Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 65

 

Latin	English
[CAP. 65. QUANDO TERMINUS IN PROPOSITIONE HABERE POTEST SUPPOSITIONEM PERSONALEM, SIMPLICEM VEL MATERIALEM]	[Chapter 65. When a term in a proposition can have personal, simple or material supposition]
(1) Notandum est etiam quod semper terminus, in quacumque propositione ponatur, potest habere suppositionem personalem, nisi ex voluntate utentium arctetur ad aliam, sicut terminus aequivocus in quacumque propositione potest supponere pro quolibet suo significato nisi ex voluntate utentium arctetur ad certum significatum. Sed terminus non in omni propositione potest habere suppositionem simplicem vel materialem, sed tunc tantum quando terminus talis comparatur alteri extremo quod respicit intentionem animae vel vocem vel scriptum.	It should also be noted that a term, in whatever proposition it occurs, can always have personal supposition unless it is restricted to another by the wish of users, just as an equivocal term can supposit in any proposition for any significate, unless it is restricted to a definite significate by the wish of users. But a term cannot have simple supposition or material in every proposition, but only when such a term is compared to another extreme that relates to an intention of the soul or to an utterance or writing.
(2) Verbi gratia in ista propositione 'homo currit' li homo non potest habere suppositionem simplicem vel materialem, quia 'currere' non respicit intentionem animae nec vocem nec scripturam. Sed in ista propositione 'homo est species', quia 'species' significat intentionem animae ideo potest habere suppositionem simplicem.	For example, in the proposition ‘A man runs’, [the word] ‘man’ cannot have simple or material supposition, for ‘to run’ does not relate to an intention of the soul or to an utterance or writing. But in the proposition ‘Man is a species’, because ‘species’ signifies an intention of the soul, therefore it can have simple supposition.
Et est propositio distinguenda penes tertium modum aequivocationis, eo quod subiectum potest habere suppositionem simplicem vel personalem. Primo modo est propositio vera, quia tunc denotatur quod una intentio animae sive conceptus sit species, et hoc est verum. Secundo modo est propositio simpliciter falsa, quia tunc denotatur quod aliqua res significata per hominem sit species, quod est manifeste falsum.	And the proposition should be distinguished according to the third mode of equivocation, as the subject can have simple or personal supposition. In the first way the proposition is true, because then it is denoted that one concept or intention of the soul is a species, and that is true. In the second way, the proposition is absolutely false, for then it is denoted that some thing signified by ‘man’ is a species, which is manifestly false.
(3) Eodem modo sunt tales distinguendae 'homo praedicatur de pluribus', 'risibile est passio hominis', 'risibile praedicatur primo de homine'. Et sunt istae distinguendae tam a parte subiecti quam a parte praedicati. Similiter ista propositio est distinguenda 'animal rationale est definitio hominis', quia si habeat suppositionem simplicem est vera, si personalem est falsa. Et sic de multis talibus, sicut de istis 'sapientia est attributum Dei', 'creativum est passio Dei', 'bonitas et sapientia sunt attributa divina', 'bonitas praedicatur de Deo', 'innascibilitas est proprietas Patris' et huiusmodi.	In the same way the propositions ‘man is predicated of several things’, ‘being capable of laughter is an affection of man’, ‘being capable of laughter is predicated first of man’ should be distinguished. Anf they should be distinguished on the side of the subject as well as on the side of the predicate. Similarly, 'rational animal is the definition of man’ should be distinguished, For if it has simple supposition, it is true; if personal, it is false. And so too for many such cases, for example, ‘wisdom is an attribute of God’, ‘to create is an attribute of God’, ‘goodness and wisdom are divine attributes’, ‘goodness is predicated of God’, ‘unbegottenness is a property of the Father’, and suchlike.
(4) Similiter quando terminus comparatur ad aliquod extremum, respiciens vocem vel scripturam, est propositio distinguenda, eo quod talis terminus potest habere suppositionem personalem vel materialem. Et isto modo sunt istae distinguendae 'Socrates est nomen', 'homo est vox disyllaba', 'paternitas significat proprietatem Patris'.	Similarly, when a term is compared against some extreme that relates to an utterance or writing, the proposition should be distinguished as such a term can have personal or material supposition. And in this way, ‘Socrates is a name’, ‘man is a monosyllabic utterance’, ‘Paternity signifies a property of the Father’ should be distinguished.
Nam si paternitas supponat materialiter, sic haec est vera 'paternitas significat proprietatem Patris', quia hoc nomen 'paternitas' significat proprietatem Patris; si autem supponat personaliter, sic est falsa, quia paternitas est proprietas Patris vel est ipse Pater. Et isto modo sunt istae distinguendae 'animal rationale significat quidditatem hominis', 'rationale significat partem hominis', 'homo albus significat aggregatum per accidens', 'homo albus est terminus compositus', et sic de multis talibus.	For if ‘paternity’ supposits materially, then ‘paternity signifies a property of the Father’ is true, for the name ‘paternity’ signifies a property of the Father. But if it supposits personally, it is false, because paternity is either a property of the Father or is the Father himself. In this way, ‘rational animal signifies the quiddity of man’, ‘rational signifies a part of man’, ‘white man signifies an aggregate per accidens’, ‘white man is a composite term’, and so on for many such cases, have to be distinguished.
(5) Potest igitur dari ista regula quod quando terminus potens habere praedictam triplicem suppositionem comparatur extremo, communi incomplexis vel complexis, sive prolatis sive scriptis, semper terminus potest habere suppositionem materialem vel personalem; et est talis propositio distinguenda.	Therefore, the rule can be given, that when a term able to have the above threefold supposition is compared to an extreme which is common to non-complex or complex expressions, whether spoken or written, the term can always have material or personal supposition and such a proposition should be distinguished.
Quando vero comparatur extremo significanti intentionem animae, est distinguenda, eo quod potest habere suppositionem simplicem vel personalem. Quando autem comparatur extremo communi omnibus praedictis, tunc est distinguenda, eo quod potest habere suppositionem personalem, simplicem vel materialem.	But when it is matched with an extreme signifying an intention of the soul, it should be distinguished so far as it can have simple or personal supposition. And when it is matched with an extreme common to all the above, then it should be distinguished sofar as it can have personal, simple or material supposition.
Et sic est haec distinguenda 'homo praedicatur de pluribus', quia si 'homo' habeat suppositionem personalem, est falsa, quia tunc denotatur quod aliqua res significata per hunc terminum 'homo' praedicatur de pluribus. Si habeat suppositionem simplicem vel materialem, sive pro voce sive pro scripto, est vera, quia tam intentio communis quam vox quam illud quod scribitur praedicatur de pluribus.	Thus ‘man is predicated of several things’ should be distinguished. For if ‘man’ has personal supposition, it is false, because then it is denoted that some thing signified by the term ‘man’ is predicated of several things. If it has simple supposition (or material supposition for an utterance or for writing) it is true, because the common intention (as well as the utterance and what is written down) is predicated of several things.