Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 64

Latin	English
[CAP. 64. DE DIVISIONE SUPPOSITIONIS]	[Chapter 64. On the division of supposition]
Sciendum est autem quod suppositio primo dividitur in suppositionem personalem, simplicem et materialem.	Now it should be known that supposition is first divided into personal, simple and material supposition.
Suppositio personalis, universaliter, est illa quando terminus supponit pro suo significato, sive illud significatum sit res extra animam, sive sit vox, sive intentio animae, sive sit scriptum, sive quodcumque aliud imaginabile; ita quod quandocumque subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis supponit pro suo significato, ita quod significative tenetur, semper est suppositio personalis.	Personal supposition, generally, is when a term supposits for its significate, whether that significate is a thing outside the soul, or an utterance, or an intention of the soul, or written, or anything else imaginable. So that whenever the subject or predicate of a proposition supposits for its significate so that it is taken significatively, the supposition is always personal.
Exemplum primi : sic dicendo 'omnis homo est animal', li homo supponit pro suis significatis, quia 'homo' non imponitur nisi ad significandum istos homines; non enim significat proprie aliquid commune eis sed ipsosmet homines, secundum Damascenum	An example of the first: in saying ‘Every man is an animal’, the word ‘man’ supposits for its significates, because ‘man’ is imposed only to signify these men. For it does not signify properly something common to them, but rather the men themselves, according to Damascene.
Exemplum secundi: sic dicendo 'omne nomen vocale est pars orationis', li nomen non supponit nisi pro vocibus; quia tamen imponitur ad significandum illas voces, ideo supponit personaliter.	An example of the second: in saying ‘Every spoken name is a part of the sentence’, the word ‘name’ supposits only for utterances, yet because it is imposed to signify those utterances, therefore it supposits personally.
Exemplum tertii: sic dicendo 'omnis species est universale' vel 'omnis intentio animae est in anima' utrumque subiectum supponit personaliter, quia supponit pro illis quibus imponitur ad significandum.	An example of the third: in saying ‘Every species is a universal’ or ‘Every intention of the soul is in the soul’, both subjects supposit personally, because it supposits for those for which it was imposed to signify.
Exemplum quarti: sic dicendo 'omnis dictio scripta est dictio' subiectum non supponit nisi pro significatis suis, puta pro scriptis, ideo supponit personaliter.	An example of the fourth: in saying ‘Every written word is a word’, the subject supposits only for its significates, that is, for written words. Therefore, it supposits personally.
Ex quo patet quod non sufficienter describunt suppositionem personalem dicentes quod suppositio personalis est quando terminus supponit pro re. Sed ista est definitio quod 'suppositio personalis est quando terminus supponit pro suo significato et significative'.	It is clear from this that those who say personal supposition occurs when a term supposits for a thing do not describe personal supposition sufficiently. But the definition is rather that “personal supposition occurs when a term supposits for its significate and is taken significatively”.
Suppositio simplex est quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, sed non tenetur significative. Verbi gratia sic dicendo 'homo est species' iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro intentione animae, quia illa intentio est species; et tamen iste terminus 'homo' non significat proprie loquendo illam intentionem, sed illa vox et illa intentio animae sunt tantum signa subordinata in significando idem, secundum modum alibi expositum.	Simple supposition is when a term supposits for an intention of the soul, but is not taken significatively. For example, in saying ‘Man is a species’, the term ‘man’ supposits for an intention of the soul, because that intention is a species, and yet the term ‘man’ does not signify that intention, properly speaking. Rather, that utterance and that intention of the soul are only signs subordinated in signifying the same thing, according to the manner explained elsewhere.
Ex hoc patet falsitas opinionis communiter dicentium quod suppositio simplex est quando terminus supponit pro suo significato, quia suppositio simplex est quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, quae proprie non est significatum termini, quia terminus talis significat veras res et non intentiones animae.	From this is clear the falsity of the opinion of those commonly saying that simple supposition is when a term supposits for its significate, because simple supposition is when a term supposits for an intention of the soul that is not properly a significate of the term. For such a term signifies true things and not intentions of the soul.
Suppositio materialis est quando terminus non supponit significative, sed supponit vel pro voce vel pro scripto. Sicut patet hic 'homo est nomen', li homo supponit pro se ipso, et tamen non significat se ipsum. Similiter in ista propositione 'homo scribitur' potest esse suppositio materialis, quia terminus supponit pro illo quod scribitur.	Material supposition is when a term does not supposit significatively but supposits for an utterance or for writing, as is clear in ‘Man is a name’, when ‘Man’ supposits for itself, and yet it does not signify itself. Similarly, in the proposition ‘Man is written’ the supposition can be material, because the term supposits for what is written.
Et est sciendum quod sicut ista triplex suppositio competit voci prolatae ita potest competere voci scriptae. Unde si scribantur istae quatuor propositiones 'homo est animal', 'homo est species', 'homo est vox disyllaba', 'homo est dictio scripta', quaelibet istarum poterit verificari, et tamen nonnisi pro diversis, quia illud quod est animal nullo modo est species, nec vox disyllaba, nec dictio scripta. Similiter illud quod est species non est animal, nec vox disyllaba, et sic de aliis.	And it should be known that, just as this threefold supposition belongs to a spoken utterance, so it can belong to an written utterance. Hence, if the four propositions ‘A man is an animal’, ‘Man is a species’, ‘Man is a monosyllabic utterance’, ‘Man is a written word’ are written down, each of them can be verified, yet only for different things. For what is an animal is in no way a species or a monosyllabic utterance or a written word. Similarly, what is a species is not an animal or a monosyllabic utterance, and so on.
Et tamen in duabus ultimis propositionibus habet terminus suppositionem materialem. Sed illa potest subdistingui, eo quod potest supponere pro voce vel pro scripto; et si essent nomina imposita, ita posset distingui suppositio pro voce vel pro scripto sicut suppositio pro significato et pro intentione animae, quarum unam vocamus personalem et aliam simplicem. Sed talia nomina non habemus.	And yet in the last two propositions the term ‘man’ has material supposition. But that can be subdivided, in that it can supposit for an utterance or for an written word, and if there were names imposed for this, supposition for an utterance and for writing could be distinguished, just as supposition for a significate is distinguished from supposition for an intention of the soul, one of which we call personal and the other simple. But we do not have such names.
Sicut autem talis diversitas suppositionis potest competere termino vocali et scripto, ita etiam potest competere termino mentali, quia intentio potest supponere pro illo quod significat et pro se ipsa et pro voce et pro scripto.	But just as such a diversity of supposition can belong to a spoken and a written term, so also can it belong a mental term, for an intention can supposit for what it signifies and for itself and for an utterance and for writing.
Est autem sciendum quod non dicitur suppositio 'personalis' quia supponit pro persona, nec simplex quia supponit pro simplici, nec materialis quia supponit pro materia, sed propter causas dictas. Et ideo isti termini 'materiale', 'personale', 'simplex' aequivoce usitantur in logica et in aliis scientiis; tamen in logica non usitantur frequenter nisi cum isto addito 'suppositio'.	Now it should be known that supposition is not called “personal” because it supposits for a person, nor “simple” because it supposits for something simple, nor ‘material’ because it supposits for matter, but rather for the reasons stated. And therefore, the terms ‘material’, ‘personal’, ‘simple’ are used equivocally in logic and in other sciences. Nevertheless, they are not often used in logic except with ‘supposition’ added.