Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 50

Latin	English
[CAP. 50. QUOD RELATIO NON SIT ALIA RES A RE ABSOLUTA]	[Chapter 50. That relation is not a distinct thing from an absolute thing]
Pro ista opinione possunt nonnullae rationes adduci, sive concludant sive non, ad praesens non curo. Unde arguitur sic: si relatio esset res extra animam, distincta realiter a re absoluta, sequeretur quod potentia materiae primae, qua potest recipere formam, esset alia res a materia; consequens est falsum, quia tunc essent in materia infinitae res, ex quo potest successive infinitas formas recipere.	For this opinion a few reasons can be cited. Whether they are conclusive or not, I am not bothered about for now. Therefore it is argued as follows. If relation were a thing outside the soul, distinct from any absolute thing, it would follow that the potential of primary matter, by which it receives a form, would be another thing apart from the matter. The consequent is false, because then there would be infinitely many things in the matter, from which it can successively receive infinitely many forms.
Item, si esset talis alia res, quandocumque asinus moveretur localiter hic inferius, quodlibet corpus caeleste mutaretur et reciperet aliquam rem de novo in se, quia aliter distaret ab isto asino nunc quam prius, et si distantia esset alia res, vere perderet unam rem et aliam de novo reciperet.	Likewise, if there were another such thing, whenever a donkey moved locally here below [on earth], every celestial body would be changed, and would receive something anew in itself, because otherwise it would be more distant from the donkey than now, and if distance were another thing , it would truly lose one thing and receive another anew.
Item, tunc in isto corpore essent infinitae res. Probatio: quia a qualibet parte alterius corporis distat realiter; sed partes alterius corporis sunt infinitae; igitur in isto corpore sunt distantiae infinitae ad infinitas partes alterius corporis.	Likewise, there would then be infinitely many things in this body. Proof, because from every part of the other body it is really distant, but the parts of the other body are infinite, therefore in this body there are infinitely many distances from the infinitely many parts of the other body.
Praeterea, istud lignum est duplum ad suam medietatem. Si igitur illa dupleitas sit talis res alia ab isto duplo, eadem ratione relatio qua istud lignum excedit medietatem suae medietatis erit res alia existens in isto ligno, et eadem ratione ad quamlibet medietatem cuiuscumque medietatis erit alia res in isto ligno. Cum igitur in isto ligno sint tales partes eiusdem proportionis infinitae, et non est eadem proportio istius totius ligni ad quascumque duas illarum partium, sequitur quod in isto ligno erunt relationes infinitae, distinctae specie.	Furthermore, this wood is double in relation to its half. Therefore, if that doubleness is some thing different from that double thing, by the same reasoning the relation by which the wood exceeds the half of its half will be another thing existing in that wood, and, by the same reasoning, [corresponding] to any half of any half there will be something else in the wood. Therefore, since there are infinitely many such parts of the same proportion in the wood, and the proportion of the whole wood to any two of those parts is not the same, it follows that in the wood there will be infinitely many relations, distinct in species.
Si dicatur: illae partes illius ligni non sunt in actu sed in potentia, et ideo relationes illae non sunt infinitae actu, contra: illae partes sunt in rerum natura, quia aliter ens componeretur ex non-ente; igitur relationes correspondentes istis partibus sunt in rerum natura, et per consequens res infinitae, distinctae specie, sunt in isto ligno.	If it is said that the parts of that wood are not in actuality but in potentiality, and therefore the relations are not infinitely many in actuality. Against. The parts are in the real world, because otherwise an existent would be composed of a non-existent, therefore the relations corresponding to those parts in the real world, and as a consequence infinitely many things, distinct in species, are in the wood.
Praeterea, hoc lignum realiter est duplum ad suam medietatem, igitur in hoc ligno est realiter et actualiter relatio dupleitatis ad suam medietatem. Sed non plus est una pars in actu quam alia, quia omnes partes sunt similes; igitur quaelibet alia pars est in actu, ita quod ad eam potest esse relatio realis. Ergo ad quamlibet erit relatio realis et actualis; et illae partes sunt infinitae; igitur in isto ligno sunt infinitae relationes.	Furthermore, this wood is double its half, therefore in this wood there is really and actually the relation of doubleness to its half. But one part is no more in actuality than the other, because all parts are similar. Therefore every part is in actuality, so that there can be a real relation to it. Therefore to any part there will be a real and actual relation, and those parts are infinitely many, therefore in this wood there are infinitely many relations.
Praeterea, si aliqua relatio sit talis res, dupleitas erit talis res. Tunc quaero: aut illa dupleitas a ad b est accidens divisibile aut indivisibile. Non potest dici quod sit accidens indivisibile: tum quia in isto ligno nullum est accidens indivisibile quod denominet totum illud lignum; tum quia quaero de primo subiecto illius accidentis: aut est divisibile aut indivisibile. Non indivisibile, manifestum est. Igitur oportet quod sit subiectum divisibile; sed subiectum divisibile non potest esse primum subiectum accidentis indivisibilis; igitur illud accidens non est indivisibile.	Furthermore, if some relation is such a thing, doubleness will be such a thing. Then I ask whether that doubleness of a to b is a divisible or an indivisible accident. It cannot be said that it is an indivisible accident, both because in this wood nothing is an indivisible accident that denominates the whole of that wood, and because I seek the primary subject of that accident: either it is divisible or indivisible. Not indivisible, it is manifest. Therefore it must be a divisible subject. But a divisible subject cannot be the primary subject of an indivisible accident, therefore that accident is not indivisible.
Nec potest dici quod est accidens divisibile et extensum, quia quaero de partibus illius accidentis: aut sunt similes aut dissimiles. Si similes, igitur conveniunt in nomine et definitione totius, et per consequens quaelibet pars dupleitatis erit dupleitas; et per consequens quaelibet pars erit dupla ad illud ad quod totum est duplum, quod est absurdum. Si sint partes dissimiles, igitur distinguuntur specie, et per consequens si componant unam rem, oportet quod una illarum rerum sit actus et alia se potentia, et per consequens dupleitas componeretur ex actu et potentia.	Nor can it be said that it is a divisible accident and extended, because I ask about the parts of that accident: either they are similar or dissimilar. If similar, therefore they agree with the name and definition of the whole, and as a consequence a part of doubleness will be doubleness, and as a consequence every part will be double of that of which the whole is double, which is absurd. If there are dissimilar parts, therefore they are distinguished in species, and as a consequence if they compose one thing, it must be that one of those things is actual and the other potential, and as a consequence doubleness would be composed of the actual and the potential.
Similiter, si una pars esset actus et alia potentia, et actus et potentia quando faciunt unum non distant situaliter, oporteret quod illae partes non distarent situaliter, et per consequens non constituerent unum extensum nisi ponantur aliae partes praeter illas.	Similarly, if one part were actual and the other potential, and if the actual and the potential are not spatially distant when they make one thing, it would have to be that those parts would not be spatially distant, and as a consequence would not constitute one extended thing unless there were supposed to be other parts beyond those.
Item, pro ista opinione potest argui theologice: omnem rem quam potest Deus facere mediante causa secunda efficiente potest per se facere sine omni causa secunda efficiente. Cum igitur in isto efficiente ponatur quidam talis respectus efficientiae causatus a Deo mediante causa secunda, poterit Deus illum respectum facere sine hoc quod aliqua causa secunda efficiat simul cum Deo.	Likewise, for this opinion it can be argued theologically. Everything which God can make by an intermediary second efficient cause, he can make per se without any second efficient cause. Therefore, since in that efficient cause there is given a certain relation of efficiency, caused by God by the intermediary second cause, God could make that relation without some second cause having its effect together with God.
Ponatur igitur in esse, si sit possibile. Quo posito probo quod positum sit impossibile: quia si Deus efficit istum respectum in isto, igitur illud est efficiens, quia tunc sicut in quocumque est albedo illud est album, ita in quo erit ille respectus efficientiae illud erit efficiens. Sed si illud est efficiens, et non est efficiens nisi respectus, igitur non solus Deus efficit istum respectum. Et ita ex posito sequitur suum oppositum, et per consequens non est possibile. Praeterea, omnem rem quam Deus conservat sine alia re, potuit vel potest producere de novo etsi illa alia res non sit nec unquam fuerit.	Suppose that to be the case, if it is possible. Having supposed that, I prove that what is supposed is impossible, for if God effects the same relation in this, therefore that relation is efficient, for just as in anything that whiteness is in, that thing is white, so in that which there is that relation of efficiency, that thing will be efficient. But if it is efficient, and is not efficient unless a relation, therefore it is not only God who effects that relation. And so from what was supposed there follows its opposite, and as a consequence is not possible. Moreover, every thing which God preserves without another thing, he could or can produce from nothing even if that other thing does not exist, and never existed.
Si ergo paternitas qua pater refertur ad filium sit alia res a patre et filio, et Deus eam conservat sine generatione, quia illa praeterita est, igitur potest vel potuit Deus istam paternitatem de novo producere etsi numquam fuisset illa generatio, et per consequens poterit aliquis pater esse illius quem non genuit.	If, therefore, the fatherhood by which a father is related to his son is another thing from both from the father and the son, and God preserves it without there being fathering, then God can (or could) produce that fatherhood anew, even that fathering never existed, and as a consequence there could be a father of someone whom he never fathered.
Item, ponatur quod Deus creet de nihilo unum hominem, post quem creet alios homines, et postea alii generentur. Quo posito arguo sic: qualis res et in aliquo istorum hominum potest Deus de sua potentia absoluta facere talem rem in isto homine; sed filiatio est in uno illorum, hominum; igitur potest Deus facere talem filiationem in isto. Et per consequens, isto posito, iste erit filius, et nonnisi hominis. Et non est aliquis alius homo ab isto nisi iunior eo, per causum; igitur iste homo erit filius hominis iunioris se, quod contradictionem videtur includere. Aliae rationes innumerae possent adduci pro ista opinione, quas causa brevitatis omitto.	Likewise, let it be supposed that God creates one man out of nothing, after whom he creates other men, and afterwards other men were fathered. With this assumed, I argue as follows. Whatever kind of thing was in any of those men, God could create in this man by his absolute power. But being-a-son is in one of those men, therefore God could create such a filiation in this man. And as a consequence, with that assumed, he will be a son - and only the son of some man.  And there is no other man than him, except younger than him, as we assumed [per causum]. Therefore this man would be son of a man younger than him, which seems to involve a contradiction. Other innumerable arguments could be advanced for this position, which I omit by reason of brevity.