Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 13

Latin	English
CAP. 13. DE DIVISIONE NOMINUM ET TERMINORUM IN AEQUIVOCA, UNIVOCA ET DENOMINATIVA, ET QUID EST AEQUIVOCUM ET QUOT MODIS DICITUR	[Chapter 13. On the division of names and terms into equivocal, univocal and denominative, and what ‘equivocal’ is, and in how many ways it is said]
Sequitur post praedicta tractare de divisione terminorum ad placitum institutorum quae est per aequivocum, univocum et denominativum. Quamvis enim Aristoteles in Praedicamentis tractet de aequivocis, univocis et denominativis, tamen ad praesens intendo tantum de univocis et aequivocis tractare, quia de denominativis dictum est superius.	After the above, it follows to treat of the division of terms instituted by convention into equivocal, univocal and denominative. Now, although Aristotle in the Categories treats of equivocals, univocals and denominatives, still, for now, I aim to treat only of univocals and equivocals, because denominatives were discussed above.
Est autem primo sciendum quod sola vox vel aliud signum ad placitum institutum est aequivocum vel univocum, et ideo intentio animae vel conceptus non est aequivocus nec univocus proprie loquendo.	It should be known first, that only an utterance or another sign instituted by convention is equivocal or univocal, and, therefore an intention of the soul, or concept, is neither equivocal nor univocal, properly speaking.
Est autem vox illa aequivoca quae significans plura non est signum subordinatum uni conceptui, sed est signum unum pluribus conceptibus seu intentionibus animae subordinatum. Et hoc intendit Aristoteles quando dicit nomen commune esse idem, sed rationem substantialem esse diversam, hoc est, conceptus vel intentiones animae, cuiusmodi sunt descriptiones et definitiones et etiam conceptus simplices, sunt diversi, tamen vox una est. Hoc expresse patet de dictione diversorum idiomatum, nam in uno idiomate imponitur ad significandum illud idem quod significatur per talem conceptum et in alio imponitur ad significandum illud idem quod significatur per alium conceptum, et ita pluribus conceptibus seu passionibus animae subordinatur in significando.	Now that utterance is ‘equivocal’ which, signifying several things, is not a sign subordinated to one concept, but rather is one sign subordinated to several concepts or intentions of the soul. And this is what Aristotle intends when he says that the common name is the same but the definition of the substance is diverse. That is, the concepts or intentions of the soul, such as descriptions and definitions and also simple concepts, are diverse, yet the utterance is one. This is expressly obvious of an expression that belongs to different languages. For in one language it is imposed to signify that same thing signified through one concept, and in the other it is imposed to signify that same thing signified through another concept. And so it is subordinated in signifying to several concepts or passions of the soul.
Tale autem aequivocum est duplex. Unum est aequivocum a casu, quando scilicet vox pluribus conceptibus subordinatur, et ita uni ac si non subordinaretur alteri et ita significat unum ac si non significaret aliud, sicut est de hoc nomine ‘Socrates’, quod imponitur pluribus hominibus.	Now such an equivocal term is of twofold. One is equivocal by chance, namely, when an utterance is subordinated to several concepts and thus to the one as if it were not subordinated to the other, and signifies one as if it did not signify the other, just as it is concerning the name ‘Socrates’, which is imposed on several men.
Aliud est aequivocum a consilio, quando vox primo imponitur alicui vel aliquibus et subordinatur uni conceptui et postea propter aliquam similitudinem primi significati ad alquid aliud vel propter aliquam aliam rationem imponitur illi alteri, ita quod non imponeretur illi alteri nisi quia primo imponebatur alii, sicut est de hoc nomine ‘homo’.	The other is equivocal by design, when an utterance is first imposed on some thing or things and is subordinated to one concept, and afterwards, on account of some similitude of the first thing signified to something other than that, or for some other reason, it is imposed on that other thing, in a way that it would not be imposed on the other unless it was first imposed on the first thing. Just as it is with the name ‘man’.
Primo enim imponebatur ad significandum omnia animalia rationalia, ita quod imponebatur ad significandum omne illud quod continetur sub hoc conceptu ‘animal rationale’, postea autem utentes, videntes similitudinem inter talem hominem et imaginem hominis, utebantur quandoque hoc nomine ‘homo’ pro tali imagine, ita quod nisi hoc nomen homo fuisset primo impositum hominibus, non uterentur nec imponerent hoc nomen homo ad significandum vel standum pro tali imagine; et propter hoc dicitur ‘aequivocum a consilio’.	For it was first imposed to signify all rational animals, so that it was imposed to signify everything contained under the concept ‘rational animal’. But afterwards, the users, seeing a similitude between such a man and the image of a man, sometimes used the name ‘man’ for such an image, so that unless the name ‘man’ had first been imposed on men, the name ‘man’ would not be used or imposed for signifying or standing for such an image. And because of this, it is called ‘equivocal by design’.
‘Univocum’ autem dicitur omne illud quod est subordinatum uni conceptui, sive significet plura sive non. Tamen proprie loquendo non est univocum nisi significet vel natum sit significare plura aeque primo, ita tamen quod non significet illa plura nisi quia una intentio animae significat illa, ita quod sit signum subordinatum in significando uni signo naturali, quod est intentio seu conceptus animae.	Now all that which is subordinated to one concept is called ‘univocal’, whether it signifies several things or not. Yet, properly speaking, it is not ‘univocal’ unless it signifies, or naturally signifies, several things equally primarily, yet so that it does not signify those several things unless it is because one intention of the soul signifies those, so that it is a sign subordinated in signifying to one natural sign that is an intention or concept of the soul.
Talis autem divisio non tantum competit nominibus sed etiam verbis et universaliter cuilibet parti orationis, immo etiam sic quod aliquid potest esse aequivocum eo quod potest esse diversarum partium orationis, puta tam nomen quam verbum vel tam nomen quam participium vel adverbium, et sic de aliis partibus orationis.	But such a division not only belongs to names, but also to verbs, and in general to any part of speech whatever. Indeed, something can even be equivocal in that it can belong to diverse parts of speech, e.g. a name as well as a verb, or both a name and a participle or an adverb, and so on for other parts of speech).
Est autem intelligendum quod ista divisio terminorum per aequivocum et univocum non est simpliciter per opposita, ita quod haec sit omnino falsa ‘aliquod aequivocum est univocum’, immo vera est, quia vere et realiter eadem vox est aequivoca et univoca sed non respectu eorundem, sicut idem est pater et filius, non tamen respectu eiusdem, et idem est simile et dissimile non tamen eidem per idem.	Now it should be understood that this division of terms into equivocal and univocal is not simply by opposites so that ‘Some equivocal is univocal’ is wholly false. By contrast, it is true. For the same utterance is truly and really equivocal and univocal, but not in respect of the same things, just as the same person is a father and a son, yet not with respect to the same person, and the same thing is like and unlike, but not to the same thing in respect of the same.
Unde si sit aliqua dictio diversorum idiomatum, manifestum est quod potest esse univoca in utroque idiomate. Unde ille qui sciret alterum idioma tantum, nullam propositionem in qua poneretur distingueret, scienti tamen utrumque idioma est aequivoca. Unde scientes utrumque idioma in multis casibus distinguerent propositiones in quibus talis dictio poneretur, et ita idem terminus est uni univocus et alteri aequivocus.	Hence, if there is some expression that belongs to different languages, it is manifest that it can be univocal in both languages. Hence, the one who knew only one language would not distinguish between propositions in which the [same] word occurred. Yet to one knowing both languages, it is equivocal. Hence, those who know both languages would in many cases distinguish between propositions in which such an expression occurred. And thus the same term is univocal to one person and equivocal to another.
Ex praedictis colligi potest quod non semper univocum habet unam definitionem, quia non semper proprie definitur. Et ideo quando Aristoteles dicit quod est et ratio substantialis eadem, accipit rationem pro intentione animae sicut tamquam primario signo vox subordinatur.	From the above it can be gathered that a univocal term does not always have one definition, because it is not always properly defined. And therefore, when Aristotle [saying what a univocal is - Categories c.1] says that the definition of the substance is also the same, he understands ‘definition’ for the intention of the soul to which the utterance is subordinated as if to a primary sign.
Est autem sciendum quod ‘univocum’ dupliciter accipitur, scilicet large, pro omni voce vel signo ad placitum instituto correspondente uni conceptui; aliter accipitur stricte, pro aliquo tali praedicabili per se primo modo de aliquibus quibus est univocum, vel de pronomine demonstrante aliquam rem.	Now it should be known that ‘univocal’ is taken in two ways, namely broadly, for every utterance or sign given an interpretation, corresponding to one concept. In another way it is taken narrowly, for some such thing predicable per se in the first way [---] of certain things to which it is univocal, or of a pronoun indicating some thing.
Terminus autem denominativus, ad praesens, dupliciter potest accipi, scilicet stricte, et sic terminus incipiens sicut abstractum incipit et non habens consimilem finem et significans accidens dicitur terminus denominativus, sicut a ‘fortitudine’ ‘fortis’, a ‘iustitia’ ‘iustus’. Aliter dicitur large terminus habens consimile principium cum abstracto, sed non consimilem finem, sive significet accidens sive non, sicut ab ‘anima’ dicitur ‘animatus’.	But ‘denominative term’, can for now be taken in two ways: namely narrowly, and in this way a term that begins as an abstract name begins but does not have a similar ending and signifies an accident is called a ‘denominative term’. For example, from ‘strength’ - ‘strong’, from ‘justice’ - ‘just’. In another way, a ‘denominative term’ is broadly one having a similar beginning to an abstract one, but not a similar ending, whether it signifies an accident or not. For example, ‘besouled’ is so-called from ‘soul’.
Et haec de divisionibus terminorum sufficiant. Aliqua autem in praedictis omissa inferius supplebuntur.	Let these things be sufficient for the divisions of terms. (But some things omitted above will be supplied below).