Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 42

Latin	English
[CAP. 42. DE PRAEDICAMENTO SUBSTANTIAE]	[Chapter 42. On the category of substance]
ƿExpeditis quibusdam generalibus circa praedicamenta, quamvis multa alia possent dici, de singulis in speciali dicendum est, et primo de substantia. Circa quam primo considerandum est quod substantia multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo substantia dicitur quaecumque res distincta ab aliis, sicut frequenter talia inveniuntur in auctoribus 'substantia albedinis', 'substantia coloris', et sic de aliis.	Having disposed of some generalities about the categories, although many others could be mentioned, we should talk specifically about them one by one. About which first it must be considered that ‘substance’ is understood in many ways. In one way, substance is called anything distinct from others. For example, ‘substance of whiteness’, ‘substance of colour’ and so on are frequently found in the authorities.
Aliter dicitur substantia magis stricte omnis res quae non est accidens realiter inhaerens alteri. Et sic substantia dicitur tam de materia quam de forma quam etiam de composito ex utrisque.	In another stricter way, any thing which is not an accident really inhering in another is called substance. And thus material and form are called substance, as well the composite of both.
Aliter dicitur substantia strictissime de illo quod nec est accidens alteri inhaerens nec est pars alicuius essentialis, quamvis possit componere cum aliquo accidente. Et isto modo substantia ponitur genus generalissimum, quod secundum Aristotelem individitur in substantias primas et secundas, sed non est intelligendum quod ista sit divisio alicuius communis praedicabilis de suis dividentibus per se sive de pronominibus demonstrantibus illa dividentia. Demonstrando enim quamcumque substantiam secundam haec est falsa 'haec est substantia'.	In another way, the strictest way, what is neither an accident inhering in another, nor an essential part of something, is called a substance, although it could be composed with some accident. And in that way the most general genus is called a substance, which according to Aristotle is individuated into first and second substances, but it is not to be understood that this is a division of some common term, predicable of divided itemsper se or of pronouns demonstrating those items. For, pointing to any second substance, it is false to say ‘this is a substance’.
Unde de haec est vera 'nulla secunda substantia est substantia', quae patere potest ex praecedentibus. Probatum est enim prius quod nullum universale est substantia; omnis autem secunda substantia est quoddam universale, cum sit genus vel species secundum Aristotelem; nulla igitur secunda substantia est substantia.	Hence ‘no second substance is a substance’ is true, which can be clear from what was said before. For it was proved before that no universal is a substance. But every second substance is a universal, since it is a genus or a species according to Aristotle, therefore no second substance is a substance.
Item, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis quidquid negatur universaliter ab omnibus contentis immediate sub aliquo communi negatur universaliter ab illo communi; sed substantia secunda negatur ab omnibus immediate contentis sub substantia; igitur negatur universaliter a substantia. Est igitur haec vera 'nulla substantia est secunda substantia', et per consequens nulla secunda substantia est substantia. Assumptum patet, nam haec est vera 'nulla substantia corporea est secunda substantia' et haec similiter 'nulla substantia incorporea est secunda substantia'.	Likewise, according to the teaching of Aristotle, whatever is denied universally of all the things subsumed directly under some common term, is denied universally of that common term. But ‘second substance’ is denied universally of all the things subsumed directly under ‘substance’, therefore it is denied universally of ‘substance’. Therefore ‘no substance is a second substance’ is true, and as a consequence no substance is a second substance. The assumption is clear, for ‘no corporeal substance is a second substance’ is true, and similarly ‘no incorporeal substance is a second substance’.
Quod prima sit vera, et per consequens secunda, eadem ratione, patet per eandem regulam, nam haec est vera 'nullum corpus animatum est substantia secunda' et similiter ista 'nullum corpus inanimatum est substantia secunda'. Et quod prima istarum sit vera, et eadem ratione secunda, probari potest per eandem regulam, nam haec est vera 'nullum corpus animatum sensibile est substantia secunda' et haec similiter 'nullum corpus animatum insensibile est secunda substantia'.	That the first is true, and as a consequence the second, is clear by the same reason through the same rule, for ‘no animate body is a second substance’, and similarly ‘no inanimate body is a second substance’. And that the first of these is true, and by the same reasoning the second, can be proved by the same rule, for ‘no animate sensitive body is a second substance’ is true, and similarly ‘no animate insensitive body is a second substance’.
Et quod prima istarum sit vera, et eadem ratione secunda, adhuc probari potest per eandem regulam, nam haec est vera 'nullum corpus animatum sensibile rationale est secunda substantia' et eadem ratione ista 'nullum corpus animatum sensibile irrationale est secunda substantia'. Et quod prima istarum sit vera patet, nam sua convertibilis est vera 'nullus homo est secunda substantia', quae evidenter patet ex hoc quod quaelibet singularis est vera. Relinquitur igitur, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, quod haec est simpliciter vera 'nulla substantia est secunda substantia', et ideo quacumque substantia secunda inferiori ad generalissimum demonstrata, haec est simpliciter falsa 'haec est substantia'.	And that the first of these is true, and by the same reasoning the second, can still be proved by the same rule, for ‘no animate sensitive rational body is a second substance’, and by the same reasoning ‘no animate sensitive non-rational body is a second substance’. And that the first of these is true is clear, for its convertible is true ‘no man is a second substance’, which is evidently clear from the fact that each of its singulars is true. It remains, therefore, according to the teaching of Aristotle, that ‘no substance is a second substance’ is absolutely true, and therefore with this demonstrated of every second substance inferior to the most general, ‘this is a substance’ is absolutely false.
Et ideo dicendum est quod ista divisio non est nisi divisio unius nominis communis in nomina minus communia, ut sit aequivalens isti divisioni: nominum importantium seu significantium substantias extra animam quaedam sunt nomina propria uni substantiae, et illa nomina vocantur hic primae substantiae; quaedam autem nomina sunt communia multis substantiis, et illa nomina vocantur secundae substantiae. Quae nomina postea dividuntur, quia quaedam sunt genera et quaedam sunt species, quae tamen omnia vere sunt [/sutit] qualitates.	And therefore it should be said that this division does not exist unless it is of one common name into names that are less common, so that it is equivalent to that division. Of names conveying or signifying substances outside the soul, some are proper names of one substance, and these names are called here first substances, but other names are common to many substances, and these names are called second substances. Which names are afterwards divided, because some are genera and some are species, which nevertheless are truly qualities.
Et ita omnia illa nomina communia quae vocantur secundae substantiae sunt in praedicamento qualitatis, accipiendo 'esse in praedicamento' pro eo de cuius pronomine demonstrante ipsum praedicatur 'qualitas'. Omnia tamen illa sunt in praedicamento substantiae, accipiendo 'esse in praedicamento' pro illo de quo significative sumpto praedicatur 'substantia'.	And so all these common names which are called second substances are in the category of quality, understanding ‘being in a category’ for that of whose pronoun demonstrating it is predicated ‘quality’. But all these are in the category of substance, understanding ‘being in a category’ for that of which is predicated ‘substance’, taken significatively.
Unde in ista propositione 'homo est animal' vel 'homo est substantia', 'homo' non supponit pro se sed pro suo significato. Si enim supponeret pro se haec esset falsa 'homo est substantia' et haec vera 'homo est qualitas'. Sicut si haec vox 'homo' supponat pro se haec est falsa 'homo est substantia' et haec vera 'homo est vox et qualitas'.	Hence, in the proposition ‘a man is an animal’ or ‘a man is a substance’, ‘man’ does not supposit for itself but for its significate. For if it were to supposit for itself ‘a man is a substance’ would be false, and ‘a man is a quality’ true. For example, if the utterance ‘man’ supposits for itself, ‘a man is a substance’ is false and ‘a man is an utterance and a quality’ true.
Et ita secundae substantiae non sunt nisi quaedam nomina et qualitates praecise significantes substantias, et propter hoc et non propter aliud dicuntur esse in praedicamento substantiae. Et quod illud sit consonum dictis auctorum patet, nam Philosophus dicit in Praedicamentis quod “Omnis substantia videtur hoc aliquid significare. Et de primis substantiis indubitabile et verum est quod hoc aliquid significant”.	And so second substances are nothing but certain names and qualities precisely signifying substances, and because of this and not anything else they are said to be in the category of substance. And that this is in harmony with the sayings of the authors is clear, for the Philosopher says in the Categories that “every substance seems to signify ‘this something’. And of the first substances is is undoubtable and true that they signify ‘this something’”.
Ex quo patet quod Aristoteles vult quod substantia prima significat hoc aliquid; sed substantia particularis exsistens extra animam non significat hoc aliquid, sed ipsa significatur; igitur primam substantiam vocat hic Aristoteles nomen substantiae particularis exsistentis extra animam. Et eadem ratione, et multo fortius, debet vocare secundas substantias ipsamet nomina. Item, Boethius vult in diversis locis super Praedicamenta quod Philosophus in libro illo tractat de vocibus, et ita per consequens vocat primas substantias et secundas ipsas voces.	From which it is clear that Aristotle wishes that first substance signifies ‘this something’, but a particular substance existing outside the soul does not signify ‘this something’, but it is signified, therefore here Aristotle calls first substance the name of a particular substance existing outside the soul. And by the same reasoning, and much more strongly, he ought to call second substances the names themselves. Likewise, Boethius wishes that in diverse places in his commentary on the Categories that the Philosopher deals with utterances in that book, and so as a consequence calls first and second substances the utterances themselves.
Similiter, Aristoteles dicit substantias primas et secundas esse in praedicamento substantiae, et ibidem ponit illa quae sunt in praedicamento substantiae esse incomplexa ex quibus componuntur propositiones. Propositiones autem non componuntur ex substantiis extra animam exsistentibus. Igitur etc.	Similarly, Aristotle says that first and second substances are in the category of substance, and in the same place proposes that things which are in the category of substance are simple items from which propositions are composed. But propositions are not composed of substances existing outside the soul. Therefore etc.
Item, Damascenus ponit voces collocari sub praedicamento substantiae. Non est igitur dissonum dictis antiquorum dicere quod Aristoteles vocat substantias secundas nomina communia substantiarum. Nec istis obstat illud quod dicit Aristoteles quod species sunt magis substantiae quam genera, quia per tales propositiones non plus intendit nisi quod convenientius respondetur ad quaestionem factam per 'quid est' de substantia demonstrata per speciem quam per genus. Et ideo talis propositio 'species est magis substantia quam genus' falsa est de virtute sermonis, sed vera est secundum mentem quam habuit de ea Philosophus.	Likewise, Damascene proposes that utterances be placed in the category of substance. Therefore it is not unharmonious with the sayings of the ancients that Aristotle calls second substances the common names of substances. Nor is it an hindrance to this that Aristotle says that species are more substances than genera, because by such propositions he did not mean any more than that a more appropriate reply to the question ‘what is it?’ involves a substance designated by a species [word] than a genus [word]. And therefore a proposition such as ‘species is more substance than genus’ is literally false, but is true according as the Philosopher thought about it.
Breviter igitur dicendum est quod talis divisio est divisio in nomina, quorum aliqua sunt propria, aliqua communia. Nomina propria dicuntur substantiae primae, nomina communia dicuntur substantiae secundae. Verumtamen sciendum est quod Philosophus in Praedicamentis aequivoce utitur termino 'primae substantiae'.	Therefore we must briefly say that such a division is a division of names, of which some are proper, others common. Proper names are called first substances, common names are called second substances. However it should be known that the Philosopher uses the term ‘first substance’ equivocally in the Categories.
Nam aliquando utitur illo pro ipsis nominibus substantiarum exsistentium extra animam, sicut ibi : “Primae substantiae significant hoc aliquid”; aliquando pro ipsis substantiis exsistentibus extra animam, sicut ibi : “Substantia est quae proprie et principaliter” etc. Propter quod quando Philosophus dicit quod “omnia alia aut de subiectis principalibus dicuntur substantiis aut in subiectis eisdem sunt”, vocat ibi subiecta non quidem subsistentia realiter aliis sed subiecta propositionum.	For sometimes he uses it for the names of substances existing outside the soul, as in “First substances signify ‘this something’”; sometimes for the actual substances existing outside the soul, as in “Substance is what properly and principally etc.”. Because of this, when the Philosopher says that “all others are [to complete]
Unde sicut dicit Damascenus in Logica sua, cap. 8, subiectum dupliciter accipitur, scilicet secundum exsistentiam, et sic substantia singularis exsistens extra animam est subiectum accidentium; vel ad praedicationem, et sic particulare est subiectum ad universalius. Et isto secundo modo accipit Philosophus subiecta quando dicit secundas substantias dici de subiecto. Et ita substantiae primae non sunt subiecta realiter subsistentia substantiis secundis, sed sunt subiecta per praedicationem.	Hence, just as Damascene says (Logic ch. 8), ‘subject’ is understood in two ways, namely according to existence, and thus a singular substance existing outside the soul is a subject of accidents; or according to predication, and thus the particular is subject to the universal. And in this second way the Philosopher understands ‘subjects’ when he says that second substances are predicated of the subject. And so first substances are not subjects really subsisting in second substances, but are subjects by predication.
Ex quo patet quod Philosophus quandoque vocat substantias primas nomina et signa substantiarum exsistentium extra animam, nam dicit secundas substantias dici de substantiis primis tamquam de subiectis; quod non potest esse nisi per praedicationem. Igitur substantia prima in praedicatione est subiectum et secunda substantia est praedicatum; sed nulla propositio componitur ex substantiis extra animam; igitur illa prima substantia quae est subiectum propositionis respectu secundae substantiae non est substantia exsistens extra animam.	From which it is clear that the Philosopher sometimes calls first substances names, and signs of substances existing outside the soul, for he says that second substances are predicated of first substances as though of subjects. This cannot happen except by predication. Therefore first substance in predication is the subject, and second substance is the predicate. But no proposition is composed of substances outside the soul, therefore the first substance, which is the subject of a proposition in respect of second substance, is not a substance existing outside the soul.
Propter quod quando dicit Aristoteles quod destructis primis substantiis impossibile est aliquid aliorum remanere, non intelligit de destructione reali et consistentia reali, sed intelligit de destructione per propositionem negativam, sub isto sensu: quando esse exsistere non praedicatur de aliquo contento sub aliquo communi tunc esse exsistere vere negatur ab illo communi et a proprietatibus et accidentibus propriis illi communi. Nihil aliud intendens nisi quod tales consequentiae bonae sunt: iste homo non est, ille homo non est, et sic de singulis; igitur nullus homo est; igitur nullum risibile est; igitur nullum grammaticum est; igitur nulla grammatica est; igitur nulla logica est.	Because of this, when Aristotle says that when first substances are destroyed, it is impossible for any substances to remain, he does not mean real destruction and real persistence, but he means the destruction by the negative proposition, under the sense: when existential being is not predicated of anything subsumed under some common [term], then existential being is truly denied of that common term, and of the properties and accidents proper to that common term, meaning nothing else but that consequences such as “this man does not exist, that man does not exist” and so on, therefore no man exists, therefore nothing capable of laughter exists, therefore no grammarian exists, no logician exists.
Si enim intelligeret de destructione reali falsum diceret. Quamvis enim nullus lapis esset, hoc genus 'lapis' posset remanere; adhuc enim posset aliquis formare istam propositionem 'nullus homo est lapis' et istam 'nullus lapis est asinus'; quod non posset facere nisi partes propositionis essent, et per consequens hoc genus 'lapis' esset. Tunc tamen de nullo vere affirmative praedicaretur in propositione mere de inesse et mere de praesenti.	For if he were understood as meaning real destruction, he would be saying something false. For although no stone existed, the genus ‘stone’ would remain, for someone could still form the proposition “no stone is a donkey”, which he could not make unless the parts of the proposition existed, and as a consequence the genus ‘stone’ would exist. But then it would be truly affirmatively predicated of nothing, in a purely assertoric proposition of the present tense.