Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 70

 

Latin	English
[CAP. 70. DE DIVISIONIBUS SUPPOSITIONIS PERSONALIS]	[Chapter 70. On the divisions of personal supposition]
(1) Suppositio personalis potest dividi primo in suppositionem discretam et communem. Suppositio discreta est in qua supponit nomen proprium alicuius vel pronomen demonstrativum significative sumptum; et talis suppositio reddit propositionem singularem, sicut hic 'Socrates est homo', 'iste homo est homo', et sic de aliis.	Personal supposition can first be divided into discrete and common supposition. Discrete supposition is that in which a proper name of something supposits, or a demonstrative pronoun taken significatively supposits, and such supposition gives a singular proposition. For example, ‘Socrates is a man’, ‘This man is a man’, and so on.
(2) Et si dicatur quod haec est vera 'haec herba crescit in horto meo', et tamen subiectum non habet suppositionem discretam, dicendum est quod ista propositio est falsa de virtute sermonis; sed per eam intelligitur talis propositio 'talis herba crescit in horto meo', ubi subiectum supponit determinate. Unde advertendum est quod quando aliqua propositio falsa est de virtute sermonis, sed tamen aliquem sensum verum habet, ipsa accepta in illo sensu, debent subiectum et praedicatum habere eandem suppositionem quam habent in illa quae de virtute sermonis est vera.	If it is said that ‘This herb grows in my garden’ is true, and yet the subject does not have discrete supposition, it should be said that the proposition false, literally speaking. But a proposition like ‘such a herb grows in my garden’ is understood by it, where the subject supposits determinately. Hence, it should be observed that when some proposition is false, literally speaking, but nevertheless has a sense in which it is true, when it is taken in that sense, subject and predicate ought to have the same supposition they have in the one that is literally true.
(3) Suppositio personalis communis est quando terminus communis supponit, sicut hic 'homo currit', 'omnis homo est animal'.	Common personal supposition is when a common term supposits, as in ‘a man runs’, ‘every man is an animal’.
(4) Suppositio personalis communis dividitur in suppositionem confusam et determinatam. Suppositio determinata est quando contingit descendere per aliquam disiunctivam ad singularia; sicut bene sequitur 'homo currit, igitur iste homo currit, vel ille', et sic de singulis. Et ideo dicitur suppositio determinata quia per talem suppositionem denotatur quod talis propositio sit vera pro aliqua singulari determinata; quae singularis determinata sola, sine veritate alterius singularis, sufficit ad verificandam talem propositionem. Sicut ad veritatem istius 'homo currit' requiritur quod aliqua certa singularis sit vera. Et quaelibet sufficit, etiam posito quod quaelibet alia esset falsa; tamen frequenter multae vel omnes sunt verae.	Common personal supposition is divided into confused and determinate supposition. Determinate supposition is when we can descend to singulars by some disjunction. For example, “a man runs; therefore, this man runs, or that [man runs]”, and so on, correctly follows, and therefore, supposition is called “determinate” because by such supposition it is denoted that such a proposition is true for some determinate singular. This determinate singular alone, without the truth of another singular, is enough to verify the proposition. For example, for the truth of ‘a man runs’ it is required that some definite singular be true, and any one is sufficient, even assuming that any other one would be false. Yet frequently many or all of them are true.
(5) Est igitur regula certa, quod quando sub termino communi contingit descendere ad singularia per propositionem disiunctivam, et ex qualibet singulari infertur talis propositio, tunc ille terminus habet suppositionem personalem determinatam. Et ideo in ista propositione 'homo est animal' utrumque extremum habet suppositionem determinatam, quia sequitur 'homo est animal, igitur iste homo est animal vel ille', et sic de singulis. Similiter sequitur 'iste homo est animal', quocumque demonstrato, 'igitur homo est animal'. Similiter se- quitur 'homo est animal, igitur homo est hoc animal vel illud animal vel illud', et sic de singulis. Et bene sequitur 'homo est hoc animal', quocumque animali demonstrato, 'igitur homo est animal'. Ideo tam 'homo' quam 'animal' habet suppositionem determinatam.	It is therefore a fixed rule that when we can descend to singulars under a common term by a disjunctive proposition, and from each singular such a proposition is inferred, then the term has determinate personal supposition. Therefore, in the proposition ‘a man is an animal’, both extremes have determinate supposition. For “a man is an animal; therefore, this man is an animal, or that man is an animal”, and so on, follows. Similarly “This man is an animal” - pointing to any [man] whatever - “therefore, a man is an animal” follows. Similarly, “a man is an animal; therefore, a man is this animal or [a man is] that animal or [a man is]that one”, and so on, follows. And “a man is this animal” - pointing to any animal - “therefore, a man is an animal” follows well. Therefore, both ‘man’ and ‘animal’ have determinate supposition.
(6) Suppositio personalis confusa est omnis suppositio personalis termini communis, quae non est determinata. Et illa dividitur, quia quaedam est suppositio confusa tantum et quaedam est suppositio confusa et distributiva.	Confused personal supposition is all personal supposition of a common term that is not determinate. And it is divided, because one kind is merely confused supposition, and another kind is confused and distributive supposition.
(7) Suppositio personalis confusa tantum est quando terminus communis supponit personaliter et non contingit descendere ad singularia per disiunctivam, nulla variatione facta a parte alterius extremi, sed per propositionem de disiuncto praedicato, et contingit eam inferri ex quocumque singulari. Verbi gratia in ista 'omnis homo est animal', li animal supponit confuse tantum, quia non contingit descendere sub animali ad sua contenta per disiunctivam; quia non sequitur 'omnis homo est animal, igitur omnis homo est hoc animal, vel onmis homo est illud animal, vel omnis homo est aliud animal' et sic de singulis.	Merely confused personal supposition is when a common term supposits personally and we cannot descend to singulars by a disjunction with no variation being made on the part of the other extreme, but by a proposition with a disjoint predicate, we can also infer the original proposition from any singular. For example, in ‘every man is an animal’, ‘animal’ supposits merely confusedly, because we cannot descend under ‘animal’ to the singulars contained under it by a disjunction. For “every man is an animal; therefore, every man is this animal, or every man is that animal, or every man is [that] other animal”, and so on, does not follow.
Sed bene contingit descendere ad propositionem de disiuncto praedicato ex singularibus, quia bene sequitur 'omnis homo est animal, igitur omnis homo est hoc animal vel illud', et sic de singulis; quia consequens est una categorica, composita ex hoc subiecto 'homo' et hoc praedicato 'hoc animal vel illud vel illud', et sic de singulis. Et manifestum est quod hoc praedicatum vere praedicatur de omni homine, ideo illa universalis est simpliciter vera. Et similiter ista infertur ex quolibet contento animalis, nam bene sequitur 'omnis homo est hoc animal', quocumque animali demonstrato, 'igitur omnis homo est animal'.	But we are perfectly able to descend to a proposition with a disjoint predicate of singular terms. For “every man is an animal; therefore, every man is this animal or that one or that one”, and so on, correctly follows. And it is manifest that this predicate is truly predicated of every man, therefore, that universal proposition is simply true. Similarly, the original proposition is inferred from anything contained under ‘animal’. For “every man is this animal” - pointing to any animal whatever - “therefore, every man is an animal” correctly follows.
(8) Suppositio confusa et distributiva est quando contingit aliquo modo descendere copulative, si habeat multa contenta et ex nullo uno formaliter infertur. Sicut est in ista 'omnis homo est animal', cuius subiectum supponit confuse et distributive: sequitur enim 'omnis homo est animal, igitur iste homo est animal et ille homo est animal', et sic de singulis; et non sequitur formaliter 'iste homo est animal', quocumque demonstrato, 'igitur omnis homo est animal'.	Confused and distributive supposition occurs when we can descend in some way copulatively, if the term has many things contained under it, and from no one is the original proposition formally inferred. For example, in ‘every man is an animal’, the subject supposits confusedly and distributively. For “every man is an animal; therefore, this man is an animal and that man is an animal,” and so on, follows. And “This man is an animal” - pointing to any man whatever - “therefore, every man is an animal” does not formally follow.
(9) Quod dixi 'aliquo modo contingit descendere', hoc dixi quia non semper eodem modo contingit descendere. Nam aliquando contingit descendere nulla variatione facta circa propositiones nisi quod in prima subicitur vel praedicatur terminus communis, et postea accipiuntur singularia, sicut patet in exemplo praedicto. Aliquando autem contingit descendere aliqua variatione facta, immo aliquo dempto in una propositione quod accipitur in alia, quod nec est terminus communis nec contentum sub termino communi.	When I said “we can descend in some way copulatively”, I said this because we cannot always descend in the same way. For sometimes we can descend without any variation in the propositions except that in the first one a common term is in subject or predicate position, and afterwards singulars are taken, as is clear in the above example. But sometimes we can descend only after making some change - in fact, sometimes only after removing something in the one proposition that is taken in the other, which is neither a common term nor contained under a common term.
%%Verbi gratia sic dicendo 'omnis honio praeter Sortem currit' bene contingit aliquo modo descendere ad aliqua singularia copulative; nam bene sequitur 'omnis homo praeter Sortern currit, igitur Plato currit et Cicero currit', et sic de aliis, [aliis] a Sorte. Sed in istis singularibus aliquid dimittitur quod accipiebatur in universali, quod non fuit terminus communis nec signum distribuens ipsum, scilicet dictio exceptiva cum parte extra capta. Et ita non eodem modo contingit descendere sub ista 'omnis homo praeter Sortem currit' et sub ista 'omnis homo currit', nec etiam ad omnia eadem contingit descendere.	For example, in saying ‘every man besides Socrates runs’, we can correctly descend copulatively in some way to some singulars. For “every man besides Socrates runs; therefore, Plato runs, and Cicero runs,” and so on for men other than Socrates, correctly follows. But in these singulars something is omitted that occurred in the universal, that was neither a common term nor a sign distributing it, namely, the exceptive word together with the part taken out. So we cannot descend in the same way under ‘every man besides Socrates runs’ and under ‘every man runs’, and we cannot descend to all the same things either.
(10) Prima suppositio confusa et distributiva vocatur suppositio confusa et distributiva mobilis, secunda vocatur confusa et distributiva immobilis.	The first kind of confused and distributive supposition is called “confused and distributive mobile supposition”, The second is called “confused and distributive immobile supposition”.