Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 14

Latin	English
[CAP. 14. DE HOC COMMUNI ‘UNIVERSALE’ ET DE ‘SINGULARI’, OPPOSITO SIBI]	[Chapter 14. On the common term ‘universal’, and its opposite, ‘singular’]
Cum non sufficiat logico tam generalis notitia terminorum, sed oportet cognoscere terminos in speciali magis ideo postquam de divisionibus generalibus terminorum tractatum est, de quibusdam contentis sub aliquibus illarum divisionum prosequendum est.	Since it is not sufficient for the logician to have a general knowledge of terms, he has also to know terms more specifically. Therefore, after having dealt with the general divisions of terms we must continue with certain things falling under some members of these divisions.
Est autem primo tractandum de terminis secundae intentionis, secundo de terminis primae intentionis. Dictum autem est quod termini secundae intentionis sunt tales ‘universale’, ‘genus’, ‘species’ etc., ideo de illis quae ponuntur quinque universalia est modo dicendum. Primo tamen dicendum est de hoc communi ‘universale’ quod praedicatur de omni universali, et de singulari opposito sibi.	First we should treat of terms of second intention; secondly, of terms of first intention. It has been said that terms of second intention are such as ‘universal’, ‘genus’, ‘species’ etc, therefore we must say something about those which are given as the ‘five predicables’. But first we must speak of the common term ‘universal’, which is predicated of every universal, and of the ‘singular’ which is opposed to it.
Est autem primo sciendum quod ‘singulare’ dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo hoc nomen ‘singulare’ significat omne illud quod est unum et non plura. Et isto modo tenentes quod universale est quaedam qualitas mentis praedicabilis de pluribus, non tamen pro se sed pro illis pluribus, dicere habent quod quodlibet universale est vere et realiter singulare: quia sicut quaelibet vox, quantumcumque communis per institutionem, est vere et realiter singularis et una numero quia est una et non plures, ita intentio animae, significans plures res extra, est vere et realiter singularis et una numero, quia est una et non plures res, quamvis significet plures res.	First we should know that ‘singular’ is taken in two senses. In one sense the name ‘singular’ signifies that which is one thing and not several. And in this way, then those holding that a universal is a certain quality of the mind predicable of several things, although not for itself but for these several things, have to say that every universal is truly and really singular. For just as every word, however common by convention, is truly and really singular and one in number because it is one thing and not several things, so an intention of the soul, signifying several things outside the mind, is truly and really singular and one in number, because it is one thing and not several things, though it signifies many things.
Aliter accipitur hoc nomen ‘singulare’ pro omni illo quod est unum et non plura, nec est natum esse signum plurium. Et sic accipiendo ‘singulare’ nullum universale est singulare, quia quodlibet universale natum est esse signum plurium et natum est praedicari de pluribus. Unde vocando universale aliquid quod non est unum numero, - quam acceptionem multi attribuunt universali -, dico quod nihil est universale nisi forte abuteris isto vocabulo, dicendo populum esse unum universale, quia non est unum sed multa; sed illud puerile esset.	In another way the name ‘singular’ is understood for that which is one and not several, and is not of such a nature as to be the sign of several things. If ‘singular’ is understood in this way, no universal is singular, because every universal naturally is a sign of, and is predicated of, several things. Hence, if a universal is that which is not one in number - a meaning attributed by many to ‘universal’ – then I say that nothing is a universal, unless you perhaps will abuse this word by saying that a population is a universal, since it is not one but many, but that would be childish.
Dicendum est igitur quod quodlibet universale est una res singularis, et ideo non est universale nisi per significationem, quia est signum plurium. Et hoc est quod dicit Avicenna, V Metaphysicae: "Una forma apud intellectum est relata ad multitudinem, et secundum hunc respectum est universale, quoniam ipsum est intentio in intellectu, cuius comparatio non variatur ad quodcumque acceperis".	Therefore, it should be said that every universal is one singular thing and that it is not a universal except by signification, because it is a sign of several. And this is what Avicenna says in his commentary (Metaphysics V): “One form in the understanding is related to a multitude, and in this respect it is universal; for it is an intention in the understanding, whose comparison is not varied to whatever you accept”.
Et sequitur: "Haec forma, quamvis in comparatione individuorum sit universalis, tamen in comparatione animae singularis, in qua imprimitur, est individua. Ipsa enim est una ex formis quae sunt in intellectu". Vult dicere quod universale est una intentio singularis ipsius animae, nata praedicari de pluribus, ita quod propter hoc quod est nata praedicari de pluribus, non pro se sed pro illis pluribus, ipsa dicitur universalis; propter hoc autem quod est una forma, exsistens realiter in intellectu, dicitur singularis.	He follows: “Although this form is a universal in comparison to individuals, still - in comparison to the singular soul in which it is impressed – it is individual. For it is one thing out of the forms which are in the understanding”. He wishes to say that a universal is an intention of a singular soul, naturally predicated of several, so that, from being naturally predicated of several, not for itself but for these several, it is called universal; but from being a particular form really existing in the intellect, it is called singular.
Et ita ‘singulare’ primo modo dictum praedicatur de universali, non tamen secundo modo dictum; ad modum quo dicimus quod sol est causa universalis, et tamen vere est res particularis et singularis, et per consequens vere est causa singularis et particularis.	Thus ‘singular’ is predicated of a universal in the first sense but not in the second, in the manner in which we say that the sun is a universal cause and yet that it truly is a particular and singular thing, and as a consequence is truly a singular or individual cause.
Dicitur enim sol causa universalis, quia est causa plurium, scilicet omnium istorum inferiorum generabilium et corruptibilium. Dicitur autem causa particularis, quia est una causa et non plures causae. Sic intentio animae dicitur universalis, quia est signum praedicabile de pluribus; et dicitur etiam singularis, quia est una res et non plures res.	For the sun is called a universal cause because it is the cause of several things, namely of all those things below that are generable and corruptible. But it is said to be a particular cause because it is one cause and not several. Thus an intention of the soul is called a universal, because it is a sign predicable of several, and is also called singular because it is one thing and not several.
Verumtamen sciendum quod universale duplex est. Quoddam est universale naturaliter, quod scilicet naturaliter est signum praedicabile de pluribus, ad modum, proportionaliter, quo fumus naturaliter significat ignem et gemitus infirmi dolorem et risus interiorem laetitiam. Et tale universale non est nisi intentio animae, ita quod nulla substantia extra animam nec aliquod accidens extra animam est tale universale. Et de tali universali loquar in sequentibus capitulis.	But it should be noted that a universal is twofold. One sort is universal by nature; that is, naturally a sign predicable of several in the manner that smoke is naturally a sign of fire; weeping, a sign of grief; and laughter, a sign of inward joy. And such a universal is nothing except an intention of the soul, so that no substance outside the soul, nor any accident outside the soul is such a universal. And of such a universal I shall be speaking in the following chapters.
Aliud est universale per voluntariam institutionem. Et sic vox prolata, quae est vere una qualitas numero, est universalis, quia scilicet est signum voluntarie institutum ad significandum plura. Unde sicut vox dicitur communis, ita potest dici universalis; sed hoc non habet ex natura rei sed ex placito instituentium tantum.	The other sort of universal is by voluntary institution. And in this way an uttered word, which is truly a single quality in number, is universal, namely because it is a sign voluntarily instituted to signify many things. Hence, just as a word is called ‘common’, so it can be said to be called ‘universal’. But this does not hold by nature, but only by the convention of those instituting it.