Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 58

Latin	English
[CAP. 58. DE PRAEDICAMENTO PASSIONIS]	[Chapter 58. On the category of affection]
Sextum praedicamentum ponitur praedicamentum passionis, quod Aristoteles nominat ubique per verbum, sicut patet in Praedicamentis, cap.1, et cap. De facere et pati. Et secum concordare videtur Damascenus in Logica sua, ubi similiter nominat hoc praedicamentum per verbum. Et sicut est de praecedenti praedicamento quod in eo, secundum opinionem Aristotelis reponuntur verba, ita in hoc praedicamento verba significantia aliquid pati reponuntur. Unde omnia quae dicta sunt de facere proportionaliter dicenda sunt de pati. Et ideo secundum viam suam pati et passio est illa substantia quae patitur, sicut videtur dicere Damascenus.	The sixth category is given as the category of affection, which Aristotle denominates everywhere using a verb, as is clear in the Categories, chapter 1 and in the chapter on doing and being affected. And Damascene seems to agree with him in his Logic, where he similarly denominates this category with a verb. And just as, according to Aristotle, verbs are placed in the previous category, so verbs signifying that something is affected are placed in this category. Hence all the things which were said about doing, should correspondingly be said about being affected. And therefore, according to his way, to be affected, or affection, is the substance which is affected, just as Damascene seems to say.
Unde dicit: 'Facere autem et pati substantia quaedam est taliter operans vel patiens'. Vel semper propositio in qua ponitur hoc verbum infinitivi modi loco nominis vel hoc nomen 'passio' resolvenda est in propositionem in qua ponitur verbum sine nomine tali et tali infinitivo modo, ut ista 'calefieri est pati' aequivaleat isti 'quod calefit patitur' et ista 'calefactio est passio' aequivaleat illi eidem.	Hence he says “to do and to be affected is a certain substance operating or being affected in some way”. Alternatively, a proposition in which a verb in the infinitive mood, or the name ‘affection’, is given in place of a name, should always be resolved into a proposition in which is given a verb without such a name or such an infinitive mood. For example “to be heated is to be affected” is equivalent to “what is heated is affected”, and “heating is an affection” is equivalent to the same thing.
Sed sciendum est quod 'pati' multipliciter accipitur: scilicet pro recipere aliquid ab aliquo, et sic subiectum patitur et materia recipiens formam patitur. Aliter accipitur magis generaliter, secundum quod est commune ad pati primo modo et moveri, quamvis nihil in se subiective recipiat, sicut quando aliquid movetur localiter. Tertio accipitur secundum quod est commune ad pati praedictis modis et ad causari vel produci, et sic est praedicamentum.	But it should be known that ‘to be affected’ is understood in many sense, namely to received something from something, and so a subject is affected, and matter receiving form is affected. In another way, it is understood more generally, according as it is common to what is affected in the first way, and moved, although it receives nothing in itself subjectively, just as when something is moved locally. In the third sense, it is understood according as it is common to a thing affected in the previous ways, and to being caused or produced, and so it is a category.
Breviter igitur, secundum viam Aristotelis, mihi videtur quod ipse posuit omnia verba activa mentalia in praedicamento 'facere' et omnia verba passiva mentalia in praedicamento 'pati', sive illa verba significent substantias sive qualitates, sive tam substantias quam qualitates. Alii autem dicunt quod passio est quidam respectus exsistens subiective in passo, correspondens respectui actionis.	Briefly therefore, according to the way of Aristotle, it seems to me that he placed all active mental verbs in the category of ‘doing’, and all passive mental verbs in the category of ‘being affected’, whether those verbs signify substances or qualities, or whether substances as well as qualities. But others say that affection is a sort of relative, existing subjectively in the thing affected, corresponding to the relative of action.