Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D2/P2Q6

• I. To the Question A. Scotus' own Response
• B. Instance
• C. Rejection of the Instance
• II. To the Principal Arguments

Latin	English
	Question Six: Whether an Angel can move himself
439 Utrum angelus possit movere se.	439. Whether an angel can move himself [d.1 interpolation to n.296].
440 Quod non: Quia nihil simul potest esse in actu et in potentia secundum idem; movens autem in quantum movens, est in actu, - et secundum quod motum, est in potentia; igitur non movet se.	440. That he cannot: Because nothing can be in act and in potency at the same time in the same respect; but the mover, insofar as it is mover, is in act, and, according as it is moved, it is in potency; therefore it does not move itself.
441 Confirmatur ratio per hoc quod aliqua dividentia ens - ut quantitas et substantia - sunt incompossibilia in aliquo uno eodem; ergo, pari ratione, actus et potentia in quocumque uno sunt incompossibilia.	441. The reason is confirmed by the fact that some of the divisions of being - as quantity and substance - are incompossible in some one and the same thing; therefore, by parity of reason, act and potency are incompossible in any one thing.
442 Item, omne quod movet se, dividitur in duo, quorum alterum est primo movens, alterum primo motum, ex VIII Physicorum. Et ƿprobatur ex prima conclusione VII, quod 'nihil movet se primo, quia tunc quiesceret ad quietem partis et non quiesceret ad quietem eius', quae probatio tenet de corpore moto; et ex hoc sequitur quod in quocumque corpore movente se sit talis distinctio, et ex hoc videtur universaliter sequi quod in quocumque movente se requiritur talis distinctio (eadem enim videtur incompossibilitas quod idem non corpus moveat se primo, sicut quod idem corpus moveat se primo). Sed angelus non dividitur in duo, quorum alterum sit primo movens et alterum primo motum; ergo etc.	442. Again, everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, one of which is mover first and the other moved first, from Physics 8.5.257b12-13. There is also proof from the first conclusion in Physics 7.1.241b33-242a15, that 'nothing moves itself first, because then it would rest on the resting of a part and would not rest on the resting of it', which proof holds about a moved body; and from this there follows that in any self¬ moving body such a distinction exists, and from this there seems to follow universally that in any self-mover such a distinction exists (for there seems to be the same incompossibility in the same non-body moving itself first as in the same body moving itself first). But an angel is not divided into two parts, one of which is mover first and the other moved first; therefore etc.
443 Contra: Angelus potest moveri localiter (ex praecedente quaestione); et non a corpore effective (ut videtur), nec tantum miraculose a Deo; igitur movetur a se ipso.	443. On the contrary: An angel can be moved locally (from the preceding question, n.310), and not by a body as efficient cause (as it seems), nor only miraculously by God; therefore he is moved by himself.
	I. To the Question A. Scotus' own Response
444 Concedo quod potest a se moveri localiter, quia cuicumque inest potentia passiva ad aliquid acquirendum vel habendum per motum, non est imperfectionis in eo quod habeat potentiam activam per quam possit illud acquirere, sed perfectionis. - Quod apparet, quia animatis data est potentia activa respectu quantitatis perƿfectae, ad quam sunt in potentia quando generantur; patet etiam in gravibus et levibus, ubi est potentia activa ad illud 'ubi' cuius sunt receptiva naturaliter; similiter, animalia habent potentiam activam respectu sensationis, ad quam sunt in potentia passiva (totalem tamen habere non possunt, sicut declaratum est distinctione 3 primi libri, - quia potentia non potest habere omnia obiecta, scilicet sibi consubstantialia). Igitur, cum angelo insit potentia ad 'ubi' quod potest acquirere per motum, non est imperfectionis in eo si habeat potentiam activam respectu eiusdem; immo videtur esse imperfectio in eo si non habeat talem potentiam activam, ex quo non repugnat aliis entibus minus perfectis habere talem potentiam activam.	444. I concede that an angel can be moved locally by himself, because in the case of anything that has a passive potency for acquiring or possessing something through motion, it is not a mark of imperfection but of perfection in it that it has an active potency whereby to acquire it. - The point is apparent from animate things, that they have been given an active power with respect to the perfect size that they are, when generated, in potency to; it is also plain in heavy and light things, which have an active potency for the 'where' of which they are naturally receptive; likewise, animals have an active potency with respect to the sensation to which they are in passive potency (however, as was made clear in 1 d.3 n.547, they cannot have it in its totality, because a power cannot have all the objects that, namely, are consubstantial with it). Therefore, since there is in an angel a potency for a 'where' that he can acquire by motion, it is not a mark of imperfection in him that he have an active power with respect to the same 'where'; rather it seems to be an imperfection in him if he not have such active power, because there is no repugnance in other less perfect beings having such an active power.
	B. Instance
445 Et si dicatur quod hoc tantum convenit imperfectioribus (ut animalibus) secundum partem, quia possunt dividi in duo (scilicet movens et motum), quod autem assumptum est de gravibus et levibus, falsum est et contra intentionem Philosophi VIII Physicorum (ut videtur), ubi videtur contra hoc specialiter facere quattuor rationes (primo per hoc quod grave non est animal, secundo per hoc quod non potest sistere se, tertio quia non potest se movere motibus diversis, quarto quia est continuum, id est eiusdem ƿdispositionis in parte et in toto et tale non potest movere se), et solvendo quaestionem dicit quod 'tantum habent naturalia principium patiendi respectu motus, et non faciendi', - primo ostendo oppositum per auctoritates, secundo per rationes.	445. And if it be said that this belongs to more imperfect things (as animals) only according to a part of them, because they can be divided into two (namely into mover and moved), but if it be said that what is assumed about heavy and light things [sc. that they have an active power, n.444] is false and against the Philosopher's intention (as it seems) in Physics 8.4.255a4-18, where he seems to give four reasons specifically against it (first by the fact that a heavy thing is not an animal, second by the fact that it cannot stop itself, third that it cannot move itself with diverse motions, fourth that it is continuous, that is, of the same kind in a part and in the whole, and such a thing cannot move itself), and in solving the question he says that 'natural things have only a principle of undergoing with respect to motion and not a principle of acting' - I show the opposite, first from authorities and second through reasons.
	C. Rejection of the Instance
446 Auctoritas prima est Aristotelis VIII Physicorum, ubi solvens dubitationem de gravibus et levibus, dicit quod 'quia potentia dicitur multipliciter, ideo immanifestum est a quo movetur grave'. Distinguit autem 'potentiam' in potentiam ad actum primum et secundum (ut patet de potentia ad scientiam et considerationem), et applicando ad propositum dicit quod 'ignis est in potentia essentiali ut fiat frigidus, prout scilicet aqua generatur ex eo, - cum autem generata fuerit aqua, est in potentia accidentali ad infrigidandum nisi impediatur'. ƿ	446. [From authorities] - The first authority is Aristotle Physics 8.4.255b19-31, where, in solving the doubt about heavy and light things, he says that 'potency is said in many ways, hence it is not evident what a heavy thing is moved by'. Now he distinguishes 'potency' into potency for first act and potency for second act (as is plain about potency for knowledge and potency for actual consideration of knowledge), and when applying it to the issue at hand he says that 'fire is in essential potency to becoming cold, namely insofar as water is generated from it - but when water has been generated, it is in accidental potency to making something cold, unless it be impeded'.
447 Ita etiam dicit ipse de gravi et levi: ((Leve enim fit ex gravi, ut ex aqua aer; cum autem est iam leve, operabitur mox nisi prohibeatur: actus autem 'levis' est alicubi et sursum, prohibetur autem cum inest ei contrarium)). Ubi nihil valet exponere quod, cum sit in actu leve, est actu leve ita quod levis est ascendere, quia tunc idem est dicere quod 'est actu leve' et dicere quod 'quia est actu leve, ascendit', quod nihil aliud est nisi causaliter dictum. Dicit enim quod 'mox operabitur nisi prohibeatur', quod non potest intelligi de actu levis 'actu primo', quia actus levis non potest sic prohiberi vel impediri dum est actu tale. Similiter, dicit quod 'prohibetur cum est in contrario loco': non autem est non leve 'quia est in contrario loco'! Igitur intendit de actu secundo, scilicet quod 'actus eius est alicubi', - id est quod eius actus, qui est sursumitas, sit operatio eius. Sicut igitur ignis habens calorem ut actum primum, vere et effective se habet ad calefactionem (quae est operatio secunda), ita et ignis actu ƿexsistens levis, effective se habet ad sursum sive ad operationem secundam qua exsistit sursum.	447. Thus too does he himself say about the heavy and light [Physics 8.4.255b8-12]: "For the light comes from the heavy, as water from air; but when it is already light it will at once operate, unless it is prohibited; now the act of a light thing is to be somewhere and to be upwards, but it is prevented when the contrary is present in it." Here there is no validity to the exposition that, since it is actually light, it is actually light such that going upwards is the feature of light, because then to say that 'it is actually light' is the same as to say 'because it is actually light, it goes upwards', which is nothing other than a causal statement. For he says that 'it will at once operate, unless it is prohibited', which cannot be understood of the actually light in first act, because the act of a light thing in this way cannot be prohibited or prevented while it is actually such. Likewise, he says that 'it is prohibited when it is in the contrary place'; but a light thing is not non-light 'because it is in a contrary place'. Therefore he means this of second act, namely that 'its act is to be somewhere' - that is, that its act, which is upwardness, is its operation. Therefore, just as fire when it has heat as first act is truly and effectively disposed toward heating (which is second operation), so also fire actually existing light is effectively disposed to being upwards, or to the second operation whereby it exists upwards.
448 Idem IV Physicorum, cap. 'De vacuo': dicit enim quod 'densum et rarum concomitantur duae contrarietates, scilicet grave et leve, durum et molle', - et loquens de contrarietate gravis et levis dicit quod ((secundum hanc contrarietatem erunt activa motus, secundum autem durum et molle passiva)). Igitur etc.	448. The same in Physics 4.9.217b16-18 about the vacuum, for he says that 'two contraries accompany the dense and the rare, namely the heavy and light and the hard and soft' - and when speaking of the contrariety of the heavy and light he says that "according to this contrariety they will be active in motion, but according to hard and soft they will be passive." Therefore etc.
449 Et si dicas quod illa non est intentio sua (quamvis sic sonent verba), quia II De generatione enumerans qualitates activas excludit grave et leve a qualitatibus vere activis et passivis, - respondeo: Dico quod contradiceret sibi ipsi in VIII Physicorum, per illud II De generatione, nisi alio modo intelligeret hic et ibi; nam in VIII Physicorum, sicut pro istis allegatum est, dicit quod 'habent principium non agendi sed patiendi', - in II autem De generatione dicit quod ((grave et leve neque sunt activa neque passiva)), et probatio sua patet ibi.	449. And if you say that that is not his intention (although the words sound that way), because when, in On Generation 2.2.329b18-22, he enumerates the active qualities, he excludes the heavy and light from qualities that are truly active and passive - I reply: I say that by what he says in On Generation 2 he would contradict himself in Physics 8 [n.445] if he did not understand the matter there differently from here; for in Physics 8 he says, the way it is cited on their behalf, that 'natural things have a principle not of acting but of undergoing' - but in On Generation 2 he says that "heavy and light are neither active nor passive," and his proof there is plain.
450 Aliter ergo loquitur de actione et passione in VIII Physicorum et ƿubi occurrit sermo de actione et passione, et aliter in II De generatione et ibi ubi occurrit sermo de generatione: sicut enim in libro Physicorum loquitur in generali et universali de motu, in libro autem De generatione de motu ad formam, ita et in III Physicorum loquitur de actione et passione in communi et in universali, - et ita verum est quod dicit in VIII Physicorum, quod 'habent principium patiendi', scilicet respectu motus localis; in libro autem De generatione loquitur de actione ad formam, ubi agens et patiens sunt contraria (quod utique verum est de actione univoca), quae sunt in principio aequivoca, et in fine sunt similia univoca similitudine (in actione aequivoca simile est agens 'producto secundum formam' similitudine aequivoca, sicut ipse concedit in I aliquod agens non communicare cum passo, sicut nec medicinam cum corpore sanato). ƿ	450. Therefore he is speaking in one way about action and passion in Physics 8 and where discussion about action and passion occurs, and in another way in On Generation 2 and where discussion about generation occurs; for just as in the Physics he is speaking in general and universally about motion while in On Generation he is speaking about motion toward form, so too in Physics 3 he is speaking of action and passion in general and universally - and thus what he says in Physics 8 is true, that 'they have a principle of undergoing', namely with respect to local motion; but in the book On Generation he is speaking of action toward form where agent and patient are contraries (which indeed is true of univocal action), and these are equivocal at the beginning, and at the end are alike with univocal likeness (in equivocal action the agent is alike in form to the produced thing with equivocal likeness, as he himself concedes in On Generation 1.7.324a34-b1, that some agent does not communicate with the thing that undergoes, as neither does medicine with the healed body).
451 Hoc autem modo negat in II De generatione gravia et levia non solum esse principia agendi vel faciendi, sed etiam patiendi, - et hoc expresse sonat ratio sua, quod ista 'non sunt principia agendi alia, nec patiendi ab aliis'; et ideo non sunt principia producendi aliquid secundum formam aliquam substantialem (de qua productione loquitur ibi), nec principia patiendi ab aliquo agente correspondente tali actioni. Sunt tamen principia passiva aliquo modo respectu motus localis ad 'ubi', et aliquo modo activa respectu eiusdem, - quorum utrumque expressit ipse in VIII Physicorum: quod passiva, in hoc quod 'naturalia in se habent principium patiendi'; quod activa, in hoc quod dixit operationem levis 'esse alicubi', sicut scientis 'considerare'.	451. Now in this way [sc. by understanding action as motion toward form] he denies in On Generation 2 that heavy and light things are principles of acting or doing and also of undergoing - and this is what the wording of his reason expressly says, that they are 'not principles of acting on other things nor of suffering from other things'; and therefore they are not principles of producing something according to some substantial form (and of this producing he is there speaking), nor are they principles of suffering from some agent correspondent to such action. But they are passive principles in some way with respect to local motion to a 'where', and in some way active principles with respect to the same - both of which he himself expressly says in Physics 8, that they are passive in that 'natural things have in themselves a principle of undergoing' [n.445], and that they are active in that he said the operation of a light thing is 'to be somewhere' [n.447], as the operation of a knower is to consider [n.446].
452 Ad hoc etiam posset adduci auctoritas Commentatoris III De caelo et mundo, in commento 28: ((In simplicibus)) - inquit ((idem est secundum rationem motor et motum, sed differunt secundum modum: lapis enim movet se in quantum gravis in actu, et movetur in quantum est in potentia inferius; invenitur enim ƿuno modo in actu, alio modo in potentia, - et causa huius est haec, quia componitur ex materia et forma)). Sed de hoc videtur varie loqui, quia in commento 28 III Caeli et mundi videtur velle quod 'moveat se per accidens, pellendo medium, sicut nauta movet se movendo navem in qua exsistit', - et ideo auctoritatibus eius non est multum innitendum.	452. The authority of the Commentator, On the Heaven 3 Com.28, could also be adduced for this purpose: "In the case of simples," he says, "mover and moved are the same in idea but different in manner; for a stone moves itself insofar as it is actually heavy, and it is moved insofar as it is potentially in a lower place; for it is found in one way to be actual and in another way to be potential - and the cause of this is that it is composed of matter and form." But he seems to speak of this variously, for in the same place he seems to mean that a stone 'moves itself per accidens, by pushing the medium in which it is, as a sailor moves himself by moving the ship on which he is' - and for this reason his authorities are not much to be relied on.
453 Ad istam conclusionem sunt rationes. Prima talis: omnis effectus, quando est actu causatus, habet causam in actu (quod patet per Aristotelem II Physicorum et V Metaphysicae, cap. 'De causa': 'Causa efficiens in actu, et causatum in actu, simul sunt et non sunt'; patet etiam - si nulla esset auctoritas - per rationem manifestam, quia quod non est, quando non est, non producit aliquid ad esse); igitur quando descensus gravis est in actu, tunc aliquid est causans in actu.	453. [From reasons] - There are reasons for this conclusion. The first is of the following sort: every effect has, when it is actually caused, an actual cause (this is plain from Aristotle Physics 2.3.195b17-20 and Metaphysics 5.2.1014a21-23, the chapter on cause: 'The efficient cause in act and the caused in act are and are not at the same time'; it is also plain - if there were no authority - from manifest reason, because what is not, when it is not, does not bring anything into being); therefore when the descent of a heavy thing is actual, then there is something actually causing it.
454 Non autem tunc est in actu a removente prohibens. Nec, per consequens, ipsum grave est ad deorsum 'quia pellens per se moƿvet deorsum', quia in hoc est quasi removens prohibens, - et tale movens, secundum Philosophum VIII Physicorum, est quasi movens per accidens; et praeter movens per accidens, oportet dare movens per se efficiens, quia omne per accidens habet reduci ad per se.	454. But this descent is not actual from something that removes an impediment. Nor consequently is it the heavy thing's relation downwards, 'because what impels it moves it per se downwards', for in this respect the heavy thing is as it were the remover of an impediment - and such a mover, according to the Philosopher in Physics 8.4.255b24-27, is as it were a per accidens mover; and there must, in addition to a per accidens mover, be a per se efficient cause, because everything per accidens has to be reduced to something per se.
455 Nec istud potest esse centrum trahens, quia si per impossibile nullum grave esset in centro, sed tota terra amota ab eo (et manente centro sub respectu centri, ut prius), adhuc grave tenderet naturaliter ad centrum. - Quid igitur attrahit? numquid 'ubi'? Manifeste constat quod non, quia non est forma activa.	455. Nor can this per se cause be the center pulling it, because if per impossibile there were nothing heavy in the center but the whole earth were removed from it (and the center remained, as before, under the relation of being the center), the heavy thing would still tend naturally to the center. - What then is pulling it? Is it the 'where'? Manifestly not because the 'where' is not an active form.
456 Nec etiam influentia caeli, quia hoc videtur esse fuga, recurrere ad agens universale, - quod est negare effectus particulares et causas particulares; influentia etiam caeli (quantum est de se) uniformis est in toto medio, - igitur non est ratio quare unam partem moveret sursum in toto medio et aliam deorsum, nisi poneretur agens particulare determinans.	456. Nor too is it the influence of the heaven, because to have recourse to a universal cause seems a subterfuge - it is to deny particular effects and particular causes; also the influence of the heaven (as far as concerns itself) is uniform in the whole medium, so there is no reason for it to move one part upwards in the whole medium and another part downwards unless a particular determining agent is posited.
457 Nec istud 'actu movens' (quando actu movet) potest poni actu grave motum, quia nihil movet se univoce ad illud quod habet, et praeter hoc, motus est quid extrinsecum gravi; nec 'generans' ƿgrave, quia tunc potest non esse. Igitur oportet dare quod sit aliquid intrinsecum.	457. Nor can the 'actual mover' (when it is actually moving) be posited to be the actual moved heavy thing, because nothing univocally moves itself toward what it possesses - and for this reason motion is something extrinsic to the heavy thing; nor can what generates the heavy thing be the actual mover, because it can at that point not be. Therefore it must be something intrinsic.
458 Dicitur quod 'generans' virtute manet in gravi, et per hoc movet ipsum grave. - Contra: non manet in virtute nisi sicut causa in suo effectu, et quod sic manet, non est in se, sed tantum quia manet in suo effectu, - et tunc virtus ista respectu motus pertinet ad genus causae efficientis. Si enim generans dicatur efficere, et non efficit nisi secundum quod est in actu, - necesse est quod efficiat, quia illud quod est 'efficiens in virtute' efficit, et ita adhuc sequitur propositum.	458. It is said that the generator [of the heavy thing] remains virtually in the heavy thing, and that in this way it moves the heavy thing [cf. 1 d.17 n.89]. - On the contrary: it does not remain virtually save as a cause remains in its effect, and what remains thus does not remain in itself but only because it remains in its effect - and then its virtue in respect of the motion pertains to the genus of efficient causality. For if the generator is said to bring something about, and if it does not bring anything about save as it is in act, it must needs bring something about because it brings about what is virtually the efficient cause, and in this way the proposed conclusion still follows.
459 Praeterea, quod non movet aliud nisi prius ab alio naturaliter motum, ab eodem habet quod moveat et quod sit motum; sed grave cui alligatum est leve (cuius levitas non excedit gravitatem ƿeius), movet idem leve, trahendo ipsum secum ad centrum, - et non movet nisi quia motum; igitur prius est motum naturaliter quam moveat. Et ab eodem movetur a quo movetur illud sibi alligatum: movet autem et illud per aliud, quia per gravitatem suam; igitur et se ipsum.	459. Besides, what does not move another save by being first naturally moved by something else [e.g. as a stick does not move a stone save by being first moved by the hand] gets from the same thing the fact that it moves and that it is moved; but a heavy thing that has a light thing tied to it (and whose lightness is not greater than the heavy thing's heaviness) moves that same light thing by drawing it with itself toward the center - and it only moves because it is moved; therefore it is moved naturally first before it moves. And it is moved by the same thing as that which is tied to it is moved by; but it moves what is tied to it by something else, namely by its heaviness; therefore it moves itself in the same way.
460 Posset confirmari ista ratio, quia quando aliquid habet potentiam activam respectu alicuius formae, potest eam causare in quocumque passo proportionato et approximato; sed grave habet potentiam activam respectu 'ubi' deorsum, sicut habet respectu illius quod trahit secum, et ipsummet - quando est extra illum locum est receptivum formae illius, carens ea, et est proportionatum et approximatum sibi; igitur potest illam formam causare in se ipso.	460. A confirmation can be given for this reasoning because, when something has active power with respect to some form, it can cause that form in any passive thing proportioned and proximate to it; but a heavy thing has active power with respect to a 'where' downward, just as it does with respect to what it pulls along with it, and it itself -when it is outside the place downward - is receptive of that form, which it lacks, and it is proportionate and proximate to itself; therefore it can cause that form in itself.
461 Hoc etiam poterit satis patere, si consideretur quod quies requirit causam actualiter causantem sicut motus: tunc enim oporteret dare causam coaeve causantem quietem naturaliter gravis cum ipso gravi; nulla autem talis causa coaeve causans quietem cum gravi est nisi grave, et per consequens grave effective movet, - et per consequens causat motum ad illam quietem, quia ista duo sunt ab eadem causa.	461. This can also be sufficiently plain if one considers that rest requires a cause actually causing it just as motion does; for then one should posit a cause naturally causing coevally with a heavy thing the rest of the heavy thing; but there is no such cause causing rest coevally with the heavy thing save the heavy thing, and so the heavy thing is causing with efficient causality - and so it is causing the motion toward that rest, because these two [sc. motion and rest] are from the same cause.
462 Praeterea, grave - impeditum a motu - removet prohibens si gravitas eius vincat virtutem illius impedientis vel resistentis; puta, ƿsi superponitur alicui continuo et gravitas eius superet rationem continuitatis, frangit illud, et sic solvendo continuitatem eius, solvit impedimentum descensus eius. Huius autem fractionis, cum sit motus violentus, oportet ponere exsistentem causam extrinsecam, et non videtur rationabile fingere aliam causam quam grave ipsum; non autem frangit illud nisi quia intendit facere se in centro; igitur ab eodem principio activo habet se facere in centro, a quo habet istud impediens removere.	462. Further, a heavy thing - when prevented from moving - removes what is preventing it if its heaviness is superior to the virtue of the impeding or resisting thing; to wit, if it is placed on something continuous [e.g. a wooden plank] and its heaviness is superior to the nature of the continuity, it breaks it and by thus getting rid of the continuity it gets rid of what impedes its going downward. Now this breaking, since it is a forced motion, must have some existing extrinsic cause for it, and to suppose there is any cause other than the heavy thing itself does not seem rational; but the heavy thing does not break the continuous object save because it aims to put itself in the center; therefore it has the putting of itself in the center from the same principle as that from which it has the removing of the impediment.
463 Hoc etiam declarari posset aliter, quia 'gravius' movetur velocius, et tamen ab eodem generante generari posset aliquid gravius et aliquid minus grave, et possent ista duo esse in eadem distantia ad centrum et in eadem influentia caeli; igitur difformitas motuum in istis est ab aliquibus eis intrinsecis.	463. This could also be made clear in another way, because the heavier object moves more quickly, and yet the same generator could generate something heavier and something less heavy, and these two could be at the same distance from the center and under the same influence of the heaven; therefore the difference of motions in them is from something intrinsic to them.
464 Item, ((motus naturalis intenditur in fine)), secundum Philosophum I Caeli et mundi, - cuius difficile esset assignare causam, si effectivum huius motus esset praecise aliquid extrinsecum. ƿ	464. Again "natural motion becomes more intense at the end," according to the Philosopher On the Heaven 1.8.277b5-7, and it would be difficult to assign a cause for this if the efficient cause of this motion were precisely something extrinsic.
465 Respondeo tunc ad Aristotelem, qui adducitur in contrarium, quod sit pro me (sicut adduxi), - quod grave moveat se effective, sicut sciens movet se effective ad actum speculandi. Et intelligo sic: sicut habens formam aliquam quae nata est esse principium alicuius actionis univocae, potest per illam formam agere in receptivum approximatum et proportionatum, sic etiam habens formam quae nata est esse principium alicuius actionis aequivocae, potest per ipsam agere aequivoce in passum approximatum; et si ipsummet sit receptivum illius actionis vel effectus aequivoci et carens eo, - ex quo est maxime approximatum et proportionatum sibi ipsi, non solum poterit, immo summe causabit istum effectum in se ipso. Sic etiam est in proposito, quia lapis exsistens sursum, est in potentia ad 'ubi' deorsum, - gravitas autem respectu illius 'ubi' est principium activum aequivocum, sicut universaliter respectu 'ubi' non oportet ponere nisi principium aequivocum (non enim movens movet mobile ad aliquod 'ubi' quia movens formaliter sit in actu secundum illud 'ubi', sed tantum quia virtualiter). Quia igitur ipsum grave est receptivum illius effectus aequivoci et caret eo, causat in se ipso 'primo' istum effectum, et in nullo alio nisi causando prius in se; ita ƿquod 'causare' istud, est operatio gravis - sicut Aristoteles dicit ut calidi calefacere. Sed quod causet in se, hoc accidit ei in quantum est activum (quia scilicet ipsummet est receptivum respectu huius causationis, vel respectu huius causabilis); istud posset intelligi, si grave - manens sursum - posset propellere se vel aliud ad centrum: tunc ibi non dubitaret aliquis quomodo grave esset principium descensus in alio; nec modo minus est causa activa descensus sui ipsius.	465 [Response to the statements of Aristotle] - I reply then to Aristotle, who is adduced for the contrary view [n.445], that he is in my favor (the way I have adduced him [nn.446-448]) - that the heavy thing does effectively move itself, as a knower moves himself effectively to an act of thinking. And I understand this as follows: just as a thing that has a form, which is of a nature to be the principle of some univocal action, can act by that form on what is receptive of the form and proportioned and proximate to it, so too a thing that has a form, which is of a nature to be the principle of some equivocal action, can by it act on what undergoes and is proximate to it; and if the thing itself is receptive of the equivocal action or equivocal effect and lacks it, then it will, by the fact it is itself most proportioned and proximate to itself, not only be able to cause this effect in itself but will supremely cause it. So also is it in the case of the issue at hand, that a stone which is up above is in potency to a 'where' down below, but heaviness with respect to that 'where' is an active equivocal principle, just as there is only need universally with respect to a 'where' to posit an equivocal principle (for a mover moves a movable to a 'where' not because the mover is formally in act with respect to that 'where', but merely because it is virtually so). Therefore, because the heavy thing is itself receptive of the equivocal effect and lacks it, so it causes that effect in itself first, and causes it in no other thing save by causing it first in itself, such that its causing it is the operation of the heavy thing - as Aristotle says [Physics 8.5.257b9] - the way heating is the operation of a hot thing. But the fact that it causes the effect in itself is accidental to it insofar as it is active (because it is itself receptive with respect to this causing, or with respect to this causability); this could be understood if the heavy thing - while remaining up above -could propel itself, or something else, to the center; no one in that case would then doubt how a heavy object is the principle of descent in something else; and it is not less an active cause now of its own descent.
466 Tamen propter verbum Philosophi addo ultra, quod motus iste non est 'naturalis in se' ex hoc quod habet principium activum in se, sed solum ex hoc quod mobile habet principium passivum intrinsecum, naturaliter inclinans ad motum. - Quod patet per definitionem naturae II Physicorum, quia ((est principium motus, eius in quo est per se et non per accidens)) (nihil enim est principium naturaliter movendi alicui, nisi in quantum est per se in eo quod movetur; non est autem per se et primo in aliquo quod movetur, nisi in quantum est passivum; igitur non est aliquid natura vel principium naturale alicuius, nisi quia est principium passivum in moto). Hoc etiam patet, quia ideo aliquid movetur naturaliter, quia movetur sicut natum est ipsum moveri. ƿ	466. However, because of what the Philosopher says [n.445, that natural things have, in respect of motion, only a principle of receiving and not of acting], I add further that this motion is 'natural in itself' not by the fact that it has an active principle in itself, but only by the fact that the movable thing has an intrinsic passive principle naturally inclining it to motion. - This is plain from the definition of nature in Physics 2.1.192b20-23, that it is "a principle of motion in that in which it is per se and not per accidens" (for nothing is a principle of moving for anything save insofar as it is per se in that which is moved; but it is not per se and first in anything that is moved save insofar as it is passive; therefore it is not anything by nature nor a natural principle of anything save because it is a passive principle in the thing moved). This is plain because something is naturally moved for this reason, that it is moved as it is of a nature to be moved.
467 Sic est in proposito, ita quod licet hic (sicut in multis aliis) principium activum sit principium movendi, non tamen propter illud principium activum movendi movetur naturaliter, sed propter principium passivum, propter quod sic movetur. Et hoc est quod subdit Philosophus (postquam dixit quod ((actus levis est esse alicubi, ad sursum))): ((Et tamen)) - dicit ipse - ((quaeritur quare moventur in ipsorum loca)); et respondet quod ((causa est, quia apta nata sunt ibi esse)). Et signanter dicit 'in ipsorum loca', hoc est, naturaliter moventur in loca illa, - 'quia nata sunt ibi esse', id est, habent inclinationem naturalem ad illud 'ubi'. Et hoc modo postea subdit quod 'habent tantum principium patiendi et non faciendi', scilicet respectu motus in quantum naturalis, - et ita ibi, in solutione huius dubitationis de motu gravium, quasi interscalariter loquitur de principio naturali huius motus et de principio effectivo eius, quod est tantum passivum.	467. Thus it is in the case of the issue at hand, so that, although here (as in the case of many other things) an active principle is the principle of moving, yet not because of that active principle of moving is it moved naturally, but because of the passive principle because of which it is thus moved. And this is what the Philosopher subjoins (after he has said that "the act of a light thing is to be somewhere, upwards" [n.447]): "And yet," he says [Physics 8.4.255b13-15], "the question is raised why they [sc. light and heavy things] are moved to their places." And he says pointedly 'to their places', that is, that they are naturally moved to those places, "because they are of a nature to be there," that is, they have a natural inclination to that 'where'. And in this way he adds afterwards that "they have only a principle of undergoing and not of doing" [n.445], namely in respect of motion insofar as it is natural - and so, in this solution of this doubt about the motion of heavy things, he says there by the by of the natural principle of this motion, and of the efficient principle of it, that it is only passive.
468 Rationes autem Aristotelis non concludunt contra me, nam primae tres (quae unam vim habent) ostendunt grave non movere se sicut agens per cognitionem movet se; non enim animal posset se movere citra ultimum terminum intentum - nec etiam posset dirigere vel sistere se - nisi ageret per cognitionem. Et ex hoc satis ƿhabetur propositum Philosophi, quod ista non sunt primo moventia, - nam primum movens movet per cognitionem (quia 'sapientis est dirigere'), sicut ostensum est supra distinctione 3 primi libri 'De cognitione Dei', et distinctione 2 eiusdem primi 'De esse Dei'.	468. Now Aristotle's reasons [n.445] do not conclude against me, for the first three (which have the same force) show that the heavy object does not move itself the way what acts by thought moves itself; for an animal could not move itself short of the intended ultimate end - nor even could it direct itself or stop itself - unless it acted by knowledge. And from this is got the Philosopher's proposed conclusion, that these things [sc. heavy and light things] are not movers first [sc. do not move themselves] - for a first mover moves by knowledge (because "to guide is the mark of the wise man" [Metaphysics 1.2.982a17-18]), as was shown in the third distinction of the first book about the knowledge of God, and in the second distinction of the same book about the being of God [1 d.3 nn.261-268, d.2 nn.76-78].
469 Quarta etiam sua ratio, de continuo, non concludit praecise in quantum 'quantum'. Sed de continuo, hoc est, quod est eiusdem dispositionis in omni parte, - probat quod grave non movet se effective, quia non est pars una in actu quae potest facere aliam in actu secundum eandem qualitatem, quomodo ipse dicit in De sensu et sensato. Et concedo quod hoc modo pars gravis, exsistens in actu, non causat motum in alia parte; sed totum grave est in actu secundum actum primum, et causat in se actum secundum.	469. Also, his fourth reason [n. 445] does not draw its conclusion about the continuous precisely as the continuous is some quantum. But it proves it relative to the continuous - namely because the continuous has the same disposition in every part of itself - that a heavy object does not move itself effectively, because there is not one part of it in act able to make another part of it to be in act according to the same quality, in the way he himself states in On Sense and the Sensed Thing [6.447a3-4; n.299 above]. And I concede that in this way an actually existing part of the heavy object does not cause motion to be in another part; but the whole heavy object is in act according to first act, and it causes in itself second act.
470 Sed si obicis 'quomodo Aristoteles, si concedat grave sic moveri a se effective (licet non per cognitionem, nec etiam quod naturalitas eius sit ab eo in quantum habet principium activum), quomodo habebit principale propositum suum, quod ista necessario moventur ab alio, - quod ipse intendit probare principaliƿter?', - dico quod satis habet hoc ex distinctione potentiae. Ista enim non reducunt se ipsa de potentia secunda ad actum, nisi prius fuerint reducta de potentia prima ad actum primum vel saltem possent reduci ad actum primum; quod dico pro totis elementis, quae tota - secundum ipsum - sunt ingenerabilia et incorruptibilia, et tamen, quia sunt eiusdem rationis cum suis partibus, non repugnat eis reduci de potentia prima ad actum primum, sicut partes eorum reducuntur. Sequitur igitur quod licet grave et leve moveant se de potentia secunda ad actum secundum, tamen mobile est vel movetur ab aliquo alio extrinseco, a potentia prima ad actum primum; non enim oportet quod 'si omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur', quod in omni motu moveatur ab alio, - et sufficit Philosopho primum, quia per hoc devenitur ad aliquod 'aliud ab omnibus istis', quod nec in uno motu, nec in quocumque, poterit moveri ab alio, sed est omnino 'movens immobile'. ƿ	470. But if you object, 'how will Aristotle, if he concede that a heavy object is thus moved effectively by itself (although not by knowledge, nor even because its naturalness is from it insofar as it has an active principle) - how will he get his principal conclusion, that these things [heavy and light things] are necessarily moved by another -which is something he intends principally to prove [n.445]?' - I say that he gets this conclusion sufficiently from a distinction of power [n.446]. For these things [sc. heavy and light things] do not reduce themselves from second potency [sc. accidental potency, n.446] to act unless they have first been reduced from first potency [sc. essential potency, n.446] to first act, or at least could be reduced to first act; and I assert this of all the elements, which are all - according to him - ungenerable and incorruptible, and yet, because they are of the same nature as their parts are, it is not repugnant for them to be reduced from first potency to first act in just the way their parts are reduced. So it follows that, although the heavy and light thing move themselves from second potency to second act, yet a movable thing is, or is moved, from first potency to first act by something else outside it; for it is not necessary that 'if everything that is moved is moved by another', that it is moved by another in the case of every motion - and the first point [sc. everything that is moved is moved by another] is enough for the Philosopher, because thereby deduction is made to something 'other than all these things', which something other cannot be moved by another either in one motion or in any motion but it is altogether 'an unmovable mover' [Physics 8.5.256a13-258b9].
471 Similiter etiam potest dici quod - in isto motu - etsi moveantur a se effective, tamen non moventur sicut a primis moventibus; ex quo etiam non movent per cognitionem, sequitur quod praesupponant aliquid sic movens per cognitionem, - et ita licet moveant se effective, non tamen sic quin moveantur ab alio, licet non sicut a causa proxima.	471. It can also similarly be said that even if heavy and light things are - in the case of this motion - moved effectively by themselves, yet they are not moved as they are by first movers; from the fact too that they do not move by knowledge, the consequence follows that they presuppose something that does move thus by knowledge - and so, although they do effectively move themselves yet they do not do so without being moved by another, although not as they are by a proximate cause.
	II. To the Principal Arguments
472 Ad primum argumentum principale dictum est distinctione 3 primi libri, quomodo aliquid potest agere in se, - et responsum est ibi ad illud argumentum.	472. As to the first principal argument [n.440], it was stated in distinction 3 of the first book [1 d.3 nn.513-517] how something can act on itself, and response was made there to this first principal argument.
473 Quod autem additur pro confirmatione quod ' quaedam dividentia ens sunt incompossibilia in quocumque, igitur et ista', concedo de istis ut sunt opposita. Opposita autem sunt prout dicunt modos cuiuslibet entis, prout scilicet 'idem' est in potentia antequam actu sit ens (sive ens in actu), quando iam est; et isto modo nulli eidem conveniunt, nec formaliter nec denominative, quod scilicet 'idem' dicatur denominatum esse simul ab aliquo in actu aliquo et ab eodem in potentia. Ut tamen actus accipitur pro ƿprincipio activo et potentia pro principio passivo, quae cadunt infra essentiam cuiuslibet definibilis vel definiti, - sic nec sunt opposita nec sic dividunt ens, nec repugnant alicui eidem.	473. But as to what is added in confirmation, that 'some of the divisions of being are not compossible in anything, so these divisions are not compossible either' [n.441] - I concede the point about these divisions [sc. act and potency] as they are opposites. But they are opposites insofar as they state modes of any being, namely insofar as 'one and the same thing' is in potency before it is actually a being (or a being in act) when it already is; and in this way these divisions do not belong to any one and the same being, either formally or denominatively, namely that 'one and the same thing' should be said to be denominated by something in some act and at the same time by the same thing in potency. However, as act is taken for active principle and potency for passive principle, which principles fall under the essence of any definable or defined thing, then they are in this way neither opposites nor divisions of being nor repugnant to any one and the same thing.
474 Ad secundum argumentum: dico primo ad auctoritatem illam VIII Physicorum, quod scilicet omne 'movens per cognitionem' dividitur in duo, quorum unum est primum movens et aliud primum motum; et ratio huiusmodi est, quia potentia motiva talis moventis est potentia organica, ita quod illa requirit non tantum distinctionem inter corpus et animam sicut inter movens et motum, sed forte in ipso corpore - in quo est virtus organica - requirit partem corporis moventem, distinctam a parte mota. Non est autem ita necessario de movente se non organice, quia totum est uniforme quantum ad actum primum, et totum in potentia quantum ad actum secundum.	474. As to the second argument [n.442], I say first to the authority from Physics 8, namely that everything 'that moves by knowledge' is divided into two, one of which is mover first and the other moved first - and the reason is of this sort, that the motive power of such a mover is an organic power so that it requires not only a distinction between body and soul as between mover and moved, but requires perhaps in the body itself - where the organic power is - a moving part of the body distinct from the moved part. But it need not be like this in the case of something non-organically moving itself, because here the whole is uniform as to first act, and the whole is in potency as to second act.
475 Sed ad probationem illius propositionis quae accipitur in principio VII Physicorum, ubi probatur quod 'nihil movet se primo', dico quod hoc quod dicit 'primo', potest dupliciter accipi: Uno modo prout dicit idem quod est 'secundum totum', et opponitur ei quod est 'secundum partem'. Et hoc modo accipit Aristoteles in V Physicorum, ubi distinguit quod aliquid movetur secundum accidens, vel secundum totum, et aliquid secundum ƿpartem; hoc etiam modo accipit Aristoteles 'moveri primo' in VI Physicorum, ubi dicit quod 'quidquid movetur in aliquo tempore, primo, movetur in quolibet illius temporis', - et alibi frequenter.	475. But as to the proof of this proposition, which is taken from the beginning of Physics 7 [n.442], where is proved that 'nothing moves itself first' - I say that what 'first' means here can be understood in two ways: In one way it is taken as it means the same as 'according to the whole' and is opposed to what 'according to a part' means. And Aristotle takes it this way in Physics 5.1.224a21-29, where he distinguishes what it is for a thing to be moved per accidens, or as a whole, and what it is for it to be moved as to a part; Aristotle also takes 'to be moved first' in this way in Physics 6.6.236b19-23, where he says that 'whatever is moved first in some time is moved in any part of that time' - and he says it frequently elsewhere.
476 Alio modo, hoc quod dico 'primo' dicit causalitatem praecisam, quomodo accipitur in I Posteriorum in definitione universalis.	476. In another way what I mean by 'first' means precise causality, in the way it is taken in Posterior Analytics 1.4.73b26-33 in the definition of the universal.
477 Dico igitur tunc quod ratio Aristotelis, in principio VII, bene probat quod nullum corpus movetur a se primo hac duplici primitate simul: Quia si movetur a se primo, id est secundum se totum, - igitur motus inest cuilibet parti eius. Haec consequentia tenet per hoc quod totum, in quantum movens, est homogeneum, et 'moveri' est passio homogenea; passio autem homogenea non inest toti 'primo' hac primitate, nisi insit cuilibet parti eius. Sequitur ergo quod si totum movetur 'primo' hoc modo, quod si pars quiescit, totum quiescit.	477. I say therefore that the reasoning of Aristotle at the beginning of Physics7 [n.442] does well prove that no body is moved by itself first at the same time in this double firstness: Because if it is moved by itself first, that is, according to the whole of itself, then the motion is present in any part of it. This consequence holds from the fact that a whole, insofar as it is a mover, is homogeneous, and that 'to be moved' is a homogeneous passion; but a homogeneous passion is only present first in a whole by this firstness if it is present in any part of it. So the result is that if a whole is moved first in this way, then if a part of it is at rest then the whole of it is at rest.
478 Accipiendo autem aliam primitatem, 'causalitatis praecisae', si totum movetur a se primo, ergo non removetur hoc praedicatum quod est 'moveri' ab ipso propter hoc quod removetur ab aliquo ƿquod non est ipsum, nec amovetur ab ipso propter hoc quod removetur ab aliquo quod est aliquid eius; si enim triangulus habet tres angulos primo hac primitate, non solum non removetur ab eo 'habere tres' si removeatur a quadrangulo, immo etiam non removetur ab eo propter hoc quod removetur a parte trianguli, puta ab hoc angulo vel illo. Ergo 'moveri' non removetur a toto cui primo inest hac primitate, etsi removeatur a parte eius, quae pars non est ipsum; et ideo si totum movetur primo hac primitate, non quiescit ad quietem partis.	478. But when taking the other firstness, the firstness of precise causality, if a whole is moved by itself first, then this predicate 'to be moved' is not removed from the whole because it is removed from something that is not the whole, nor is it removed from the whole because it is removed from something that is not any part of the whole; for if a triangle has three angles first by this firstness, not only is the predicate 'having three angles' not removed from it if it is removed from a quadrilateral, but it is also not removed from it because of its being removed from a part of the triangle, as from this or that angle. Therefore 'to be moved' is not removed from a whole in which it is first by this firstness, even if it be removed from a part of it, which part is not it; and therefore if a whole is moved first by this firstness, it does not rest on the resting of a part.
479 Prius autem illatum est quod movetur primo altera primitate; igitur est impossibile totum moveri primo utraque primitate simul, quia includit contradictionem, sicut contradictio sequitur. Tamen altera primitate, praecise, potest totum aliquod moveri a se ipso 'primo'.	479. But the prior inference was that it is moved first by the other firstness [sc. the firstness of 'according to the whole', nn.477, 475]; so it is impossible for a whole to be moved first by both firstnesses at the same time [nn.477-478], because this involves a contradiction, in that a contradiction follows [sc. the contradiction that the whole would both rest and not rest on the resting of a part]. However, some whole can precisely by the one firstness [sc. the firstness of 'according to the whole' n.475] be moved by itself first.
480 In proposito autem dico quod grave movetur a se ipso 'primo' primo modo, quia secundum quamlibet partem et movet et movetur, et cuilibet parti convenit - licet non primo sed in quantum est in toto - et movere et moveri.	480. Now in the issue at hand, I say that a heavy thing is moved by itself first in the prior way of 'firstness' [n.475], because it moves and is moved according to any part whatever, and moving and being moved belong to any part whatever - although not first but insofar as any part is in the whole.
481 Sed numquid convenit gravi 'primo moveri deorsum' primitate secundo modo dicta? ƿDico quod possumus loqui de moveri deorsum in communi, vel de hoc moveri quod convenit huic toti gravi, vel de parte huius moveri quod convenit parti huius gravis. Et dico quod sicut totum grave et pars gravis sunt homogenea in gravitate, ita moveri totale (quod est passio totalis totius) et moveri partiale (quod est passio partis) sunt 'moveri' eiusdem rationis; et sicut moveri deorsum naturaliter - in communi - inest primo primitate causalitatis praecisae gravi in communi, ita hoc moveri totale inest huic gravi totali simili primitate, et hoc moveri partiale (quod est pars huius moveri totalis) inest parti huius gravis simili primitate.	481. But does it ever belong to a heavy thing 'to be moved first downwards' by the firstness stated in the second way [n.476]? I say that we can in general speak of the heavy thing's being moved downwards either as to the being moved that belongs to the whole heavy thing or as to a part of the being moved that belongs to a part of the heavy thing. And I say that just as the whole heavy thing and a part of the heavy thing are homogeneous in heaviness, so the total being moved (which is a total passion of the whole) and the partial being moved (which is a passion of a part) are 'being moveds' of the same nature; and just as being moved downwards is naturally - and in general - present first by the firstness of precise causality in a heavy thing generally, so the total being moved is present in the whole heavy thing by a like firstness, and the partial being moved (which is a part of the total being moved) is present in a part of the heavy thing by a like firstness.
482 Non igitur hoc totum homogeneum grave movetur a se primo, ita quod 'moveri', ut est commune sibi et parti eius cuilibet, insit sibi primo secundum hanc primitatem, quia tunc non removeretur a toto etsi removeretur a parte; hoc autem est falsum propter aliam primitatem necessario concurrentem cum ista, si ista ponitur in subiecto homogeneo respectu passionis homogeneae.	482. Therefore the whole homogeneous heavy thing is not moved by itself first such that the 'being moved', as being moved is common to the whole and to any part of the whole, is present in it first according to this firstness [sc. the firstness of precise causality], because then being moved would not be removed from the whole even if it were removed from a part; however this is false because of the other firstness [sc. the firstness of 'according to the whole'], which is necessarily going along with it, if this other firstness is posited in a homogeneous subject with respect to a homogeneous passion.
483 Tamen grave etiam hac primitate causalitatis, videlicet praecisae, movetur hac motione, - et verum est quod haec motio totalis non removetur a totali gravi propter hoc quod removetur a quocumque quod non est hoc grave totale: verum autem est quod pars huius totius gravis non movetur hac motione totali, nec tamen propter hoc removetur haec motio totalis ab hoc gravi totali. ƿ	483. However, the heavy thing is also moved with this motion by the firstness of causality, namely of precise causality - and it is true that this total motion is not removed from the whole heavy thing because it is removed from anything that is not this whole heavy thing; but it is true that a part of this whole heavy thing is not moved by this total motion, and yet not for this reason is this total motion removed from the whole heavy thing.
484 Si obicis quod saltem removetur a totali gravi motio totalis, si a parte eius removetur motio partialis, - igitur motio totalis non inest toti primitate causalitatis praecisae (quia si sic inesset, nullo modo removeretur ab ipso propter remotionem alicuius alterius praedicati a toto, quod non est ipsum), - respondeo: Dico quod hoc totale grave, in quantum est homogeneum, est ex partibus similibus (et partes istae sunt priores aliquo modo ipso toto), ita quod destructis istis in ratione partium, non manet totum; ita dico quod non est inconveniens quod eis insint suae passiones et motiones partiales (et quodammodo prius quam motio totalis conveniat ipsi toti), quia et motio totalis componitur ex partium motionibus partialibus, sicut totum grave ex partibus gravis. Et tunc nego hanc propositionem assumptam 'quod convenit alicui, primo (id est secundum causalitatem praecisam), non removetur ab eo', - quia aliquid quod non est ipsum praedicatum, removetur ab aliquo quod non est ipsum subiectum. Haec enim propositio falsa est universaliter, ubi subiectum habet subiectum prius et passio passionem priorem; tunc enim ad remotionem prioris passionis de priore subiecto, sequitur passionem posteriorem removeri a posteriore subiecto.	484. If you object that at least the total motion is removed from the whole heavy thing if partial motion is removed from a part of the heavy thing - so the total motion is not present in the whole by the firstness of precise causality (for if it were thus present, in no way would it be removed from the whole because of the removal of any other predicate from the whole that is not the whole) - I reply: I say that the whole heavy thing, insofar as it is homogeneous, is made up of like parts (and these parts are prior in some way to the whole itself), so that when these are destroyed in idea of parts the whole does not remain; thus I say that it is not unacceptable for the parts to have their own partial properties and partial motions (and to have them somehow before the whole motion belongs to the whole itself), because even the whole motion is composed of the partial motions of the parts just as the whole heavy thing is composed of parts of the heavy thing. And then I deny the assumed proposition that 'what belongs to something first (that is, according to precise causality) is not removed from it' because something which is not the very predicate is removed from something which is not the very subject. For this assumed proposition is universally false when the subject has a prior subject and the property a prior property; for then on the removal of the prior property from the prior subject there follows the removal of the posterior property from the posterior subject.
485 Praecise igitur probat ratio Aristotelis quod totum non ƿmovetur a se primo: hoc est quod 'moveri', quod est passio homogenea, non inest toti homogeneo 'primo' (hoc est secundum causalitatem praecisam) in quantum illa passio accipitur ut homogenea (hoc est ut eiusdem rationis) toti quanto et parti quanti, - quia sic non removeretur a toto, licet removeretur a parte; quod falsum est, propter primitatem totalitatis, quae infertur hic ex ratione causalitatis praecisae. Tamen non probat quin totum possit a se moveri primo, loquendo de illa motione totali cuius partes sunt motiones partium, et de primitate causalitatis praecisae; et cum hoc stat quod movetur primo alia primitate (scilicet totalitatis), accipiendo 'moveri' in communi (prout scilicet convenit toti et cuilibet parti totius), ita quod aliquo modo oportet accipere praedicatum quod debet inesse toti hac primitate et illa.	485. The reasoning of Aristotle, therefore [nn.477, 442], proves precisely that the whole is not moved by itself first, that is, his reasoning proves that 'to be moved', which is a homogeneous property, is not present in the homogeneous whole first (that is, first according to precise causality), insofar as the property is taken as homogeneous (that is, as of the same nature) in the whole quantity and in a part of the quantity - because thus it would not be removed from the whole although it were removed from a part; and this is false, because of the firstness of the whole that is entailed here by reason of precise causality. Yet Aristotle's reasoning does not prove that, speaking about that total motion whose parts are motions of parts and about the firstness of precise causality, the whole cannot be moved by itself first; and compatible with this stands that it is moved first by another firstness (namely the firstness of the whole), taking 'to be moved' generally (namely as it belongs to the whole and to any part of the whole), so that in some way one needs to assume a predicate that must be present in the whole with both the latter firstness and the former.