Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 66

Latin	English
[CAP. 66. DE OBIECTIONIBUS QUAE FIERI POSSUNT CONTRA PRAEDICTA]	[Chapter 66. On objections which can be raised against what was said above]
(1) Sed contra praedicta potest obici multipliciter.	But many kinds of objections can be raised against what was said above.
(2) Primo sic. Haec est vera 'homo est dignissima creatura creaturarum'. Quaero, quam suppositionem habet li homo? Non personalem, quia quaelibet singularis est falsa, igitur habet suppositionem simplicem. Sed si suppositio simplex esset pro intentione animae, illa esset falsa, quia intentio animae non est dignissima creaturarum. Igitur suppositio simplex non est pro intentione animae.	First, as follows. ‘Man is the most dignified creature of all creatures’ is true. I ask what supposition the word ‘man’ has here. Not personal, because each of its singulars is false, therefore, it has simple supposition. But if simple supposition were for an intention of the soul, it would be false, because an intention of the soul is not the most dignified of creatures. Therefore, simple supposition is not for an intention of the soul.
(3) Praeterea, haec est vera 'color est primum obiectum visus'; sed si 'obiectum' habet suppositionem personalem, quaelibet singularis est falsa; igitur habet suppositionem simplicem. Sed si supponeret pro intentione animae, illa esset falsa, quia nulla intentio animae est primum obiectum visus, quia nulla intentio videtur; igitur suppositio simplex non est pro intentione animae.	Moreover, ‘colour is the first object of sight’ is true. But if ‘object’ has personal supposition, each singular is false. Therefore, it has simple supposition. But if it supposited for an intention of the soul, it would be false, because no intention of the soul is the first object of sight (for no intention is seen). Therefore, simple supposition is not for an intention of the soul.
Similiter, ista est vera 'homo est primo risibilis'; et non pro re singulari nec pro intentione animae; igitur pro aliquo alio.	Similarly, ‘Man is the first thing capable of laughter’ is true. And not for a singular thing nor for an intention of the soul. Therefore, for something else.
(5) Idem potest argui de istis 'ens est primo unum', 'Deus est primo persona', quia quaelibet talis est vera, et non pro re singulari nec pro intentione animae, igitur pro aliquo alio. Et tamen subiectum habet suppositionem simplicem, igitur suppositio simplex non est pro intentione animae.	The same can be argued for ‘being is first one’, ‘God is first a person’. For each of these is true, but not for a singular or for an intention of the soul, therefore, for something else. And yet the subject has simple supposition, therefore, simple supposition is not for an intention of the soul.
(6) Praeterea, vox non praedicatur de voce nec intentio de intentione, quia tunc quaelibet propositio talis 'homo est animal' esset simpliciter falsa.	Moreover, an utterance is not predicated of an utterance, nor an intention of an intention, for then every proposition like ‘A man is an animal’ would be absolutely false.
(7) Ad primum istorum est dicendum quod opinio dicentium quod in ista 'homo est dignissima creaturarum' subiectum habet suppositionem simplicem, est simpliciter falsa; immo 'homo' habet tantum suppositionem personalem in ista.	To the first of these, it should be said that the opinion of those saying that in ‘man is the most worthy of creatures’ the subject has simple supposition is absolutely false. Rather, ‘man’ has personal supposition only in that proposition.
(8) Nec ratio eorum valet, sed est contra eos, nam probant quod si 'homo' haberet suppositionem personalem quod tunc esset falsa, quia quaelibet singularis est falsa. Sed ista ratio est contra ipsos, quia si 'homo' stet simpliciter in ista et non pro aliquo singulari, igitur pro aliquo alio, et per consequens illud esset dignissima creaturarum. Sed hoc est falsum, quia tunc esset nobilius omni homine.	Nor is their reasoning valid, but is against them, for they prove that if ‘man’ had personal supposition, then the proposition would be false, because each singular is false. But this reasoning is against them, for if ‘man’ stands simply in this proposition, and not for some singular, therefore it stands for something other thing, and consequently that thing would be the most dignified of creatures. But that is false, because in that case it would be nobler than any man.
(9) Quod est manifeste contra eos, quia numquam commune vel species est nobilius suo singulari, cum secundum modum eorum loquendi inferius semper includat suum superius et plus. Igitur illa forma communis, cum sit pars istius hominis, non est nobilior isto homine. Et ita si subiectum in ista 'homo est dignissima creaturarum' supponeret pro aliquo alio ab homine singulari, ipsa esset simpliciter falsa.	This is manifestly against them, for a common entity or a species is never nobler than its singular, since according to their mode of speaking, the inferior always includes its superior and more. Therefore, the common form, since it is a part of this man, is not nobler than this man, and so if the subject in ‘man is the most dignified of creatures’ supposited for something other than a singular man, it would be absolutely false.
(10) Ideo dicendum est quod 'homo' supponit personaliter, et est de virtute sermonis falsa, quia quaelibet singularis est falsa. Tamen secundum intentionem ponentium eam vera est, quia non intendunt quod homo sit nobilior omni creatura universaliter, sed quod sit nobilior omni creatura quae non est homo. Et hoc est verum inter creaturas corporales, non autem est verum de substantiis intellectualibus.	Therefore, it should be said ‘man’ supposits personally, and the proposition is literally false, because each singular is false. Nevertheless, it is true according to the meaning of those who posit it, for they do not mean that a man is nobler than any creature in general, but that he is nobler than any creature who is not a man. And this is true among corporeal creatures, but not true of intellectual substances.
(11) Et ita est frequenter quod propositiones authenticae et magistrales sunt falsae de virtute sermonis, et verae in sensu in quo fiunt, hoc est, illi intendebant per eas veras propositiones. Et ita est de ista.	And so it is often the case that authentic and magisterial propositions are literally false, but true in the sense in which they were made. That is, they meant true propositions by them. And it is so in this case.
(12) Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes tales 'color est primum obiectum visus', 'homo est primo risibilis', 'ens est prmio unum'; similiter 'homo est primo animal rationale', 'triangulus habet primo tres angulos', 'sonus est primum et adaequatum obiectu auditus', et ceterae tales multae, sunt simpliciter falsae de virtute sermonis, tamen illae quas Philosophus intendebat per istas sunt verae.	To the second argument, it must be said that all such propositions as ‘colour is the first object of sight’, ‘man is the first thing capable of laughter’, ‘being is primarily one’, and similarly ‘man is the first rational animal’, ‘the triangle primarily has three angles’, ‘sound is the first and adequate object of hearing’, and many other such propositions, is absolutely false literally, although the propositions the Philosopher meant by them are true.
(13) Unde sciendum quod sicut frequenter Philosophus et alii accipiunt concretum pro abstracto et e converso, similiter aliquando accipiunt plurale pro singulari et e converso, ita frequenter accipiunt actum exercitum pro actu signato et e converso. Est autem actus exercitus qui importatur per hoc verbum 'est', vel aliquod huiusmodi, quod non tantum significat aliquid praedicari de aliquo sed exercet, praedicando unum de alio, sic dicendo 'homo est animal', 'homo currit', 'homo disputat', et sic de aliis. Actus autem signatus est ille qui importatur per hoc verbum 'praedicari' vel 'subici' vel 'verificari' vel 'competere' vel huiusmodi, quae idem significant.	Hence, it should be known that just as the Philosopher and others frequently accept a concrete term for the corresponding abstract term and conversely, and similarly sometimes accept the plural for the singular and conversely, so also they frequently take the exercised act for the designated act and conversely. Now an 'exercised act' is one that is conveyed by the verb ‘is’, or something of that sort, which does not only signify that something is predicated of something but exercises by predicating one thing of another in saying ‘a man is an animal’, ‘a man runs’, ‘a man argues’, and so on. But a designated act is what is conveyed by the verb ‘to be predicated’ or ‘to be in subject position’ or ‘to be verified’ or ‘to belong to’ and other such verbs that signify the same thing.
(14) Verbi gratia sic dicendo 'animal praedicatur de homine', hic non praedicatur animal de homine, quia in ista propositione animal subicitur et non praedicatur, et ideo est actus signatus. Et non est idem dicere 'animal praedicatur de homine' et 'homo est animal', quia una est multiplex et alia non. Sicut non est idem dicere quod genus praedicatur de hoc communi 'homo' et quod hoc commune 'homo' est genus. Nec est idem dicere 'genus praedicatur de specie' vel 'haec vox 'animal' praedicatur de hac voce 'homo' et 'species est genus' vel 'haec vox 'homo' est haec vox 'animal', nam primae duae sunt verae et secundae duae sunt falsae. Et tamen hoc non obstante Philosophus accipit aliquando actum exercitum pro actu signato et aliquando e converso, et ita faciunt multi alii. Et hoc facit multos incidere in errores.	For example, in saying ‘animal is predicated of man’, animal is not predicated here of man, for in that proposition ‘animal’ is in subject position, and is not predicated, and therefore is a designated one. And saying ‘animal is predicated of man’ is not the same as saying ‘a man is an animal’, for the one is multiple and the other not, just as saying that ‘genus’ is predicated of the common term ‘man’ is not the same as saying that the common term ‘man’ is a genus. Nor is saying ‘genus is predicated of species’ or ‘the utterance “animal” is predicated of the utterance “man”’ the same as saying ‘a species is a genus’ or ‘the utterance “man” is the utterance “animal”’. For the first two are true and the second two are false. And yet, notwithstanding this, the Philosopher sometimes takes the exercised act for the designated act, and sometimes conversely, and so do many others. This makes many fall into error.
(15) Et ita est in proposito. Nam ista propositio 'homo est primo risibilis', accipiendo 'primo' sicut accipit Philosophus I Posteriorum , est ita falsa sicut ista 'species est genus', sed tamen actus signatus, in cuius loco ponitur, est simpliciter verus. Sicut haec est vera 'de homine praedicatur primo hoc praedicatum 'risibile '; et in isto actu signato tam 'homo' quam 'risibile' supponit simpliciter pro intentione animae, nam de hac intentione animae praedicatur primo 'risibile', non tamen pro se sed pro singularibus. Et debet iste actus sic exerceri 'omnis homo est risibilis, et nihil aliud ab homine est risibile'; et ita in isto actu signato 'homo' supponit simpliciter et pro intentione.	And so it is in this case. For the proposition ‘man is the first thing capable of laughter’ (understanding ‘first’ as the Philosopher takes it in Posterior Analytics I ) is as false as is ‘a species is a genus’. But nevertheless, the designated act in whose place it is put, is absolutely true. For example, ‘the predicate “capable of laughter” is first predicated of man’ is true, and in this designated act both ‘man’ and ‘capable of laughter’ supposit simply for the intention of the soul. For of this intention of the soul “capable of laughter” is first predicated, not for itself but for its singulars. This designated act should be exercised as ‘every man is capable of laughter and nothing other than a man is capable of laughter’, and so in the designated act ‘man’ supposits absolutely, and for an intention.
Sed in actu exercito correspondente 'homo' supponit personaliter et pro rebus singularibus, quia nulla res potest ridere nisi res singularis. Et ideo in actu signato bene ponitur hoc incomplexum 'primo', sed in actu exercito correspondente non debet poni 'primo'. Et quia 'primo' dicit idem quod praedicari de aliquo universaliter et de nullo nisi de quo illud praedicatur, ideo tali actui signato debent correspondere duo actus exerciti.	But in the corresponding exercised act, ‘man’ supposits personally and for singular things, for no thing is able to laugh except a singular thing. And therefore, in the designated act the non-complex ‘first’ occurs well, but in the corresponding exercised act ‘first’ should not occur. And because ‘first’ means the same as being predicated universally of something, and of nothing except what it is predicated of, therefore two exercised acts should correspond to such a designated act.
(16) Sic est de ista 'sonus est primum obiectum et adequatum auditus'. Nam falsa est de virtute sermonis, quia aut 'sonus' supponit pro re singulari aut pro re communi; si pro re singulari, tunc est falsa, quia quaelibet singularis est falsa; si pro re communi, tunc adhuc est falsa, quia secundum istos nulla res communis apprehenditur a sensu, et ideo est simpliciter falsa de virtute sermonis.	So it is for ‘sound is the first and adequate object of hearing’. For it is literally false, because ‘sound’ either supposits for a singular thing or for a common thing. If for a singular thing, then it is false because each singular is false. If for a common thing, then it is still false because, according to these persons, no common thing is apprehended by sense. Therefore, it is absolutely false, understood literally.
(17) Tamen forte secundum communiter loquentes et bene intelligentes per istam intelligitur unus actus signatus, et est iste 'de sono praedicatur primo esse apprehensibile ab auditu', quia de hoc communi praedicatur primo tale praedicatum. Non tamen pro se sed pro singularibus, quia in tali propositione ubi subicitur hoc commune 'sonus' et praedicatur hoc praedicatum 'apprehensibile a potentia auditiva', 'sonus' non supponit pro se et simpliciter, sed supponit pro singularibus.	Yet perhaps, among those speaking in the common way and among those understanding correctly, a designated act is understood by the proposition ‘of sound there is first predicated being apprehensible by hearing’, for that predicate is first predicated of this common term ‘sound’, yet not for itself but for its singulars, for in such a proposition, where the common term ‘sound’ is subject and the predicate ‘apprehensible by a power of hearing’ is predicated, ‘sound’ does not supposit for itself and simply but rather supposits for singulars.
Sicut in ista 'omnis sonus est apprehensibilis a potentia auditiva' subicitur hoc commune 'sonus', et tamen non pro se sed pro singularibus. Et ita in actu signato 'sonus' supponit simpliciter et pro intentione animae, sed in actu exercito utroque supponit personaliter et pro singularibus, hoc est pro suis significatis.	For example, in ‘every sound is apprehensible by an auditive power’, the common term ‘sound’ is subject, and yet not for itself but rather for singulars. And so in the designated act ‘sound’ supposits simply and for the intention of the soul, but in the exercised act both supposit personally and for singulars - that is, for their significates.
(18) Exemplum de praedictis est manifestum in theologia. Nam haec est vera 'substantia intellectualis completa, non dependens ad aliud suppositum, est primo persona' eadem ratione qua ista est vera 'homo est primo risibilis', quia eadem ratio est de una et de alia. Tunc quaero: aut subiectum istius propositionis supponit personaliter et pro singularibus, et tunc est falsa, quia quaelibet singularis est falsa; patet inductive. Aut supponit simpliciter et pro forma communi, et tunc est falsa, quia nulla forma communis, nec primo nec non primo, est persona, quia omni communi - etiam secundum eos - repugnat ratio personae.	An example of what was said above is manifest in theology. For ‘a complete intellectual substance that does not depend on another suppositum is first a person’ is true for the same reason that ‘man is the first thing capable of laughter’ is true, for one has the same nature [ratio] as the other. Then I ask whether the subject of this proposition supposits personally and for singulars, and then it is false, because each singular is false, which is clear by example. Or does it supposit simply and for a common form, and then it is false, because no common form is - either first or not first - a person. For - even for them - the nature of a person is repugnant to every common entity.
(19) Idem est de istis 'singulare est primo unum numero', 'individuum primo distinguitur a communi', et sic de multis talibus, quae falsae sunt de virtute sermonis, et tamen actus signati correspondentes sunt veri.	It is the same for ‘The singular is first one in number’, ‘The individual is first distinguished from the common’, and so for many such propositions that are false, literally speaking, and yet the corresponding designated acts are true.
Ideo dicendum est, sicut prius, quod suppositio simplex est quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, quae est communis per praedicationem pluribus, aliquando autem est propria uni. Et huius ratio est quia nihil est a parte rei quin sit simpliciter singulare.	Therefore it should be said, just as before, that simple supposition is when a term supposits for an intention of the soul, which is common to several things by predication, but sometimes is proper to on. And the reason of this is that nothing is on the side of reality unless it is absolutely singular.
(20) Unde error istorum omnium qui credebant aliquid esse in re praeter singulare et quod humanitas, quae est distincta a singularibus, est aliquid in individuis et de essentia eorum, induxit eos in istos errores et multos alios logicales. Hoc tamen ad logicum non pertinet considerare, sicut dicit Porphyrius in prologo, sed logicus tantum habet dicere quod suppositio simplex non est pro suo significato; sed quando terminus est communis habet dicere quod suppositio simplex est pro aliquo communi suis significatis. Utrum autem illud commune sit in re vel non, ad eum non pertinet.	Hence the error of all those who believed there is something in reality besides the singular, and that humanity, which is distinct from singulars, is something in individuals and belongs to their essence, led them into these and many other logical errors. But it does not pertain to the logician to consider this, just as Porphyry says in [his] prologue, but rather the logician only has to say that simple supposition is not for its significate. But when the term is a common one, he has to say that simple supposition is for something common to its significates. But whether that common thing is something in reality or not, does not pertain to him.
(21) Ad tertium dicendum est quod vox praedicatur de voce et similiter intentio de intentione, non tamen pro se sed pro re. Et ideo per talem propositionem 'homo est animal', quamvis vox praedicetur de voce vel intentio de intentione, non denotatur quod una vox sit alia vel quod una intentio sit alia, sed denotatur quod illud pro quo stat vel supponit subiectum sit illud pro quo stat vel supponit praedicatum.	To the third argument, it must be said that an utterance is predicated of an utterance, and similarly an intention of an intention, although not for itself but for a thing. Therefore, by a proposition such as ‘a man is an animal’, although an utterance is predicated of an utterance or an intention of an intention, it is not denoted that the one utterance is the other, or that the one intention is the other, but rather it is denoted that what the subject stands or supposits for is what the predicate stands or supposits for.
(22) Si autem adhuc obiciatur contra praedicta quod haec est vera 'piper venditur hic et Romae', et tamen nulla singularis est vera. Et non est vera nisi secundum quod 'piper' supponit simpliciter; et non pro intentione; igitur suppositio simplex non est pro intentione.	But if it is still objected against what was said above that ‘pepper is sold here and at Rome’ is true, and yet no singular is true, it is not true except according as ‘pepper’ supposits simply, and it does not supposit for an intention. Therefore, simple supposition is not for an intention.
(23) Dicendum quod ista propositio si sit de copulato extremo est simpliciter falsa, quia quaelibet singularis est falsa. Etiam secundum quod habet suppositionem simplicem est falsa, quia nullus vult emere illud commune 'piper', sive sit in re extra sive in anima, sed quilibet intendit emere aliquam rem singularem quam non habet.	It must be said that the proposition is absolutely false if it has a coupled extreme, because each singular is false. It is also false according as it has simple supposition, because no one wants to buy the common pepper, whether that is in external reality or in the soul, but rather everyone means to buy some singular thing which they do not have.
(24) Sed illa propositio vera est si sit copulativa, scilicet ista 'piper venditur hic et piper venditur Romae', quia ambae partes sunt verae pro diversis singularibus. Unde non plus est ista vera 'piper venditur hic et Romae' quam ista 'piper singulare venditur hic et Romae'.	But the proposition is true if it is copulative, namely, “pepper is sold here and pepper is sold at Rome”, for both parts are true for diverse singulars. Hence ‘pepper is sold here and at Rome’ is no more true than ‘A singular pepper is sold here and at Rome’.