Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 49

Latin	English
[CAP. 49. DE PRAEDICAMENTO 'AD ALIQUID']	[Chapter 49. On the category of 'to something' (i.e. relation)]
Tertium praedicamentum quod ponit Aristoteles vocatur 'ad aliquid' sive relatio.	The third category that Aristotle gives is called ‘to something’ or relation.
Et est primo sciendum quod sicut sunt opiniones contrariae de quantitate ita sunt contrariae opiniones de 'ad aliquid' sive de relatione.	And it should first be known that just as there are contrary opinions about quantity, so there are contrary opinions about ‘to something’, or relation.
Quidam enim ponunt quod relatio non est aliqua res extra animam distincta realiter et totaliter a re absoluta et a rebus absolutis. Et de ista opinione reputo fuisse Aristotelem et alios philosophos sequentes eum.	For some suppose that relation is not some thing outside the soul, really and totally distinct from an absolute thing and from absolute things. And I deem Aristotle to have been of that opinion, as well as other philosophers following him.
Alii autem ponunt quod relatio est quaedam res quae non plus est res absoluta quam homo est asinus, sed est distincta realiter et totaliter a re absoluta et a rebus absolutis. Et de ista opinione sunt multi theologi, quam etiam aliquando credidi fuisse opinionem Aristotelis, sed nunc mihi videtur quod opinio contraria sequitur ex principiis suis.	Others suppose that relation is a certain thing which is no more absolute than a man or a donkey, but is really and totally distinct from an absolute thing and from absolute things. And of this opinion are many theologians, which also I once believed to have been the opinion of Aristotle, although it now seems that the contrary opinion follows from his principles.
Unde istam materiam de relativis primo volo prosequi secundum opinionem primam, secundo secundum opinionem secundam. Tractando autem istam materiam iuxta primam opinionem, primo ponam modum ponendi et ostendam quod opinio illa est Aristotelis; secundo confirmabo eam per aliquas rationes; tertio obiciam contra eam et respondebo illo modo quo responderet Aristoteles, ut mihi videtur; quarto prosequar de illis quae in isto praedicamento ponuntur.	Therefore I wish first to follow the material about relatives according to the first opinion. Second, according to the second. But in dealing with that material in connection with the first opinion, first I will give the mode of putting it, and I will show that this opinion is Aristotle’s. Second, I will confirm it through other reasonings. Third, I will give objections to it, and I will reply in the manner by which Aristotle would reply (as it seems to me). Fourth, I will follow concerning those things which are given in that category.
Est autem ista opinio quod praeter res absolutas, scilicet substantias et qualitates nulla res est imaginabilis, nec in actu nec in potentia. Verumtamen illas easdem res diversa nomina diversimode significant. Quia aliqua nomina sic sua significata significant quod absolute possunt de aliquo praedicari absque hoc quod addatur eis aliquis casus obliquus, sicut aliquis est homo, quamvis non sit alicuius homo vel alicui homo, et sic de aliis casibus obliquis.	Now this opinion is that beyond absolute things (namely substances and qualities), no thing is imaginable, neither in actuality nor potentiality. Nevertheless, diverse names signify the same things in diverse ways. For some names signify their significates in such a way that they can be absolutely predicated of something without some oblique case being added to them. For example, someone is a man, although there is not a man of something, or a man to something, and so for other oblique cases.
Aliqua autem nomina sic sua significata significat quod de nullo verificari possunt nisi vere et convenienter possit eis addi casus obliquus/obliquis alterius dictionis, sicut impossibile est quod aliquis sit pater nisi sit alicuius pater, et impossibile est quod aliquis sit similis nisi alicui sit similis, ita quod ista nomina 'pater', 'filius', 'causa', 'causatum', 'similis' et huiusmodi de nullo possunt vere affirmari si significative sumantur nisi vere et convenienter possit eis addi respectu eiusdem aliquis casus obliquus. Et omnia talia nomina vocantur nomina relativa.	But some names signify their significates in such a way that they can be verified of nothing unless truly and appropriately can be added to them the oblique case of the other expression. For example it is impossible that someone is a father unless he is the father of someone, and it is impossible that someone is similar unless he is similar to someone, so that the names ‘father’, ‘son’, ‘cause’, ‘caused’, ‘similar’ and suchlike can be truly affirmed of nothing (if significatively taken) unless some oblique case can truly and appropriately be added to them in respect of the same thing. And all such names are called relative names.
Et secundum unam opinionem omnis res pro qua potest tale nomen in propositione vera supponere est vera relatio, ut sic 'relatio' non sit nomen secundae intentionis, nec secundae impositionis, sed sit nomen primae intentionis, quia quando significative sumitur pro re, quae non est signum, potest supponere, ut sic haec sit vera 'homo est relatio', 'Sortes est relatio', ex hoc ipso quod Sortes est similis vel pater alterius.	And according to one opinion, every thing which such a name can truly supposit for in a proposition is a true relation, so that in this way ‘relation’ is not a name of second intention, nor of second imposition, but is a name of first intention. For when it is significatively taken for a thing, which is not a sign, it can supposit, so that in this way ‘a man is a relation’, ‘Socrates is a relation’ is true, from the very fact that Socrates is similar to, or a father of, another.
Et quamvis secundum usum theologorum oporteat concedere quod aliqua res extra animam, quae non est signum incomplexum alterius ex quo nata est componi propositio, sit relatio, tamen puto quod Aristoteles nihil posuit relativum nec 'ad aliquid' nec relationem nisi solum nomen ex quo nata est propositio mentalis, vocalis vel scripta componi.	And although, according to the usage of theologians, one has to concede that some thing outside the soul, which is not a simple sign of another thing from which a proposition is suitable to be composed, is a relation, nevertheless I think that Aristotle did not suppose anything to be a relative term, or ‘to something’ or a relation, unless it was only a name from which a mental, spoken or written proposition is suitable to be composed.
Et ideo secundum opinionem Aristotelis, ut aestimo, 'relatio' sive 'ad aliquid' sive etiam 'relativum' erat nomen secundae impositionis vel nomen secundae intentionis et non nomen primae intentionis. Et ideo secundum suam opinionem non debet concedi quod homo est relatio vel albedo est relatio, sed debet concedi quod hoc nomen 'pater' est relativum, et non debet concedi quod iste homo qui est pater est relativum.	And therefore according to the opinion of Aristotle (in my estimation), relation (or ‘to something’ or even ‘relative’) was a name of second imposition or a name of second intention, and not a name of first intention. And therefore, according to his opinion it ought not to be conceded that a man is a relation, or whiteness is a relation. But it ought to be conceded that the name ‘father’ is a relative [term], and it ought not to be conceded that the man who is a father is a relative [term].
Et quod ista sit opinio Aristotelis potest persuaderi. Primo, quia Philosophus in Praedicamentis definiens 'ad aliquid' dicit quod 'ad aliquid talia dicuntur quaecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud'. Et exemplificat quomodo aliquid dicitur ad aliud diversimode, quia aliquid sub habitudine casus genitivi, aliquid sub habitudine casus ablativi vel dativi. Ex hoc arguo sic: nihil dicitur alterius sub habitudine casus genitivi vel ad aliud sub alio casu nisi nomen; sed omne ad aliquid dicitur ad aliud sub aliqua habitudine tali casuali; igitur omne ad aliquid est nomen.	And that this is the opinion of Aristotle can be persuasively argued. First, because the Philosopher in the Categories, defining ‘to something’, says that ‘to something’ means that ‘things are called relative, which are either said to be of other things or related to something else. And he gives examples of how something is said to be related to something else in diverse ways, e.g. something in the habitude of the genitive case, or something in the habitude of the ablative or dative case. From this I argue as follows. Nothing is predicated of another under the habitude of the genitive case, or to another thing in another case, except a name. But every relation is predicated of something else under some habitude that is has a case [casuale].
Unde et omnes expositores dicunt quod ad aliquid sub aliqua habitudine casuali ad aliud dicitur; tale autem quid nonnisi nominibus competere potest. Relinquitur igitur, secundum Philosophum, quod 'ad aliquid' est nomen importans suum significatum, sic quod non potest pro eo convenienter supponere nisi possit sibi addi aliquis casus obliquus.	Therefore also all those explaining this say that relation is predicated of another under some ‘cased’ habitude. But such a thing can only belong to names. Therefore it remains – according to the Philosopher – that relation is a name conveying its significate in such a way that it cannot appropriately supposit for it unless some oblique case can be added to it.
Nec valet dicere quod Philosophus istam definitionem relativorum reprehendit versus finem capituli[/capitul], quia Philosophus ibidem non intendit quod ista definitio ab aliquibus relativis removeatur, sed dicit ibidem quod ista definitio convenit omnibus relativis, non tamen est convertibilis, sed est in plus, sicut patebit inferius.	Nor is it valid to say that the Philosopher repudiates that definition towards the end of the chapter, because in the same place he does not mean that this definition is removed from other relatives, but rather he says in the same place that this definition belongs to all relative terms, yet it is not convertible, but is wider, as will be clear below.
Et ita omne relativum est tale nomen secundum eum, sicut patet per ipsum ibidem. Per quem etiam ibidem patet quod substantias primas et secundas vocat nomina substantiarum, quia aliquas substantias ponit quae dicuntur aliorum, sed illae res non dicuntur aliorum sed nomina tantum, quamvis sint aliorum.	And so every relative is such a name, according to him, just as is clear from him in the same place. Through which also in the same place it is clear that he calls first and second substances the names of substances, because he supposes there are some substances which are not predicated of others. But those things are not predicated of others, but only names, although they may be of others.
Item, Philosophus in Praedicamentis ponit quod omnia relativa dicuntur ad convertentiam si convenienter assignentur. Ubi etiam ponit quod ubi deficiunt nobis nomina, licitum est fingere nomina ad quae alia relativa dicuntur. Ex istis arguo sic: nos non assignamus nisi nomina, sicut nec utimur nisi nominibus; cum igitur nos assignemus relativa, ipsa nomina erunt relativa. Praeterea, secundum intentionem Philosophi, nos fingimus relativa ad quae dicuntur alia; sed non fingimus nisi nomina; igitur ipsa nomina sunt relativa.	Likewise, the Philosopher proposes in the Categories that all relative terms are ‘predicated conversely’ if they are appropriately assigned. There also he proposes there that where names are not available to us, it is OK to create names to which other relative terms are predicated. From these cases I argue as follows. We do not assign [anything] except names, just as we do not use anything except names. Therefore since we assign relative terms, those names will be relative terms. Moreover, according to the meaning of the Philosopher, we create relative terms against which others are predicated, but we do not create anything except names, therefore those names are relative terms.
Et si dicas quod secundum Philosophum non fingimus relativa sed fingimus nomina relativorum; unde dicit Philosophus: 'Aliquotiens et forte nomina fingere necesse est, si non fuerit nomen impositum ad quod convenienter assignetur'. Igitur videtur quod possumus fingere nomen relativum et non ipsum relativum: Sed istud non valet ad intentionem Philosophi, quia ipse intendit quod fingimus ipsum relativum. Quando enim non est nomen relativum impositum ad significandum correspondens alteri correlativo, tunc licitum est fingere nomen relativum.	And if you say that, according to the Philosopher we do not create relatives but rather create the names of relative [things], therefore the Philosopher says that ‘occasionally, perhaps, it is also necessary to make up names, if there were no name [already] imposed which could appropriately be assigned’. Therefore it seems that we can make up a relative name and not the relative itself. But this does not validly reflect the meaning of the Philosopher because he means that we make up the relative itself. For when it is not a relative name imposed to signify what corresponds to the other correlative, then it is OK to make up a relative name.
Unde dicit quod 'necesse est fingere si non fuerit nomen impositum ad quod convenienter assignetur', et per consequens ad nomen fictum assignatur relativum; Sed non assignatur nisi ad relativum; igitur ipsum nomen est relativum.	Therefore he says that ‘it is necessary to make up [one], if there were no name already imposed which could appropriately be assigned, and as a consequence a relative is assigned to a made-up name. But it is only assigned to a relative, therefore the name itself is relative.
Hoc idem patet per eundem, ibidem, nam postquam exemplificavit quomodo relativa aliqua dicuntur ad convertentiam, subdit: 'Similiter autem et in aliis; sed casu aliquotiens differunt secundum locutionem'. Ex quo patet quod dicit relativa differre casu; sed sola nomina differunt casu; igitur secundum eum sola nomina sunt relativa.	The same thing is clear from the same place, for after he has given examples of how some relatives are ‘predicated conversely’, he adds: ‘It is similar with other relative terms; but sometimes they differ in case according to locution’. From this it is clear that he says relative terms differ in case, but only names differ in case, therefore according to him, names alone are relatives.
Item, quod non ponat relationes esse alias res, potest persuaderi sic: si relatio esset alia res, quandocumque adveniret alicui, illa res vere haberet rem novam in se, et per consequens vere mutaretur; quod est contra eum, V Physicorum, ubi ponit relationem advenire ipso nihil mutato.	Likewise, that he does not suppose that relations are other things can be persuasively argued as follows. If a relation were another thing, whenever it applied to something, that thing would truly have a new thing in itself, and as a consequence would truly be changed, which is against what he says in Physics V, where he supposes that a relation applies to a thing without any of it changing.
Item, secundum Philosophum, V Metaphysicae, 'calefactivum est ad calefactibile'; igitur si relatio esset alia res in calefactivo, esset talis res ad illud calefactibile quod nihil est.	Likewise, according to the Philosopher (Metaphysics V) ‘what is capable of heating is related to what is capable of being heated. Therefore, if relation were another thing in the what is capable of heating, it would something related to what is capable of being heated, which is nothing.
Item, tunc essent in eodem res infinitae actualiter. Probatio: nam ista res est calefactiva illius ligni et etiam infinitorum, scilicet sol, secundum Philosophum, quia sol calefacit infinita corpora; igitur cuiuslibet illorum est modo calefactivus. Si igitur relatio sit alia res, tot erunt res actualiter exsistentes in sole quot erunt calefacta a sole.	Likewise, then there would be infinitely many actual things in the same thing. Proof: for that thing is capable of heating that wood, and also of infinitely many things, namely the sun, according to the Philosopher, for the sun heats infinitely many bodies, therefore of any of them there is now capable of being heated. Therefore, if relation is another thing, there will be as many things actually existing in the sun as there are capable of being heated by the sun.
Sed sol calefacit infinita, igitur infinitae res, quarum quaelibet secundum se tota est distincta ab alia, modo sunt in sole. Quod est contra Philosophum, VI Physicorum, negantem talia infinita esse in rerum natura. Nec valet dicere quod ad omnia illa calefactibilia est una relatio, et non variantur relationes secundum variationem terminorum, quia eadem facilitate dicetur quod respectu omnium non oportet ponere nec unam talem relationem, sed sufficit quod sit una res quae potest appellari diversis nominiibus, vel eodem nomine, adiectis sibi diversis casibus obliquis.	But the sun heats infinitely many things, therefore infinitely many things, of which any is according to itself wholly distinct from another, are now in the sun. This is against the Philosopher (Physics VI), denying that such an infinity of things exists in nature. Nor is it valid to say that there is one relation to all those things capable of being heated, and relations are not varied according to the variation of the terms, because with the same facility it may be said that in respect of all things we do not have to posit [even] one such relation, but rather it suffices that there is one thing which can be called by diverse names, or by the same name with diverse oblique cases adjoined to it.
Similiter, qua ratione dicis quod respectu omnium eiusdem rationis sufficit unica relatio, eadem ratione et aeque faciliter dicam ego quod respectu quorumcumque, etiam specie et genere distinctorum, sufficit una relatio, ita quod non oportet ponere tales relationes extra animam distinctas specie.	Similarly, by the reason you say that in respect of all things of the same logical nature, there suffices a unique relation, by the same reasoning and equally easily I will say that in respect of any things, even of those distinct in species and genus, there suffices one relation, so that we do not have to suppose there are such relations outside the soul, distinct in species.
Sic igitur mihi videtur quod opinio Aristotelis fuit quod sola nomina sunt ad aliquid vel relativa. Et isti opinioni concordant multi grammatici, ponentes ad aliquid vel relativum esse speciem nominis. Unde Priscianus, in Maiori Volumine, libro III, cap. De nomine, enumerans multas species nominis, inter alias enumerat 'ad aliquid', dicens: 'Ad aliquid dictum est quod sine intellectu illius ad quod dictum est proferri non potest, ut 'filius', 'servus'. Nam dicendo filium etiam patrem, et dicendo servum dominum quoque intelligo; quod si intereat, una interimit illud quod ab eo intelligitur'. Eandem sententiam dicunt alii grammatici, sequentes praedictum auctorem.	Thus it seems to me, therefore, that the opinion of the Philosopher was that only names are ‘to something’ or relative. And many grammarians agree with this opinion, supposing that ‘to something’ or ‘relative term’ is a species of name. Therefore Prisician (Priscian Major, book III, chapter on names), enumerating many species of names, enumerates ‘to something’ among them, saying ‘something is called to something which cannot be uttered without the understanding of that of which it is predicated, such as ‘son’, ‘servant’. For in saying ‘son’ I also understand ‘father’, and in saying ‘servant’ I also understand ‘master’. For of one perishes, the other who is understood by it perishes. The same view is expressed by other grammarians, following the author above.