Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 11

Latin	English
[CAP. 11. DE DIVISIONE NOMINUM SIGNIFICANTIUM AD PLACITUM, PUTA IN NOMINA PRIMAE IMPOSITIONIS ET IN NOMINA SECUNDAE IMPOSITIONIS]	[Chapter 11 On the division of names signifying by convention, for example into names of first and of second imposition]
Positis divisionibus quae possunt competere tam terminis naturaliter significantibus quam etiam terminis ad placitum institutis, dicendum est de quibusdam divisionibus competentibus terminis ad placitum institutis.	Now the divisions that can belong to terms signifying naturally as well as established by convention have been given, we should speak of certain divisions belonging to terms established by convention.
Est autem prima divisio talis: nominum ad placitum significantium quaedam sunt nomina primae impositionis et quaedam sunt nomina secundae impositionis. Nomina secundae impositionis sunt nomina imposita ad significandum signa ad placitum instituta et illa quae consequuntur talia signa, sed nonnisi dum sunt signa.	The first such division is that of names signifying by convention, some are names of first imposition, and some are names of second imposition. Names of second imposition are names imposed for signifying signs established by convention and those things which follow from such signs – but only while they are signs.
Verumtamen hoc commune ‘nomen secundae impositionis’ potest dupliciter accipi.	Nevertheless, the common term ‘name of second imposition’ can be understood in two senses.
Scilicet large, et tunc omne illud est nomen secundae impositionis quod significat voces ad placitum institutas, sed nonnisi quando sunt ad placitum institutae, sive illud nomen sit commune etiam intentionibus animae quae sunt signa naturalia sive non.	In the broad sense, a name of second imposition is everything that signifies utterances established by convention, but only when they are established by convention, whether that name is also common to intentions of the soul, which are natural signs, or not.
Talia autem nomina sunt huiusmodi ‘nomen’, ‘pronomen’, ‘coniunctio’, ‘verbum’, ‘casus’, ‘numerus’, ‘modus’, ‘tempus’ et huiusmodi, accipiendo ista vocabula illo modo quo utitur eis grammaticus. Et vocantur ista nomina ‘nomina nominum’, quia non imponuntur nisi ad significandum partes orationis, et hoc nonnisi dum istae partes sunt significativae. Illa enim nomina quae praedicantur de vocibus ita quando non sunt significativae sicut quando sunt significativae, non vocantur nomina secundae impositionis.	Now such names are ‘name’, ‘pronoun’, ‘conjunction’, ‘verb’, ‘case’, ‘number’, ‘mood’, ‘tense’, and the like - understanding these words in the way the grammarian uses them. And these names are called "names of names", because they are imposed only to signify parts of speech, and only while these parts are significative. For names that are predicated of utterances when they are not significative just as much as when they are significative are not called names of second imposition.
Et ideo talia nomina ‘qualitas’, ‘prolatum’, ‘vox’ et huiusmodi, quamvis significent voces ad placitum institutas et verificentur de eis, quia tamen ita significarent eas si non essent significativae sicut nunc, ideo non sunt nomina secundae impositionis. Sed ‘nomen’ est nomen secundae impositionis, quia ista vox ‘homo’, nec aliqua alia, antequam imponebatur ad significandum non erat nomen, et similiter ‘hominis’ antequam imponebatur ad significandum nullius casus erat, et ita est de aliis.	Therefore, names such as ‘quality’, ‘uttered’, ‘utterance’, and suchlike, although they signify utterances established by convention and are verified of them, because they would still signify those utterances just as much if they were not significative as they do now, are not therefore names of second imposition. But ‘name’ is a name of second imposition, because the utterance ‘man’ (or any other) was not a name before it was imposed to signify, and similarly ‘man’s’, before it was imposed to signify, had no case, and so on.
Stricte autem dicitur ‘nomen secundae impositionis’ illud quod non significat nisi signa ad placitum instituta, ita quod non potest competere intentionibus animae quae sunt naturalia signa, cuiusmodi sunt talia ‘figura’, ‘coniugatio’ et huiusmodi.	But in the narrow sense, a "name of second imposition" is that which signifies only signs established by convention, in such a way that it cannot be applied to intentions of the soul, which are natural signs. Of this sort are ‘inflection’, ‘conjugation’, and suchlike.
Omnia autem alia nomina ab istis, quae scilicet non sunt nomina secundae impositionis nec uno modo nec alio, vocantur nomina primae impositionis.	And all names other than these, namely, which are not names of second imposition either in the one way or the other, are called "names of first imposition."
Verumtamen nomen primae impositionis dupliciter accipi potest, scilicet large, et sic omnia nomina quae non sunt nomina secundae impositionis sunt nomina primae impositionis. Et sic talia signa syncategorematica ‘omnis’, ‘nullus’, ‘aliquis’, ‘quilibet’ et huiusmodi sunt nomina primae impositionis.	Nevertheless, ‘name of first imposition’ can be understood in two senses. In the broad sense, all names that are not names of second imposition are names of first imposition. And thus syncategorematic signs such as ‘every’, ‘no’, ‘some’, ‘any’, and the like, are names of first imposition.
Aliter potest accipi stricte, et tunc sola nomina categorematica, quae non sunt nomina secundae impositionis, vocantur nomina primae impositionis, et non nomina syncategorematica.	Otherwise it can be understood in the narrow sense, and then only categorematic names which are not names of second imposition are called names of first imposition, and not syncategorematic names.
Nomina autem primae impositionis, stricte accipiendo ‘nomen primae impositionis’, sunt in duplici differentia, quia quaedam sunt nomina primae intentionis et quaedam sunt nomina secundae intentionis. Nomina secundae intentionis vocantur illa nomina quae praecise imposita sunt ad significandum intentiones animae, vel praecise intentiones animae quae sunt signa naturalia, et alia signa ad placitum instituta vel consequentia talia signa. Et talia nomina sunt omnia talia ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘universale’, ‘praedicabile’ et huiusmodi, quia talia nomina non significant nisi intentiones animae quae sunt signa naturalia vel signa voluntarie instituta.	Now names of first imposition, understanding ‘name of first imposition’ narrowly, are of two kinds, for some are names of first intention, and others are names of second intention. "Names of second intention" are those which are precisely imposed to signify intentions of the soul, or precisely intentions of the soul which are natural signs, or other signs established by convention, or what follow from such signs. And all names such as’genus’, ‘species’, ‘universal’, ‘predicable’, and so on, are such, for such names signify only intentions of the soul, which are natural signs, or else signs voluntarily established.
Unde potest dici quod hoc commune ‘nomen secundae intentionis’ potest accipi stricte et large. Large illud dicitur nomen secundae intentionis quod significat intentiones animae quae sunt naturalia signa, sive etiam significet signa ad placitum instituta tantum dum sunt signa sive non. Et sic aliquod nomen secundae intentionis et primae impositionis est etiam nomen secundae impositionis. Stricte autem illud solum dicitur nomen secundae intentionis quod praecise significat intentiones animae quae sunt naturalia signa, et sic accipiendo nullum nomen secundae intentionis est nomen secundae impositionis.	Hence, it can be said that the common term ‘name of second intention’ can be taken in a narrow sense and in a broad sense. In the broad sense, a "name of second intention" is what signifies intentions of the soul which are natural signs, whether it also signifies signs established by convention (only while they are signs), or not. And so a name of second intention and of first imposition is also a name of second imposition. But in the narrow sense, a "name of second intention" is only what precisely signifies intentions of the soul, which are natural signs, and understood in this way, no name of second intention is a name of second imposition.
Nomina autem primae intentionis vocantur omnia alia nomina a praedictis, quae videlicet significant aliquas res quae non sunt signa, nec consequentia talia signa, cuiusmodi sunt omnia talia ‘homo’, ‘animal’, ‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’, `albedo’, ‘album’, ‘ens’, ‘verum’, ‘bonum’ et huiusmodi, quorum aliqua significant praecise res quae non sunt signa nata supponere pro aliis, aliqua significant talia signa et simul cum hoc alias res.	Now "names of first imposition" are all other names than those mentioned, namely, those that signify some things that are not signs or what follow from such signs. All such names as ‘man’, ‘animal’, ‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’, ‘whiteness’, ‘white’, ‘being’, ‘true’, ‘good’, and so on, are like this, of which some signify precisely things that are not signs that naturally supposit for other things, others signify such signs and other things together with that.
Ex quibus omnibus colligi potest quod quaedam nomina significant praecise signa ad placitum instituta, et nonnisi dum, sunt signa, quaedam autem praecise significant signa tam ad placitum instituta quam signa naturalia. Quaedam vero significant praecise res quae non sunt signa talia, quae sunt partes propositionis; quaedam indifferenter significant tales res quae non sunt partes propositionis nec orationis et etiam signa talia, cuiusmodi sunt talia nomina ‘res’, ‘ens’, ‘aliquid’ et huiusmodi.	From all this, it can be gathered that certain names signify precisely signs established by convention, and only while they are signs, but others precisely signify things that are established by convention as well as natural signs. But certain [names] signify precisely things which are not such signs, which are parts of a proposition. Some indifferently signify such things as are not parts of a proposition or of speech, and also signify such signs, such as names like ‘thing’, ‘being’, ‘something’, and so on.