Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 8

Latin	English
[CAP. 8. DE NOMINIBUS ABSTRACTIS QUAE AEQUIVALENTER ALIQUA SYNCATEGOREMATA VEL ALIQUAS DETERMINATIONES ADVERBIALES COINCLUDUNT]	[Chapter 8. Of abstract names which equivalently include some syncategoremata or some adverbial determinations]
Pertractatis quibusdam quae principali proposito impertinentia videbantur, necessaria tamen, ad intentum redeundo de alio modo nominum concretorum et abstractorum tractabitur, ex quo aliqua quae praedicta sunt patefieri possunt.	Now that we have dealt with certain matters that did not seem pertinent to our main thesis, but necessary nevertheless, we shall return to our intention and deal with another mode of concrete and abstract names, of which some things said above can be made clear.
Sunt enim quaedam nomina abstracta, vel esse possunt ad placitum instituentium, quae aequivalenter aliqua syncategoremata vel aliquas determinationes adverbiales, vel alias, includant, ita quod abstractum in significando aequivaleat concreto vel alteri termino sumpto cum aliquo syncategoremate vel aliqua alia dictione vel dictionibus.	For there are certain abstract names, or there can be at the pleasure of those instituting names, which equivalently include some syncategoremata or some adverbial determinations or some other determinations, so that the abstract name is equivalent in signifying to the concrete name, or to another term taken with some syncategorema or some other expression or expressions.
Possunt enim utentes, si voluerint, uti una dictione loco plurium, sicut loco istius totius 'omnis homo' possem uti hac dictione a et loco istius totius 'tantum homo' possem uti hoc vocabulo b, et sic de aliis. Et si ita esset, possibile esset quod concretum et abstractum non supponerent pro distinctis rebus nec significarent distinctas res, et tamen quod praedicatio unius de altero esset falsa et quod aliquid praedicaretur de uno et non de alio. Si enim istud abstractum 'humanitas' aequivaleret in significando isti toti 'hoino secundum quod homo' vel 'homo in quantum homo', haec esset vera 'homo currit' et haec falsa 'humanitas currit', sicut ista est falsa 'homo in quantum homo currit'.	For users can, if they wished, use one expression in place of several. For example, in place of the whole expression ‘every man’, I could use the word ‘a’, and in place of the whole expression ‘only man’, I could use the consonant ‘b’, and so on. And if it were so, it would be possible that a concrete name and the abstract name would not supposit for distinct things nor signify distinct things, and it would be possible that the predication of one of the other would be false, and that something would be predicated of one and not the other. For if that abstract name ‘humanity’ were equivalent in signifying to the whole ‘man according as he is a man’ or ‘man insofar as he is a man’, ‘A man runs’ would be true, and ‘A humanity runs’ [would be] false, just as ‘A man insofar as he is a man runs’ is false.
Similiter si hoc nomen 'humanitas' aequivaleret isti toti 'homo necessario', ita quod haec dictio 'humanitas' poneretur loco istius totius 'homo necessario', haec esset falsa 'humanitas est homo' sicut haec est falsa 'homo necessario est homo', nam nullus homo necessario est homo, sed contingenter tantum; et eodem modo haec esset falsa 'humanitas est alba' sicut ista est falsa 'homo necessario est albus'.	Similarly, if the name ‘humanity’ were equivalent to the whole expression ‘man necessarily’, so that the word ‘humanity’ were put in place of the whole ‘man necessarily’, ‘a humanity is a man’ would be false, just as ‘a man necessarily is a man’ is false. For no man is necessarily a man, but contingently only. And in the same way, ‘A humanity is white’ would be false, just as ‘A man necessarily is white’ is false.
Et per talem modum potest salvari ubicumque placet quod concretum et abstractum non significant distinctas res nec pro distinctis rebus supponunt, et tamen praedicatio unius de alio est simpliciter falsa, et quod aliquid praedicatur de uno quod non praedicatur de reliquo. Et sic possent aliqui dicere quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, et tamen quod quaelibet talis est falsa 'substantia est quantitas, 'qualitas est quantitas'.	In this way, whenever you like, you can keep it so that a concrete name and the corresponding abstract name do not signify distinct things nor supposit for distinct things, and nevertheless the predication of one of the other is absolutely false, and [you can keep it] that something is predicated of the one that is not predicated of the other. So some persons could say that quantity is not a thing other than substance and quality, and that still each of ‘A substance is a quantity’, ‘A quality is a quantity’ is false.
Si enim hoc nomen 'quantitas' aequivaleret isti toti in significando, vel alicui consimili, 'necessario quantum quamdiu manet in rerum natura', haec esset falsa - etiam tenendo illam opinionem - 'substantia est quantitas' sicut ista est falsa 'substantia necessario est quanta quamdiu manet in rerum natura'. Et sicut dicitur de ista, ita posset dici de multis aliis, tam in divinis quam in creaturis.	For if the name ‘quantity’ were equivalent in signifying to the whole expression ‘necessarily a quantum as long as it remains in rerum natura’, or something similar, ‘a substance is a quantity’ would be false, even holding the opinion [above], just as ‘A substance necessarily is a quantum as long as it remains in reality’ is false. And just as it is said about this example, so it could be said about many other cases, both in the divine persons and in the case of creatures.
Per aliquem enim talem modum posset salvari quod essentia divina et intellectus et voluntas nullo modo distinguuntur in Deo, et tamen haec esset vera 'Deus intelligit per intellectum' et haec falsa 'Deus intelligit per voluntatem'. Similiter posset dici quod anima nullo modo distinguitur ab intellectu et voluntate, et tamen haec esset vera 'intellectus intelligit' et non ista 'voluntas intelligit'. Et ita de multis aliis.	For by some such means one could keep it so that the divine essence and understanding and will are in no way distinguished in God, and yet ‘God understands by understanding’ would be true and ‘God understands by will’ false. Similarly, it could be said that the soul is in no way distinguished from the understanding and the will, and yet ‘The understanding understands’ would be true and not ‘The will understands’. And so for many other cases.
Unde in talibus magis reputo difficultatem vocalem, dependentem ex logica, quam realem. Propter quod nescientes logicam quaternos innumeros circa talia inutiliter replent, facientes difficultatem ubi nulla est, et deserentes difficultatem quam investigare deberent.	Therefore in such cases I judge more a verbal difficulty depending on logic rather than a real one. Because of this, persons ignorant of logic have uselessly filled up innumerable tomes on such matters, making a difficulty where there is none, and abandoning a difficulty which they ought to investigate.
Est autem advertendum quod quamvis in vulgari locutione abstracta talia, aequivalentia multis dictionibus talibus in significando, raro vel numquam locum habeant, in dictis tamen philosophorum et Sanctorum frequenter inveniuntur abstracta usitata sic accipi. Unde sic accipit Avicenna, V Metaphysicae, dicens: "Equinitas non est aliud nisi equinitas tantum; ipsa enim ex se nec est unum nec multa, nec exsistens in his sensibilibus nec in anima".	But it should be observed that although in common speech such abstract name, equivalent in signifying to many such expressions, rarely or never have a place, nevertheless in the sayings of the philosophers and saints, familiar abstract [terms] are frequently found to be taken in this way. Therefore, Avicenna (Metaphysics V) takes ‘horsehood’ in this way, saying “Horsehood is nothing other than just horsehood, for from itself it is neither one nor many, neither existing in these perceptibles nor in the soul.”
Nihil enim aliud intelligebat nisi quod equus non definitur nec per unum nec per multa, nec per esse in anima nec per esse in re extra, ita quod nullum istorum ponitur in definitione eius. Et ita volebat quod hoc nomen 'equinitas', secundum quod tunc utebatur eo, aequivaleret in significando multis dictionibus, sive simul proferantur sive mediante verbo et copula.	He was understanding nothing else than that ‘horse’ is not defined either by ‘one’ or by ‘many’, nor by ‘being in the soul’ or by ‘being in external reality’, so that none of these expressions is given in its definition. And so he was wishing that the name ‘horsehood’, according as he was then using it, would be equivalent in signifying to many words, whether they are uttered together, or with a verb and copula between.
Unde non intendebat quod equinitas esset aliqua res et tamen quod illa res realiter non esset una nec plures, nec in effectu extra animam nec in anima,- hoc enim impossibile est et absurdum - , sed intendebat quod nihil tale ponitur in definitione eius. Et quod haec sit intentio sua satis patet intuenti verba eius. Unde dicit: "Cum ipsum", supple universale, "fuerit homo vel equus, haec intentio est alia praeter intentionem universalitatis quae est humanitas vel equinitas. Definitio enim equinitatis est praeter definitionem universalitatis, nec universalitas continetur in definitione equinitatis. Equinitas enim habet definitionem quae non eget universalitate".	Thus, he did not mean that horsehood would be some thing, and nevertheless that this thing would not really be one or many, neither actually outside the soul nor in the soul, for this is impossible and absurd. But rather he meant that no such thing is given in its definition. And that this is his meaning is clear enough to anyone who looks at his words. Therefore he says, ‘Since this’ (add “universal”) ‘was man or horse, this intention is something else, beyond the intention of universality, which is humanity or horsehood. For the definition of horsehood is beyond the definition of universality. Neither is universality contained in the definition of horsehood. For horsehood has a definition that does not need universality’.
Ex istis et aliis verbis suis, quae propter brevitatem omitto, satis patet quod non plus intendit nisi quod nihil tale ponitur in definitione equi vel equinitatis. Et ita vult quod in illis verbis hoc nomen 'equinitas' aequivaleat in significando pluribus dictionibus. Aliter enim non sequeretur ista 'unum et multa et huiusmodi non ponuntur in definitione equinitatis, igitur equinitas non est una', sicut non sequitur 'album non ponitur in definitione hominis, igitur homo non est albus'.	From these and other words of his, which I omit for the sake of brevity, it is quite clear that he means no more than that no such thing occurs in the definition of ‘horse’ or ‘horsehood’. And so he wishes that in those words given above, that the name ‘horsehood’ is equivalent in signifying to many words. For otherwise “One and many and suchlike do not occur in the definition of horsehood; therefore, horsehood is not one” would not follow: just as “White does not occur in the definition of man; therefore, a man is not white” does not follow:
Per praedicta posset prohiberi, secundum unam opinionem, talis modus arguendi, qui secundum vocem videtur syllogisticus 'omnis res absoluta est substantia vel qualitas; quantitas est res absoluta; ergo quantitas est substantia vel qualitas', sicut iste modus arguendi 'omne b est a; c est b; igitur c est a' prohiberi potest ipsis vocabulis alio modo institutis.	From what has been said above, the following manner of arguing (which in verbal form appears syllogistical) could, according to one opinion, be prevented. “Every absolute thing is a substance or a quality; quantity is an absolute thing; therefore, quantity is a substance or a quality”, just as the mode of arguing: “Every B is A; C is B; therefore, C is A” can be prevented when these letters are instituted in another way.
Si enim b significet idem quod homo, et a idem quod animal, et c idem quod hoc totum 'tantum risibile', ita quod semper loco istius totius 'tantum risibile' sit licitum ponere hoc vocabulum c et e converso, tunc sicut non sequitur 'omnis homo est animal; tantum risibile est homo; igitur tantum risibile est animal', ita non sequitur 'omne b est a; c est b; ergo c est a. Et ita per modum istum nominum abstractorum possunt salvari multa dicta auctorum, quae tamen de virtute sermonis videntur esse falsa.	For if ‘B’ signified the same as ‘man’, and ‘A’ the same as ‘animal’, and ‘C’ the same as the whole expression ‘only capable of laughter’ - so that it is always allowable to put the letter ‘C’ in place of the expression ‘only capable of laughter’, and conversely - then, just as “Every man is an animal; only a thing capable of laughter is a man; therefore, only a thing capable of laughter is an animal” does not follow, so “Every B is A; C is B; therefore, C is A” does not follow. And so by means of this mode of [analyzing] abstract names, many sayings of the authorities can be preserved, although they seem literally to be false.
Non solum autem potest abstractum sic aequivalere multis dictionibus in significando, sed hoc etiam potest convenire concretis et aliis dictionibus. Sic enim concedunt in logica eruditi quod hoc signum 'totus' includit suum distribuibile, ut aequivaleat isti 'quaelibet pars', quando sumitur syncategorematice.	But not only can an abstract term be equivalent in this way to many words in signifying, but also this can also belong to concrete terms and to other expressions. For in this way those skilled in logic concede that the sign ‘whole’ includes its distributable, so that it is equivalent to saying ‘any part’ when it is taken syncategorematically.
Unde ista 'totus Socrates est minor Sorte' aequivalet isti 'quaelibet pars Sortis est minor Sorte'. Similiter, hoc signum 'quidlibet' includit suum distribuibile, ut aequivaleat isti 'omne ens'; aliter enim haec non esset intelligibilis 'quidlibet est homo vel non homo'. Sic etiam est de multis verbis, nam cum dicitur 'curro' subintelligitur pronomen primae personae, et ita hoc verbum 'curro' aequivalet sibi ipsi et pronomini. Et ita est de multis aliis, quod maxime necessarium est scire propter mentem auctorum habendam.	Therefore, ‘The whole of Socrates is less than Socrates’ is equivalent to ‘any part of Socrates is less than Socrates’. Similarly, the sign ‘anything’ includes its distributable, so that it is equivalent to ‘every being’. For otherwise ‘anything is a man or a non-man’ would not be intelligible. So it is also for many verbs. For when one says ‘I run’ [curro in Latin], the first-person pronoun is implicit. So the verb curro is equivalent to itself and the pronoun. And so it is in many other cases that it is particularly necessary to know because of the meaning of the authorities.
(10) Non solum autem aliquando una dictio aequivalet multis dictionibus in significando, sed etiam addita alteri totum resultans aequivalet composito ex pluribus, inter quae illud cui additur aliquando mutatur vel secundum casum vel secundum modum vel tempus; aliquando autem illud simpliciter in resolvendo et ultimate explicando quod importatur per illam orationem auferendum est. Unde quando dicitur 'totus Sortes est minor Sorte', si 'totus' syncategorematice accipiatur aequivalet isti 'quaelibet pars Sortis est minor Sorte', ubi loco istius recti 'Socrates' ponitur iste obliquus 'Sortis', et loco istius dictionis 'totus' ponuntur istae duae dictiones 'quaelibet pars'. Ita dicerent aliqui quod ista propositio 'generatio formae est in instanti' aequivalet isti 'una pars formae non producitur ante aliam, sed omnes simul', ubi haec copula 'est' ablata est.	Not only is one expression sometimes equivalent in signifying to many words, but also, when added to something else, the whole resulting expression is equivalent to a composite of several expressions. Among these, what is added is sometimes changed, either in case or in mood or tense. But sometimes it has to be absolutely removed by resolving and finally explicating what is conveyed by that expression. Therefore, when ‘The whole Socrates is less than Socrates’ is said, if ‘whole’ is taken syncategorematically, the proposition is equivalent to ‘Any part of Socrates is less than Socrates’, where in place of the nominative ‘Socrates’ the oblique form ‘of Socrates’ is given, and in place of the word ‘whole’ the two words ‘any part’ are given. Thus some persons would say that the proposition ‘generation of a form is in an instant’ is equivalent to ‘one part of a form is not produced before another, but rather all at once’, where the copula ‘is’ is removed.
(11) Sic possent aliqui dicere quod ista 'quantitas est res absoluta' aequivalet isti 'distantia partium et extensio, etsi non esset substantia nec qualitas, esset res absoluta si esset in rerum natura'. Et si ita esset, manifestum esset quod iste discursus non valeret 'omnis res absoluta est substantia vel qualitas; quantitas est res absoluta; ergo quantitas est substantia vel qualitas'.	Thus some persons could say that “quantity is an absolute thing’ is equivalent to ‘distance between parts, and extension, if it were not a substance or a quality, would be an absolute thing, if it were in reality”. And if it were so, it would be manifest that the discourse “every absolute thing is a substance or a quality; quantity is an absolute thing; therefore, quantity is a substance or a quality” would not be valid.
(12) Et si dicatur quod per istam viam possem impedire quemcumque syllogismum, dicendo in aliquo terminorum aliquod tale aequivalenter includi dicendum quod ad sciendum an aliquis discursus valeat, oportet praesupponere significata vocabulorum, et secundum hoc iudicandum est de discursu an sit bonus vel non. Et quia de multis terminis est certum quod secundum usum omnium nihil tale includunt aequivalenter, ideo simpliciter iuxta regulas traditas est concedendum quod syllogismus valet vel non valet.	And if it is said that by this means I could prevent any syllogism by saying that some such [syncategorema] is included in one of the terms, it must be said that, in order to know when an argument is valid, you have to presuppose the significates of the words, and according to this it is to be judged whether the discourse is good or not. And because for many terms it is certain that, according to everyone’s usage, nothing like that is equivalently included, therefore it has to be absolutely conceded that the syllogism is valid or not valid, in accordance with the traditional rules.
(13) De omni tamen discursu proposito posset logicus iudicare an valeat, resolvendo terminos in suas definitiones exprimentes quid nominis, quo facto potest per regulas certas evidenter cognoscere quid de eo est dicendum.Ad praedictum autem modum nominum abstractorum possent reduci omnia abstracta privativa et negativa et etiam omnia verbalia et multa alia, de quibus inferius perscrutabitur.	Yet for any proposed discourse, the logician could judge whether it is valid by resolving the terms into their nominal definitions. When this is done, he can recognize plainly by particular rules what is to be said about it. All privative and negative abstract terms could be reduced to the mode of abstract names mentioned above, and also all verbal names and many others, which will be examined below.
(14) Et per talem modum faciliter possent negari omnes tales propositiones 'materia est privatio', 'aer est tenebra', 'anima est peccatum' et huiusmodi. Per istum etiam modum possunt salvari tales 'Deus non facit peccatum', 'Deus non est auctor mali', et huiusmodi. Et qualiter tales consequentiae non valent 'hoc est malum; Deus facit hoc; igitur Deus facit malum', in tractatu de fallaciis ostendetur.	And by such a mode of abstract names, all propositions such as ‘Matter is a privation’, ‘Air is a shadow’, ‘A soul is a sin’ and suchlike, could easily be denied. By means of this mode too, propositions such as ‘God does not make a sin’, ‘God is not the author of evil’ and suchlike, can be kept. It will be shown in the tract on fallacies how inferences such as “This is an evil; God makes this; therefore, God makes an evil” are not valid.