Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 48

Latin	English
[CAP. 48. QUALITER RESPONDENDUM EST SUSTINENDO QUANTITATEM ESSE ALIAM REM ABSOLUTAM, DISTINCTAM A SUBSTANTIA ET QUALITATE ET QUOMODO EXPONENDUS EST ARISTOTELES]	[Chapter 48. How it should be replied when maintaining that quantity is another absolute thing, distinct from substance and quality, and how Aristotle should be expounded]
Secundum opinionem autem quae ponit quantitatem esse aliam rem absolutam a substantia et qualitate, et quod punctus, linea et superficies et corpus inter se realiter distinguuntur, aliter debet dici. Unde secundum opinionem illam dimensiones sunt quaedam res informantes substantiam et sustentantes qualitates corporales, ita quod substantia non est dimensio sed est subiectum dimensionis; nec qualitas est dimensio sed est subiective exsistens in dimensione.	Now according to the opinion that quantity is another absolute thing, [distinct] from substance and quality, and that point, line, surface and body are really distinct from one another, it ought to said otherwise. Hence, according to that opinion, dimensions are certain things informing substances and sustaining corporeal qualities, so that substance is not a dimension but the subject of dimensions, nor is quality a dimension but is subjectively existing in dimension.
Et tunc quantitas vel habet partes copulatas ad terminum communem vel non habet tales partes copulatas ad terminum communem. Si detur primum, vel illae partes omnes sunt permanentes: et tunc vel sunt extensae secundum longitudinem tantum, et sic est linea; vel secundum longitudinem et latitudinem, et sic est superficies; vel secundum longitudinem, latitudinem et profunditatem, et sic est corpus.	And than quantity either has parts joined to a common term, or does not have parts joined to a common term. If the first, either all those parts are permanent, and then they are extended either in length only, and then the [quantity] is a line, or in length and breadth, and then it is a surface, or in length and breadth and depth, and then it is a body.
Locus autem a multis ponitur esse idem realiter cum superficie. Si autem non omnes partes sunt permanentes, sic est tempus. Si autem partes non copulantur ad terminum communem, vel igitur illae partes sunt permanentes, et tunc est numerus; vel non sunt permanentes, et tunc est oratio. Et ita ista ponuntur in genere quantitatis: linea, superficies, corpus, locus, tempus, numerus et oratio. Punctus autem, instans et unitas non ponuntur in genere quantitatis per se sed per reductionem.	But place is supposed by many to be the same in reality with a surface. But if not all parts are permanent, then it is time. But if the parts are not joined by a common term, either those parts are permanent, and then [the quantity] is a number, or they are not permanent, and then it is speech. And thus the following are given in the genus of quantity: line, surface, body, place, time, number and speech. But a point, an instant and a unity are not given in the genus of quantity per se, but by reduction.
Aliter autem dividitur quantitas, quia quaedam est habens positionem, et sic sunt istae species: linea, superficies, corpus et locus; quaedam autem non habens positionem, et sic sunt istae species: tempus, numerus et oratio.	Now quantity is divided in another way, for one sort has position, and thus these species are: line, surface, body and place. Another sort does not have position, and these species are: time, number and speech.
Prima autem proprietas quantitatis est non habere contrarium, quia quamvis qualitas exsistens subiective in quantitate habeat contrarium, ipsa tamen quantitas non habet contrarium, sicut inductive patet. Secunda proprietas est quod quantitas non suscipit magis et minus, quia una quantitas non est magis quantitas quam alia. Tertia proprietas est quod secundum quantitatem aliquid dicitur aequale vel inaequale, ita quod ipsa quantitas per se et primo est aequalis vel inaequalis, et secundario et per accidens substantia sustentans quantitatem et qualitas exsistens in quantitate subiective est aequalis vel inaequalis.	Now the first property of quantity is not to have a contrary, for although quality existing subjectively in quantity has a contrary, still that quantity does not have a contrary, as is clear inductively. The second property is that quantity is not receptive of more and les, for one quantity is not more a quantity than another. The third property is that in terms of quantity something is called equal or unequal, so that this quantity per se and primarily is equal or unequal, and secondarily and per accidens, a substance receptive of quantity [or] quality existing in quantity subjectively is equal or unequal.
Et de quantitate ista sufficiant.	And that suffices about quantity.