Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 10

Latin	English
[CAP. 10. DE DIVISIONE NOMINUM IN MERE ABSOLUTA ET CONNOTATIVA]	C. 10. ON THE DIVISION OF NAMES INTO PURELY ABSOLUTE, AND CONNOTATIVE
Postquam de nominibus concretis et abstractis est discussum, nunc de alia divisione nominum, quibus scholastici frequenter utuntur, est dicendum. Unde sciendum quod nominum quaedam sunt absoluta mere, quaedam sunt connotativa. Nomina mere absoluta sunt illa quae non significant aliquid principaliter et aliud vel idem secundario, sed quidquid significatur per illud nomen, aeque primo significatur, sicut patet de hoc nomine 'animal' quod non significat nisi boves, asinos et homines, et sic de aliis animalibus, et non significat unum primo et aliud secundario, ita quod oporteat aliquid significari in recto et aliud in obliquo, nec in definitione exprimente quid nominis oportet ponere talia distincta in diversis casibus vel aliquod verbum adiectivum.	After concrete and abstract names have been discussed, we should now speak about another division of names which scholastics frequently use. Hence you should know that certain names are 'purely absolute', certain are 'connotative'. Purely absolute names are those which do not signify something principally and something else (or the same thing) secondarily, but rather, whatever is signified by that name, is equally signified primarily. Thus the name 'animal' clearly does not signify anything but cattle, donkeys and men, and so for other animals, and does not signify one primarily and another secondarily in such a way that something has to be signified in the nominative case and another in an oblique case, and in the nominal definition it is not necessary to put such distinct terms in different cases, or to use some participle.
Immo, proprie loquendo talia nomina non habent definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, quia proprie loquendo unius nominis habentis definitionem exprimentem quid nominis est una definitio explicans quid nominis, sic scilicet quod talis nominis non sunt diversae orationes exprimentes quid nominis habentes partes distinctas, quarum aliqua significat aliquid quod non eodem modo importatur per aliquam partem alterius orationis.	Indeed, properly speaking, such names do not have a nominal definition, since, properly speaking, there is one definition of a name that has a nominal definition, explicating the nominal essence, thus it is evident that of such a name there are not different nominal definitions having distinct parts, of which one signifies something that is not conveyed in the same way by some part of the other expression.
Sed talia quantum ad quid nominis possunt aliquo modo pluribus orationibus non easdem res secundum suas partes significantibus explicari, et ideo nulla earum est proprie definitio exprimens quid nominis.	But, as far as their nominal definition is concerned, such names can be explained in some way by several expressions that do not signify the same things by their parts. And on that account none of them is properly a nominal definition.
Verbi gratia 'angelus' est nomen mere absolutum, saltem si non sit nomen officii sed tantum substantiae. Et istius nominis non est aliqua una definitio exprimens quid nominis, nam unus explicat quid hoc nomen significat, sic dicendo 'intelligo per angelum substantiam abstractam a materia'; alius sic 'angelus est substantia intellectualis et incorruptibilis'; alius sic 'angelus est substantia simplex, non componens cum alio'.	For example, 'angel' is a purely absolute name (at least if it is not the name of a function, but of a substance only). And there is not one nominal definition of this name, for one person explains what the name means by saying 'I understand by an angel a substance abstracted from matter', another saying 'an angel is an intellectual and incorruptible substance', and another 'an angel is a simple substance that does not join with any other'.
Et ita bene explicat unus quid significat hoc nomen sicut alius. Et tamen aliquis terminus positus in una oratione significat aliquid quod non significatur eodem modo per terminum alterius orationis, et ideo nulla earum est proprie definitio exprimens quid nominis.	And so one explains what the name means just as well as the other. And yet some term occurring in one expression signifies something that is not signified in the same way by some term in the other expression, and for that reason none of them is properly a nominal definition.
Et ita est de nominibus mere absolutis quod stricte loquendo nullum eorum habet definitionem exprimentem quid nominis. Talia autem nomina sunt huiusmodi 'homo', 'animal', 'capra', 'lapis', 'arbor', 'ignis', 'terra, 'aqua', 'caelum', 'albedo', 'nigredo', 'calor', 'dulcedo', 'odor', 'sapor' et huiusmodi.	And so it is for purely absolute names that (strictly speaking) none of them has a nominal definition. And such names are as follows: 'man', 'animal', 'goat', 'stone', 'tree', 'fire', 'earth', 'water', 'heaven', 'whiteness', 'blackness', 'heat', 'sweetness', 'smell', 'taste', and the like.
Nomen autem connotativum est illud quod significat aliquid primario et aliquid secundario. Et tale nomen proprie habet definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, et frequenter oportet ponere unum illius definitionis in recto et aliud in obliquo. Sicut est de hoc nomine 'album, nam 'album' habet definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, in qua una dictio ponitur in recto et alia in obliquo.	But a connotative name is one that signifies something primarily and something secondarily. And such a name does properly have a nominal definition, and often we have to put one part of that definition in the nominative case and the other in an oblique case. So it is for the name 'white', for 'white' has a nominal definition, in which one word is put in the nominative and another one in an oblique case.
Unde si quaeras, quid significat hoc nomen 'album', dices quod illud idem quod ista oratio tota 'aliquid informatum albedine' vel 'aliquid habens albedinem'. Et patet quod una pars orationis istius ponitur in recto et alia in obliquo.	Hence, if you ask what the name 'a white thing' signifies, you will say: that name signifies the same as the entire expression 'something informed by whiteness' or 'something having whiteness'. And it is clear that one part of that expression is put in the nominative and the other part in an oblique case.
Potest etiam aliquando aliquod verbum cadere in definitione exprimente quid nominis, sicut si quaeras, quid significat hoc nomen 'causa', potest dici quod idem quod haec oratio 'aliquid ad cuius esse sequitur aliud' vel 'aliquid potens producere aliud', vel aliquid huiusmodi.	Sometimes too a verb can occur in the nominal definition, so, for instance, if you ask what the name 'cause' signifies, it can be said [that it signifies] the same as 'something on whose being something else follows' or 'something that can produce another thing', or something of that sort.
Huiusmodi autem nomina connotativa sunt omnia nomina concreta primo modo dicta, de quibus dictum est in quinto capitulo. Et hoc quia talia concreta significant unum in recto et aliud in obliquo; hoc est dictu, in definitione exprimente quid nominis debet poni unus rectus, significans unam rem, et alius obliquus, significans aliam rem, sicut patet de omnibus talibus 'iustus', 'albus', 'animatus', 'humanum', et sic de aliis.	Now such connotative names include all concrete names of the first sort (which were mentioned in c. 5). And this is because such concrete names signify one thing in the nominative and another in an oblique case; that is to say, in the nominal definition there ought to be put one nominative term, signifying one thing, and another oblique term, signifying another thing, as is clear for all such names as 'just', 'white', 'animate', 'human', and so on.
Huiusmodi etiam nomina sunt omnia nomina relativa, quia semper in sua definitione ponuntur diversa idem diversis modis, vel distincta, significantia, sicut patet de hoc nomine 'simile'.	Such names also include all relative names, since in their definition there are always put different terms signifying the same thing in different ways or distinct things, such as is is clear for the name 'similar'.
Si enim definiatur simile, debet dici sic 'simile est aliquid habens qualitatem talem qualem habet aliud', vel aliquo modo consimili debet definiri. Unde de exemplis non est magna cura.	For if 'similar' is defined, it should be expressed as follow: 'the similar is something having a quality such as another thing has', or it ought to be defined in some similar way. Hence there is no great importance attached to these examples.
Ex quo patet quod hoc commune 'nomen en connotativum' est superius ad hoc commune 'nomen relativum', et hoc accipiendo hoc commune 'nomen connotativum' largissime.	From this it is clear that the common term 'connotative name' is of a higher genus than the common term 'relative name', taking here the common term 'connotative name' in the broadest sense.
Talia etiam nomina sunt omnia nomina pertinentia ad genus quantitatis, secundum illos qui ponunt quantitatem non esse aliam rem a substantia et qualitate, sicut 'corpus', secundum eos, debet poni nomen connotativum.	Such names also include all names pertaining to the genus of quantity, according to those who propose that quantity is not another thing from substance and quality, so that 'body', according to them, ought to be supposed a connotative name.
Unde secundum eos debet dici quod corpus non est aliud nisi aliqua res habens partem distantem a parte secundum longum, latum et profundum; et quantitas continua et permanens non est nisi res habens partem distantem a parte, ita quod ista est definitio exprimens quid nominis ipsius.	Hence, according to them, it ought to be said that a body is nothing but some thing having part distant from part in respect of length, breadth and depth; and continuous and permanent quantity is nothing but some thing having part distant from part', so that this is a nominal definition.
Tales etiam consequenter habent ponere quod 'figura', 'curvitas', 'rectitudo', 'longitudo', 'latitudo' et huiusmodi sunt nomina connotativa. Immo, qui ponunt quod quaelibet res est substantia vel qualitas, habent ponere quod omnia contenta in aliis praedicamentis a substantia et qualitate sunt nomina connotativa; et etiam quaedam de genere qualitatis sunt connotativa, sicut ostendetur inferius.	Such persons also have to maintain that 'figure', 'curvedness', 'rightness', 'length', 'breadth' and the like are connotative names. Indeed, those who suppose that every thing is either a substance or a quality have to suppose that all the contents in categories other than substance and quality are connotative names; and even certain names in the category of quality are connotative, as will be shown below.
Sub istis etiam nominibus comprehenduntur omnia talia 'verum', 'bonum', 'unum', 'potentia', 'actus', 'intellectus', 'intelligibile', 'voluntas', 'volibile' et huiusmodi. Unde de intellectu est sciendum quod habet quid nominis istud 'intellectus est anima potens intelligere', ita quod anima significatur per rectum et actus intelligendi per aliam partem.	Under these names are also comprehended all such as 'true', 'good', 'one', 'power', 'act', 'intellect', 'intelligible', 'will', 'willible'and the like. Hence, concerning intellect you should know that it has this nominal essence: 'Intellect is soul able to understand.', so that the soul is signified by the nominative, and the act of understanding by the other part.
Hoc autem nomen 'intelligibile' est nomen connotativum, et significat intellectum tam in recto quam in obliquo, quia definitio sua est ista 'intelligibile est aliquid apprehensibile ab intellectu'. Ibi intellectus significatur per hoc nomen 'aliquid', et per istum obliquum 'intellectu' significatur etiam intellectus.	But the name 'intelligible' is a connotative name, and signifies the intellect in the nominative just as in an oblique case, because its definition is 'an intelligible thing is something that can be apprehended by the intellect.' Here the intellect is signified by the name 'something', and the intellect is also signified by the oblique 'by an intellect'.
Et eodem modo dicendum est de 'vero' et 'bono', quia 'verum', quod ponitur convertibile cum 'ente', significat idem quod 'intelligibile'. 'Bonum' etiam, quod est convertibiIe cum 'ente', significat idem quod haec oratio 'aliquid secundum rectam rationem volibile vel diligibile'.	And we should say the same of 'true' and 'good', since 'true', which is supposed convertible with 'being', signifies the same as 'intelligible'. 'Good' too, which is convertible with 'being',signifies the same as the expression 'something willable or lovable according to right reason'.