Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 54

Latin	English
[CAP. 54. DE RELATIVIS: QUOMODO DICENDUM EST SECUNDUM TENENTES CONTRARIAM OPINIONEM, SCILICET QUOD EST QUAEDAM RES DISTINCTA A RE ABSOLUTA]	[Chapter 54. On relatives: how they must be treated according to those who hold the contrary opinion,namely that relation is a certain thing distinct from an absolute thing]
Hactenus dictum est de relativis secundum opinionem quae mihi videtur Aristotelis esse; nunc dicendum est de relativis secundum opinionem contrariam praecedenti. Unde ponit illa opinio quod quaelibet relatio est res distincta realiter a suo fundamento, ita quod ponit quod similitudo qua Socrates albus est similis Platoni albo est quaedam res realiter et totaliter distincta a Sorte et ab albedine quae fundat istam similitudinem.	Up to this point we have spoken of relatives according to the opinion which seems to me to be Aristotle's  Now we should speak of relatives according to the opinion contrary to the preceding. Hence, that opinion supposes that every relation is something really distinct from its basis, so that it supposes that the likeness by which white Socrates is similar to white Plato is a certain thing that is really and wholly distinct from Socrates and from the whiteness that is the basis of that likeness.
Et consimiliter est de paternitate et filiatione et omnibus aliis quae ponuntur in genere relationis. Unde quamvis istud vocabulum 'fundamentum relationis' non sit verbum philosophicum, secundum philosophiam Aristotelis, tamen dicunt quod quaelibet relatio habet fundamentum et terminum, a quorum utroque realiter distinguitur. Et quod relatio sit alia res, probatur multipliciter.	And it is similar concerning paternity and being-a-son, and concerning all others which are supposed to be in the genus of relation. Hence, although the expression ‘basis of relation’ is not a philosophical word, according to the philosophy of Aristotle, nevertheless they say that every relation has a basis and a terminus, from which both are really distinguished. And that relation is some other thing, is proved in many ways.
Primo, quia distinctum praedicamentum res distinctas significat; relatio autem est distinctum praedicamentum; ergo etc.	First, because a category which is distinct, signifies things which are distinct. But relation is a category which is distinct, therefore etc.
Item, albedo potest manere sine similitudine; igitur albedo non est similitudo.	Likewise, whiteness can remain without a likeness, therefore whiteness is not a likeness.
Item, si relatio esset eadem cum suo fundamento, sicut fundamenta sunt in diversis praedicamentis, scilicet substantia, qualitas et quantitas, ita relationes aliquae essent in praedicamento substantiae, aliquae in praedicamento qualitatis, aliquae in praedicamento quantitatis; et ita relatio non esset distinctum praedicamentum.	Likewise, if a relation were the same thing as its basis, just as bases are in diverse categories, namely substance, quality and quantity, so some relations would be in the category of substance, some in the category of quality, some in the category of quantity, and so relation would not be a distinct category.
Item, per idem fundamentum Socrates albus est similis Platoni albo et dissimilis Ciceroni nigro; si igitur relatio esset eadem cum suo fundamento, similitudo et dissimilitudo essent eadem res, et per consequens non essent distinctae relationes.	Likewise, on the same basis, white Socrates is similar to white Plato, and dissimilar to dark Cicero. Therefore if relation were the same as its basis, similarity and dissimilarity would be the same things, and as a consequence would not be distinct relations.
Item, si relatio esset eadem cum suo fundamento, et ad fundamentum est motus, sicut ad albedinem est motus, igitur ad relationem esset motus; quod est contra Philiosophum, V Physicorum.	Likewise, if a relation were the same as its basis, and there is a change towards the basis, e.g. there is a change to whiteness, then there would be change towards the relation, which is against the Philosopher, Physics V.
Item, unitas universi consistit in ordine partium; si ergo relatio non est alia res, ille ordo non erit alia res; et ita universum noti esset unum.	Likewise, unity of the universal consists in the order of its parts. Therefore, if relation is not another thing, that order will not be another thing, and so the universal noti esset unum.
Item, divisis partibus componentibus aliquod totum, manent partes et non manet unio, igitur unio est aliud a partibus.	Likewise, with the component parts divided aliquod totum, the parts remain and the union does not remain, therefore the union is different from the parts.
Item, in natura assumpta a Verbo non est aliquod absolutum quin consimile sit in natura mea; cum igitur illa sit unita et non mea, aliquid habet illa natura quod non habet mea; sed illud non potest esse absolutum, igitur est aliquid respectivum, quod est intentum.	Likewise, in the [human] nature assumed by the Word, there is nothing absolute, but that there is something similar in my nature.  Therefore, since that is a united nature and not my nature, that nature has something that my nature does not, but that cannot be absolute, therefore it is something relative, which is as was intended.
Propter istas rationes et alias multas, quas propter brevitatem omitto, tenetur a multis quod relatio est res extra animam, distincta realiter ab omni re absoluta.	Because of these reasons and many others, which I omit for sake of brevity, it is held by many that relation is a thing outside the soul, really distinct from every absolute thing.
Distinguunt tamen de relationibus quia quaedam sunt relationes reales et quaedam sunt relationes rationis, cuiusmodi sunt relationes Dei ad creaturam, et aliae quae sine omni operatione intellectus esse non possunt.	Yet they distinguish between relations, because some are real relations and some are relations of reason, of which sort are the relations of God to a creature, and others which cannot exist without any operation of the understanding.
Istis autem relationibus attribuuntur praedictae proprietates. Nam aliquae relationes sunt contrariae, sicut virtus et vitium, aliquae autem non sunt contrariae, sicut triplo nihil contrariatur.	To these relations are attributed the previously mentioned properties. For some relations are contraries, such as virtue and vice, but others are not contraries, just as nothing is contrary to a triple.
Item, relativa suscipiunt magis et minus, non tamen omnia, sicut dictum est.	Likewise, relatives are receptive of greater and lesser, but not all, as was said.
Item, omnia relativa dicuntur ad convertentiam. Verumtamen aliquando uni relationi reali correspondet relatio realis in alio, sicut similitudini Sortis correspondet relatio realis in alio cui est similis. Aliquando autem relationi reali in uno non correspondet relatio realis in alio sed relatio rationis tantum, sicut relationi reali qua creatura dependet a Deo non correspondet relatio realis in Deo sed rationis tantum.	Likewise, all relatives are predicated reciprocally. But nevertheless sometimes to one real relation there corresponds a real relation in another, for example, to the likeness of Socrates there corresponds a real relation in another to whom he is similar. But sometimes to a real relation there does not correspond a real relation in another, but only a relation of reason. For example, to a real relation by which a creature depends on God, there does not correspond a real relation in God, but only a relation of reason.
Similiter, relationes ponuntur simul natura, ita quod si una relatio sit, oportet quod alia relatio sit. Et haec proprietas intelligitur quando utraque relatio est realis; si autem una sit realis et alia rationis, non oportet; sicut ponitur de scientia et scibili et de sensu et sensibili.	Similarly, relations are supposed to be simultaneous by nature, so that if one relation exists, the other relation has to exist.  And this property is understood when both relations are real.  But if one relation is real, and the other a relation of reason, it does not have to exist, just as is supposed of knowledge and the knowable, and of sense and the sensible.