Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 55

Latin	English
[CAP. 55. DE PRAEDICAMENTO QUALITATIS]	[Chapter 55. On the category of quality]
Quartum praedicamentum ponitur praedicamentum qualitatis. Et sicut de prioribus ita de isto primo procedendum est secundum opinionem quae mihi videtur consona principiis Aristotelis, sive sit vera sive falsa. Secundo de eodem dicendum est secundum opinionem contrariam.	The fourth category is given as the category of quality. And just as with the ones before, so with this one, first we should proceed according to the opinion that seems to me to be consonant with the principles of Aristotle, whether it is true or false. According to the same procedure, we should speak according to the contrary opinion.
Videtur autem mihi quod secundum principia Aristotelis debet poni quod praedicamentum qualitatis est quidam conceptus vel signum continens sub se omnia illa per quae respondetur convenienter ad quaestionem factam per 'quale' de substantia, quod non exprimit partem substantialem substantiae.	Now it seems to me that according to the principles of Aristotle, it ought to be supposed that the category of quality is a certain concept or sign containing under it all those things which are an appropriate answer to the question “what kind of thing is it” about a substance, that does not express a substantial part of the substance.
Utrum autem magis proprie concreta vel abstracta debeant poni in praedicamento qualitatis, non est ad praesens discutiendum. Sunt autem quaedam in genere qualitatis quae important res distinctas a substantia, ita quod illa res non est substantia, sicut sunt 'albedo' et 'nigredo', 'color', 'scientia', 'lux' et huiusmodi. Quaedam autem sunt quae alias res a praedictis qualitatibus et substantia non important, cuiusmodi sunt 'figura', 'curvitas', 'rectitudo', 'densitas', 'raritas' et huiusmodi.	But whether more properly concrete or abstract names ought to be put in the category of quality, is not under discussion for the moment. But there are certain things in the genus of quality which convey things that are distinct from substance, so that that thing is not a substance, for example ‘whiteness’ and ‘blackness’, ‘colour’, ‘knowledge’, ‘light’ and so on. But certain things are those which do not convey other things from the qualities above and from substance, such as ‘figure’, ‘curvature’, ‘straightness’, ‘density’, ‘rarity’ and so on.
Ad sciendum autem quando qualitas debet poni alia res a substantia et quando non, hac arte convenit uti: quia quando aliqua praedicabilia possunt successive verificari de eodem - quae non possunt simul de eodem verificari - propter solum motum localem, non oportet quod illa praedicabilia res distinctas significent.	Now in order to know when a quality should be supposed to be a thing other than a substance and when not, it is appropriate to use the following method. For when some predicables can be successively verified of the same thing, which cannot be verified at the same time, on account of local motion alone, these predicables do not have to signify distinct things.
Sed talia praedicabilia 'curvum', 'rectum' propter solum motum localem possunt de eodem verificari successive: nam quando aliquid est rectum, si postea sine alia re adveniente partes ipsius per motum localem approximentur, ita quod minus distent quam prius, dicitur curvum; et propter hoc curvitas et rectitudo non important alias res a rebus rectis et curvis.	But such predicables as ‘curved’ and ‘straight’ can be successively true of the same thing because of local motion alone. For when something is straight, if its parts are then brought closer by local motion alone without any other thing being applied, so that they are less distant than before, it is called ‘curved’. And because of this, ‘curvature’ and ‘straightness’ do not convey any things other than straight or curved things.
Et consimiliter est de figura: quia per solum motum localem aliquarum partium potest aliquid fieri diversae figurae. Et ita est de raro et denso et consimilibus. Sed non sic est de albedine et nigredine, de calore et frigore et huiusmodi; non enim per hoc solum quod aliquid vel partes alicuius moventur localiter fit aliquid calidum vel frigidum, et ideo omnia talia important res distinctas a substantia.	And likewise for ‘figure’, because, by the local motion alone of some parts, a thing can be made into different figures. And so it is with the rare and the dense and similar things. But it is not so with whiteness and blackness, or hotness and coldness and so on, for it is not through the mere fact that something, or the parts of something are locally moved, that it is made hot or cold, and so all such things convey things distinct from substance.
Hoc viso sciendum est quod Aristoteles ponit quatuor modos vel quatuor species qualitatis. Primus modus est habitus et dispositio. Et vocatur habitus omnis qualitas de difficili mobilis, sive sit spiritualis sive corporalis. Dispositio autem vocatur omnis qualitas de facili mobilis, sive sit corporalis sive spiritualis. Et secundum hoc qualitas eiusdem speciei in uno est habitus et in alio est dispositio.	Having looked at this, it should be known that Aristotle gives four modes or four species of quality. The first mode is ‘having’ or disposition. And every quality that is difficult to change is called a having, whether it be spiritual or corporeal. But every quality that is easy to change is called a disposition, whether it be spiritual or corporeal. And according to this, a quality of the same species is called a ‘having’ in one thing, and a ‘disposition’ in another.
Et est sciendum quod sub isto modo non tantum comprehenditur illud quod importat aliam rem a substantia sed etiam illud quod quandoque non importat aliam rem. Unde omne illud sub hoc modo continetur quod, faciliter vel difficiliter, propter mutationem rei removetur a subiecto. Et ut breviter dicam, omnis qualitas sub hoc modo continetur, et ideo dicitur species qualitatis: non quia aliqua sit qualitas quae nec sit habitus nec dispositio, sed quia aliqua qualitas non est habitus et aliqua qualitas non est dispositio; vel dicitur 'species', quia aliquid specialius connotat quam hoc nomen 'qualitas'.	And it should be known that under this mode is comprehended not only that which conveys something other than substance, but also that which sometimes does not convey another thing. Hence, all that which is removed from the subject because of the change of a thing, either easily or with difficulty, is contained under this mode. And so that I may speak briefly, every quality is contained under this mode, and so it is called a species of quality, not because something is a quality which is neither a having or a disposition, but because some quality is not a having and some quality is not a disposition. Or it is called ‘species’ because it connotes something more specific than the name ‘quality’.
Aliud genus qualitatis ponitur potentia naturalis vel impotentia. Unde omnis res qua potest aliquid faciliter agere vel resistere actioni in hoc genere ponitur.	Another genus of quality that is given is natural power or lack of power. Hence, every thing by which something easily acts or resists action is placed in this genus.
Tertia species ponitur passio et passibilis qualitas. Omnis enim qualitas sensibilis ponitur in tertia specie qualitatis.	A third species which is given is passivity, or ‘passible quality’. For every sensible quality is placed in the third species of quality.
Quartum autem genus qualitatis ponitur forma et circa aliquid constans figura, et similiter rectum et curvum et huiusmodi. Et sciendum quod 'forma' potest vocari illa qualitas propter quam aliquid dicitur pulcrum vel turpe; et ista nomina non important alias res a praedictis qualitatibus et substantia.	And the fourth genus of quality is given as form and circa aliquid constans figura, and similarly the straight and the curved and so on. And it should be known that ‘form’ can be called the quality on whose account something is called pulcrum vel turpe; and these names do not convey anything different from the previously mentioned qualities, or from substance.
Unde notandum est quod secundum intentionem Philosophi idem est in diversis speciebus qualitatis, sicut patet, quia ponit quod calor et frigiditas sunt in prima specie qualitatis, et similiter sunt in tertia. Ex quo patet quod non est intentionis suae ponere quod istae a se mutuo universaliter removentur, sed quod de se mutuo, saltem particulariter, praedicantur. Et sicut ponit de speciebus ita ponit etiam de praedicamentis quod de se mutuo particulariter praedicantur.	Hence it should be noted that, according to the intention of the Philosopher, the same thing is in diverse species of quality, as is clear when he supposes that hotness and coldness are in the first species of quality, and similarly are in the third. From which it is clear that it is not his intention to suppose that these are universally removed from themselves, but that they are predicated mutually of themselves, at least in a particular manner. And just as he supposed of species, so he also supposes of the categories that they are mutually predicated of each other in a particular manner.
Qualitati autem Philosophus multas attribuit proprietates Et ponitur prima proprietas quod qualitas suscipit contraria. Una enim qualitas alteri contrariatur, et similiter nomina concreta, importantia illas qualitates in obliquo, contrariantur. Non tamen omni qualitati contrariatur qualitas, nam aliqua est qualitas quae non habet contrarium, sicut lux non habet contrarium.	Now the Philosopher attributes many properties to quality. And he supposes the first property to be that quality is receptive of contraries. For one quality is contrary to another, and similarly concrete names, conveying those qualities in an oblique case, are contraries. Nevertheless, not every quality is a contrary to every quality, for some qualities do not have a contrary. For example, light does not have a contrary.
Secunda proprietas est quod qualitas suscipit magis et minus, quia concretum de aliquo praedicatur quandoque cum hoc adverbio 'magis' et quandoque cum hoc adverbio 'minus'. Quandoque enim haec est vera 'a est magis album quam b' et quandoque ista 'a est minus album quam b'. Sed ista proprietas non inest omnibus qualitatibus: non enim aliquid dicitur magis triangulus quam aliud, nec unum magis quadratum quam aliud.	The second property is that quality is receptive of more or less, for a concrete name is sometimes predicated with the adverb ‘more’, and sometimes with the adverb ‘less’. For sometimes “a is more white than b” is true, and sometimes “a is less white than b”. But this property does not inhere in all qualities, for nothing is said to be more ‘triangular’ than another, nor more ‘quadrangular’ than another.
Tertia proprietas qualitatis est quod secundum qualitatem aliquid dicitur simile vel dissimile. Duo enim alba sunt similia et similiter duo nigra, sed album et nigrum sunt dissimilia.	The third property of quality is that, according to quality, something is said to be similar or dissimilar. For two white things are similar, and similarly two black things. But a white thing and a black thing are dissimilar.
Et de qualitate secundum opinionem Aristotelis ista sufficiant, quia in Praedicamentis diffuse tractavi de qualitate secundum opinionem Aristotelis. Quidquid enim super philosophiam scribo non tamquam meum sed tamquam Aristotelis, ut mihi videtur, dico.	And these things are sufficient concerning quality, according to the opinion of Aristotle, for in my commentary on the Categories I dealt with quality according to the opinion of Aristotle diffusely. For whatever I write about philosophy, I do not speak as if my opinion, but as if it were the opinion of Aristotle (as it seems to me).