Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 59

Latin	English
[CAP. 59. DE PRAEDICAMENTO 'QUANDO']	[Chapter 59. On the category of 'when']
Septimum praedicamentum ponitur 'quando', quod est ordinatio adverbiorum vel aliorum eis aequivalentium, quibus convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam per hoc interrogativum 'quando', secundum viam Aristotelis. Unde semper nominat illud praedicamentum per hoc interrogativum 'quando' et non aliter; nec habemus aliquod generale commune ad illa per quae respondetur ad talem quaestionem. Et ideo secundum viam Aristotelis, ut mihi videtur, hoc praedicamentum non importat aliquam rem distinctam a substantia et qualitate, sed importat illas easdem res, quamvis non nominaliter sed adverbialiter tantum.	The seventh category is called ‘when’, which is the ordering of adverbs or of others equivalent to them, to which it can appropriately be replied to the question made by the interrogative ‘when’, according to the way of Aristotle. Hence he always names that category by the interrogative ‘when’ and not otherwise. Nor do we have some general common [term] to those by which it is replied to such a question. And therefore according to the way of Aristotle, as it seems to me, this category does not convey some distinct thing from substance or quality, but rather it conveys those same things, although not nominally but adverbially only.
Et pro ista opinione, sive sit vera sive falsa, potest argui. Nam si 'quando' sit talis res inhaerens rei temporali, cum non plus debeat poni talis res respectu unius temporis quam respectu alterius, igitur respectu temporis futuri est talis res. Consequens falsum, quia si sit talis res in isto quod erit cras, sine qua non potest dici quod erit cras, sicut non potest aliquid esse album sine albedine, igitur respectu cuiuslibet instantis illius temporis in quo erit, erit aliqua talis res in isto. Et cum illa instantia ponantur infinita, sequitur quod in isto erunt res infinitae.	And for this opinion – whether it is true or false – it can be argued. For if ‘when’ is the sort of thing that inheres in a temporal thing (since such a thing ought no more to be given in respect of one time than in respect of another), therefore in respect of the future time there ought to be such a thing. The consequent is false, for if there is such a thing in what will exist tomorrow, without which it cannot be said that it will exist tomorrow, just as there cannot be anything white without whiteness, then in respect of any instant of that time in which it will be, there will be some such thing in that [time]. And since there are infinitely many such instants given, it follows that there will be infinitely many things in that [time].
Similiter, istud fuit in infinitis temporibus et in infinitis instantibus igitur in eo sunt derelictae tales res infinitae. Et si dicatur quod illa instantia non fuerunt in actu, contra: aut aliquod instans unquam fuit in actu aut nullum. Si nullum, igitur nihil est instans; si aliquod, et non plus unum quam reliquum, igitur infinita fuerunt in actu.	Similarly, that was in infinitely many times and in infinitely many instants, therefore such infinite things are left behind in it. If if it is said that those instants did not actually exist. Against: either some instant ever actually existed, or none. If none, then nothing is an instant. If some, then no more one than another, therefore they were actually infinite.
Praeterea, de omni re contingit determinate dicere quod est vel non est; igitur in isto homine vel est determinate talis res - et accipio illam rem quae debet relinqui ex adiacentia crastinae diei - vel non est in isto homine. Si est in ipso, igitur haec est determinate vera 'iste homo erit cras'. Si non est in eo, igitur sua opposita est determinate vera; quae videntur esse contra Aristotelem, qui in futuris contingentibus negat veritatem determinatam.	Moreover, it can be determinately said of every thing that it is or is not. Therefore in that man either there is determinately such a thing– and I take that thing which ought to be left behind from the adjacency of the following day – or [such as a thing] is not in that man. If it is in him, then ‘that man will be tomorrow’ is determinately true. If it is not in him, than its opposite is determinately true, which seem to be against Aristotle, who denies determinate truth in future contingents.
Et potest argui theologice sic. Quaero: aut in isto homine est talis res aut non est in eo. Si est in eo, et sequitur formaliter 'talis res respectu crastinae diei est in isto homine, igitur iste homo erit cras', sicut sequitur formaliter 'in isto subiecto primo est albedo, igitur hoc est album', et antecedens istud 'ista res est in isto homine' est sic verum quod non potest contingere etiam per divinam potentiam quin postea sit verum dicere 'haec res fuit', igitur semper necessario erit verum dicere 'iste homo fuit futurus in illa die', et per consequens Deus non potest facere quin erit in illa die.	And it can be theologically argued as follows. I ask whether in that man there is such a thing, or there is not such a thing. If it is in him, and it formally follows ‘such a thing is in that man in respect of the following day, therefore that man will exist tomorrow’, just as it formally follows ‘whiteness is primarily in that subject, therefore this is white’ and the antecedent ‘that thing is in that man’ is thus true ....
Si autem ista res non sit in isto homine, igitur haec erit necessaria postea 'ista res non fuit in isto homine', et sequitur formaliter 'ista res non fuit in isto homine, igitur iste non fuit futurus in illa die'. Et antecedens est necessarium, igitur consequens est necessarium. Et per consequens Deus non potest continuare vitam istius hominis usque ad diem crastinam.	But if that thing is not in that man, therefore But if that thing does not exist in that man, then “that thing was not in that man” will be necessary afterwards, and “that thing was not in that man, therefore that was not going to be on that day” follows formally. And the antecedent is necessary, therefore also the consequent is necessary. And as a consequence God cannot continue the life of that man to the following day.
Item, si 'quando' esset talis res sicut isti opinantes contrarium imaginantur, tunc sicut calidum est calidum calore ita illud temporale esset tale per illam rem, et per consequens sicut est impossibile aliquid esse calidum sine calore ita impossibile esset aliquid esse tale sine tali re inhaerente sibi. Sed consequens est falsum, nam haec est vera 'Antichristus erit ante diem iudicii', et tamen in Antichristo, cum sit nihil, non est talis res. Si dicatur ad omnia quod ex tempore futuro non derelinquitur talis res antequam fuerit in illo tempore, et ideo nec iste homo nec Antichristus habet talem rem in se derelictum ex tempore futuro, contra: si sine tali re vere ista res erit cras et in tempore futuro, eadem ratione sine tali re vere fuit in tempore praeterito et vere est nunc; igitur frustra ponuntur tales res.	Likewise, if ‘when’ were such a thing as those with the opposite opinion imagine, then just as the hot is hot by heat, so the temporal [thing] would be so by that thing, and as a consequence just as it is impossible for something to be hot without heat, so it would be impossible for something to be so without such a thing inhering in it. But the consequent is false, for “the Antichrist will exist before the day of judgment” is true, and yet there is no such thing in the Antichrist, as he is nothing. If it is said to all [these objections] that from a future time there is not left behind such a thing before it existed in that time, and therefore neither that man nor the Antichrist has such a thing left behind in itself from a future time. Against: if that thing will truly exist tomorrow and in a future time without such a thing, by the same reasoning it truly existed in past and truly exists now without such a thing. Therefore such things are supposed in vain.
Praeterea, si in isto homine qui fuit heri est talis res derelicta per quam dicitur fuisse heri, sicut lignum est calidum per calorem, igitur impossibile est quod haec sit vera 'iste homo fuit heri' sine tali re, sicut impossibile est quod lignum sit calidum sine calore. Sed hoc videtur falsum, nam nullam contradictionem includit quod Deus conservet istum hominem sine illa re, quia potest per suam potentiam absolutam istum hominem conservare et illam rem destruere. Ponatur igitur in esse. Et tunc quaero: aut iste homo fuit heri aut non fuit. Si fuit, igitur vere fuit heri sine tali re, igitur per illam rem non dicitur fuisse heri; quod est intentum. Si non fuit heri, contra: propositio talis de praeterito est necessaria, ita quod Deus non potest facere quin hoc fuerit, ex quo fuit.	Futhermore, if in that man who existed yesterday there is such a thing left behind through which it is said that he existed yesterday, just as the wood is hot through heat, then it is impossible that “that man existed yesterday” is true without such a thing, just as it is impossible that wood is hot without heat. But that seems to be false, for it involves no contradiction that God preserves that man without that thing, for he can by his absolute power preserve that man and destroy that thing. Therefore let it be supposed to be the case. And then I ask whether that man existed yesterday or not. If he did, then he truly existed yesterday without such a thing, therefore he is not said to have existed yesterday through that thing, which was my intention. If he did not exist yesterday. Against: such a proposition about the past is necessary, so that God cannot bring it about but that hoc fuerit, ex quo fuit.
Propter ista et multa alia, quae causa brevitatis omitto, posset aliquis catholicus vel haereticus tenere quod 'quando' non est talis res. Et haec fuit opinio Aristotelis, ut mihi videtur, et ideo numquam hoc praedicamentum per nomen sed per adverbium nominavit. Alii autem dicunt quod 'quando' vel 'quandalitas' est quaedam res respectiva, derelicta in re temporali ex adiacentia temporis, propter quam rem dicitur quod res fuit vel erit vel est.	Because of these, and many others which I omit for the sake of brevity, a Catholic or a heretic could hold that ‘when’ is not such a thing. And this was the opinion of Aristotle, as it seems to me, and therefore he never denominated this category by a name, but by an adverb. But others say that ‘when’ or ‘whenness’ is a certain relative thing, left behind in a temporal thing from the adjacency of time, because of which it is said that a thing was, or will be, or is.