark 5.1-17); but a legion could not have been in someone if they had bodies. Therefore he seems to prove that, if they had bodies with them, their bodies would have been in the same place together; therefore now, when they do not have bodies, it seems one should say that they were together without bodies.
277 Si etiam unus angelus movens caelum sit in meridie, et alius bonus angelus missus a Deo de caelo ad terram debeat transire per locum illum, non videtur necessitas quod non transeat quasi per lineam rectam vel quod alius cedat sibi.	277. Also if one angel, who is moving the heaven, is in the south and another good angel, sent by God from heaven to earth, has to pass through that place, there seems no necessity for him not to pass through in a straight line, as it were, or for the other to yield to him.
278 Si etiam omnes angeli fuissent creati ante creaturam corporalem (sicut verum videtur, secundum Damascenum cap. 17), non videtur facile assignare quomodo tunc fuissent simul, - et si tunc non fuissent simul, nec modo.	278. Also, if all the angels had been created before the corporeal creation (as seems true according to Damascene ch.17 [n.215]), it does not seem easy to assign any way that they were then together - and if they were then not together, then not together now either.
279 Quidquid sit de facto et de possibili potentia naturali eorum, de possibili tamen respectu potentiae divinae non videtur impossibile quin per ipsam possint simul esse.	279. Whatever be true of their natural power as to fact and possibility, yet as to possibility in respect of divine power there seems no impossibility in angels' being able by that power to be together.
	II. To the Principal Arguments
280 Et tunc ad argumenta, postquam videntur probare oppositum, respondendum est. Ad primum dico quod falsum praesupponit, scilicet quod ƿangelus non sit in loco nisi per operationem, - quod improbatum est in prima quaestione huius materiae. Si etiam illud suppositum admitteretur, posset unus angelus operari circa illud una operatione et alius alia operatione, et uterque secundum eos posset poni per suam operationem in loco (scilicet illius corporis) ubi operaretur et sic esse simul, quod est oppositum conclusionis argumenti.	280. And so one must reply to the arguments, when they seem to prove the opposite. To the first [n.274] I say that it presupposes something false, namely that an angel is in a place only by operation - which was rejected in the first question on this topic [nn.204-215]. Also, if that supposition be admitted, one angel could operate about the place with one operation and the other with another operation, and each could, in their view [sc. those holding this opinion], be put by its operation in the place where he was operating (namely the place of the one body) and thus both could be together, which is the opposite of the conclusion of the argument.
281 Et si dicas quod non possent operari nisi corporaliter movendo, nec hoc iuvat, quia sicut angelus movet libere, ita potest movere secundum ultimum potentiae suae vel citra ultimum; et si moveat aliquid citra ultimum potentiae suae, potest alius mobile movere secum (sicut apparet de homine, qui secundum ultimum potentiae suae potens portare decem lapides, potest citra ultimum potentiae suae portare quinque, ita quod potentia sua activa non habeat actum nisi circa quinque, - et tunc potest habere alium, cooperantem, portantem idem), cum angelus sit substantia agens libere.	281. And if you say that they could not operate without moving bodily - neither does this help, because just as an angel moves freely, so he can move according to the utmost, or below the utmost, of his power; and if he moves something below the utmost of his power, another angel could move the movable thing along with him (as is clear about a man, who while able, according to the utmost of his power, to carry ten stones, can, below the utmost of his power, carry five, so that his active power has an act only about five stones - and then he could have another man, cooperating with him, carrying the same), for an angel is a substance that acts freely.
282 Ad secundum dico quod illa maior, quae est famosa in multis materiis, non est rationabilis. Nam esse 'in' nullam habitudinem essentialem dicit necessario ad illud in quo est, esse autem 'ab' dicit dependentiam essentialem ad illud a quo aliquid est. Quae igitur rationabilitas, quod plura possunt esse ab eodem et eodem ƿmodo, et non possunt plura esse in eodem et eodem modo essendi 'in'? Quare enim plus repugnat respectus accidentalis specie unius rationis, quam dependentia essentialis respectus? Similiter, habent temporalia eundem respectum ad tempus sicut locata ad locum; igitur ex hoc videtur sequi plura temporalia non esse in eodem tempore, quod videtur absurdum.	282. To the second [n.275] I say that the major [sc. 'things that have the same mode of existing 'in' cannot be together'], which is famous in many topics, is not reasonable. For 'to exist in' states no essential relation to that in which it is, but 'to exist by (or from)' does state an essential relation to that by which it is. What is the reasonableness, then, in saying that several things can be by the same and be so in the same way and that several things cannot be in the same and be so in the same way of being in? For why is an accidental respect more repugnant to the species of one idea than the dependence of an essential respect? Likewise, temporal things have the same respect to time as things in place have to place; so it hereby seems to follow that several temporal things cannot be in the same time, which is absurd.
283 Quod autem adducitur de duobus corporibus gloriosis, et duobus Diis si simul essent, - si verum est, oportet aliunde probare quam ex ratione eius quod est 'esse in loco eodem modo essendi', quia ex hoc non videtur esse aliqua repugnantia simultatis.	283. Now as to what is said about two glorious bodies, and about two Gods, if they were together [n.275] - if this is true, it must be proved otherwise than by the term 'being in a place in the same way of being in', for no repugnance seems to arise from this for things that are together.