Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 21

Latin	English
[1.21. DE SPECIE]	[Chapter 21. Of species]
Speciem similiter definiunt philosophi dicentes quod “species est illud quod praedicatur de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid”.	Philosophers define species in a similar way, saying that ‘species is that which is predicated of several different differing in number in respect of the kind of thing they are.
Circa quam dicendum est, sicut de genere, quod species est intentio animae, quae non est de essentia individuorum, quamvis sit praedicabilis de eis. Differt autem ista intentio ab intentione quae est genus, non tamquam totum a parte, quia realiter et proprie loquendo nec genus est pars speciei nec species est pars generis, sed in hoc differunt quod species est communis ad pauciora quam genus suum, ita quod genus est signum plurium et species pauciorum.	Concerning which it must be said, just as of genus, that species is an intention of the soul, which is not of the essence of individuals, although it is predicable of them. But that intention differs from the intention which is genus, not as the whole from the part, because really and properly speaking neither genus is a part of the species nor species is a part of the genus, but they differ in that species is common to fewer things than its genus, so that genus is the sign of several things, and species of fewer.
Unde sicut hoc nomen ‘animal’ significat plura, quia significat omnia animalia, hoc autem nomen ‘homo’ significat pauciora, quia significat tantum homines, ita est de genere et specie. Et hoc est speciem esse partem subiectivam generis, scilicet speciem significare pauciora quam genus. Sic etiam haec vox ‘homo’ potest dici pars huius vocis ‘animal’, hoc est haec vox ‘homo’ significat pauciora quam haec vox ‘animal’. Et sic accipiunt omnes recte loquentes istum terminum ‘pars subiectiva’.	Hence, just as the name ‘animal’ signifies several things, because it signifies all animals, but the name ‘man’ signifies fewer, because it signifies only men, so it is with genus and species. And thus it is that the species is a subjective part of the genus, namely the species signifies fewer things than the genus. Thus also the utterance ‘man’ can be called part of the utterance ‘animal’, that is, the utterance ‘man’ signifies fewer things than the utterance ‘animal’. And thus all those who speak correctly understand the term ‘subjective part’.
Similiter sicut genus non praedicatur de speciebus pro se sed pro rebus quas significat, ita species non praedicatur de pluribus pro se sed pro rebus. Ipsa enim species non est plura, quamvis praedicetur de pluribus. Nec etiam species est realiter in individuo, tunc enim esset pars individui, quod manifestum est esse falsum: tum quia nec est materia nec forma; tum quia aliqua sunt individua quae non habent partes, et per consequens species non est pars individui, sed est signum individui, immo significat omnes res individuales contentas sub ea.	Similarly, just as the genus is not predicated of species for itself, but for the things which it signifies, so the species is not predicated of several things for itself, but for the things. For the species itself is not several, although it is predicated of several. Nor also is the species really in the individual, for then it would be a part of the individual, which it is manifest is false, both because it is neither material nor form, and because some things are individuals which do not have parts, and as a consequence a species is not part of the individual, but is a sign of the individual, indeed it signifies all individual things contained under it.
Est autem sciendum quod intentionum, quae sunt genera et species, quaedam sunt genera generalissima, quaedam sunt genera et species subalternae, quaedam sunt species specialissimae.	But it must be known that of intentions, which are genus and species, certain are the most general genera, certain are genera and species which are subordinated, certain are the most specific species.
Est autem genus generalissimum quod non habet genus supra se, hoc est genus generalissimum est illud de quo universaliter sumpto non praedicatur aliud genus et simul de alio, quamvis secundum aliquam opinionem de genere generalissimo praedicetur particulariter aliquod aliud genus. Unde aliqui ponunt quod haec est vera ‘substantia est quantitas’, quia tamen non ponunt istam esse veram ‘omnis substantia est quantitas’, ideo possunt saluare quod substantia est genus generalissimum. Quamvis etiam aliter possent saluare, scilicet dicendo quod genus generalissimum est illud de quo universaliter sumpto non praedicatur in quid aliud genus. Nunc autem quamvis dicerent istam esse veram ‘substantia est quantitas’, non tamen dicerent quod quantitas praedicatur in quid de substantia universaliter sumpta.	But it is the most general genus which does not have a genus above it, that is, the most general genus is that of which universally taken another genus is not predicated, also together of another although according to some opinion about the most general genus, some other genus may be predicated in a particular way. Hence some suppose that ‘substance is quantity’ is true, nevertheless because they do not suppose ‘every substance is quantity’ is true, for that reason they can save that substance is the most general genus. Although also in another way they could save, namely by saying that the most general genus is that of which universally taken there is not predicated ‘in quid’ another genus. Now also although they would say ‘substance is quantity’ is true, nevertheless they would say that quantity is predicated in quid of substance universally taken.
Species autem specialissima est intentio non habens speciem sub se, hoc est species specialissima de nullo communi praedicatur in quid, quamvis de multis singularibus possit praedicari in quid. Media autem inter speciem specialissimam et genus generalissimum vocantur genera et species subalternae	But the most specific species is an intention not having a species under it, that is, the most specific species is predicated of nothing common in quid, although it could be predicated in quid of many singulars. But the intermediates between the most specific species and the most general genus are called the subordinate genera and species.