Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 29

Latin	English
[CAP. 29. DE ISTIS TERMINIS 'DEFINITUM' ET 'DESCRIPTUM']	[Chapter. 29 On the terms 'defined' and 'described']
Quia ostensum est quid est definitio et quid descriptio, ideo videndum est quid est definitum et quid descriptum. Sciendum est autem quod 'definitum' dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro illo cuius partes vel essentia per definitionem exprimuntur, et sic definitio est ipsarum substantiarum singularium, sicut ista definitio 'animal rationale' est definitio omnium hominum, quia essentia omnium hominum per istam definitionem importatur. Unde per istam definitionem nullius rei essentia importatur nisi hominis particularis, quia nulla res est quae sit animal rationale nisi iste homo vel ille, et sic de singulis. Et isto modo accipiendo definitum, concedendum est quod substantia particularis definitur.	Because we have shown what a definition is, and what a description is, therefore it must be seen what a defined thing is, and what the thing described is. Now it should be known that ‘the defined’ is understood in two ways. In one way for that whose parts or essence is expressed through a definition, and thus is a definition of those singular substances, for example the definition ‘rational animal’ is the definition of all men, because the essence of all men is conveyed by that definition. Therefore, through that definition, the essence of nothing is conveyed except of a particular man, because no thing is a rational animal except this man and that one, and so on individually. And understanding the defined in that way, it must be allowed that a particular substance is defined.
Aliter accipitur 'definitum' pro aliquo convertibili cum definitione, de quo definitio adaequate praedicatur. Et sic definitum est una dictio convertibilis cum definitione, significans illud idem praecise quod significat definitio. Et isto modo non definiuntur singularia sed praecise species, quia sola species est convertibilis cum definitione et nullum singulare. Et per istam distinctionem de definito possunt glossari multae auctoritates Aristotelis et Commentatoris, quarum aliquae dicunt quod definitiones sunt singularium et aliquae nonnisi specierum.	Another way ‘the defined’ is undersood for something convertible with a definition, of which the definition is adequately predicated. And thus ‘the defined’ is a single expression convertible with the definition, signifying precisely what the definition signifies. And in this way singulars are not defined, but just (praecise) species, because the species alone is convertible with the definition, and no singular [is]. And by that distinction of ‘the defined’ can be glossed many of the authoritative passages of Aristotle and the Commentator, of which some say that definitions are of singulars, and some only of species.
Et sicut dictum est de definito, ita debet distingui de descripto: quod potest accipi vel pro dictione de qua primo, non pro se sed pro re, dicitur descriptio; vel potest accipi pro re importata per illud nomen et per illam descriptionem.	And just as was said of the defined, so it ought to be distinguished in the case of ‘the described’. What can (a) be understood for an expression of which primarily not for itself but for the thing, is called a description or (b) can be understood for what is conveyed by that name and by that description.