Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D2/P2Q8

• I. To the Question
• II. To the Principal Arguments

Latin	English
	Question Eight: Whether an Angel could Move from Extreme to Extreme without Passing through the Middle
507 Duodecimo et ultimo quaero utrum angelus possit moveri ab extremo in extremum non pertranseundo medium.	507. Twelfth and finally I ask whether an angel could move from extreme to extreme without passing through the middle.
508 Quod sic: Quia aut angelus est in loco per operationem (secundum aliquos), et videtur planum quod potest operari in extremo, non operando in medio; aut saltem imperio voluntatis movet se (licet per aliquam aliam potentiam exsecutivam), et potest velle esse in extremo non volendo esse in medio, sicut potest intelligere extremum non intelligendo medium.	508. That he could: Because either an angel is in place by his operation (according to some), and it seems plain that he can operate on an extreme without operating on the middle [Aquinas Sent. 1 d.37 q.3 a.1, q.4 a.2]; or he does at least move himself by command of will (although through some executive power), and he can wish to be in an extreme without wishing to be in the middle, just as he can understand an extreme without understanding the middle [Aquinas Quodlibet 1 q.3 a.2].
509 Secundo sic: corpus Christi, exsistens in caelo empireo, nunc est in altari, et non transit medium; igitur hoc poterit angelus, cum corpus magis videatur sequi leges loci quam spiritus.	509. Second as follows: the body of Christ, being in the empyrean heaven, is now on the altar, and it does not pass through the middle; therefore an angel will be able to do this, since a body seems more to follow the laws of place than a spirit does [William of Ware, Sent. 2 d.2 q.11 arg.1].
510 Contra: Nulla pars temporis potest transire a futuro in praeteritum nisi per praesens; sed ita videtur esse essentialis ordo inter partes loci ƿsicut inter partes temporis; igitur non poterit transiri ab extremo in extremum nisi per medium.	510. On the contrary: No part of time can pass from the future to the past save through the present; but the essential order between the parts of place seems to be just like that between the parts of time; therefore a transit from extreme to extreme will not be possible save through the middle [William of Ware, Sent. 2 q.11 arg.2 to the opposite].
	I. To the Question
511 Hic dicunt quidam quod extrema possunt intelligi aut duo 'ubi' distantia, inter quae est aliquod medium quod nihil est extremorum, - aut duo immediata, inter quae sunt media, quorum tamen quodlibet est aliquid extremorum.	511. It is said here by some that extremes can be understood either as two distant 'wheres' between which there is some middle that is not part of the extremes, or as two immediate 'wheres' between which there are middles yet any one of them is some part of the extremes.
512 Loquendo de mediis secundo modo et de motu continuo angeli, dico quod non potest continue transire ab extremo in extremum (loquendo sic de extremis), nisi pertranseundo per tale medium quod est utriusque extremi, quia tale medium est ratio continuitatis inter extrema transita, sicut patet ex definitione medii X Metaphysicae.	512. Speaking of middles in the second way and of the continuous motion of an angel, I say that he cannot pass from extreme to extreme (speaking in this second way about extremes) save by passing through such a middle as is part of each extreme, because such a middle is the idea of continuity between the extremes passed through, as is plain from the definition of a middle in Metaphysics 10.5.1057a21-26.
513 Similiter etiam videtur esse loquendo de motu continuo et de medio alio modo dicto, quia si movetur continue, non est totaliter in altero termino: igitur partim in uno et partim in altero, vel in medio inter ambo; non enim potest dici - ut videtur - quod sit in parte unius extremi et in parte alterius et tamen quod omnino non sit in tali medio inter talia extrema, quia tunc esset in duobus locis discontinuatis et nullo modo in loco medio, quod non videtur sibi posse competere virtute naturali. ƿ	513. It seems to be similar when speaking of continuous motion and of a middle said in the other way [sc. the first, n.511], because, if an angel moves continuously, he is not completely in either extreme; therefore he is partly in one and partly in the other, or he is in the middle between both; for it cannot be said - as it seems - that he is in part of one extreme and in part of the other and yet that he is altogether not in such a middle between such extremes, because then he would be in two discontinuous places and in not in any way in the middle place, which does not seem to belong to him by natural power [nn.262-64].
514 Si autem loquamur de motu indivisibili, dico quod in tali motu potest pertransire ab extremo in extremum immediatum, non transeundo per medium quod est aliquid utriusque extremi; immo necesse est hoc, quia si transiret per tale medium, continue transiret et non instantanee.	514. But if we are speaking of indivisible motion, I say that in such a motion an angel can pass from extreme to immediate extreme without passing through a middle that is some part of either extreme; rather this must be the case, because if he were to pass through such a middle he would pass continuously and not instantaneously [n.512].
515 Sed de extremis distantibus est dubium. Patet quidem, ex quaestione praecedente, quod non potest se facere in extremo distante mutatione includente totam realitatem motus. - Sed numquid potest se facere in extremo distante, praecise includente realitatem termini motus, ita quod in aliquo toto tempore sit in a 'ubi' et in parte illius temporis praecise sit in b 'ubi' (ita quod b 'ubi' sit distans ab a 'ubi' per aliquod medium, in quo 'medio' numquam fuerit, nec in tempore nec in instanti)? Videtur probabiliter quod non, quia ordo praefixus a superiore agente videtur esse necessarius cuicumquae agenti inferiori quando habet actionem praecise circa talia ordinata (exemplum: ordo formarum naturalium, succedentium sibi in generatione naturali, determinatus est ab instituente naturam, et ideo respectu cuiuslibet agentis naturalis est necessarius, ita quod nullum agens naturale potest facere immediate acetum nisi de vino); igitur, cum a Deo sit ordo partium principalium universi cuilibet agenti creato et virtuti creatae ƿinditus, videtur iste ordo esse necessarius, quando debet agere circa ista quorum est talis ordo. Ergo angelus, quando movet se per corpora quorum est talis ordo, non potest absque omni ordine de quocumque 'ubi' facere se in quodcumque 'ubi' immediate; tunc enim nulla distantia videretur impedire actionem eius.	515. However as to distant extremes there is doubt. It is plain indeed from the preceding question [nn.503-504] that an angel cannot put himself in a distant extreme with a change that involves the whole reality of motion. - But can he really put himself in a distant extreme that involves precisely the reality of the term of motion, so that in some whole time he is in 'where' a and in part of that time he is precisely in 'where' b (such that 'where' b is distant from 'where' a by some middle, and the angel was never in this middle, whether in time or in an instant)? It seems probably that he cannot, because an order pre-established by a superior agent seems to be necessary for any inferior agent when the inferior agent does an action precisely about things in that order (an example: the order of natural forms that succeed each other in natural generation is determined by the institutor of nature, and so this order is necessary in respect of any natural agent, such that no natural agent can make vinegar immediately save from wine); therefore, since the order of the principal parts of the universe has been imposed by God on every created agent and created power, this order seems to be a necessary one when a natural agent moves itself through bodies to which such an order belongs. So when an angel moves himself through bodies to which such an order belongs, he cannot put himself in any 'where' whatever and follow no order about any 'where' whatever; for then no distance would seem to impede his action.
516 Et si obicias quod ista ratio concludit contra aliud membrum 'de mediis quae sunt extremorum', - dico quod non, quia ibi, transeundo de uno 'ubi' immediate ad aliud 'ubi' in instanti, habet omnia illa 'ubi' ordine quodam naturae (inter quae est ordo potentialis ex natura rei), sed non oportet quod habeat ea ordine durationis; si autem transiret a distante in distans absque ordine omni modo, tunc nullo ordine - nec naturae nec durationis - haberet illa quorum est ordo naturalis, circa quae tamen operatur praesupponens necessario ordinem eorum.	516. And if you object that this argument [n.515] is conclusive against the second member, 'about middles that are part of the extremes' [n.514], I deny it, because in that case, when an angel passes in an instant immediately from one 'where' to another 'where', he has all the 'wheres' in some order of nature (and between these 'wheres' there is, from the nature of the thing, a potential order), but he need not have them in an order of duration; and if he passes from a distant 'where' to a distant 'where' without any order in any way, then he would, without any order at all whether of nature or of duration, possess things to which a natural order belongs even though his acting about them necessarily presupposes the order of them.
	II. To the Principal Arguments
517 Ad primum argumentum dico quod malus angelus potest inordinate velle; nec oportet, quod bonus tantum ordinate vult, quod velit virtute propria, - et ita si vult statim esse in 'ubi' aliquo, non tamen vult quod potentia propria sit ibi, quia hoc esset inordinate velle. Si tamen talis potentia non convenit sibi, sed velle quod ƿpotentia Dei statim sit ibi, - est verisimile quod Deus condescendat voluntati eius (si talis sit), ut faciat eum in tali 'ubi'; numquam autem potentia propria potest alicubi esse nisi eo modo quo convenit suae potentiae.	517. To the first argument [n.508] I say that a bad angel can will disorderedly; and a good angel, just because he only wills orderedly, need not will with his own power - and so, if a good angel wills to be at once in some 'where', still he does not will to be there by his own power, because this would be to will disorderedly. If however such power does not belong to the good angel but he wills to be there at once by the power of God, it is likely that God would accede to his will (if such it be), so as to put the angel in such 'where'; but an angel can never by his own power be anywhere save in the way in which it belongs to his power.
518 Ad secundum dico quod corpus Christi potentia infinita fit praesens in altari, de quo in IV libro. Potentia autem illa quodcumque medium inter extrema potest habere pro non medio, et ordinem pro non ordine, quia est supra illum ordinem, praefigens illum et non habens ipsum pro praefixo; non sic autem virtus angeli limitata.	518. To the second [n.509] I say that the body of Christ is by his infinite power made to be present on the altar, on which point see 4 d.10 p.1 q.3 n.5. But that infinite power can hold any middle between extremes to be no middle, and can hold order for no order, because he is above that order, being the one who prefixes it and not having it prefixed for him; but the limited power of an angel is not of this sort.
519 Ex isto apparet ad illud De sensu et sensato, quod omissum fuit in quaestione 5 de locatione angeli. Non enim est inconveniens aliquam alterationem esse totam simul, quando scilicet agens respicit totum passum tamquam terminum indivisibilem et formam secundum ultimum gradum (secundum quem ipsam totam inducit tamquam indivisibilem); tunc mutatione indivisibili inducitur forma perfecta in passo divisibili. Sed secundum talem formam non est motus, sed tantum mutatio una, - vel forte plures habitae (aut ordine durationis, aut naturae), sicut ipse dicit ibi quod ((si magnum fuerit, habitum ab habito patitur)); quod potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo, quod pars posterior a parte priore - prius ƿnaturaliter perfecta - perficiatur naturaliter posterius, ita quod sit tantum ordo naturae inter mutationem partis prioris et posterioris; alio modo, quod sit ordo durationis, puta quod pars posterior movetur successive a parte priore et tamen 'pars prior' mutata est praecise ab ipso agente extrinseco (iste secundus modus videtur improbabilior, nisi ponatur partem priorem - transmutatam - esse imperfectiorem transmutante ipsam, et ita non posset subito transmutare sicut ipsa' subito transmutaretur ab agente extrinseco).	519. From this is apparent the response to the passage from On Sense and Sensibles 6.446b28-7a6 [n.404, 299], which was passed over in question 5 about the place of an angel. For it is not unacceptable that some alteration is complete all at once, namely when the agent has regard to the whole passive subject as an indivisible term and to the form in its ultimate degree (according to which degree it introduces the whole form as an indivisible); in that case a perfect form is introduced by an indivisible change in a divisible subject. But according to such form there is no motion, but only a single change - or perhaps several changes are had (in the order either of duration or of nature), as Aristotle himself there says, that "if it was large, it undergoes one complete change after another" [n.299]; which can be understood in two ways: in one way that a later part is naturally perfected later by a prior part - the prior part naturally perfect before -, so that there is only an order of nature between the change of the prior and of the later part; in another way that there is an order of duration, namely that a later part is moved in succession by a prior part and yet the prior part was changed precisely by the extrinsic agent itself (this second way seems less probable, unless one posits that the prior part -already changed - is more imperfect than what changes it, and thus that it cannot change the later part at once in the way it was itself changed by the extrinsic agent).
520 Dicit igitur ibi Philosophus quod 'non est ita in multiplicatione soni, sicut in luce', quia multiplicatio illa soni cum quanto, quae fit cum motu locali, necessario est successiva, - non sic multiplicatio illa lucis; et ita simultas non repugnat rationi alterationis sicut rationi loci mutationis, et hoc comparando ad virtutem naturalem. Sed tamen numquam est, nec in alterationibus quae sunt motus prima mutatio, sicut nec in loci mutationibus, quia ubi est mutatio instantanea, ibi illa non est mutatio initians motum; nec sequitur etiam universaliter ubi motus sequitur, si est dare immutationem quae est terminus quietis praecedentis (ubi autem quietem sequitur mutatio immediate propter perfectionem virtutis ipsius agentis, ibi non est mutatio terminans quietem praecedentem).	520. So the Philosopher says there that "things in change of sound are not as they are in light," because the multiplication in quantity of a sound, which takes place along with local motion, is necessarily successive - but not so the multiplication of light; and so simultaneity is not repugnant to the idea of alteration as it is to the idea of change of place, and this when making reference to natural power. Yet, however, there is never simultaneity in alterations that are a first change of motion, just as neither in changes of place, because where change is instantaneous, there the change is not a change initiating motion; nor even does simultaneity follow universally where motion follows, if there is a change that is the term of the preceding rest (but where rest, because of the perfection of the power of the agent, is followed immediately by a change, there no change terminating the preceding rest exists).