Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 7

Latin	English
[CAP. 7. INQUIRIT PER RATIONEM UTRUM HUIUSMODI NOMINA CONCRETA ET ABSTRACTA 'HOMO' ET 'HUMANITAS' 'ANIMAL' ET 'ANIMALITAS' ET HUIUSMODI SINT NOMINA SYNONYMA]	[Chapter 7. We enquire by argument whether concrete and abstract names of this sort (‘man’ and ‘humanity’, ‘animal’ and ‘animality’ and the like) are synonymous names]
Quia dictum est esse de intentione Aristotelis et Commentatoris sui 'hominem' et 'humanitatem' esse nomina synonyma , aliquantulum a principali proposito disgrediendo, quomodo verum sit et quomodo non, et an secundum veritatem sint synonyma, declarare curabo. Unde dico quod Aristoteles opinabatur quod nulla res imaginabilis importatur per hoc nomen 'homo' quin eodem modo importetur per hoc nomen 'humanitas' et e converso. Cuius ratio est quia secundum eum nulla res est hic inferius nisi materia et forma vel compositum vel accidens; sed nullum istorum, sicut inductive patet, plus importatur per unum istorum nominum quam per reliquum. Et hoc supposito patet quod haec sit falsa 'anima intellectiva est humanitas'.	Because it was said that the intention of Aristotle and his Commentator was that ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ are synonymous names, I will try (digressing a little from the main subject ) to clarify how it is true and how not, and whether they are in truth synonymous. Hence I say that Aristotle’s opinion was that no imaginable thing is conveyed by the name ‘man’, unless it is conveyed by the name ‘humanity’ in the same way, and conversely. The reason of this is that according to him no thing exists in the world below except material and form, or composite or accident. But none of these, as is clear by example [inductive] is more conveyed by one of these names than by the other. And assuming this, it is clear that ‘an intellective soul is a humanity’ is false.
Nec valet cavillatio aliquorum dicentium quod 'humanitas' significat tantum naturam specificam, 'homo' autem addit, ultra, differentiam individualem, quia hoc inferius ostendetur esse falsum et contra intentionem Aristotelis . Et ad principale propositum sufficiat nunc adducere unicam rationem.	Nor are the cavils of those valid who say that ‘humanity’ signifies only a specific nature, but ‘man’ adds beyond that an individual differentia, because this will be shown below to be false and against the intention of Aristotle. And to the main thesis it suffices now to cite a single line of argument.
Unde sic arguo. Sicut se habent ad invicem 'homo' et 'humanitas', sic se habent 'Socrates' et 'Socrateitas'. Hanc enim ponunt adversarii consimiliter fingentes tale abstractum de hoc nomine 'Socrates' sicut de hoc nomine 'homo'. Sed 'Socrates' nullam rem, nec distinctam formaliter nec realiter, significat quin significetur per hoc nomen 'Socrateitas', secundum sic fingentes, nec e converso; ergo 'homo' non significat aliquam rem quae non significetur per hoc nomen 'humanitas', nec e converso.	Therefore I argue as follows. Just as ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ stand to one another, so ‘Socrates’ and ‘Socrateity’. For the adversaries similarly suppose this, in making up an abstract name of this sort of ‘Socrates’, just as for the name ‘man’. But ‘Socrates’ signifies no thing, nor anything distinct, formally or in reality, unless it is signified by the name ‘Socrateity’, according to those contriving this, nor conversely. Therefore ‘man’ does not signify any thing which is not signified by the name ‘humanity’, nor conversely.
Probatio assumpti: quia si alterum istorum nominum 'Socrates' et 'Socrateitas' significat aliquid quod non significatur per reliquum, vel est natura specifica, et manifestum est quod illa aequaliter significatur per utrumque vel per neutrum; vel est materia vel forma vel compositum vel accidens, quae omnia sic dicentes negant; vel est differentia individualis illa quam ponunt, quod dici non potest ab eis.	Proof of the assumption. For if either of the names ‘Socrates’ and ‘Socrateity’ signifies something that is not signified by the other, either this is a specific nature, and it is manifest that it is equally signified by both or by neither; or it is material or form or a composite or an accident, which all those saying those deny. Or it is an individual differentia that they are proposing, which cannot be said by them.
Nam, secundum eos, Socrates addit ultra naturam specificam differentiam individualem et similiter socrateitas addit ultra naturam specificam differentiam individualem, quia aliter Socrateitas nullo modo differret ab humanitate, et per consequens, secundum modum eorum arguendi, sicut humanitas est in Platone ita socrateitas esset in Platone.	For, according to them, Socrates adds beyond a nature, a specific individual differentia, and similarly Socrateity adds, beyond a nature, a specific individual differentia, for otherwise Socrateity would in no way differ from humanity, and as a consequence, according to their manner of arguing, just as humanity is in Plato, so Socrateity would be in Plato.
Relinquitur igitur quod nihil a parte rei possunt ponere significari per hoc nomen Socrates quin eodem modo significetur per hoc nomen 'Socrateitas', nec e converso, et per consequens 'Socrates' et 'Socrateitas' nullo modo distinguuntur a parte rei.	Therefore it remains that nothing on the side of reality can be given to be signified by the name ‘Socrates’, unless it is signified in the same way by the name ‘Socrateity’, nor conversely, and as a consequence ‘Socrates’ and ‘Socrateity’ are in no way distinguished on the side of reality.
Et per consequens oportet eos concedere quod haec est vera 'Socrates est Sorteitas' , ex qua sequitur quod Socrates est haec humanitas demonstrando sorteitatem. Et per consequens 'Socrates est humanitas' , ab inferiori ad superius [sine distributione] a parte praedicati, et sequitur 'Socrates est humanitas, igitur homo est humanitas'. Et si hoc, nihil significatur per hoc nomen 'homo' quin significetur per hoc nomen 'humanitas' nec e converso.	And in consequence they must concede that ‘Socrates is Socrateity’ is true, from which it follows that Socrates is this humanity (pointing to Socrateity). And as a consequence, ‘Socrates is humanity’, by argument from inferior to superior [without distribution] on the side of the predicate, and ‘Socrates is humanity, therefore a man is humanity’ follows. And if so, nothing is signified by the name ‘man’ unless signified by the name ‘humanity’, nor conversely.
Ex quibus omnibus sequitur quod, secundum viam Aristotelis, nihil significatur per hoc nomen 'homo' quin significetur per hoc nomen 'humanitas' et e converso. Et hoc dico esse de intentione eius, et ideo vel concederet istam de virtute sermonis 'homo est humanitas' vel negaret eam solum propter aliquod syncategorema aequivalenter inclusum in altero istorum nominum, sicut inferius ostendetur.	From all of these things it follows that, according to the way of Aristotle, nothing is signified by the name ‘man’ unless it is signified by the name ‘humanity’, and conversely. And I say that this is his intention, and so he would concede the literal truth of ‘a man is humanity’, or he would deny it only on account of some syncategorema equivalently included in one of those names, as will be shown below.
Sed quamvis haec fuerit intentio Aristotelis, tamen secundum veritatem theologorum non est sic dicendum. Non enim ista nomina sunt synonyma 'homo' et 'humanitas', quamvis concederetur quod neutrum istorum aliquod syncategorema aequivalenter includeret. Immo ista nomina possunt pro distinctis rebus supponere et aliquam rem significat vel consignificat unum nomen quam reliquum nomen nullo modo significat.	But although this was the intention of Aristotle, still, according to the truth of theologians, it should not be said this way. For the names ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ are not synonymous, although it was conceded that neither of those equivalently included some syncategorematic element. Indeed, these names can supposit for distinct things, and one name signifies or co-signifies some thing which the other name in no way signifies.
Nam hoc nomen 'homo' vere supponit pro Filio Dei, et ideo Filium Dei significat vel aliquo modo importat, hoc autem nomen 'humanitas' non supponit pro Filio Dei nec aliquo modo Filium Dei significat, non plus quam hoc nomen 'albedo'. Propter quod ista est concedenda 'Filius Dei est homo', haec autem falsa est `Filius Dei est humanitas'. Et ita, cum non quidlibet quod per unum istorum importatur, eodem modo importetur per reliquum, non sunt synonyma.	For the name ‘man’ truly supposits for the son of God, and therefore signifies the son of God, or conveys him in some way. But the name ‘humanity’ does not supposit for the son of God, nor does it signify the son of God in some way, any more than the name ‘whiteness’. Because of this the proposition ‘the son of God is a man’ is to be conceded, but ‘the son of God is humanity’ is false. And so, since not everything that is conveyed by one is conveyed in the same way by the other, they are not synonymous.
Qualiter autem ista nomina non omnino idem significant, videri faciliter potest si definitiones exprimentes quid nominis eorum inspiciantur. Hoc enim nomen' humanitas' nihil significat nisi naturam unam compositam ex corpore et anima intellectiva, non connotando quod ista natura sustentetur ab aliquo supposito, puta a persona divina nec quod non sustentetur, et ideo semper pro illa natura supponit. Propter quod numquam potest supponere pro Filio Dei, cum Filius Dei non possit esse illa natura.	And how these names do not entirely signify the same can easily be seen if their nominal definitions are examined. For the name ‘humanity’ signifies nothing except a single nature composed from body and intellective soul, not by connoting that this nature is sustained by some suppositum, for example by the divine person, nor that it is not sustained, and therefore it always supposits for that nature. Because of this, it can never supposit for the son of God, since the son of God could not be that nature.
Hoc autem nomen 'homo' significat illam naturam, dando intelligere illam naturam esse per se subsistentem et non sustentatam ab alio supposito vel esse sustentatam ab alio. Unde definitione exprimente quid nominis posset sic definiri, homo est natura composita ex corpore et anima intellectiva, a nullo supposito sustentata, vel est aliquod suppositum talem naturam compositam ex corpore et anima intellectiva sustentans. De quolibet enim homine ista descriptio pro altera parte verificatur. Nam haec est vera 'Socrates est natura composita ex corpore et anima intellectiva, non sustentata ab alio supposito, quamvis haec sit falsa de virtute sermonis 'Socrates est suppositum sustentans talem naturam'.	But the name ‘man’ signifies that nature, by giving to understand that nature to be per se subsistent, and not sustained by another suppositum, or sustained by another. Therefore the nominal definition could be defined thus: ‘a man is a nature composed from body and intellective soul, sustained by no suppositum, or is some suppositum sustaining such a nature composed from body and intellective soul’. For that description is verified of any man in one way or another [pro altera parte]. For ‘Socrates is a nature composed from body and intellective soul, not sustained by another suppositum’ although ‘Socrates is a suppositum sustaining such a nature’ is literally false.
Quod enim haec sit falsa, patet: quia si Socrates sit suppositum sustentans talem naturam, quaero, pro quo supponit hoc nomen 'Socrates' ? Si pro illa natura, igitur illa natura est sustentans talem naturam; quod falsum est, quia ipsa non sustentat se ipsam. Si supponit pro aliquo alio ab illa natura, hoc est impossibile, quia vel supponit pro parte illius naturae, vel pro aliqua substantia disparata ab illa natura, vel pro uno composito ex illa natura et aliquo alio; quorum quodlibet est de se falsum, et ex dicendis inferius satis apparebit falsitas ipsius. Et si dicatur quod Socrates supponit pro uno composito ex natura et differentia individuali, quod compositum sustentat naturam, hoc non valet, quia sicut inferius ostendetur, nullum est tale compositum.	For it is clear that it is false, for if Socrates is a suppositum sustaining such a nature, I ask what the name ‘Socrates’ supposits for? If for that nature, then that nature is sustaining such a nature. Which is false, because that [nature] does not sustain itself. If it supposits for something other than that nature, that is impossible, because it either supposits for part of that nature, or from some substance disparate from that nature, or from a single thing composed from that nature and something else – of which any of them is of itself false, and from what are to be said below the falsity of that will become apparent enough. And if it is said that ‘Socrates’ supposits for a single thing composed out of nature and individual differentia, and that this composite sustains the nature, this is not valid, for just as will be shown below, there is no such composite.
Similiter, hoc dato non evaditur ratio, nam si Socrates sustentat naturam, oportet quod aliquam naturam individuam sustentet. Sed nullam naturam individuam sustentat, quia quaelibet natura individua includit talem differentiam, secundum istos, et ita unum compositum ex natura et differentia individuali sustentaret unum compositum ex natura et differentia individuali, quod est absurdum.	Similarly, the reasoning is not evaded with this granted, for if Socrates sustains a nature, he has to sustain some individual nature. But he sustains no individual differentia, for every individual nature includes such a differentia, according to those persons, and so a single composite from nature and individual differentia would sustain a single composite out of nature and individual differentia, which is absurd.
Nec valet dicere quod subiectum in ista 'Socrates sustentat naturam humanam' supponit pro uno composito ex natura singulari et negatione dependentiae ad aliud suppositum; tum quia tunc Socrates esset compositus ex affirmatione et negatione, quod est absurdum, cum nihil reale substantiale possit componi ex talibus, tum quia nullum tale compositum potest sustentare naturam, cum natura non possit ad tale compositum dependere.	Nor is it valid to say that the subject in ‘Socrates sustains a human nature’ supposits for one thing composed from a singular nature and from the negation of dependency on another suppositum, both because (i) Socrates would then be composed from affirmation and negation, which is absurd, since no real substantial thing could be composed from such things, and (ii) because no such composite can sustain a nature, since a nature could not depend on such a composite.
Relinquitur igitur quod haec est falsa de virtute sermonis 'Socrates est suppositum sustentans naturam humanam'; haec tamen est vera 'Socrates est natura composita ex corpore et anima intellectiva, a nullo sustentata', et propter hoc est homo. Haec autem 'Filius Dei est homo' non est vera quia Filius Dei sit talis natura composita ex corpore et anima intellectiva, sed quia Filius Dei est suppositum sustentans talem naturam et terminans dependentiam eius.	Therefore it remains that ‘Socrates is a suppositum sustaining a human nature’ is literally false. But ‘Socrates is a nature composed from body and intellective soul, sustained by no [suppositum]’ is true – and because of this, he is a man. But ‘the son of God is a man’ is not true because the son of God is such a nature composed from body and intellective soul, but rather because the son of God is a suppositum sustaining such a nature and terminating its dependency.
Ex praedictis possunt elici diversae conclusiones. Una, quod quamvis haec concederetur 'homo est humanitas', haec tamen est falsa 'omnis homo est humanitas', immo haec esset vera 'aliquis homo non est humanitas'. Si enim neutrum istorum nominum 'homo', 'humanitas' includeret aliquod syncategorema aequivalenter, haec esset concedenda 'homo est humanitas', quia hic homo esset humanitas, demonstrando Socratem, quia non posset dari quod subiectum et praedicatum pro distinctis supponerent sed pro eadem re; et per consequens propositio esset vera si nullum syncategorema nec aliqua determinatio aequivalenter includeretur.	From what has been said, diverse conclusions can be drawn. One, that although ‘a man is humanity’ were conceded, nevertheless ‘every man is a humanity’ is false. Indeed, ‘some man is not a humanity’ would be true. For if neither of the names ‘man’, ‘humanity’ included some syncategorematic term equivalently, ‘a man is humanity’ would be conceded, because this man would be a humanity (pointing to Socrates), because it could not be allowed that the subject and predicate supposited for distinct things, but for the same thing, and as a consequence the proposition would be true if no syncategorematic term nor some determination were equivalently included.
Hoc tamen concesso haec esset falsa 'omnis homo est humanitas', quia haberet unam singularem falsam, scilicet istam 'hic homo est humanitas', demonstrando Filium Dei. Et ita istae duae starent simul pro diversis singularibus 'homo est humanitas', 'homo non est humanitas'. Et qui vellet istud concedere, deberet consequenter dicere quod aliquando abstractum praedicatur de concreto et e converso.	Nevertheless, with this conceded, ‘every man is a humanity’ would be false, because it would have one singular false, namely ‘this man is a humanity’ – pointing to the son of God. And so the two propositions ‘a man is a humanity’ and ‘a man is not a humanity’ would be consistent together, for diverse singulars. And one who wished to concede this, ought consequently to say that sometimes an abstract is predicated of a concrete, and conversely.
Et non tantum hoc, immo deberet dicere quod abstractum affirmatur et negatur vere de concreto particulariter sumpto et e converso, quamvis non universaliter sumpto nisi forte successive. Oporteret etiam concedere quod tale concretum de eodem vere affirmatur et negatur successive. Unde haec nunc est vera 'haec humanitas est homo', demonstrando humanitatem quae est Socrates, secundum istam opinionem.	And not only this, but indeed they ought to say that an abstract name is affirmed and denied truly of a concrete name, taken in a particular way, and conversely, although not taken in a universal way (unless perhaps successively). Also they would have to concede that such a concrete name is affirmed and denied of the same thing successively. Therefore ‘this humanity is a man’ is now true – pointing to a humanity which is Socrates – according to this opinion.
Et si ista humanitas assumeretur a Verbo vel ab alia persona divina, haec esset falsa 'haec humanitas est homo', et hoc quia hoc nomen 'homo' numquam supponit pro illa re, scilicet pro illa humanitate nisi quando non est unita. Et ideo quia aliquando potest esse unita et aliquando non unita, ideo aliquando supponit pro ea et aliquando non.	And if this humanity were assumed by the Word, or by another divine person, the proposition ‘this humanity is a man’ would be false, and this is because the name ‘man’ never supposits for that thing (namely for that humanity) except when it is not thus united. And therefore because it can sometimes be united and sometimes not united, therefore it sometimes supposits for it, sometimes not.
Et ideo aliquando concretum praedicatur de abstracto et aliquando non, et similiter e converso. Alia conclusio potest colligi ex praedictis, videlicet quod omnis propositio composita ex tali concreto et abstracto, vel aliquo aequivalenti tali concreto, per quam ratione verbi vel alicuius determinationis additae denotantur illa pro quibus stant subiectum et praedicatum esse distincta, falsa est si sit universalis; et hoc dum aliqua natura talis non est assumpta.	And therefore sometimes a concrete name is predicated of an abstract name and sometimes not – and similarly conversely. Another conclusion can be gathered from what was said above, namely that every proposition composed from such a concrete and such an abstract name, or from something equivalent to such a concrete name, through which (by reason of the verb or of some added determination) what the subject and predicate stand for are denoted to be distinct, is false if it is universal. And this is as long as some such nature is not assumed.
Cuius ratio est quia talia concreta et abstracta non supponunt pro distinctis rebus nisi ratione personae divinae sustentantis naturam humanam in Christo. Hoc patet, quia si sic, oporteret quod unum supponeret pro parte et aliud pro toto, vel illa duo pro duabus partibus, vel pro duabus substantiis totaliter distinctis, vel unum pro substantia et aliud pro accidente; quorum quodlibet manifestum est esse falsum. Non igitur supponunt pro distinctis rebus nisi quando unum illorum supponit pro persona divina. Ex quo sequitur quod propositio denotans illa esse distincta falsa est.	The reason of this is that such concrete and abstract names do not supposit for distinct things, except because of the divine person sustaining human nature in Christ. This is clear, because if so, it would have to be that on would supposit for a part, the other for the whole, or those two for two parts, or for two substances totally distinct, or one for a substance and the other for an accident – any of which is manifestly false. Therefore they do not supposit for distinct things unless when one of them supposits for the divine person. From this, it follows that a proposition denoting those to be distinct, is false.
Ex quo sequitur quod omnes tales propositiones de virtute sermonis, hoc est secundum proprietatem sermonis, falsae sunt 'omnis homo habet humanitatem', 'omnis humanitas est in homine', 'omne animal habet animalitatem' et huiusmodi. Et hoc, quia cum nihil habeat se nec aliquid sit in se, et per tales propositiones denotatur quod illud pro quo supponit subiectum habet illud pro quo supponit praedicatum, vel illud pro quo supponit subiectum est in illo pro quo supponit praedicatum, et hoc est falsum, cum subiectum et praedicatum supponant pro eodem, manifestum est quod tales propositiones sunt falsae.	From this, it follows that all such propositions as ‘every man has humanity’, ‘every humanity is in man’, ‘every animal has animality’ and suchlike are literally (i.e. in propriety of speech) false. And this is because, since nothing has itself, nor is anything in itself - and because it is denoted by such propositions that what the subject supposits for has what the predicate supposits for, or that what the subject supposits for is in what the predicate supposits for (which is false, since the subject and the predicate supposit for the same thing) - it is manifest that such propositions are false.
Unde sicut secundum Anselmum, Monologion, cap.16, non proprie dicitur quod summa natura, scilicet Deus, habet iustitiam, sed proprie dicitur quod summa natura est iustitia, ita non proprie dicitur quod iste homo, demonstrando Sortem, habet humanitatem, sed proprie dicitur quod est humanitas.	Therefore, just as (according to Anselm, Monologion c. 16) is is not proper to say that the highest nature, namely God, has justice, but rather it is proper to say that the highest nature is justice, so it is not proper to say that this man – pointing to Socrates – has humanity, but it is proper to say that ‘this is humanity’.
Et ideo sicut tales propositiones recipiuntur et usitantur a Sanctis 'Deus habet iustitiam', 'Deus habet sapientiam, bonitatem, intelligentiam', 'in Deo est sapientia' et huiusmodi, quae tamen secundum proprietatem sermonis verae non sunt, secundum Anselmum, ita tales conceduntur 'homo habet humanitatem', 'humanitas est in Sorte' et huiusmodi, quae tamen secundum proprietatem sermonis verae non sunt.	And therefore such propositions as ‘God has justice’, ‘God has wisdom, goodness and understanding’, ‘in God there is wisdom’ and suchlike, are received and used by holy men. Nevertheless, according to propriety of speech they are not true, according to Anselm, thus such propositions as ‘a man has humanity’, ‘humanity is in Socrates’ and suchlike, are conceded, which nevertheless are not true according to propriety of speech.
Ex isto sequitur ulterius quod tales propositiones de virtute sermonis falsae sunt 'humanitas subsistit in supposito proprio', 'humanitas dependet a supposito proprio', 'proprium suppositum terminat dependentiam naturae', sed magis posset concedi quod humanitas est suppositum.	From this, it follows further that such propositions as ‘a humanity subsists in a proper suppositum’, ‘a humanity depends on a proper suppositum’, ‘a proper suppositum terminates the dependency of a nature’ are literally false. But it could more be conceded that a humanity is a suppositum.
Unde sciendum quod nisi aliquod syncategorema impediat istam praedicationem ‘humanitas est suppositum', debet concedi absolute. Verumtamen humanitas non esset suppositum, hoc concesso, nisi quando non esset unita. Si enim esset unita, statim desineret esse suppositum. Et ideo hoc nomen 'suppositum' connotat quod non sit unita, ut haec sit definitio exprimens quid nominis 'suppositum', vel aequivalens ei: suppositum est res completa, una et non plures, a nullo supposito sustentata.	Therefore it should be known that unless some syncategorema prevents the predication ‘humanity is a suppositum’, it ought to be conceded absolutely. Yet humanity would not be a suppositum, with this conceded, unless when it were not united. For if it were united, it would immediately cease to be a suppositum. And therefore the name ‘suppositum’ connotes that it is not united, as this is the nominal definition of the name ‘suppositum’, or equivalent to it. A suppositum is a perfect thing, one and not several, not sustained by any suppositum.
Ita quod loco istius nominis 'suppositum' licitum sit ponere totam istam orationem et e converso, quando sumuntur significative. Quo facto facile est videre quae propositiones debent negari et quae concedi.	So that in place of the name ‘suppositum’, it is permissible to put that whole expression, and conversely, when they are taken significatively. With this done, it is easy to see which propositions ought to be denied, and which conceded.