Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 41

 

Latin	English
[CAP. 41. DE NUMERO PRAEDICAMENTORUM]	[Chapter 41. On the number of categories]
His praemissis videndum est de numero praedicamentorum. Ponuntur autem ab omnibus auctoribus decem praedicamenta, sed in modo ponendi, ut mihi videtur, multi moderni discordant ab antiquis. Nam multi ponunt quod in omni praedicamento sunt multa ordinabilia secundum superius et inferius, ita quod superius per se primo modo et in recto praedicatur de quolibet inferiori, tali praedicatione qualis est haec 'omne a est b'.	After these preliminary remarks, we must look at the number of categories. There are ten categories given by all authorities, but in the manner of giving these, as it seems to me, many of the moderns disagree with the ancients. For many suppose that in every category there are many things that can be ordered according to superior and inferior, so that the superior is predicated in the first mode of per se and in the direct case of every inferior. ‘Every a is b’ is a predication of this type.
Unde ut talem praedicationem habeant, de adverbiis fingunt nomina abstracta, sicut de 'quando', quod est adverbium, fingunt tale abstractum 'quandalitas' et de 'ubi' hoc nomen 'ubitas', et sic de aliis.	Hence, in order to have such predication, they make up abstract names of adverbs. For example, from ‘when’, which is an adverb, they make up the abstract name ‘when-ness’, and from ‘where’, the name ‘whereness’, and so on.
Sed antiqui, ut mihi videtur, non posuerunt talem ordinem in quolibet praedicamento, et ideo hoc nomine 'praedicamentum' et similiter talibus nominibus 'genus', 'species' et consimilibus magis large utebantur quam faciunt multi moderni.	But the ancients – as it seems to me - did not posit such an order in every category. And therefore they used the name ‘category’, and similarly such names as ‘genus’, ‘species’ and similar ones more broadly than many moderns.
Unde quando dixerunt semper superius praedicari de inferiori et quodlibet praedicamentum habere sub se species, extendebant 'praedicari' ad verba, quo modo dicimus quod 'ambulat' praedicatur de homine, sic dicendo 'homo ambulat', similiter 'iste calceatur', 'iste armatur'. Extendebant etiam praedicationem ad praedicationem adverbiorum et praepositionum cum casualibus suis, sicut exercemus in talibus propositionibus 'iste est hodie', 'iste fuit heri', 'iste est in domo', 'iste est in civitate'. Et ita in quolibet praedicamento invenitur aliqua talium praedicationum. Non tamen oportet quod ibi sit semper praedicatio propria recti de recto.	Hence, when they said that the superior is always predicated of the inferior, and that any category has species under it, they extended ‘to be predicated’ to verbs, in the way we say that ‘walks’ is predicated of man, in saying ‘A man walks’, and similarly ‘He is shod’ and ‘He is armed’. And they also extended predication to the predication of adverbs and of prepositions together with their [grammatical] cases, just as we exercise predication in propositions such as ‘This is today’, ‘This was yesterday’, ‘This is in the house’, ‘This is in the city’. And in this way there are such predications in every category. But there does not always have to be predication in the proper sense, of a direct case of direct case.
Et ideo non omnis ordo superioris et inferioris est secundum praedicationem, stricte accipiendo praedicationem, sed aliquis est in consequendo et in praedicando, large accipiendo praedicationem.	And therefore, not every ordering of a superior to inferior is in accordance to predication, taking predication in the strict sense, but some ordering is in inference and in predication, taking predication in a broad sense.
Et quia intentio antiquorum mihi videtur rationabilior, ideo ipsam prosequendo primo ostendam quod haec fuit eorum intentio. Quod probari potest primo per Aristotelem enumerantem praedicamenta, ubi sic exprimit ea: “Eorum quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur singulum aut significat substantiam aut qualitatem aut quantitatem aut ad aliquid aut ubi aut quando aut situm esse aut habitum aut facere aut pati”. Et postea exemplificans dicit: “Ubi, ut in loco; quando autem, ut in tempore, ut heri; situm esse vero, ut sedet aut iacet; habere, ut calceatus, armatus; facere vero, ut secare, urere; pati, ut secari, uri”.	And because the intention of the ancients seems to me to be more reasonable, in pursuing it I will first show that this was their intention. This can be proved first by Aristotle enumerating the categories, where he explains them as follows: “Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. And explaining this afterwards he says “where, as in place , when, as in time, for example yesterday, position as in to sit, to lie, state as in shod, armed, action as in to cut, to cauterise, affection, as in to be cut, to be cauterised.
Idem etiam patet in capitulo De facere et pati. Item, Damascenus in Logica sua, cap. 32, dicit sic: “Oportet cognoscere quod decem sunt omnia praedicamenta, id est generalissima genera sub quibus refertur omnis vox simpliciter dicta. Sunt autem haec: substantia, ut lapis; quantum, ut duo, tria; ad aliquid, ut pater, filius; quale, ut album, nigrum; ubi, ut in Tyro, in Damasco, hoc autem loci ostensivum est; quando, ut heri, cras, hoc autem temporis est ostensivum; habere, ut vestimentum induere; situm esse, ut stare, sedere; facere, ut urere; pati, ut uri”.	The same is also clear in the chapter on action and affection. Likewise, in chapter 32 of his Logic, Damascene says “you should know that there are ten categories, that is, ten most general genera to which every simple utterance is referred. They are as follows: substance, as in ‘stone’; quantity, as in ‘two’ and ‘three’; relation, as in ‘father’ and ‘son’; quality, as in ‘white’, ‘black’, where as ‘in Tyre’, ‘in Damascus’, for this is ostensive of places; when, as in yesterday, tomorrow, for this is ostensive of time; state, as clad; position, as to stand, to sit; action, as to burn; affection, as to be burned”.
Et isti duo auctores, unus sanctus et alius philosophus, sufficiant ad probandum quod per praedicamenta non intelligunt nisi quaedam incomplexa continentia sub se diversas voces vel intentiones animae, de quibus tamen non praedicantur praedicatione propria et in recto.	And these two authors, one a saint and the other a philosopher, are sufficient to prove that by ‘categories’ nothing is understood except certain simple terms containing under them diverse utterances or intentions of the soul, of which nevertheless are not predicated by proper predication and in a direct case.
Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod secundum intentionem antiquorum exsistentia in praedicamentis non sunt nisi quaedam incomplexa ex quibus affirmatio et negatio, scilicet propositiones affirmativae et negativae, natae sunt constitui. Propter quod dicit Aristoteles, ubi prius: “Singula igitur eorum quae dicta sunt ipsa quidem secundum se in nulla affirmatione dicuntur, horum autem ad se invicem complexione affirmatio fit”. Et similiter dicit Damascenus, sicut dictum est, quod sub decem praedicamentis “refertur omnis vox simpliciter dicta”, hoc est omnis vox categorematica, quae non est affirmatio vel negatio.	As evidence of this it should be known that according to the intention of the ancients, things existing in the categories are only certain simple terms from which affirmation and negation (namely affirmative and negative propositions) are suited to be constructed. Because of this, Aristotle says in the same place, that “No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; but it is by the combination of such terms that affirmations come about”. And similarly Damascene says, as was mentioned, that every simple utterance is subsumed under the ten categories, i.e. every categorematic expression, which is not affirmation or negation.
Et ita constat esse de intentione eorum quod illa quae sunt in praedicamentis sunt incomplexa ex quibus sunt propositiones natae componi. Et hoc est verum tam de incomplexis mentalibus quam vocalibus; mentalia tamen principaliora sunt, sicut dictum est prius. Sumitur autem distinctio istorum praedicamentorum, sicut innuit Commentator VII Metaphysicae , ex distinctione interrogativorum de substantia sive de individuo substantiae.	And so it is plain that their intention was that the items in the categories are simple terms from which propositions are suited to be composed. And this is true of mental simple terms as well as uttered ones. But mental ones are more primary, as we said above. And the distinction made by the categories is drawn from the distinction of questions about substance or about an individual substance, just as the Commentator suggests (Metaphysics VII).
Unde secundum quod ad diversas quaestiones factas de substantia per diversa incomplexa respondetur, secundum hoc diversa in diversis praedicamentis collocantur.	Hence, according as the answer is given to diverse questions about substance through diverse simple terms, so those simple terms are organised under diverse categories.
Unde omnia incomplexa per quae convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam per 'quid est' de aliquo individuo substantiae sunt in praedicamento substantiae, cuiusmodi sunt omnia talia 'homo', 'animal', 'lapis', 'corpus', 'terra', 'ignis', 'sol', 'luna' et huiusmodi. Illa autem per quae convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam per 'quale' de substantia sunt in genere qualitatis, cuiusmodi sunt talia 'album', 'calidum', 'sciens', 'quadratum', 'longum', 'latum', et sic de aliis. Illa autem per quae respondetur ad quaestionem factam per 'quantum' de substantia vel substantiis demonstratis continentur in genere quantitatis, cuiusmodi sunt talia 'bicubitum', 'tricubitum' et huiusmodi. Illa autem per quae respondetur ad quaestionem factam per 'cuius' vel per consimile, quia forte ibi deficit nobis unum interrogativum generale, sunt in genere relationis.	Hence all such simple terms that are appropriate answers to the question ‘what is it’, concerning some individual substance, are in the category of substance, of which sort are ‘man’, ‘animal’, ‘stone’, ‘body’, ‘earth’, ‘fire’, ‘sun’, and ‘moon’. Those which are appropriate answers to the question ‘Of what quality] And those which are the answer to the question ‘of what quality’ are in the genus of quality, of which sort are ‘white’, ‘cold’, ‘knowing’, ‘four-sided’, ‘long’, ‘wide’ etc. But those which are the answer to the question ‘how much’, of a substance or of substances demonstrated, are contained under the genus of quantity, of which sort are ‘two metres’, ‘three metres’ and so on. And that which is the answer to the question ‘whose’ (or similar) are in the genus of relation, perhaps because there we lack a single general interrogative.
Illa autem per quae convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam per 'ubi' sunt in genere ubi. Et quia ad quaestionem factam per 'ubi' numquam convenienter respondetur nisi per adverbium vel praepositionem cum suo casuali, sicut si quaeratur 'ubi est Socrates' convenienter respondetur 'ibi vel hic, vel in Tyro vel in Damasco, vel in mari vel in terra', ideo ista incomplexa, pro quanto non sunt affirmationes vel negationes, dicuntur in genere ubi.	Now the terms which are an appropriate answer to the question 'where' are in the genus of 'where'. And because we cannot answer this question except through adverbs and propositions with their noun in a case, an appropriate reply to the question ‘Where is Socrates?’ is ‘Here’ or ‘There’ or ‘In Tyre’ or ‘In Damascus’ or ‘At sea’ or 'On land'. Therefore those simple terms, forasmuch as they are not affirmations or negations, are said to be in the genus of 'where'.
Similiter ad quaestionem factam de substantia demonstrata per 'quando' numquam respondetur nisi per adverbia vel per praepositiones cum suis casualibus, sicut si quaeratur 'quando fuit Socrates' convenienter respondetur quod fuit heri vel in tali die, ideo praecise talia sunt in genere quando.	Similarly, in answer to a question about a substance demonstrated by ‘when’, the only reply is by adverbs or prepositions with their grammatical cases. For example, if we ask ‘when was Socrates’, the appropriate reply is that he was yesterday, or ‘in such a day’, there precisely these are in the genus of ‘when’.
Similiter ad quaestionem factam per hoc totum 'quid facit Socrates' convenienter respondetur per verba, sicut quod calefacit vel ambulat, ideo talia sunt in genere actionis.	Similarly, to the question made by the whole expression ‘what is Socrates doing’, the appropriate reply is by a verb, for example ‘warms’ or ‘walks’, therefore these are in the genus of action.
Et sic, proportionaliter, est de aliis, quamvis forte propter penuriam nominum aliquando interrogativa propria praedicamentis et generalia nobis deficiant. Ex isto sequitur quod talia concreta 'album', 'nigrum', 'calidum', 'amarum' magis directe sunt in genere qualitatis quam eorum abstracta. Propter quod Philosophus, in Praedicamentis, exemplificans de illis quae sunt in praedicamento qualitatis dicit: “Qualitas, ut album”. Verumtamen accipiendo praedicamentum qualitatis pro aliquo quod universaliter removetur a substantia, sic talia concreta non sunt in genere qualitatis sed praecise abstracta. Et sic intellexi aliquando, quando dixi talia abstracta esse in genere per se et concreta per reductionem.	And thus it is correspondingly so with the others, although perhaps on account of the poverty of words, sometimes the proper interrogatives for the categories et generalia nobis, are lacking. From this, it follows that such concrete terms as ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘hot’, ‘bitter’ are more directly in the genus of quality than their abstract forms. Because of this, the Philosopher (Categories), giving examples of things in the category of quality says “Quality, such as white”. Nevertheless, understanding the category of quality for something that is universally removed from substance, so such concrete terms are not in the genus of quality, but precisely abstract terms are. And thus I have sometimes been understood, when I said that such abstract terms are in a genus per se, and concrete terms [in a genus] by reduction.
Sed in talibus magis est difficultas verbalis quam realis, ideo ad praesens pertranseo. Et sufficiat scire quod omne incomplexum per quod responderi potest ad aliquam quaestionem factam de substantia est in aliquo praedicamento, sive illud sit adverbium sive verbum sive nomen sive praepositio cum suo casuali.	But in such cases the difficulty is more verbal than real, therefore for the present I will pass over the issue. And it is sufficient to know that every simple term, by which a question about substance can be answered, is in some category, whether it is an adverb or a verb or a name or a preposition with a noun in a grammatical case.
Alia autem incomplexa non sunt in aliquo praedicamento; propter quod coniunctiones et syncategoremata in nullo praedicamento reponuntur. Per talia enim 'si', ‘et', 'omnis', 'nullus' ad nullam quaestionem de individuo substantiae respondetur. Si autem per aliqua talia poterit aliquo modo responderi ad aliquam quaestionem certam, licet non ad omnem, illa possunt ad aliquod praedicamentum reduci.	But other simple terms are not in any category. Because of this, conjunctions and syncategoremata are not placed in any category. For such terms as ‘if’, ‘and’, ‘every’, ‘none’ are not the reply to any question about an individual substance. But if through some such terms there could be some sort of reply to some (although not to every) determinate question, they could be reduced to some determinate category.