Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D2/P2Q3

• I. To the Question
• II. To the Principal Arguments

Latin	English
	Question Three: Whether an Angel can be in Two Places at Once
254 Septimo quaero utrum angelus posset simul esse in duobus locis.	254. Seventh [sc. seventh from the beginning of d.2, but third from the second part of d.2] I ask whether an angel could be in two places at once.
255 Quod non: Quia tunc distaret a se ut locus distat a loco. Consequentia probatur ex opposito consequentis, quia illa quae simul sunt alicui tertio, sunt simul inter se.	255. That he could not. Because then he would be spatially separate from himself as place is spatially separate from place. The proof of the consequence is from the opposite of the consequent [sc. 'if an angel was not thus spatially separate from himself, then place would not be spatially separate from place'], because things that exist together with some third thing exist together with each other.
256 Secundo sic: angelus est natura limitata omnino, igitur secundum quidlibet quod potest inesse sibi, - igitur et secundum locum; igitur non potest esse simul in pluribus locis. ƿ	256. Secondly as follows: an angel is a nature limited in every respect, therefore limited as to whatever can be present in him - therefore limited in place too; therefore he cannot be in several places at once.
257 Tertio sic: duo 'ubi' sunt formaliter contraria, quia inter ea potest esse distantia localis, et motus est inter contraria vel a contrario in medium; et in praecedente quaestione dictum est quod omnia distincta 'ubi' differunt specie, - et quae differunt specie sub eodem genere, sunt contraria, et contraria non possunt simul inesse eidem (quia maxime distant) sicut nec contradictoria; igitur etc.	257. Thirdly as follows: two 'wheres' are formally contraries, because there can be a distance of place between them, and because motion is between two contraries or from a contrary to what is in between; and in the preceding question it was said that all distinct 'wheres' differ in species [n.227] - and things that differ in species within the same genus are contraries, and contraries cannot be present together in the same thing (because contraries are maximally distant from each other), just as neither can contradictories be; therefore etc.
258 Quarto sic: quia si sic, tunc posset simul quiescere et moveri, quia quiescere secundum unum 'ubi' et moveri secundum aliud 'ubi'; sed quiescere et moveri inferunt quiescere et non quiescere, quae sunt contradictoria, et incompossibilia simul esse in eodem; igitur etc.	258. Fourthly as follows: because if an angel is in two places at once, then he could be at rest and in motion at once, because he could be at rest as to one 'where' and in motion as to the other 'where'; but to be at rest and to be in motion imply being at rest and not being at rest, which are contradictories and cannot be in the same thing at once; therefore etc.
259 Quinto sic: quia aut posset simul moveri ad illa duo 'ubi', - aut ab uno 'ubi' moveri ad aliud, et tamen remanere in illo primo 'ubi' et acquirere secundum, cum hoc. Et non primo modo, quia duo motus eiusdem speciei non possunt inesse eidem (III Physicorum); nec multo magis duo motus contrarii. Nec secundo modo, quia termini motus sunt incompossibiles; et ideo 'mobile' acquirendo terminum 'ad quem', necessario amittit terminum 'a quo'. Igitur etc.	259. Fifthly as follows: because then either he could be in motion toward those two 'wheres', or he could be moving from one 'where' to the other and yet be remaining in the first 'where' and acquiring the second along with it. But not in the first way, because two motions of the same species cannot be present in the same thing (Physics 3.3.202a34-36), and even less two contrary motions. Nor in the second way, because the terms of the motions are incompossible together; and that is why a movable thing necessarily loses the term 'from which' when acquiring the term 'to which'. Therefore etc.
260 Contra: Potest esse in aliquo toto loco, puta pedali; faciat ergo se in extremis huius loci, non exhibendo se praesentem medio (quia non ƿest ibi ut forma, nec aliquo alio modo quo videatur necessario exhibere praesentiam toti), igitur erit in duobus locis non continuatis.	260. To the contrary: An angel can be in some whole place, for example the area of a foot; so let him put himself in the end points of this place without making himself present in the middle (because he is not there as a form is, nor in any way in which he would seem required to make himself present to the whole); therefore he will be in two non-continuous places.
261 Praeterea: corpus potest esse in duobus locis simul, igitur multo magis spiritus; antecedens declarabitur in IV, in materia de eucharistia; ergo etc.	261. Further: a body can be in two places at once, therefore a spirit can much more be so; the antecedent is made clear in 4 d.10 p.1 q.2 nn.11-24, in the material about the Eucharist; therefore etc.
	I. To the Question
262 In ista quaestione dicit Damascenus (cap. 13 et cap. 16) quod de facto non est simul in duobus locis, quia - secundum eum - ((cum sunt in caelo, non sunt in terra)), nec e converso. Hoc de facto.	262. On this question Damascene ch.13 says that in fact an angel is not in two places at once, because - in his view - "when they are in heaven, they are not on earth," and conversely. And this as to the fact.
263 De possibilitate tamen eorum naturali, videtur probabile quod non possit simul unus esse in duobus locis quorum uterque sit sibi adaequatus secundum ultimum potentiae suae: puta, si secundum ultimum potentiae suae posset esse in loco unius milliaris, non posset virtute sua propria esse in duobus locis talibus, quia tunc iste locus non videtur sibi esse adaequatus secundum virtutem suam naturalem. ƿ	263. But as to the natural possibility of angels, it seems probable that one angel cannot be at once in two places each of which is adequate to him according to the utmost of his power; to wit, if he could, as to the utmost of his power, be in a place of one mile, he could not, by his own power, be in two such places, because then this place of one mile does not seem to be adequate to him according to his natural power.
264 Sed utrum in duobus locis discontinuatis posset esse, quorum nec unus nec alius est sibi adaequatus, dubium est, nec videtur ratio necessaria 'pro' nec 'contra'. Sed quod in duobus locis (sive adaequatis sive non) posset esse per potentiam divinam, certum puto, quia nullam contradictionem includit, ut dicetur in IV, in materia de eucharistia.	264. But whether he could be in two discontinuous places, neither one nor the other of which is adequate to him, is a matter of doubt, and there seems no necessary reason either for it or against. But that he could be in two places (whether adequate to him or not) by divine power I think to be certain, because this involves no contradiction, as will be said in 4 d.10 p.1 q.2 nn.11-24 in the matter about the Eucharist.
	II. To the Principal Arguments
265 Et ideo ad argumenta ad primam partem, quae videntur probare non tantum impossibilitatem de potentia naturali angeli, verum etiam impossibilitatem simpliciter (quia contradictionem), respondendum est: Et primo ad primum, quod non sequitur. Sic nec e converso, quando illud tertium (ad quod comparantur extrema) est illimitatum secundum hoc secundum quod extrema comparantur ad ipsum sicut patet de anima in manu dextra et sinistra, quae anima non distat a se, et tamen manus distat a manu; ita, Deus non distat a se, et tamen distant inter se illa quae cum illo sunt hic et Romae. Quodcumque autem ponitur idem in duobus 'ubi', quacumque virtute sit in eis, est aliquo modo sic illimitatum ad illa, et ideo neutra consequentia valet.	265. And therefore to the arguments for the first part [nn.255-59], which seem to prove not only an impossibility as to the natural power of an angel but also an impossibility simply (because they seem to prove a contradiction), a reply must be made: And first to the first argument [n.255], that it is a non sequitur; and the converse too is a non sequitur, when the third thing (to which the extremes are compared) is unlimited in the respect in which the extremes are compared to it - as is plain about the soul in the right hand and the left hand, which soul is not spatially separate from itself and yet hand is spatially separate from hand; thus God is not spatially separate from himself and yet the things that exist with him here and in Rome are spatially separate from each other. But whatever is posited as the same in two 'wheres', whatever the power be by which it exists in them, is in some way thus unlimited with respect to them, and so neither consequence is valid.
266 Ad secundum dico quod ex se limitatus est ad naturam et ad proprietates naturales; sed ad passionem accidentalem sive respectum (qualem dicit 'ubi', vel saltem non est sine respectu), non ƿoportet ipsum esse limitatum omnino (ita quod incompossibile sit ipsum habere talia duo), licet forte virtute naturali sit limitatus ad unum adaequate.	266. To the second [n.256] I say that an angel is of himself limited both in nature and in natural properties; but as to an accidental property or respect (of the sort that 'where' states, or at any rate 'where' is not without a respect), there is no need that an angel be limited altogether (such that it is incompossible for him to have two such respects), although perhaps he is limited by natural power to one of them as to adequacy.
267 Ad tertium argumentum quaere.	267. As to the third argument [n.257] see 4 d.10 p.1 q.2 n.25.
268 Ad quartum argumentum dico quod sicut 'moveri' est aliter se habere nunc quam prius, ita 'quiescere' est nunc se habere ut prius; non est autem inconveniens respectu huius 'ubi' aliquid nunc se habere ut prius, et respectu alterius aliter se habere quam prius, - et ita non est inconveniens quod hic possit quiescere et ibi moveri. Et ex hoc concedo absolute quod quiescit simul et movetur, - quia praedicata affirmativa simpliciter sumpta sequuntur ex se ipsis, sumptis cum determinatione non deminuente.	268. As to the fourth argument [n.258] I say that just as 'to be moved' means to be disposed differently now than before, so 'to be at rest' is to be disposed now as before; but it is not unacceptable that something is with respect to one 'where' disposed now as before and is with respect to a second disposed differently than before - and so it is not unacceptable that it could be at rest here and in motion there. And hereby I concede absolutely that it is at once at rest and in motion - because affirmative predicates simply taken follow of themselves, being taken with a non-diminishing determination.
269 Et cum infertur ulterius 'ergo quiescit et non quiescit', ibi est ignorantia elenchi et fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter: nam 'quiescere' non infert 'non moveri' absolute, sed infert 'non moveri' tantum cum illa determinatione cum qua accipiebatur 'quiescere' prout antecedebat ad quiescere simpliciter; et ideo non sequitur nisi quod hic movetur in hoc 'ubi', et non movetur in illo 'ubi', quae non sunt contradictoria. Exemplum huius est: hoc est duplum ad a et dimidium ad b, ergo est duplum et dimidium. Sed ultra non sequitur 'igitur est duplum et non duplum'; non enim sequitur ex primis antecedenƿtibus, nisi cum ista determinatione quod est duplum ad a et non duplum ad b, - et ex illis ulterius non sequitur 'ergo est duplum et non duplum', sed est ibi ignorantia elenchi. Ita quod in omnibus talibus in quibus praedicata contrahuntur, inferunt affirmativas in quibus eadem praedicata simpliciter includuntur; non autem inferunt negativas in quibus praedicata includuntur simpliciter subiectis convenire, propter dictas causas.	269. And when the inference is further drawn that 'therefore it is at rest and not at rest' [n.258], there is here a mistaking of the question and a fallacy of simply and in a certain respect; for 'to be at rest' does not entail 'not to be in motion' absolutely but entails only 'not to be in motion' with that determination with which 'to be at rest' was taken insofar as it preceded being at rest simply; and therefore all that follows is that the thing is in motion in this 'where' and is not in motion in that 'where', which are not contradictories. Here is an example: this is double a and half b, therefore it is double and half. But the further inference 'therefore it is double and not double' does not follow; for this inference only follows from the first antecedents together with the determination that the thing is double a and not double b - and from these the further inference does not follow that 'therefore it is double and not double', but there is here a mistaking of the question. So, in all such cases where the predicates are taken with a qualification, affirmative conclusions are entailed in which the same predicates are included simply; but negative conclusions are not entailed in which the predicates are involved simply in belonging to the subjects, for the reasons stated.
270 Ad ultimum dico quod utroque modo est possibile.	270. To the final argument [n.259] I say that both ways are possible.
271 Et cum improbatur primus modus, dico quod non est incompossibilitas motuum nisi propter incompossibilitatem formarum secundum quas sunt motus; et ideo si duo 'ubi' non sunt formaliter incompossibilia (neque ut esse in motu, neque ut esse in fluxu), nec duo motus ad duo 'ubi' in eodem simul erunt incompossibiles. Est autem dictum Philosophi III Physicorum verum de motibus secundum formas incompossibiles, quales sunt forte formae absolutae (sed non eiusdem speciei), et de hoc alias.	271. And when the first way is criticized, I say that there is no incompossibility of motions unless there is an incompossibility of the forms according to which they are motions; and therefore, if two 'wheres' are not formally incompossible (either as to being in motion or as to being in flux), then neither will two motions at once to two 'wheres' be incompossible. Now the statement of the Philosopher in Physics 3 [n.259] is true of motions according to incompossible forms, of which sort perhaps are absolute forms (but not of the same species), and of this matter elsewhere [4 d.10 p.1 q.2 nn.13-17, 19].
272 Et cum improbatur secundus modus, dico quod sicut generatio et corruptio sunt duo motus distincti et habent proprios terminos distinctos, licet frequenter concurrant (et tunc sunt quattuor termini: duo scilicet 'a quibus', - una privatio et una forma; et duo termini 'ad quos', - una similiter privatio et una forma), ita in motibus est recessus a termino 'a quo' et accessus ad terminum 'ad quem'; et tamen sicut sine contradictione generatio potest esse sine corruptione vel e converso, quia non sunt eadem mutatio, - sic ƿpotest esse motus vel mutatio in quantum est accessus ad terminum 'ad quem', absque alio motu qui est recessus a termino 'a quo'. Et tunc: 'sunt termini motus incompossibiles', - verum est de proximis terminis eiusdem motus, sed non est verum de terminis qui possunt esse quorumcumque motuum differentium.	272. And when the second way is criticized, I say that just as generation and corruption are two distinct motions and have their own distinct terms, even though they frequently coincide (and then there are four terms, namely two terms 'from which' - one privation and one form - and two terms 'to which' - similarly one privation and one form), so there is in the case of motions a departure from the term 'from which' and an approaching to the term 'to which'; and yet, just as generation can, without contradiction, be without corruption and conversely, because they are not the same change, so there can be motion or change insofar as there is an approaching to the term 'to which' without any motion which is a departure from a term 'from which'. And then the statement 'the terms of the motions are incompossible' [n.259] is true of the proximate terms of the same motion, but it is not true of terms that can be those of any different motions whatever.