Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 20

Latin	English
[1.20. DE GENERE: QUID EST GENUS?]	[1.20. OF GENUS: WHAT IS A GENUS?]
Post haec dicendum est de quinque universalibus, et primo, sequendo Porphyrium, dicendum est de genere.	After this we must speak of the five universals. And first, following Porphyry, we must speak about the genus.
Definitur autem genus a Philosopho et a Porphyrio sic “Genus est quod praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid” .	Now genus is defined, by the Philosopher and by Porphyry, as follows. ‘Genus is what is predicated of several things differing in species, in respect of ‘what it is’.
Circa quam definitionem primo notandum est quod genus non est aliqua res extra animam, de essentia illorum de quibus praedicatur, sed est quaedam intentio animae, praedicabilis de multis, non quidem pro se sed pro rebus quas significat. Unde sicut quando profero istam propositionem ‘homo est animal’, vox praedicatur de voce, non tamen praedicatur vox de voce pro voce, quia non intendimus uti ipsa voce pro se ipsa, sed pro re quam significat, et ita praedicatur de re.	Concerning this definition, it should first be noted that a genus is not something outside the soul, of the essence of those of which it is predicated, but is a certain intention of the soul, predicable of many things: not of course for itself, but for things which it signifies. Hence, just as when I utter the proposition ‘a man is an animal’, an utterance is predicated of an utterance, yet an utterance is not predicated of an utterance for an utterance, because we do not mean to use that utterance for itself, but for the thing which it signifies, and so it is predicated of a thing.
Sic est de intentione generis, quia non praedicatur pro se sed pro re quam significat. Et ideo quando genus praedicatur de specie non denotatur quod subiectum sit praedicatum nec quod praedicatum realiter conveniat subiecto in esse reali, sed denotatur quod illud quod importatur per subiectum est illud quod importatur per praedicatum.	So it is of the intention of genus, because it is not predicated for itself, but for the thing which it signifies. And therefore, when a genus is predicated of a species, it is not meant that the subject is the predicate nor that the predicate really belongs to the subject in real being, but it is meant that what is conveyed by the subject is what is conveyed by the predicate.
Ista autem intentio quae est genus non praedicatur de rebus extra animam, quia illae non subiciuntur, sed praedicatur de signis talium rerum, de quarum essentia tamen non est genus, sicut nec intentio animae est de essentia rei extra.	Now that intention which is genus is not predicated of things outside the soul, because those are not subjects, but it is predicated of the signs of such things, of whose essence nonetheless there is no genus, just as an intention of the soul is not of the essence of an external thing.
Ex quo sequitur quod genus non est pars speciei. Et non solum hoc, sed etiam nec genus importat partem speciei, immo genus importat totum. Non enim illa intentio plus importat materiam quam formam nec e converso, proprie loquendo de ‘importare’ seu ‘significare’. Improprie tamen utendo vocabulo potest dici quod genus aliquando importat materiam et non formam; quod non est aliud quam dicere quod in quolibet significato per tale genus invenitur materia eiusdem rationis, non autem aliqua forma eiusdem rationis.	From which it follows that genus is not a part of a species. And not only this, but also neither does genus mean a part of a species. Indeed, genus means the whole. For that intention does not mean more matter than form and conversely, properly speaking of ‘mean’ or ‘signify’. Yet improperly using the word it can be said that genus sometimes means matter and not form, which is nothing else than to say that in any thing signified through such a genus there is found matter of the same definition, but not from of the same definition.
Verumtamen non omne genus, etiam isto modo loquendo, significat materiam rei, quia aliquod est genus quod est commune praecise ad simplicia, carentia compositione ex materia et forma, sicut est de ‘colore’, quod non est commune nisi ad colores, qui non componuntur ex materia et forma.	Nevertheless not every genus, even in that way of speaking, signifies the matter of the thing, because a thing is genus which is common precisely to simple things, lacking composition from material and form, for example as it is of ‘colour’, which is not common except to coloured things, which is not compounded out of material and form.
Et ideo omnes auctoritates philosophorum quae ponunt quod genus est pars rei vel quod est materia ret vel consimilia, sic glossari debent quod ideo genus dicitur pars rei vel materia, quia est quasi pars materialis definitionis vel descriptionis. Sicut enim in naturalibus materia praesupponitur formae et forma advenit sibi, ita si aliqua res debeat definiri, primo ponendum est genus, secundo addendae sunt differentiae essentiales vel accidentales. Et ideo genus est pars definitionis et primum in definitione, ad modum, aliquo modo, quo materia est primum in composito. Et propter hoc, et propter nihil aliud, dicunt auctores quod genus est materia et pars rei.	And for that reason the authoritative passages of the philosopher which suppose that genus is a part of the thing, or that is the material of the thing or similar, thus ought to be glossed that for that reason the genus is called part of the thing, or the material, because it is as it were part of the material definition or description. For, just as in natural objects the material is presupposed to the form, and the form comes into it, so if some thing ought to be defined, first the genus is to be given, second the differentiae are to be added, essential or accidental. And for that reason genus is part of the definition and first in the definition, ad modum, in some manner, by which the material is primary in the composite. And on account of this, also on account of nothing else, the authoritative passages say that genus is material and part of the thing.
Et si dicas: si genus est pars dcfinitionis et definitio est eadem realiter cum definito, igitur est pars definiti, dicendum est quod de virtute sermonis ista est simpliciter falsa ‘definitio est eadem realiter cum definito’; sed ista est simpliciter vera ‘definitio et definitum significant idem’. Nec aliud intendunt auctores.	And if you say, if genus is part of the definition and the definition is really the same as the thing defined, accordingly it is part of the thing defined, it must be said that literally speaking ‘definition is really the same as the thing defined’ is absolutely false, but ‘a definition and the thing defined signify the same’ is absolutely true. Nor do the authoritative passages signify anything else.
Secundo notandum est quod genus praedicatur de speciebus et individuis. Tamen aliter est de genere stricte sumpto et large sumpto. Nam omne genus stricte sumptum requirit res distinctas dissimiles, pro quibus illa de quibus praedicatur genus supponunt. Non sic autem est de genere large sumpto, immo sufficit quod illa de quibus praedicatur et quae supponunt pro aliis sint communia et ab invcem se removentia. Sicut si non esset possibile quod esset aliqua res substantialis nisi homo, adhuc ‘numerus’ vel ‘multitudo’ propria substantiis posset poni genus. ‘Multa’ enim vel ‘multitudo’ praedicaretur de istis communibus ‘duo’, ‘tres’, ‘quatuor’ et sic de aliis, quorum nullum praedicatur de alio. Tamen multae auctoritates de isto genere non intelliguntur	Secondly, it must be noted that the genus is predicated of species and individuals. Yet in another way the genus is to be understood broadly, and strictly. For every genus taken strictly requires distinct, dissimilar things, for which those things of which the genus is predicated supposit. But not thus is the genus broadly taken, indeed it is sufficient that those things of which it is predicated, and which supposit for other things, are common and are being removed from one another. For example, if it were not possible that there were some substantial thing except man, still ‘number’ or ‘multitude’ properly to substances could be given the genus. For ‘many’ or ‘multitude’ would be predicated of those common things ‘two’, ‘three’ ‘four’ and so on, of which none is predicated of another. Yet many authoritative passages are not understood of that genus.