Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 30

Latin	English
[CAP. 30. DE ISTO TERMINO 'SUBIECTUM']	[Chapter 30: On the term 'subject']
(1) Dicto de terminis qui non competunt alicui uni universali, cuiusmodi sunt 'definitio' et 'descriptio' et huiusmodi, quia nullum unum universale est definitio vel descriptio sed quaelibet definitio et descriptio ex pluribus universalibus est composita, dicendum est nunc de terminis consequentibus quodlibet universale, cuiusmodi termini sunt 'subiectum' et 'praedicatum' et huiusmodi.	Having talked about terms that do not belong to any one universal term, of which sort are ‘definition’, ‘description’, and the like (because no one universal term is a definition or description, but rather each definition and description is composed from several universal terms) - we should now talk about terms that are consequents of any universal term, of which sort are ‘subject’, ‘predicate’ and the like.
(2) Et de subiecto quidem est primo sciendum quod, sicut dicit Damascenus in Logica sua, cap. 8: Subiectum dicitur dupliciter: hoc quidem ad exsistentiam, hoc autem ad praedicationem. Et ad exsistentiam quidem, quemadmodum subicitur substantia accidentibus. In ipsa enim habent esse et extra ipsam non substant. Quod autem ad praedicationem, subiectum est particulare.	And concerning ‘subject’, you should first know that, as Damascene says in his Logica, Ch. 8 : ‘Subject’ is said in two ways: with respect to existence and with respect to predication. And with respect to existence, in the way that a substance is subjected to accidents. For they have being in it, and outside it they do not stand under. But with respect to predication, the subject is particular.
(3) Ex quo colligi potest quod aliquid dicitur subiectum, quia realiter substat alteri rei inhaerenti sibi et sibi advenienti realiter. Et sic subiectum accipitur dupliciter, stricte scilicet, et sic dicitur subiectum respectu accidentium realiter inhaerentium sibi, sine quibus potest subsistere. Large autem dicitur subiectum omnis res quae alteri substat, sive illa res cui substat sit accidens inhaerens realiter sive sit forma substantialis informans rem cui adhaeret, et sic materia dicitur subiectum respectu formarum substantialium.	From this it can be gathered that something is called a “subject” because it really stands under another thing inhering in it and really applies to it. And so in this sense, ‘subject’ is understood in two ways, namely strictly, and in that way a “subject” is so-called in respect of the accidents really inhering in it, without which it is able to subsist. But in the broad sense, a "subject" is every thing that stands under something else, whether the thing it stands under is a accident really inhering in it, or whether it is a substantial form informing the thing to which it applies. And in this sense, matter is a “subject” in respect of substantial forms.
(4) Aliter autem dicitur subiectum, quia est pars propositionis praececedens copulam, de quo aliquid praedicatur, sicut in ista propositione 'homo est animal', 'homo' est subiectum, quia de homine praedicatur animal. Et subiectum sic acceptum potest multipliciter accipi. Uno modo dicitur subiectum large omne illud quod potest in quacumque propositione vera vel falsa subici. Et sic quodlibet universale respectu alterius potest esse subiectum, sicut patet in talibus propositionibus 'omne animal est asinus', 'omnis albedo est corvus', et sic de aliis.	But ‘subject’ is meant in another sense, for it is the part of a proposition preceding the copula, of which something is predicated. For example, in the proposition ‘Man is an animal’, ‘man’ is the subject, because ‘animal’ is predicated of ‘man’. And ‘subject’ so taken can be understood in many ways. In one way, a “subject” is broadly every thing that can be a subject in any proposition whatever, true or false. And so, any universal term can be a subject with respect to any other, as is clear with propositions such as ‘Every animal is a donkey’, ‘Every whiteness is a crow’, and so on.
(5) Aliter accipitur subiectum stricte, et sic dicitur subiectum illud quod subicitur in propositione vera ubi est directa praedicatio; et sic est homo subiectum respectu animalis, sed non e converso.	‘Subject’ can be taken in another way, strictly, and in this way a 'subject' is subject in a true proposition where there is direct predication. And in this way ‘man’ is a subject with respect to ‘animal’, but not the other way around.
(6) Tertio dicitur subiectum magis stricte, scilicet illud quod est subiectum in conclusione demonstrata, quae scitur vel nata est sciri scientia proprie dicta. Et sic accipiendo subiectum, quot sunt conclusiones habentes distincta subiecta, tot sunt subiecta in ista scientia aggregata; et sic in logica sunt multa subiecta, et similiter in metaphysica et in naturali philosophia.	In a third way, more strictly, a 'subject' is what is the subject in a demonstrated conclusion, which is known (or suited to be known) by scientific knowledge properly so-called. And understanding ‘subject’ in this sense, there are as many subjects grouped together in a science as there are conclusions having distinct subjects. And so in logic there are many subjects, and similarly in metaphysics and in natural philosophy.
(7) Aliter accipitur subiectum strictissime pro aliquo primo aliqua primitate inter talia subiecta. Et sic aliquando subiectum comunissimum inter talia subiecta vocatur subiectum, et aliquando illud quod est perfectius, et sic de aliis primitatibus.	In another way, ‘subject’ is taken most strictly as something that is first, by some primacy, among such subjects. And thus sometimes the most common subject among such subjects is called the “subject”, and sometimes that which is more perfect, and so for other ways of being primary.
(8) Hoc tantem est commune omnibus quod quodlibet istorum est subiectum per praedicationem.	Nevertheless, it is common to all these, that each of them is a subject by predication.