Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 40

Latin	English
[CAP. 40. DE ISTO TERMINO 'PRAEDICAMENTUM']	[Chapter 40. On the term 'category']
Post praedicta restat dicere de inferioribus ad 'ens', quae ponuntur decem praedicamenta. Est autem sciendum quod hoc nomen 'praedicamentum' est nomen secundae intentionis sicut hoc nomen 'genus', quamvis illa de quibus praedicatur sint incomplexa primae intentionis. Verumtamen praedicamentum dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro toto ordine aliquorum ordinatorum secundum superius et inferius, alio modo accipitur pro primo et communissimo in ordine illo. Et isto secundo modo accipiendo praedicamentum, quodlibet praedicamentum est unum incomplexum primae intentionis, et hoc quia significat res quae non sunt signa. Accipiendo autem praedicamentum primo modo, sic potest dici quod quandoque in aliquo tali ordine sunt incomplexa primae intentionis, et aliqua sunt incomplexa secundae intentionis.	After what has been said, it remains to speak of things inferior to ‘being’, which are given as the ten categories. And it should be known that the name ‘category’ is a name of second intention, just as the name ‘genus’, although those of which it is predicated are simple terms of first intention. However, ‘category’ is understood in two ways. In one way, for the whole ordering of things ordered according to superior and inferior. In another way it is understood as the first and most common in that ordering. And understanding ‘category’ in that second way, any category is a single simple of first intention, and this is because it signifies things which are not signs. Understanding ‘category’ in the first way, it can thus be said that whenever in some such ordering there are simple terms of the first intention, and some are simple terms of second intention.
Vel potest dici quod aliqua talia sunt primae intentionis et aliqua secundae intentionis. Sicut secundum opinionem quae ponit quod intentio vel conceptus est qualitas subiective exsistens in mente, hoc commune 'genus' est in praedicamento qualitatis vel relationis, nam omne genus est qualitas secundum illam opinionem. Et hoc commune 'genus' est secunda intentio vel nomen secundae intentionis, hoc autem commune 'color' est prima intentio. Et consimiliter potest dici de multis aliis.	Or it can be said that some such are of first intention and some are of second intention. Just as, according to the opinion which supposes that an intention or a concept is a quality subjectively existing in the mind, the common term ‘genus’ is in the category of quality or relation, for every genus is a quality according to that opinion. And the common term ‘genus’ is a second intention, or a name of second intention, but the common term ‘colour’ is first intention. And it can similarly be said of many others.
Et si dicas quod intentio prima non est superior ad intentionem secundam: similiter, intentio prima non praedicatur de intentione secunda nec e converso. Similiter, ens rationis non potest esse in praedicamento reali; intentio autem secunda est ens rationis; igitur non est in praedicamento reali.	And if you say that a first intention is not superior to a second intention: similarly, a first intention is not predicated of a second intention nor conversely. Similarly, a being of reason cannot be in a real category. But a second intention is a being of reason, therefore it is not in a real category.
Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod intentio prima est superior ad intentionem secundam, sicut 'ens' est intentio prima et tamen est superius ad intentionem secundam. Omnis enim intentio secunda est ens, et non e converso.	To the first of these it should be said that a first intention is superior to a second intention, just as ‘being’ is a first intention and yet is superior to a second intention. For every second intention is a being, and not conversely.
Ad secundum dicendum est quod quamvis intentio prima non praedicetur de intentione secunda si utraque intentio supponat pro se ipsa, - tunc enim oporteret concedere quod intentio secunda esset intentio prima, quod falsum est -, tamen intentio prima potest praedicari de intentione secunda, non pro se sed pro intentione secunda. Unde ista 'genus substantiae est qualitas' vera est, non tamen verificatur hoc praedicatum 'qualitas' pro se sed pro intentione secunda, quae est genus. Sicut in ista propositione prolata 'nomen est qualitas' praedicatur nomen primae impositionis de nomine secundae impositionis, non pro se sed pro nomine secundae impositionis, et tamen nullum nomen secundae impositionis est nomen primae impositionis.	To the second it should be said that although a first intention is not predicated of a second intention, if both intentions supposit for themselves – for then one would have to concede that a second intention would be a first intention, which is false – still a first intention can be predicated of a second intention, not for itself but for a second intention.Hence ‘the genus of substance is quality’ is true, yet the category ‘quality’ is not verified for itself but for a second intention, which is genus. Just as in the uttered proposition ‘a name is a quality’, a name of first imposition is predicated of a name of second imposition, not for itself but for a name of second imposition, and yet no name of second imposition is a name of first imposition.
Ad tertium dicendum quod iste terminus 'esse in praedicamento' dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro illo quod sic est in praedicamento quod de pronomine demonstrante ipsum praedicatur primum illius praedicamenti sumptum significative. Et sic accipiendo 'esse in praedicamento' nihil est in genere substantiae nisi substantia particularis, quia nihil est substantia nisi substantia particularis. Et sic accipiendo 'esse in praedicamento' omnia universalia, etiam importantia praecise substantias, sunt in praedicamento qualitatis, quia quodlibet universale est qualitas.	To the third, it should be said that the term ‘being in a category’ is accepted in two ways. In one way for that which is in a category in such a way that of a demonstrative pronoun pointing to it is predicated first of that category, significatively taken. And thus accepting ‘being in a category’, nothing is in the genus of substance except a particular substance, because nothing is a substance except a particular substance. And thus accepting ‘being in a category’, all universals, even those conveying substances precisely, are in the category of quality, because every universal is a quality.
Aliter accipitur 'esse in praedicamento' pro illo de quo significative sumpto praedicatur primum illius praedicamenti significative sumptum.	In another way, ‘being in a category’ is understood as what, significatively taken, is predicated first of that category significatively taken.
Et sic quaedam universalia sunt in genere substantiae, quia de quibusdam universalibus significative sumptis praedicatur 'substantia' quando sumitur significative, sic dicendo 'omnis homo est substantia', 'omne animal est substantia', 'omnis lapis est substantia' et sic de aliis. Quaedam autem universalia sic sunt in praedicamento qualitatis, et sic de aliis. Et ideo illa propositio accepta 'ens rationis non potest esse in praedicamento reali' falsa est, sive accipiatur 'esse in praedicamento' uno modo sive alio.	And so some universals are in the genus of substance, because ‘substance’ is predicated of some universals when they are taken significatively, in saying ‘every man is a substance’, ‘every animal is a substance’, ‘every stone is a substance’, and so on. But some universals are in the category of quality, and so on. And therefore the understood proposition ‘a being of reason cannot be in a real category’ is false, whether ‘being in a category’ is understood in one way or the other.
Verumtamen sciendum est quod secundum opinionem quae ponit quod intentio, conceptus sive passio animae est qualitas mentis, non ideo dicitur aliquid 'ens rationis' quia non sit vera res exsistens in rerum natura, sed ideo dicitur ens rationis quia non est nisi in ratione, quo mens utitur pro alio vel propter aliud. Et sic omnes propositiones et consequentiae et termini mentales sunt entia rationis, et tamen vere sunt realiter exsistentia in rerum natura, et entia perfectiora et realiora quam qualitates quaecumque corporales.	But nevertheless it should be known that according to the opinion which supposes that an intention, concept or attribute of the soul is a quality of the mind, something is not for that reason called ‘being of reason’, because it is not a true being existing in a state of reality, but for that reason it is called a ‘being of reason’ because it does not exist except in reason, by which the mind uses it for something else, or because of something else. And thus all propositions and consequences and mental terms are beings of reason, and yet truly are really existing in a state of reality, and are more perfect and real beings than any corporeal qualities.
Et ideo quod Commentator et Philosophus dividunt ens primo in ens reale et in ens rationis, sive in ens in anima et in ens extra animam, et postea ens reale in decem praedicamenta, non est divisio per simpliciter opposita, illo modo quo animal dividitur in animal rationale et irrationale, sed magis est divisio vocis in significationes, illo modo quo Aristoteles in I Priorum dividit contingens in contingens necessarium et ad utrumlibet et possibile commune. Et ideo sicut unum istorum trium membrorum praedicatur de alio, - haec enim est vera contingens necessarium est possibile', similiter ista 'contingens ad utrumlibet est possibile'-, ita non obstante illa divisione entis haec est vera 'ens rationis est ens reale', accipiendo 'ens reale' pro illo quod est vera qualitas exsistens in rerum natura.	And therefore that the Commentator and the Philosopher divide ‘being’ first into real being and being of reason, or being in the soul and in being outside the soul, and then into real being in the ten categories, is not a division into things that are absolutely opposed, in the way that animal is divided into rational and non-rational animal, but is more a division of utterances into their signification, in the way that Aristotle (Prior Analytics I) divides the contingent into contingens necessarium et ad utrumlibet et possibile commune. And therefore just as one of those three members is predicated of the other, for ‘a necessary contingent is possible’, and similarly ‘a contingent ad utrumlibet is possible’ is true, so, not withstanding the division of being ‘a being of reason is a real being’ is true, understanding ‘real being’ for what is a true quality existing in reality.
Si tamen accipiatur 'ens reale' vel 'extra animam' praecise pro illo quod non est in anima, tunc divisio entis in decem praedicamenta non est divisio per se communis in sua inferiora, sed est consimilis et aequivalens isti divisioni 'ens reale extra animam quoddam importatur per hoc praedicamentum, quoddam per illud', et sic de singulis; vel tali 'omne reale ens extra animam vel est in tali praedicamento vel in tali'. Cum hoc tamen stat quod etiam in illis praedicamentis sunt multa quae non sunt entia extra animam.	But if ‘real being’ or ‘outside the soul’ is understood to mean exactly what is not in the soul, then the division of being into the ten categories is not a division per se of a common into its inferiors, but is instead similar and equivalent to the division “one sort of being outside the soul is conveyed the this category, another sort of being by another category”, and so on, or to ‘every real being outside the soul is in this or that category’. Also consistent with this is that in these categories are many things which are not beings outside the soul.