Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 37

Latin	English
[CAP. 37. DE ISTO TERMINO 'PASSIO']	[Chapter 37. Of the term ‘attribute’]
Restat nunc de uno vocabulo, quo logici tractando de demonstratione frequenter utuntur, disserere, scilicet de isto vocabulo 'passio'. Et est sciendum quod quamvis multipliciter accipi possit, sicut dixi super Praedicamenta, tamen secundum quod logicus utitur 'passione' passio non est aliqua res extra animam, inhaerens illi cuius dicitur passio, sed passio est quoddam praedicabile mentale vel vocale vel scriptum, praedicabile per se secundo modo de subiecto cuius dicitur passio. Quamvis proprie et stricte loquendo passio non sit nisi tale praedicabile mentale et non vocale neque scriptum, secundario tamen et improprie vox vel scriptura potest dici passio, illo modo quo dicimus quod in ista propositione prolata 'omnis homo est risibilis' praedicatur passio de suo subiecto.	It remains now to discuss one word, which logicians frequently use when dealing with demonstration, namely the word ‘attribute’. And it should be known that although it can be accepted in many ways, just as I said in the commentary on the Categories, nevertheless according as the logician uses ‘attribute’, an attribute is not some thing outside the soul, inhering in that of which it is called an attribute, but it is rather a sort of mental or uttered or written predicable, predicable per se in the second mode of the subject of which it is called an attribute. Although properly and strictly speaking an attribute is nothing except such a mental predicable, that is not uttered or written, secondarily however and improperly an utterance or writing can be called an attribute, in the way that we say that in the uttered proposition ‘every man is capable of laughter’ an attribute is predicated of its subject.
Quod autem passio non sit res extra animam, quae non est signum praedicabile, patet. Quia secundum philosophos passio praedicatur per se secundo modo de suo subiecto, sed solus conceptus vel vox vel scriptum praedicatur, cum propositio non componatur nisi ex talibus et non ex rebus extra, igitur res extra non est passio.	But that an attribute is not a thing outside the soul, which is not a predicable sign, is clear. For according to philosophers, ‘attribute’ is predicated per se in the second mode of its subject, but only a concept or an utterance or a written word is predicated, since a proposition is composed only of such things and not of things outside, therefore a thing outside is not an attribute.
Item, entis sunt passiones; sed non inhaerent illi communi, manifestum est; igitur etc. Item, secundum philosophos omnis passio est primo alicuius universalis; sed nulla res extra est inhaerens primo alicui universali; igitur etc.	Likewise, there are attributes of being, but they do not inhere in that common, it is manifest, therefore etc. Likewise, according to philosophers every attribute is primarily of some universal, but no thing outside is primarily inherent in any universal, therefore etc.
Item, de Deo praedicantur passiones propriae sibi; sed Deo non inhaerent aliquae aliae res; igitur passio non est talis res inhaerens suo subiecto. Dicendum est igitur quod passio non est nisi quoddam praedicabile secundo modo dicendi per se de suo subiecto, et ideo omnis passio potest esse pars propositionis, et per consequens non est talis res extra.	Likewise, attributes are predicated of God that are proper to him; but in God there do not inhere any other things, therefore an attribute is not such a thing inhering in a subject. Therefore it should be said that an attribute is nothing except something predicable of its subject in the second mode of saying per se, and therefore every attribute can be part of a proposition, and as a consequence there is not such a thing outside.
Ex quo sequitur quod non est impossibile subiectum esse in rerum natura sine sua passione, nec est impossibile passionem esse in rerum natura sine suo subiecto. Et ideo quod dicunt auctores quod subiectum non potest esse sine sua passione, exponendum est quod nihil aliud intendunt nisi quod passio non potest vere per propositionem negativam removeri a suo subiecto, maxime si esse exsistere praedicetur de illo subiecto. Unde ista propositio est impossibilis 'Deus non est creativus', et tamen Deus potest esse et fuit quando praedicatum non erat in rerum natura.	From this it follows that it is not impossible for a subject to exist in reality without its attribute, nor is it impossible that an attribute exists in reality without its subject. And therefore what the authorities say, that a subject cannot be without its attribute, is to be explained as meaning nothing other than that an attribute cannot truly be removed from its subject by a negative proposition, particularly if existential being is predicated of its subject. Hence the proposition ‘God is not creative’ is impossible, and yet God can exist, and did exist, when the predicate did not exist in reality.
Est etiam sciendum quod semper passio supponit pro illo eodem pro quo subiectum supponit, quamvis aliquid aliud ab illo significet aliquo modo, scilicet in recto vel in obliquo, vel affirmative vel negative. Unde et quaedam passiones vocantur positivae et quaedam negativae.	It should also be known that an attribute always supposits for the same thing for which the subject supposits, although it signifies something other than that in some way, namely in a direct or indirect case, either affirmatively or negatively. Hence also certain attributes are called positive and some negative.
Ex praedictis patere potest quomodo 'unum' est passio entis et realiter distinguitur ab illo ente cuius est passio, scilicet ab illo communi, et tamen idem significat quod illud commune; tamen alio modo, sicut patet per definitionem exprimentem quid nominis. Unde generaliter verum est quod subiectum et passio sua non sunt idem realiter, quamvis supponant pro eodem, et quamvis praedicatio unius de alio sit necessaria.	From what has been said it is clear how ‘one’ is an attribute of being, and that it is really distinguished from that being of which it is an attribute, namely from that common,yet in some other way, as is clear from the nominal definition. Hence it is generally true that a subject and its attribute are not really the same, although they supposit for the same thing, and although the predication of one thing of another may be necessary.