Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 38

Latin	English
[CAP. 38. DE ISTO TERMINO 'ENS']	[Chapter 38. Of the term ‘being’]
Dicto de terminis quibusdam secundae intentionis et quibusdam secundae impositionis, videndum est de terminis primae intentionis, cuiusmodi ponuntur praedicamenta. Primo tamen dicendum est de quibusdam communibus omnibus, sive sint res quae non sunt signa sive sint signa, cuiusmodi sunt 'ens' et 'unum'. Circa 'ens' autem est primo sciendum quod ens dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo accipitur hoc nomen 'ens' secundum quod sibi correspondet unus conceptus communis omnibus rebus, praedicabilis de omnibus in quid, illo modo quo transcendens potest in quid praedicari.	Having spoken of some terms of second intention, and of some terms of second imposition, we must look at terms of first intention, of which sort are the categories. But first we must speak of certain things which are common to all, whether they are things which are not signs, or whether they are signs. Of this sort are ‘being’ and ‘one’. Concerning ‘being’ it should be known first that ‘being’ can be understood in two ways. In one way, the name ‘being’ is understood according as there corresponds to it a single concept common to all things, predicable of all essentially [in quid], in the way that a transcendental can be predicated essentially.
Quod enim omnibus rebus sit unus conceptus communis praedicabilis de omnibus rebus ex hoc persuaderi potest: quia si non sit aliquis talis conceptus communis, ergo diversis rebus sunt diversi conceptus communes, qui sunt a et b. Sed ostendo quod aliquis conceptus est communior tam a quam b, praedicabilis de quocumque, puta de c, gratia exempli: quia sicut possunt formari tales tres propositiones vocales 'c est b', 'c est a', 'c est aliquid', ita possunt in mente tales tres propositiones formari quarum duae sunt dubiae et tertia est scita. Nam possibile est quod aliquis dubitet utramque istarum 'c est b', 'c est a' et tamen quod sciat istam 'c est aliquid'.	Now that there is one concept common to all things, predicable of all things can be persuasively argued as follows. For if there were no such common concept, then there would be diverse concepts common to diverse things, which are a and b. But I show that some concept is more common than a and b, predicable of anything, for example of c, for just as there can be formed three uttered propositions such as ‘c is b’, ‘c is a’ and ‘c is something’, so three such propositions can be formed in the mind, of which two are doubtful and the third is known. For it is possible that someone doubts both ‘c is b’ and ‘c is a’, but knows ‘c is something’
Quo dato arguo sic: duae istarum propositionum sunt dubiae et una est scita, et istae tres habent idem subiectum, igitur habent distincta praedicata; quia si non, eadem propositio esset scita et dubia, ex quo duae sunt hic dubiae. Si habent distincta praedicata, igitur aliud praedicatum est in ista 'c est aliquid' quod non est praedicatum in aliqua istarum 'c est b', 'c est a', igitur illud praedicatum est distinctum ab illis.	With this given, I argue as follows. Two of these propositions are doubtful and one is certain, and the three propositions have the same subject, therefore they have distinct predicates. For if not, the same proposition would be doubtful and known, from which the two here are doubtful. If they have distinct predicates, then the predicate in ‘c is something’ is not the predicate in one of ‘c is b’ and ‘c is a’. Therefore that predicate is distinct from those predicates.
Sed manifestum est quod illud praedicatum non est minus commune nec convertibile cum aliquo illorum, igitur est communius quam aliquod illorum. Quod est propositum: scilicet quod aliquis conceptus mentis alius ab istis inferioribus est communis cuilibet enti. Quod concedendum est, nam de omni ente vel de pronomine demonstrante quodcumque ens potest idem conceptus mentis vere praedicari, sicut eadem vox potest de quolibet vere praedicari.	But it is manifest that this predicate is not less common or convertible than any of the others. Therefore it is more common than any of them. Which is what was proposed, namely that some concept of the mind, other than those inferiors, is common to any being. Which should be conceded, for of every being, or of a pronoun demonstrative of any being, the same concept of the mind can be truly predicated, just as the same utterance can be truly predicated of anything.
Tamen non obstante quod sic sit unus conceptus communis omni enti, tamen hoc nomen 'ens' est aequivocum, quia non praedicatur de omnibus subicibilibus, quando significative sumuntur, secundum unum conceptum, sed sibi diversi conceptus correspondent, sicut super Porphyrium declaravi. Ulterius sciendum est quod secundum Philosophum, V Metaphysicae: Ens dicitur hoc quidem secundum accidens, illud vero secundum se.	But notwithstanding that it is thus a single concept common to every being, still the name ‘being’ is equivocal, because it is not predicated of all possible subjects, when significatively taken according to one concept, but rather diverse concepts correspond to it, just as I made clear in the commentary on Porphyry. Furthermore, it should be known that according to the Philosopher (Metaphysics V), ‘Being is predicated in one way per accidens, but in another per se.
Quae distinctio non est intelligenda quod aliquod ens sit per se, aliud per accidens, sed ostendit ibi diversum modum praedicandi unius de reliquo mediante hoc verbo 'est'. Quod satis claret per exempla Philosophi, quia dicit quod dicimus 'musicum secundum accidens est iustum', et similiter 'musicum secundum accidens est homo', et musicum dicimus aedificare secundum accidens. Ex quo patet quod non loquitur nisi de diverso modo praedicandi alicuius de aliquo, quia aliquid dicitur de aliquo per se et aliquid dicitur de aliquo per accidens.	This distinction is not to be understood as meaning that one being is per se and another being per accidens. Rather, he shows there a diverse mode of predication of one thing of another by the intermediary verb ‘is’. Which is quite clear from the example given by the Philosopher, for he says that we say ‘a musician is per accidens just’, and similarly ‘a musiciam is per accidens a man’. From which it is clear that he only speaks of a diverse mode of predication of something of something, because something is said of something per se, and something is said of something per accidens.
Quod enim aliqua res non sit ens per se et aliqua per accidens patet, quia nulla res est quin sit substantia vel accidens; sed tam substantia quam accidens est ens per se; igitur etc. Hoc tamen non obstante aliquid praedicatur de aliquo per se et aliquid per accidens. Similiter dividitur ens in ens in potentia et in ens in actu. Quod non est intelligendum quod aliquid quod non est in rerum natura, sed potest esse, sit vere ens, et aliquid aliud quod est in rerum natura sit etiam ens.	For that some thing is not a being per se and another thing a being per accidens is clear, for no thing exists unless it is a substance or an accident. But both substance as well as accident is a being per se. This notwithstanding, something is predicated of something per se, and something per accidens. Similarly, being is divided into potential being and actual being. This is not to be understood as meaning that something which does not exist in reality, but which can exist, is truly a being, and that something else which exists in reality is also a being.
Sed Aristoteles dividendo 'ens' in potentiam et in actum, V Metaphysicae, intendit quod hoc nomen 'ens' de aliquo praedicatur mediante hoc verbo 'est' in propositione mere de inesse, non aequivalenti propositioni de possibili, sic dicendo 'Socrates est ens', 'albedo est ens'; de aliquo autem non praedicatur nisi in propositione de possibili, vel aequivalenti propositioni de possibili, sic dicendo 'Antichristus potest esse ens' sive 'Antichristus est ens in potentia', et sic de aliis. Unde vult ibidem quod ens est dicibile potestate et actu, sicut sciens et quiescens, et tamen nihil est sciens vel quiescens nisi actualiter sit sciens vel quiescens. De aliis divisionibus entis alias patebit. Et ista causa brevitatis ad praesens sufficiant.	But Aristotle, in dividing being into potential and actual being (in Metaphysics V), meant that the name ‘being’ is predicated of something by the intermediary verb ‘is’ in a purely assertoric proposition, not equivalent to a de possibili proposition, by saying ‘Socrates is a being’, ‘whiteness is a being’. But by saying ‘the Antichrist can be a being’ or ‘the Antichrist is a potential being’, it is not predicated except in a de possibili proposition, or one equivalent to a de possibili proposition. Hence he wishes in the same place that being is predicable potentially and actually, such as knowing or resting, and yet nothing is knowing or resting unless it is actually knowing or resting. Of the other divisions of being it will become clear elsewhere. And this, by reason of of brevity, will suffice for the moment.