Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 43

 

Latin	English
[CAP. 43. DE PROPRIETATIBUS SUBSTANTIAE]	[Chapter 43. On the properties of substance]
Viso quae ponuntur in linea praedicamentali substantiae, videndum est de quibusdam proprietatibus substantiae. Ponit autem Aristoteles in Praedicamentis unam proprietatem substantiae quam dicit esse communem omni substantiae, scilicet tam primae quam secundae, videlicet quod substantia non est in aliquo subiecto. Quae si intelligatur de substantia exsistente extra animam, manifesta est; nulla enim talis est in aliquo subiecto.	Having seen what are given in the categorial line of substance, we should look at certain properties of substance. Now Aristotle in the Categories gives one property of substance which he says is common to every substance, namely both first and second substance, viz. that substance is not in any subject. If this is understood of substance existing outside the soul, this is manifest, for no such thing is in a subject.
Si autem intelligatur de substantiis primis et secundis quae sunt nomina substantiarum exsistentium extra animam, sic per istam propositionem 'substantia non est in subiecto' debet intelligi ista propositio, quae est actus signatus, 'de nullo nomine substantiae proprio vel communi significative sumpto praedicatur esse in subiecto, sed removetur a quolibet tali significative sumpto esse in subiecto'.	But if it is understood of first and second substances which are names of substances existing outside the soul, then by the proposition “substance is not in the subject”, we ought to understood the proposition, (which is an actus signatus) “being in a subject is not predicated of any proper or common name of a substance, significatively taken, but rather being in a subject is removed from any such thing, significatively taken,”.
Unde quaelibet talis vera est 'homo non est in subiecto', 'animal non est in subiecto', 'Socrates non est in subiecto', et sic de aliis. Tamen si tales termini supponerent pro se et non pro suis significatis vere posset dici quod sunt in subiectis, sicut vere dicitur quod sunt partes propositionum, et per consequens vel sunt conceptus mentis vel voces vel scripta.	Hence any such proposition as “man is not in a subject”, “animal is not in a subject”, “Socrates is not in a subject”, and so on, is true. Yet if such terms supposited for themselves and not for their significates, it could truly be said that they are in subjects, just as it is truly said that they are parts of a proposition, and as a consequence are concepts of the mind, or utterances, or written script.
Sed contra illud videtur esse Aristoteles, nam de secundis substantiis concedit quod dicuntur de subiecto, et negat eas esse in subiecto; sed accipiendo uniformiter secundas substantias, non plus competit eis unum quam aliud. Dicendum quod Philosophus non uniformiter accipit, nec hoc est necessarium; sed frequenter utile est propter brevitatem difformiter accipere eundem terminum.	But against that seems to be Aristotle, for he concedes of second substances that they are said of a subject, and denies that they are in a subject. But in uniformly understanding second substances, no more does one belong to them than another. It should be said that the Philosopher does not uniformly understand them, nor is this necessary, but frequently it is useful for brevity to understand the same term non-uniformly.
Unde per talem propositionem nihil aliud intelligit nisi quod nomina communia substantiarum praedicantur de subiectis. Et tamen de eisdem eodem modo supponentibus quo supponunt in illis actibus exercitis non verificatur 'esse in subiecto'. Unde haec est vera 'Socrates est animal', et de animali eodem modo supponente quo supponit in ista 'Socrates est animal' non verificatur esse in subiecto, quia si sic supponat 'animal' haec est falsa 'animal est in subiecto.	Hence by such a proposition, nothing else is understood but that common names of substances are predicated of the subjects. And yet of the same things, suppositing in the same way as they supposit when used in those functions ‘being in the subject’ is not verified. Hence “Socrates is an animal” is true, and of animal suppositing in the same way as it supposits in “Socrates is an animal”, being in the subject is not verified, because if ‘animal’ supposited in this way, “animal is in the subject” is false.
Alia proprietas substantiae ponitur, quae est quod omnibus substantiis secundis convenit praedicari univoce, non tamen convenit tantum substantiis secundis sed etiam differentiis, quamvis ista proprietas non conveniat primis substantiis. Sciendum est quod nihil praedicatur univoce proprie loquendo nisi quod est commune ad multa, hoc est nisi illud quod significat multa vel natum est significare multa. Et ideo quia substantiae primae sunt propriae, et non significantes multa, ideo non praedicantur univoce.	Another property of substance is given, which is that to all second substances it is appropriate to be predicated univocally, yet it does not belong to second substances only, but also to differentia, although that property does not belong to first substances. It should be known that nothing is predicated univocally, properly speaking, except what is common to many, i.e. that which signifies many or naturally signifies many. And therefore because first substances are proper, and do not signify many, therefore they are not predicated univocally.
Secundae autem substantiae significant multa. Hoc enim nomen 'homo' non significat primo unam naturam communem omnibus hominibus, sicut multi errantes imaginantur, sed significat primo omnes homines particulares, sicut auctoritate Damasceni prius ostensum est. Ille enim qui primo instituit hanc vocem 'homo', videns aliquem hominem particularem, instituit hanc vocem ad significandum illum hominem et quamlibet talem substantiam qualis est ille homo. Unde de natura communi non oportuit eum cogitare, cum non sit aliqua talis natura communis. Non tamen est haec vox 'homo' aequivoca, quamvis significet multa aeque primo, quia est signum subordinatum uni conceptui et non pluribus in significando illos plures homines aeque primo.	But second substances signify many. For the name ‘man’ does not signify primarily a single nature common to all men, as many of those in error imagine, but it signifies primarily all particular men, just as was shown before from the authority of Damascene. For someone who first imposes the utterance ‘man’, seeing some particular man, imposes the utterance to signify that man, and any such substance like that man. Hence, he does not have to think of a common nature, since there is no such common nature. Yet the utterance ‘man’ is not equivocal, although it signifies many equally primarily, for it is a sign subordinated to one concept, and not to several in signifying those several men equally primarily.
Tertia proprietas substantiae assignatur haec, scilicet quod prima substantia significat hoc aliquid, secunda autem substantia significat quale quid. Et ex ista proprietate manifeste patet quod cum significare sive hoc aliquid sive quale quid non competat substantiis extra animam exsistentibus sed tantum signis talium substantiarum, substantiae primae et secundae vocantur signa propria et communia substantiarum extra animam exsistentium. Quod concedendum est. Est tamen advertendum quod significare hoc aliquid non est aliud quam significare unum et non plura, significare autem quale quid est esse natum significare plura.	A third property of substance is assigned as follows: first substance signifies ‘this something’, but second substance signifies ‘being such-and-such’. And from this property it is manifestly clear that since signifying – whether ‘this something’ or ‘being such-and-such’ – does not belong to substances existing outside the soul, but only to signs of such substances, first and second substances are called proper and common signs of substances existing outside the soul. Which should be conceded. And yet it should be noted that to signify ‘this something’ is no other than to signify one thing and not several, but to signify ‘being such-and-such’ is to signify more than one things by nature.
Et ideo quando dicit Aristoteles quod substantiae secundae significant quale quid, non intendit quod substantiae secundae significant aliquam qualitatem vel aliquid reale adveniens individuo, - hoc enim simpliciter falsum est, sicut potest patere ex praedictis -, sed intendit quod significant plura et non unum solum. Quod evidenter probatur ex littera sua in Praedicamentis, sicut patet in expositione quam edidi super eundem librum.	And therefore when Aristotle says that second substances signify ‘being such-and-such’, he does not mean that second subtances signify some quality or something real applied to an individual, for this is absolutely false, as is clear from what was said above, but he means that they signify more than one thing, and not one thing only. Which is evidently proved from his passage in the Categories, and as is clear in the exposition which I published on the same book.
Quarta proprietas substantiae est quod substantiae nihil est contrarium. Circa quod sciendum est quod contrarietas dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro proprietate quadam terminorum, illo modo quo dicimus quod 'album' et 'nigrum' sunt contraria, quia impossibile est istos duos terminos 'album' et 'nigrum' de eodem et pro eodem simul verificari.	The fourth property of substance is that there is no contrary to substance. Concerning this it should be known that contrariety is understood in two ways. In one way, for a certain property of terms, in the way that we say that ‘white’ and ‘black’ are contraries, because it is impossible that the two terms ‘white’ and ‘black’ are verified of and for the same thing at the same time.
Aliter accipitur pro quadam proprietate conveniente rebus, et sic potest accipi tripliciter, scilicet stricte, large et largissime. Stricte dicuntur illae res contrariae quae in eodem subiecto mutuo se expellunt et partibiliter in eodem subiecto adquiruntur vel adquiri possunt, saltem naturaliter; et isto modo nulla substantia contrariatur alteri. Large dicuntur illae res contrariae quae mutuo se expellunt in eodem, quamvis naturaliter partibiliter adquiri non possunt in eodem subiecto primo. Et sic formae substantiales sunt contrariae, quia mutuo se expellunt in eadem materia.	In another way, it is understood for a certain property belong to things, and here it can be understood in three ways, namely narrowly, broadly, and very broadly. Things are called ‘contrary’ in the narrow sense when they mutually expel each other in the same subject, and which are acquired, or can be acquired, in the same subject divisibly, at least naturally. And in this way no substance is made contrary to another. Things are called ‘contrary’ in the broad sense when they mutually expel each other in the same subject, although they cannot be primarily acquired in the same subject naturally and divisibly. And thus substantial forms are contraries, because they mutually expel one another in the same material.
Largissime dicuntur illa contraria quae componuntur ex talibus contrariis. Et sic aer et ignis dicuntur contraria, quia componuntur ex formis substantialibus contrariis, secundo modo loquendo de hoc vocabulo 'contraria'. Primo modo substantiae nihil est contrarium, sed secundo modo et tertio substantia contrariatur substantiae. Primo modo loquitur Philosophus in Praedicamentis, aliter loquitur alibi de contrariis.	Things are called ‘contrary’ in the broadest sense when they are composed from such contraries. And thus air and fire are called contraries, because they are composed from contrary substantial forms, in the second way of speaking of the word ‘contrary’. In the first way, nothing is a contrary to substance, but in the second and third way substance is contrary to substance. In the Categories, the Philosopher is speaking of the first way. Elsewhere, he speaks in other ways of contraries.
Quinta proprietas substantiae est quod substantia non suscipit magis et minus. Quae sic est intelligenda: de nulla substantia una numero praedicatur primo aliquod commune in genere substantiae cum hoc adverbio 'magis' et postea cum hoc adverbio 'minus', nec e converso.	The fifth property of substance is that substance is not receptive or more or less. Which is to be understood as follows: of no substance that is one in number is some common term in the genus of substance primarily predicated with the adverb ‘more’ and afterwards with the adverb ‘less’, or conversely.
Unde non est possibile quod istae duae, vel consimiles, successive verificentur 'Socrates est magis homo nunc quam prius vel magis animal nunc quam prius', 'Socrates est minus homo vel minus animal nunc quam prius'. Unde de nullo supponente pro substantia potest aliquod tale praedicatum verificari 'hoc est magis homo vel magis animal nunc quam prius', 'hoc est minus homo vel minus animal nunc quam prius', sicut de eodem numero contingit vere dicere 'hoc est magis album nunc quam prius'.	Hence it is not possible that the following two propositions, or ones similar to them, are successively verified: “Socrates is more a man now than before or more an animal than before”, “Socrates is less a man now than before or less an animal than before”. Hence of nothing suppositing for a substance can such predicates as “this is more a man or more an animal than before” or “this is less a man or less an animal than before” be verified, in the way that it is possible truly to say of something the same in number “this is more white now than before”.
Sexta proprietas substantiae est quod substantia, cum sit una et eadem numero, est susceptiva successive contrariorum, sicut idem homo numero est primo niger et postea albus. Haec autem proprietas ita convenit substantiae quod nulli alii potest convenire, sicut dicit Aristoteles in Praedicamentis.	The sixth property of substance is that substance, while it is one and the same thing in number, is successively susceptive of contraries. For example, one and the same man in number can be first black and afterwards white. But this property bleongs to substance and to no other, just as Aristotle notes in the Categories.
Unde dicit ibidem sic: “Maxime vero videtur proprium esse substantiae quod, cum unum et idem numero sit, susceptibile est contrariorum.Et in aliis quidem non habebit quisquid proferat quaecumque non sunt substantiae, quod cum sit unum et idem numero sit susceptibile contrariorum, et velut color htc, cum sit unum numero, non erit album et nigrum, neque actio aliqua, cum sit una et eadem, erit prava et studiosa; similiter autem et in aliis quae non sunt substantiae. Substantia vero, cum unum et idem numero sit, capax est contrariorum; ut quidam homo, cum unum et idem numero sit, aliquando est niger aliquando albus, sic et calidus et frigidus, pravus et studiosus. In nullis autem aliis aliquid tale videtur”.	Hence he says in the same place, ‘But it seems most proper to substance that, while remaining numerically one and the same thing, it should be susceptible of admitting contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the same one action be good and bad: this law holds good with everything that is not substance. But substances, while one and the same in number, is capable of contraries. For example, a particular man, while one and the same in number, is sometimes dark and sometimes white, also hot and cold, bad and good (pravus et studiosus). In no other things is this seen.
Ex isto patet quod de intentione Aristotelis fuit quod suscipere realiter contraria successive soli substantiae competit, ita quod impossibile est aliquid aliud a substantia realiter suscipere contraria. Ex quo, tamquam ex principio, sequuntur duo esse de mente Aristotelis, sive secundum veritatem sint vera sive falsa.	From this it is clear of the intention of Aristotle that it was that it belongs to substance alone to be really receptive of contraries successively, so that it is impossible for anything other than substance to be really receptive of contraries. From which, as it were from principle, it follows that two things are of the thinking of Aristotle, whether they are actually true or false.
Primum est quod non est de mente Aristotelis quod quantitas sit quoddam accidens realiter distinctum a substantia, inhaerens realiter illi, et realiter exsistens subiectum qualitatum corporalium, sicut multi moderni dicunt quod quantitas est unum accidens exsistens in substantia et realiter subiectum qualitatum.	The first is that it is not the thinking of Aristotle that quantity is a sort of accident, really distinct from substance, really inhering in it, and really the existing subject of corporeal qualities, the way many of the moderns say that quantity is a single accident existing in substance and really the subject of qualities.
Si enim ita esset, sequeretur necessario quod aliquid aliud a substantia, exsistens unum et idem numero, esset susceptivum contrariorum per propriam mutationem, quia illa quantitas primo reciperet unam qualitatem contrariam et postea aliam.	For if it were so, it would necessarily follow that something other than substance, being one and the same in number, would be receptive of contraries through proper change, because that quantity would first receive one contrary quality and afterwards another.
Immo, quantitas immediatius et prius susciperet contraria quam substantia, cum substantia, secundum eos, non sit immediatum subiectum qualitatum contrariarum sed mediatum tantum, nec per consequens suscipit contraria nisi mediante quantitate. Aliud sequitur esse de mente Aristotelis, quod nullum accidens est subiectum alterius accidentis, saltem accidentis habentis contrarium. Si enim sic esset, aliud a substantia susciperet contraria successive. Et ex isto sequitur quod est contra mentem Aristotelis dicere quod intellectus et voluntas sunt quaedam accidentia ipsius animae intellectivae, in quibus accidentibus primo recipiantur intellectiones et volitiones et tales actus et habitus.	On the contrary, quantity more immediately and primarily would be receptive of contraries, because substance, according to them, is not the immediate subject of contrary qualities but mediately only, nor as a consequence is it receptive of contraries except by quantity mediating. It follows that the thinking of Aristotle is something else, at least of an accident having a contrary. For if it were so, something other than substance would be receptive of contraries successively. And from that it follows that it is contrary to the thinking of Aristotle to say that the understanding and the will are a sort of accident of the intellective soul itself, in which accidents are first received intellections and volitions and such acts and states.
Et eodem modo potentiae sensitivae, secundum eum, non sunt quaedam accidentia recipientia alia accidentia. Sequitur etiam, secundum eum, quod relationes non sunt quaedam res distinctae realiter a substantia, subiective exsistentes in quantitate et qualitate, quae sint accidentia realiter exsistentia in substantia. Unde intentio Aristotelis est quod omne accidens est immediate exsistens in substantia, ita quod inter substantiam et quodcumque accidens suum nihil est medium in ratione subiecti.	And in the same way, sensitive powers, according to him, are not a sort of accident receiving other accidents. It also follows, according to him, that relations are a sort of thing really distinct from substance, subjectively existing in quantity and quality, which are accidents really existing in substance. Hence the intention of Aristotle is that every accident is immediately existing in a substance, so that between substance and any of its accidents there is no intermediary in the logical nature of the subject.
Unde Aristoteles, ut magis explanet intentionem suam per dubiorum remotionem, obicit contra se ipsum per orationem et opinionem, quae non sunt substantiae et tamen videntur suscipere contraria; eadem enim oratio est primo vera et postea falsa. Et solvens dicit: “Sed si quis hoc suscipiat sed tamen in modo suscipiendi differt; nam ea quae in substantiis sunt ipsa mutata susceptibilia sunt contrariorum. Frigidum enim de calido factum mutatum est, alteratum enim factum est; et nigrum ex albo et studiosum ex pravo; similiter autem in aliis unumquodque mutationem suscipiens susceptibile est contrariorum. Oratio autem et opinio ipsa quidem immobilia omnino perseverant, cum vero res movetur contrarium fit circa eam, ut quod sedeat aliquis, oratio vero permanet eadem, cum vero res mota, aliquando quidem vera aliquando quidem falsa. Similiter autem et in opinione. Quapropter solummodo substantiae proprium est eo quod secundum sui mutationem captabilis sit contrariorum”.	Hence Aristotle, in order to explain his meaning more by the removal of doubts, raises objections against himself regarding sentences and belief, which are not substances and yet seem to be receptive of contraries (for the same sentence is first true and then false). And resolving the issue he says "Yet although this exception may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in the manner in which the thing takes place. It is by themselves changing that substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which was hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state. Similarly that which was white becomes black, and that which was bad good, by a process of change; and in the same way in all other cases it is by changing that substances are capable of admitting contrary qualities. But statements and opinions themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that the contrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement 'he is sitting' remains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false, according to circumstances. What has been said of statements applies also to opinions. Hence it is a property of substance alone that, by changing, it is susceptible of contrary qualities".
Ex ista solutione patet quod intentio sua est quod nihil aliud a substantia potest moveri ab uno contrariorum ad reliquum, quod tamen falsum esset si quantitas esset immediatum subiectum qualitatum et tamen differret realiter a substantia. Et ideo quod oratio aliquando est vera aliquando falsa, hoc non est quia ipsa oratio mutatur et aliquando recipit realiter veritatem et aliquando falsitatem, sed hoc est propter mutationem alicuius substantiae, saltem localem.	From this solution it is clear his intention is that nothing apart from substance can be moved from one contrary to another, which, however, would be false if quantity were the immediate subject of qualities and yet really differed from substance. And therefore the fact that a sentence is sometimes true and sometimes false is not because the sentence itself has been changed and sometimes really receives truth, and sometimes falsity. Rather, it is because of change – or at least local change – in some substance.
Unde ad evidentiam istius solutionis est sciendum quod tam hoc nomen 'contraria' quam hoc verbum 'suscipere' accipitur aequivoce. Hoc enim nomen 'contraria', sicut tactum est prius, dupliciter, ad praesens, accipitur. Nam uno modo verificatur de aliquibus pro ipsis rebus extra, sicut dicimus quod albedo et nigredo sunt contraria. Aliter verificatur de terminis, sicut dicimus quod isti termini 'album' et 'nigrum' sunt contraria.	Hence, as evidence of this solution, it should be known that the name ‘contraries’ as well as the verb ‘receptive of’ is understood equivocally. For the name ‘contraries’, as mentioned before, is understood in two senses, for the present purposes. For in one sense, the name is verified of some things in respect of things outside the mind. For example, we say that blackness and whiteness are contraries. In another sense, it is verified of terms, such as when we say that the terms ‘black’ and ‘white’ are contraries.
Unde dicimus quod de eodem particulariter sumpto possunt verificari contraria, sicut sic dicendo 'homo est albus', 'homo est niger', quod non potest verificari nisi de terminis solis. Et contraria isto modo dicta dupliciter accipi possunt, scilicet stricte, et tunc dicuntur contraria quia significant res contrarias. Aliter potest hoc vocabulum 'contraria' accipi large, et tunc dicuntur illa contraria quae non possunt de eodem pro eodem simul verificari sed successive.	Hence, when we say that contraries can be verified of the same thing, taken particularly, for example when we say ‘a man is white’, ‘a man is black’, this cannot be verified except of terms alone. And predicated in this way, contraries can be understood in two senses, namely narrowly, and then they are called contraries because they signify contrary things. Otherwise the word ‘contraries’ can be understood broadly, and then what are called ‘contraries’ cannot be verified of the same thing, for the same thing at the same time, but successively.
'Suscipere' autem dupliciter accipitur, scilicet per realem inexsistentiam vel per praedicationem. Accipiendo 'contraria' primo modo, oratio nullo modo suscipit contraria. Sed accipiendo 'contraria' secundo modo, scilicet pro terminis, et hoc large, et 'suscipere' secundo modo, sic oratio suscipit contraria, hoc est dictu oratio non recipit in se tamquam accidens in subiecto aliqua contraria, sed de oratione praedicantur contraria successive, non quidem contraria quae sunt res contrariae mutuo se expellentes, sed termini qui non possunt de eodem pro eodem simul verificari sed successive. Substantia autem recipit realiter per inhaerentiam contraria in se tamquam accidentia in subiecto.	And ‘receptive of’ is understood in two senses, namely by real inherence or by predication. Understanding ‘contraries’ in the first way, in no way can a sentence be receptive of contraries. But understanding it in the second way (namely for terms, and in the broad sense), and understanding ‘receptive of’ in the second sense, then a sentence can be receptive of contraries, that is to say, the sentence does not receive contraries as if they were an accident in a subject, but rather contraries are successively predicated of the sentence: not contraries which mutually expel each other, but rather terms which cannot be verified of the same thing, for the same thing at the same time, but successively only. But substances really receive contraries by inherence in them, as if they were accidents in a subject.
Et hoc est quod subdit Aristoteles: “Si quis autem et hoc recipiat, opinionem scilicet et orationem dicens susceptibilia esse contrariorum”, scilicet per realem inhaerentiam, “non est verum”, quia oratio non recipit realiter contraria. Et subdit: “Oratio namque et opinio susceptibilia contrariorum esse dicuntur”, hoc est oratio et opinio sunt susceptibilia contrariorum per praedicationem, “non in eo quod ipsamet aliquid contrariorum suscipiant”, supple per realem inhaerentiam, “sed in eo quod circa alterum aliqua passio facta sit. Nam in eo quod res est vel non est dicitur oratio vera vel falsa, non in eo quod captabilis sit contrariorum. Simpliciter autem a nullo neque oratio movetur neque opinio”.	And this is what Aristotle adds: “And if someone were to allow this, and claim that opinions and sentences are capable of admitting contrary qualities” – i.e. by real inherence – “this is not true” – because a sentences does not really receive contraries. And he adds, “For sentences and opinions are said to be susceptive of contraries” – i.e. sentences and opinion are susceptive of contraries by predication – “not because they themselves receive contraries” – add ‘by real inherence” – “but because this affection occurs in something else. For it is because something is or is not the case that a sentence is called true or false, not because it is susceptive of contraries. In short, there is nothing which can alter the nature of statements and opinions.
Vult dicere quod quamvis ista contraria 'verum' et 'falsum' successive verificentur de eadem oratione, sicut ista oratio manens eadem numero 'tu sedes' est primo vera et postea falsa, tamen ista oratio non recipit realiter contraria, quia per hoc quod ista oratio est falsa quae prius fuit vera, nihil est realiter in oratione ista magis nunc quam prius.	He wishes to say that although the contraries ‘true’ and ‘false’ may successively be verified of the same sentence, for example, the sentence “you are sitting” is first true and then false, still this sentence does not really receive contraries, because, from a sentence, which was true before, now being false, there is nothing in reality in that sentence now than before.
Sed ideo praecise nunc dicitur falsa et non prius, quia nunc significat aliter esse a parte rei quam est et prius significavit ita esse a parte rei sicut fuit. Unde nunc significat te sedere, et tamen non sedes, ideo est falsa; et prius fuit vera, quia prius sedisti, sicut ista oratio significavit. Et tamen ista oratio nihil recipit in se nec mutatur in aliquo.	But therefore it is precisely said to be false now, and not before, because it now signifies it to be otherwise in reality than it actually is, but before signified it to be so in reality as it actually was. Hence it now signifies that you are sitting, and yet you are not sitting, therefore it is false. And before it was true, because you were sitting before, just as it signified. And yet that sentence received nothing in it, nor was it changed into something.
Propter quod subdit Aristotelis: 'Quapropter non erunt susceptibilia contrariorum, cum nulla in eis passio facta sit'. Ex isto processu Aristotelis evidenter apparet quod de intentione sua non est quod veritas et falsitas propositionum sunt quaedam qualitates propositionum inhaerentes eis. Si enim ita esset, sequeretur quod propositio quae est aliquando vera, aliquando falsa, realiter susciperet contraria. Sequeretur etiam quod quandocumque aliquid movetur extra me et postea quiescit quod una qualitas nova esset in anima cuiuslibet formantis talem propositionem 'hoc movetur' et alia deperderetur. Immo sequeretur quod propositio scripta vere alteraretur per hoc quod musca volat. Quae omnia sunt absurda et simpliciter falsa.	Because of this, Aristotle adds, “therefore they will not be susceptible of contraries, since no affection is brought about in them”. From this thought-process of Aristotle, it evidently seems that his intention is not that the truth and falsity of propositions are a sort of quality inhering in them. For if it were so, it would follow that some proposition, which is sometimes true, sometimes false, really received contraries. It would also follow that whenever something moved outside me, and then came to rest, that one new quality would be in the soul of anyone forming a proposition such as ‘this moves’, and another one was destroyed. Indeed, it would follow that a written proposition was truly altered by the fact that a fly was flying. All of which are absurd and absolutely false.
Immo videtur quod in theologia sequeretur haeresis manifesta.Nam si veritas et falsitas propositionum sunt tales qualitates propositionum sicut albedo et nigredo sunt qualitates corporum, tunc quandocumque veritas aliqua erit, haec erit vera 'haec veritas est', sicut quandocumque aliqua albedo erit, haec erit vera 'haec albedo est'. Et eodem modo de qualibet falsitate. Tunc accipio falsitatem istius propositionis 'Deus aliquid creat de novo': haec per illam opinionem est una qualitas propositionis, inhaerens sibi, et per consequens est alia res a Deo.	Indeed, it seems that manifest heresy would follow in theology. For if the truth and falsity of propositions are qualities of propositions as whiteness and blackness are qualities of bodies, then whenever some truth exists, ‘this truth exists’ will be true, just as whenever some whiteness exists, ‘this whiteness exists’ will be true. And in the same way of any falsity. Then I accept the falsity of the proposition “God newly creates something”, which by that opinion is a single quality of the proposition, inhering in it, and as a consequence is something other than God.
Tunc quaero: aut ista res potest creari a Deo aut non potest. Si non potest, igitur est aliquid aliud a Deo quod a Deo creari non potest; quod est contra Evangelistam, dicentem: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt et sine ipso factum est nihil. Si potest creari a Deo de novo, ponatur in esse. Tunc erit haec vera 'haec falsitas de novo a Deo creatur'; et sequitur 'haec falsitas de novo a Deo creatur, igitur aliquid de novo creatur'; et ultra 'igitur haec est vera: aliquid de novo creatur a Deo', et per consequens non est falsa; et ultra 'igitur haec falsitas istius propositionis non est'; et ultra 'igitur non creatur a Deo de novo'.	Then I ask whether that thing can be created by God, or not. If it cannot, then it is something other than God which cannot be created by God, which is against the Evangelist, who says “All things were made by him: and without him was made nothing that was made.” [John 1.3]. But if it can be newly created by God, let it be given. Then “this falsity is newly created by God” will be true, and “this falsity is newly created by God, therefore something is newly created” will follow, and further “therefore it is true that something is newly created by God”, and as a consequence it is not false, and furthermore “therefore this falsity of the proposition does not exist”, and further still “therefore it is not newly created by God”.
Patet igitur quod falsitas non est talis qualitas propositionis. Quid igitur est veritas et falsitas? Dico quod Aristoteles diceret quod veritas et falsitas non sunt res distinctae realiter a propositione vera vel falsa. Et ideo nisi ista abstracta 'veritas' et 'falsitas' includant aliqua syncategoremata vel aliquas dictiones aequivalentes, haec est concedenda 'veritas est propositio vera et falsitas est propositio falsa'. Sed numquid argumentum praecedens procedit contra istum modum ponendi veritatem et falsitatem?	Therefore it is clear that falsity is not such a quality of a proposition. When then is truth and falsity? I say that Aristotle would say that truth and falsity are not things distinct in reality from a proposition that is true or false. And therefore unless the abstract terms ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ involve some syncategorematic terms, or some equivalent expressions, “truth is a true proposition and falsity is a false proposition” should be conceded. But does the preceding argument go against that manner of giving truth and falsity?
Dicendum est quod non, quia posito quod haec esset vera 'veritas est propositio vera et falsitas est propositio falsa', tunc esset haec propositio falsa 'quandocumque haec falsitas erit, haec erit vera: haec falsitas est'. Et ideo concedendum esset quod haec falsitas istius propositionis 'Deus aliquid creat de novo' potest creari a Deo de novo. Haec tamen est impossibilis 'haec falsitas creatur a Deo', sicut haec est vera 'album potest esse nigrum', haec tamen est impossibilis 'album est nigrum'.	It should be said that it does not, because supposing that “truth is a true proposition and falsity a false proposition” is true, then the proposition “whenever this falsity exists, ‘this falsity exists’ will be true”, and therefore it would have to be conceded that the falsity of the proposition “God newly creates something” can be newly created by God. Nevertheless, the proposition ‘This falsehood is created by God’ is impossible. In the same way, while ‘the white can be black’ is true, ‘the white is black’ is impossible.
Et ratio quare ista opinio potest sic dicere, et non praecedens, est ista: quia scilicet ista opinio habet dicere quod ista nomina 'veritas' et 'falsitas' non sunt nomina simpliciter absoluta sed connotativa; prior autem opinio habet dicere quod sunt nomina mere absoluta, sicut ista 'albedo', 'nigredo', 'calor' et 'frigus'. Ista autem secunda opinio est de mente Aristotelis, sicut opinio sua est quod nulla res realiter per inhaerentiam suscipit quaecumque accidentia contraria nisi sola substantia. Unde in fine capituli de substantia concludit: “Quare proprium erit substantiae quod, cum sit unum et idem numero, secundum sui mutationem contrariorum esse susceptibilis dicitur. Et de substantia quidem haec dicta sunt”.	The reason this view can hold and the preceding view cannot is, namely, that ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ are not absolute names, but connotative names. But the former view has to say that they are purely absolute names like ‘whiteness’ and ‘blackness’ and ‘cold’ and ‘heat’. This second opinion is of the thinking of Aristotle, just as his opinion is that, except for substance, nothing can admit contrary qualities by inherence. Thus, at the end of the chapter on substance he concludes “Thus, it is peculiar to substance that while being numerically one and the same, it is said to be susceptive of contraries by its change. Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance."