Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 63

Latin	English
[CAP. 63. DE SUPPOSITIONE TERMINORUM IN PROPOSITIONIBUS]	[Chapter 63. On the supposition of terms in propositions]
(1) Dicto de significatione terminorum restat dicere de suppositione, quae est proprietas conveniens termino sed numquam nisi in propositione.	Having spoken about the signification of terms, it remains to speak of supposition, which is a property that belongs to a term, but never except in a proposition.
(2) Est autem primo sciendum quod suppositio accipitur dupliciter, scilicet large et stricte. Large accepta non distinguitur contra appellationem, sed appellatio est unum contentum sub suppositione. Aliter accipitur stricte, secundum quod distinguitur contra appellationem. Sed sic non intendo loqui de suppositione sed primo modo tantum. Et sic tam subiectum quam praedicatum supponit; et universaliter quidquid potest esse subiectum propositionis vel praedicatum supponit.	Now first, it should be known that supposition is understood in two ways, namely, broadly and narrowly. Taken broadly, it is not distinguished from appellation. Rather, appellation is one item contained under supposition. In another sense it is understood narrowly, according as it is distinguished from appellation. But I do not intend to speak about supposition in this way, but rather in the first way only. And so the subject as well as the predicate supposit, and generally, whatever can be the subject or predicate of a proposition supposits.
(3) Dicitur autem suppositio quasi pro alio positio, ita quod quando terminus in propositione stat pro aliquo, ita quod utimur illo termino pro aliquo de quo, sive de pronomine demonstrante ipsum, ille terminus vel rectus illius termini si sit obliquus verificatur, supponit pro illo. Et hoc saltem verum est quando terminus supponens significative accipitur.	Supposition is so-called as if it were a positing for another, so that when a term in a proposition stands for something, so that we use the term for something of which - or of a pronoun pointing to it - that term (or the nominative of that term, if it is in an oblique case) is verified, it supposits for that [thing]. And this at least is true when the suppositing term is taken significatively.
(4) Et sic universaliter terminus supponit pro illo de quo - vel de pronomine demonstrante ipsum - per propositionem denotatur praedicatum praedicari, si terminus supponens sit subiectum ; si autem terminus supponens sit praedicatum, denotatur quod subiectum subicitur respectu illius, vel respectu pronominis demonstrantis ipsum, si propositio formetur.	And so in general, a term supposits for that of which - or of a pronoun pointing to it - the predicate is denoted by the proposition to be predicated, if the suppositing term is the subject. But if the suppositing term is the predicate, it is denoted that the subject is a subject with respect to that - or with respect to a pronoun pointing to it - if the proposition is formed.
Sicut per istam 'homo est animal' denotatur quod Socrates vere est animal, ita quod haec sit vera si formetur 'hoc est animal', demonstrando Sortem. Per istam autem 'homo est nomen' denotatur quod haec vox 'homo' sit nomen, ideo in ista supponit 'homo' pro illa voce. Similiter per istam 'album est animal' denotatur quod illa res quae est alba sit animal, ita quod haec sit vera 'hoc est aninial' demonstrando illam rem quae est alba; et propter hoc pro illa re subiectum supponit.	For example, it is denoted by ‘A man is an animal’ that Socrates truly is an animal, so that ‘This is an animal’ - pointing to Socrates - is true if it is formed. But it is denoted by ‘Man is a name’ that the utterance ‘man’ is a name. Therefore in that proposition ‘man’ supposits for the that utterance. Similarly, by ‘A white thing is an animal’ it is denoted that the thing that is white is an animal, so that ‘This is an animal’ - pointing to the thing that is white - is true. And because of this, the subject supposits for that thing.
(5) Et sic, proportionaliter, dicendum est de praedicato: nam per istam 'Socrates est albus' denotatur quod Socrates est illa res quae habet albedinem, et ideo praedicatum supponit pro illa re quae habet albedinem; et si nulla res haberet albedinem nisi Socrates, tunc praedicatum praecise supponeret pro Sorte.	So, correspondingly, it should be said of the predicate, for by ‘Socrates is white’ it is denoted that Socrates is that thing which has whiteness, and therefore, the predicate supposits for that thing which has whiteness. And if no thing but Socrates had whiteness, then the predicate would supposit precisely for Socrates.
Est igitur una regula generalis quod numquam terminus in aliqua propositione, saltem quando significative accipitur, supponit pro aliquo nisi de quo vere praedicatur.	Therefore, one general rule is that a term never supposits for anything in any proposition, at least when it is taken significatively, except for what it can be truly predicated of.
(7) Ex quo sequitur quod falsum est, quod aliqui ignorantes dicunt, quod concretum a parte praedicati supponit pro forma; videlicet quod in ista 'Socrates est albus' li albus supponit pro albedine, nam haec est simpliciter falsa 'albedo est alba', qualitercumque termini supponant. Ideo numquam concretum tale supponit pro forma tali significata per suum abstractum, secundum viam Aristotelis. In aliis autem concretis, de quibus dictum est, hoc est bene possibile.	From this, it follows that is false what some ignorant persons say, that a concrete term on the side of the predicate supposits for a form, viz., that in ‘Socrates is white’, the word ‘white’ supposits for whiteness. For ‘A whiteness is white’ is absolutely false, however the terms supposit. Therefore, such a concrete term never supposits for such a form as is signified by its abstract term, according to the way of Aristotle. But this is certainly possible for other concrete terms, which were discussed above.
(8) Eodem modo in ista 'homo est Deus' 'homo' vere supponit pro Filio Dei, quia ille vere est homo.	In the same way, in ‘A man is God’, the term ‘man’ truly supposits for the Son of God, because he is truly a man.