Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D2/P2Q7

• I. To the Question A. The Opinions of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent
• II. Rejection of the Opinions
• C. Scotus' own Response
• II. To the Principal Arguments

Latin	English
	Question Seven: Whether an Angel can Move in an Instant
486 Undecimo quaero utrum angelus possit moveri in instanti.	486. Eleventh I ask whether an angel can move in an instant.
487 Quod non: Quia tunc maior virtus posset moveri in minore quam in instanti. Probatio consequentiae: sic enim arguit Philosophus VI Phyƿsicorum, quod si maior virtus moveret in tempore, et maxima in instanti.	487. That he cannot: Because then a greater power could move in less than an instant. Proof of the consequence: for thus does the Philosopher argue in Physics 6.3.234a22-31, that if a greater power were to move something in time, the greatest power would move it in an instant.
488 Contra: Aliqui motus ab aliquibus corporibus moventibus, sunt in instanti, ut illuminatio medii; ergo et motus angeli multo fortius potest esse in instanti, quia maior est virtus moventis et minor resistentia medii.	488. On the contrary: Some movings by some moving bodies exist in an instant, as the illumination of a medium; therefore too the much stronger moving of an angel can exist in an instant, because the power of the mover is greater and the resistance of the medium smaller.
	I. To the Question A. The Opinions of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent
489 Hic dicitur quod angelus potest moveri in instanti, non quidem temporis continui sed discreti; quod probatur, - quaere in Thoma.	489. Here the statement is made that an angel can move in an instant, not indeed of continuous time but of discrete time; for the proof see Thomas.
490 Alius doctor dicit de isto tempore, - quaere.	490. Another doctor speaks about this time; see Henry.
	II. Rejection of the Opinions
491 Contra primam positionem arguo: Videtur enim contradicere sibi ipsi. Videtur enim ponere angeƿlum esse in loco per operationem: et si intelligat de operatione transeunte in corpus, illa operatio erit in tempore vel in instanti temporis communis; si autem intelligat de operatione immanente, scilicet intellectione vel volitione, - illa (ex dictis prius in materia de aevo) nec est in tempore nostro communi nec in alio, sed est in aevo secundum eum. Igitur etc.	491. Against the first position [n.489] I argue thus:For he seems to contradict himself. For he seems to posit that an angel exists in place through operation; and if he is understanding the operation of an angel that passes over into a body, then that operation will exist in time or in an instant of common time; but if he is understanding an angel's immanent operation, namely intellection or volition, then (from what was said earlier in the discussion of aeviternity [nn.153-67]) that operation is neither in our common time nor in any other time but is, according to him, in aeviternity. Therefore etc.
492 Praeterea, ratio sua non videtur concludere, quia tunc sequitur quod in ultimo instanti prolationis verborum in consecratione, esset ibi vera forma panis, quae praefuit in toto tempore illius prolationis.	492. Besides, his reasoning does not seem conclusive, because then it follows that, in the ultimate instant of pronouncing the words of consecration [sc. in the eucharist], the true form of bread would be there that was there before during the whole time of the pronouncing.
493 Similiter, cum aer quievit in esse tenebroso per totum tempus, sequitur quod in ultimo instanti illuminationis illius aeris tenebrosi aer esset tenebrosus, et ita sequitur quod illuminatio non fieret in instanti. ƿ	493. Likewise it follows that, when air has remained in darkness for the whole of a time, the air would be in darkness in the ultimate instant of the illumining of this dark air, and thus it follows that illumination does not take place in an instant.
494 Et si dicas quod ista illuminatio est ((terminus motus localis)), quo sol fit praesens medio, - contra: Ponatur sol creatus de novo et medium praeexsistens. Modo etiam, licet cum 'ubi' terminante motum localem concurrat illuminatio medii (a sole sic facto praesente), tamen illa illuminatio non est per se terminus motus localis, sed aliquod 'ubi' acquisitum ipsi soli: nec etiam potest per hoc evadi quin aer quieverit sub esse tenebroso usque ad hoc instans.	494. And if you say that this illumining is 'the term of a local motion' whereby the sun is made present to the medium - on the contrary: Let the sun be posited as created de novo and the medium as pre-existing. Then too, although the illumining of the medium (done by the sun made present in this way) goes along with the 'where' terminating the local motion, yet the illumining is not per se the term of the local motion but is some 'where' acquired by the sun itself; nor even can this happen without the air having remained in darkness up to that instant.
495 Praeterea, si angelum - in quocumque tempore quiescentem oportet in ultimo illius temporis immutatum esse in eodem 'ubi', ergo numquam mutatur, nec in tempore continuo nec in tempore discreto.	495. Further, if an angel - whatever time he is resting at - has to have moved in the ultimate moment of that time at the same 'where', then he never move, either in continuous time or in discrete time.
496 Probatio consequentiae: Accipio aliquam partem temporis cum quo quiescit, et per consequens cum ultimo illius immutatus est. Si etiam in aliquo instanti temporis discreti debeat moveri localiter, quaero: aut illud est immediatum instans nostro instanti terminanti tempus quietis, aut mediatum? Si mediatum, igitur inter instans nostrum (in quo fuit angelus immutatus) et istud instans, est tempus medium, cum quo etiam quiesceret angelus; igitur in illo et cum illo ultimo instanti illius temporis immutatus ƿerit, et ita in illo instanti mediato (in quo ponebatur mutari) non mutatur. Si autem est instans immediatum, quaero quid respondet ei in tempore nostro? Si instans, igitur instans in tempore nostro est immediatum instanti (ergo tempus discretum); Si tempus, ergo in illo instanti non mutatur angelus instantanee, quia illud instans - per te - coexsistit parti temporis nostri, in qua vel cum qua potest continue moveri vel quiescere.	496. Proof of the consequence: I take some part of the time at which the angel is at rest and at which, consequently, he changes in the ultimate moment of it. Even if he should change in some instant of discrete time, I ask: is that instant immediate or mediate with our instant that terminates the time of his resting? If mediate then between our instant (at which the angel has moved) and that instant there is a time in between, at which too the angel would be resting; therefore in and at the ultimate instant of that time he will have changed, and so in that mediate instant (at which he was posited as changing) he does not change. But if the instant is immediate, I ask what within our time corresponds to it? If an instant, then an instant in our time is immediate to an instant [sc. of the angel's time] (so our time is discrete [sc. as the angel's time is posited to be discrete]); if time corresponds to it, then the angel does not in that instant instantaneously change, because - according to you - that instant coexists with a part of our time, in which or at which he can continuously change or be at rest.
497 Propter istud argumentum, forte, ponit secunda positio quod inter duo instantia temporis discreti cadit quasi quies media ipsius angeli cum parte media temporis nostri.	497. It is because of this argument perhaps [sc. the last argument in the previous paragraph] that the second position [sc. of Henry, n.490] posits that between two instants of discrete time a quasi-intermediate rest of the angel occurs along with an intermediate part of our time.
498 Sed contra istam secundam positionem probatum est supra, quod non est necesse operationem angeli durare cum instanti temporis nostri; igitur nec illa duratio erit ratio quietis in termino transitus subiti. 'Quare erit etiam necesse ponere angelum post transitum subitum quiescere', videtur non esse ratio, sed fuga tantum, ne ponatur tempus nostrum 'discretum' ex hoc quod ponitur talis transitus eius discretum tempus. ƿ	498. But it was proved above [nn.161-62] against this second position that there is no need for the operation of an angel to have duration along with an instant of our time; so neither will that operation be the reason for the resting of the angel at the term of a sudden local motion. To say 'therefore it will also be necessary to posit that the angel rests after the sudden local motion' does not seem to be an argument but merely a subterfuge, to prevent our time being posited to be discrete from the fact that such local moving of an angel is posited to be a discrete time.
499 Praeterea, quod ponit quod in 'nunc' tali potest mutari, ita quod simul habet plura 'ubi' aequalia, inter quae non erit ordo nisi tantum naturae vel imaginatione, non autem duratione, - videtur impossibile quod angelus virtute sua naturali habeat ((in uno instanti temporis sui et nostri)) plura 'ubi' aequalia. Et hoc declarat exemplum de gravi (quod ipsi adducunt ad oppositum): si enim vacuum posset cedere corpori imposito (et ita esset motus in vacuo), non esset intelligibile quod grave esset in pluribus 'ubi' sibi aequalibus, sed prius in uno 'ubi' quam in alio 'ubi', et prius in priore 'ubi' quam in posteriore; et prius, duratione, una pars gravis esset cum spatio quam alia pars.	499. Further, as to what it [sc. the second position] posits that in such a 'now' an angel can locally move, so that he has several equal 'wheres' all at once between which there will only be an order of nature, or an order in imagination and not in duration - it seems to be impossible that an angel should, by his own power, have several equal 'wheres' "in one instant of his time and of ours". And this is made clear by the example of the heavy object (which they [sc. Henry and his supporters] adduce for the opposite): for if a vacuum could give way to a body placed in it (and thus if there were motion in a vacuum), there would be no intelligibility in a heavy object's being in several 'wheres' equal to it, but it would be first in one 'where' before it was in another 'where', and first in a prior 'where' before it was in a later 'where' [n.431]; and one part of the heavy object would be in a place first in duration before another part of it was.
500 Quod etiam ipse adducit de corpore, quod pertransit infinita 'ubi' in tempore finito, propter hoc quod non est in illis 'ubi' nisi in potentia, - bene concludit quod tempus angeli potest esse ex partibus finitis eiusdem quantitatis et tamen in illo tempore possit pertransire spatium infinitum; sed non concludit quod in uno instanti ƿpossit pertransire tantum spatium, immo concludit oppositum: corpus enim ita pertransit totum spatium, in aliquo tempore, quod in alia et alia parte temporis pertransit aliam et aliam partem spatii.	500. And what he himself [sc. Henry] adduces about a body that passes through an infinity of 'wheres' in a finite time, because of the fact that it is only in those 'wheres' potentially - this does well prove that the time of an angel can be made of infinite parts of the same quantity and that yet in that time he can pass through an infinite space; but it does not prove that he can pass through so much space in a single instant; rather it proves the opposite; for a body passes through a whole space thus in some period of time, because in different parts of the time it passes through different parts of the space.
	C. Scotus' own Response
501 Dico igitur ad quaestionem quod pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate, et non est necessitas quare debeat poni tempus discretum mensurans motum angeli, - nam quidquid salvatur per illud tempus discretum, salvatur etiam per tempus continuum in communi: sicut enim oportet eos dicere quod si pertranseat in instanti, non potest immediate habere alium transitum instantaneum, ita potest poni - si transeat instantanee in instanti temporis communis - quod licet immediate possit habere post illud instans motum continuum in tempore habito, non tamen potest habere transitum instantaneum immediatum. Non igitur est inconveniens ponere angelum, in quantum participat condicionem corporalem (id est, quae potest esse aliquo modo eiusdem rationis in ipso et in corpore), quod etiam participet mensuram corporis aliquo modo; in quantum autem movetur localiter, participat 'ubi' (quod est passio corporalis, aliquo modo eiusdem rationis in ipso et in corpore); igitur etiam potest mensurari mensura primi corporis moti.	501. I say therefore to the question [n.486] that a plurality is not to be posited without necessity, and there is no necessity why one should posit a discrete time that measures the motion of an angel - for whatever is secured by that discrete time is also secured by continuous time in general; for just as they [sc. those who posit such a discrete time] must say that, if an angel passes through something in an instant, he cannot immediately have another instantaneous passing through, so one can, if an angel instantaneously passes through something in an instant of common time, posit that, although he can immediately have after that instant a continuous motion in actual time, yet he cannot immediately have an instantaneous passing through. There is nothing unacceptable, then, in positing that an angel, to the extent he participates in bodily condition (that is, a condition which is in some way of the same nature in himself as in a body), also participates in some way in the measure of body; but to the extent he moves locally, he participates in a 'where' (which is a bodily property that is in some way of the same nature in himself as in a body); therefore he can also be measured by the measure of the first moved body.
502 Et si obicis quod posset moveri stante caelo, igitur non oportet motum eius esse in tempore, - respondeo: ƿIta stante caelo poterit Petrus post resurrectionem ambulare, et tamen ista ambulatio non fingetur esse in tempore quodam alio a communi tempore nostro continuo et tamen est non exsistente primo motu caeli. Mensuratur quidem quies ipsius caeli potentialiter (sicut dictum est prius) tempore illo quo motus primus mensuraretur - si esset - positive et actualiter; et illo tempore potentiali potest mensurari motus alius tunc actualiter exsistens, ita quod non est necesse mensuratum primi caeli dependere in essentia (vel esse) a motu illo (sicut fuit motus sub tempore Iosue, stante caelo), quia mensuratio ista quanti per 'quantum' et 'quale' non est per aliquid a quo mensuratum essentialiter dependeat (sicut est in mensuris quiditativis), sed tantum sufficit quod motus ille - quando est - possit distincte cognosci secundum quantitatem suam ex cognitione distincta temporis, actualis vel potentialis. Et ita dico quod quando iste motus caeli non erit, poterit tamen alius motus mensurari per tempus huius motus primi caeli, in quantum scilicet motus ille posset fieri cum tanta parte motus istius si esset, et modo est cum tanta parte quietis cum quanta posset esse pars motus.	502. And if you object that an angel could move while the heaven is stationary, so there is no need for his motion to be in time - I reply: Peter after the resurrection will be able to walk about when the heaven is thus stationary, and yet this walking about is not imagined to be in any time other than our common continuous time, even though it takes place when there is no first motion of the heaven. The resting of the heaven itself, indeed, is (as was said before [n.178]) measured potentially by the time by which the first motion - if it existed - would be positively and actually measured; and by that potential time can another motion be measured which is then actually existing, such that there is no need for what is measured by the first heaven to depend in its essence (or in its being) on that motion (as was the case with the motion when the heaven was standing still in the time of Joshua [Joshua 10.12-14]), because this measuring of a quantity by quantity and quality is not by something on which the measured thing essentially depends (as is true in the case of quidditative measures), but it is sufficient only for that motion - when it exists - to be able to be distinctly known, according to its quantity, by a distinct knowledge of time, whether actual or potential time. And thus I say that, when this motion of the heaven does not exist, yet another motion will be able to be measured by the time of that motion of the first heaven, namely insofar as the other motion could take place simultaneously with some amount of the former motion, if the former motion existed, and takes place now with as great an amount of rest as there could be of the motion.
503 Hoc ergo supposito quod non est necesse pro motu angeli ponere aliam mensuram a tempore communi, - cum quaeritur 'utrum ƿangelus possit mutari vel moveri in instanti', dico quod dupliciter potest intelligi mutatio, et potest dici duplex mutatio: una includens totam realitatem motus, alia praecise includens realitatem termini motus. Exemplum huius est. Quod istud mutatur ab a 'ubi' usque ad b 'ubi', potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quod simul habeat omnia 'ubi' media (sicut haberet si praecise moveretur successive), vel quod illa mutatione praecise haberet ultimum 'ubi' (sicut haberet si illa mutatio esset ultimus terminus motus).	503. On this supposition then, that there is no need to posit for the motion of an angel a measure other than common time [n.501] - when it is asked 'whether an angel could change or move in an instant' [n.486], I say that change can be understood in two ways and can be said in two ways: one way includes the whole reality of motion, and the other includes the reality precisely of the term of motion. An example. That this thing is changed from 'where' a to 'where' b can be understood in two ways: either that it possesses at once all the intermediate 'wheres' (in the way it would if it precisely moved successively), or that it would possess by that change exactly the ultimate 'where' (the way it would if the change were the ultimate term of motion).
504 Primo modo - contradicendo secundae opinioni - non video qualiter angelus virtute naturali posset moveri vel mutari in instanti, quia non videtur quod virtute sua naturali posset habere plura 'ubi' sibi aequalia; secundo modo non videtur quin possit moveri in instanti, quia quod terminus motus non statim inducatur, hoc est ex imperfectione virtutis ipsius moventis, - quae imperfectio non est angelo attribuenda nisi aliqua necessitas appareat, quia dignificanda est natura quantum apparentia permittunt.	504. In the first way - in contradiction to the second opinion [n.490] - I do not see in what way an angel could by natural power move or change in an instant, because it does not seem that he could by his natural power have several 'wheres' equal to himself [n.499]; in the second way [n.503] it does not seem he could not move in an instant, because the fact that the term of a motion is not immediately introduced comes from the imperfection of the power of the mover - and this imperfection is not to be attributed to an angel unless some necessity appears, because a nature should be granted as much worth as appearances allow.
	II. To the Principal Arguments
505 Ad argumentum in oppositum dico quod illa consequentia Philosophi tenet ex hoc quod in antecedente includitur mensuram esse divisibilem, per hoc quod ponitur in eo; in quacumƿque autem mensura divisibili potest aliqua virtus aliquid facere, potest maior virtus facere in minore. Sed in isto antecedente 'angelus mutatur in instanti', non includitur mensuram esse divisibilem.	505. To the argument for the opposite [n.487] I say that the consequence of the Philosopher [sc. if a greater power moves in time, a greatest would move in an instant] holds from the fact that in the antecedent is included that the measure is divisible, because of what is posited in it [sc. time, for time is divisible]; but in whatever divisible measure some power can do something, a greater power can do it in a lesser measure. But in the antecedent 'an angel changes in an instant' is not included that the measure is divisible.
506 Consequentia igitur haec 'movetur in instanti, igitur aliquid potest moveri in minore', tenet, non tantum ex propositionibus veris et ex natura rei, sed ex aliqua falsa, quae includitur in isto antecedente: est enim ista vera ex natura rei 'quidquid causat aliqua virtus in mensura divisibili, potest maior virtus illud causare in mensura minore', sed minor - quae erit ibi sumenda sub ista maiore vera - non est vera ex natura rei, sed tantum ex hypothesi, ista videlicet quod 'motus est in instanti'. Si autem dicatur 'angelum mutari in instanti', et per hoc debeat inferri quod 'aliqua virtus debeat ipsum mutare in minore quam in instanti', - minor illa sic sumenda non erit vera ex natura rei, nec ex hypothesi, et ideo consequentia non valebit. Et ex hoc patet quod multae consequentiae enthymematicae tenent non praecise virtute alicuius verae subintellectae, sed quandoque virtute alicuius falsae subintellectae, dum tamen includatur in antecedente. ƿ	506. This consequence, then, that 'it moves in an instant, therefore something can move in less than an instant', does not so much hold from true propositions and the nature of the thing, but it holds from something false that is included in the antecedent [sc. the antecedent 'it moves in an instant']; for this premise, that 'whatever some power causes in a divisible measure, a greater power can cause in a lesser measure', is true from the nature of the thing, but the minor premise - which will have to subsumed there under this true major [sc. the minor 'an angel moves in an instant'] - is not true from the nature of the thing, but only by hypothesis, namely that 'there is motion in an instant'. But if it be said that 'an angel changes in an instant', and if from this one is to infer that 'some power should change him in less than an instant' - then the minor thus to be assumed will not be true from the nature of the thing, nor by hypothesis, and so the consequence will not be valid. And from this it is plain that many enthymematic consequences [sc. consequences where one premise is left unexpressed] do not hold precisely by virtue of some understood truth, but sometimes by virtue of some understood falsehood, provided however a falsehood is included in the antecedent.